
Oass 
Book, 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



.?> 



THE 
BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



Xibc Centuc)5 IKlcw IClotlD Seyics 

W. F. WiLLOUGHBY, GENERAL EDITOR 



THE NEW WORLD OF SCIENCE 
Edited by Robert M. Yerkes 

POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TRAN- 
SITION 

By Charles G. Fenwick 

THE WORKERS AT WAR 

By Frank Julian Warne 

THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

By John Dickinson 



Other titles ivill be publijhed later 



Zbc Century IRcw MorlO device 

THE 
BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF LEGISLA- 
TION, ADMINISTRATION AND OPINION 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1915-1920 



BY 
JOHN DICKINSON 

LL.B. (Harvard;) Ph.D. (Princeton); sometime Charlotte Elizabeth 

Proctes fellow in Princeton University; Former 1st Lieutenant, 

U. S. A., attached to General Staff 




NEW YORK 
THE CENTURY CO. 

1922 



n' 






Copyright, 1922, by 
The Centuby C)o. 



PBINTED IN IT. 8. A. 



JUN -3 1922 
©CI.A6 744-2 8 



TO 
LINDSAY ROGERS 

COMRADE AND FRIEND 



PREFACE 

As long as a Secretary of War sits in the President's cabinet 
and as long as an Army Appropriations Act is annually passed 
by Congress, the country will be confronted with concrete 
evidence that there is need for an army policy. The developed 
practices of nations with regard to foreign relations, protection 
of citizens and interests abroad, and the maintenance of domes- 
tic order, raise inevitably the question of whether the country 
shall maintain an army, and, if so, what shall be its size and 
how it shall be constituted. From decade to decade new settle- 
ments may be reached on one policy or another, but the problem 
itself is as continuing as national life. Our naval policy seems 
at present to have reached such a periodic stage of settlement 
in consequence of the recent international conference at Wash- 
ington, but the question of land armaments has not yet been 
seriously touched. It is one of those open questions as to 
which there is a very practical need for full public information. 

In the meanwhile during the past six or seven years a fund 
of experience has accrued, and discussions, debates and inves- 
tigations have taken place, the results of which should be 
gathered up and preserved because of their important bearing 
on permanent issues as to policy. To do this is the task at- 
tempted in this book. It is written from the standpoint of no 
controversial proposals, and it advocates no simple solution of 
what is a most complicated problem. It is intended rather as a 
more or less careful study of recent experience made with a 
view of separating out the elements which are of permanent 
interest from what has been merely transient. The book is 
meant, in addition, as a study of opinion, for the reason that in 



PREFACE 

a democratic country opinion sets the limits of the feasible 
within all practicable policy must be confined. A large number 
of quotations have therefore been included from the utterances 
of members of Congress, administrative officials, military ex- 
perts and other public persons who speak for important groups 
in the country. These quotations have been gathered not 
merely for the intrinsic importance of any ideas which they ex- 
press, but for their representative character and in some in- 
stances because of the highly interesting light which they shed 
on the mental processes of an important public figure or a 
group. Not being written from the standpoint of advocacy, 
the book attempts to reproduce with fairness all important 
shades of opinion. 

Indebtedness is acknowledged to a number of valuable gov- 
ernmental compilations of recent years from which much of 
the material presented in this book has been drawn. Chief 
among these are the "Second Report of the Provost Marshal 
General" which has been heavily drawn on in Chapters IV, V 
and VI.; the report of the Chief of Staff for 1918, printed in 
the War Department's "Annual Report" for that year, which 
has supplied the basic material for Chapter VIII ; and the 
"Hearings on Army Reorganization" held by the Senate and 
House Committees on Military Affairs during the autumn of 
1920, from which most of Chapter IX has been taken. 

I have attempted in the final chapter to express the conclu- 
sions as to the essentials of a feasible American army policy as 
they appear to me to follow from what is set forth in the pre- 
ceding chapters. 

John Dickin-son 
51 East 58th Street, New York City, 

March 15, 1922 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I The Background of Our Traditional Army Policy . . 3 

II The Continental Army Plan and the National De- 
fence Act 29 

III The Selective Service Act 57 

IV One Army 85 

V Selection for Service 128 

VI A Triumph of Administration 171 

VII An Army of Human Beings 202 

VIII The Brain of the Army 247 

IX The Army Act of 1920 323 

X Essentials of American Army Policy 378 

Index 391 



The Building of an Army 



i 



The Building of an Army 

CHAPTER I 

THE BACKGROUND OF OUR TRADITIONAL ARMY POLICY 



THE purpose of this book is to tell the story of the build- 
ing of an army; to describe the process by which the 
United States, with a regular military force of but one hundred 
thousand men on April i, 19 17, succeeded by November 11, 
1918, in placing more than three million men under arms. 
More accurately, it is to tell only a part of that story ; for in a 
broad sense an account of the building of an army under 
modern conditions of organized national warfare would call for 
an account of every side of the life of the nation at war. To 
describe how the army was provided with munitions and equip- 
ment would lead into a description of the war-time organiza- 
tion of the nation's whole industrial activity; to describe how 
it was fed would raise a discussion of the war-time dislocation 
of agriculture and commerce; an account of transportation 
and shipping arrangements would be essential; all sides of 
national effort would have to be touched on, because during the 
war all converged and focused on the combat-point of the 
army. None of these matters is within the scope of this 
book. The story which will be told is simpler. It is the story 
of the procuring and assembling of the human material out of 
which the army was built, and of its fashioning into an or- 
ganized instrument of warfare. In a sense it will be also a 
story of organization, but not the whole story. Nothing, for 
instance, will be said about the arrangement and grouping of 

3 



4 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the men for purposes of a technical miHtary nature; nor about 
the machinery of organization developed for the services of 
supply. What we shall be concerned with will be only the 
broader matter of organization for purposes of general control 
and direction ; with such questions, for instance, as the relation 
of the army to one set of political authorities — the nation — 
rather than to another — the States — , and with the internal 
ojganization which had for its object the welding of the army 
as a whole into a more eflFective and cohesive unit. Within the 
limited field thus marked out, there lie a number of questions 
which, linked together, are fundamenta^l to our military policy 
in the future as in the past, and which consequently deserve at- 
tention as having an important bearing on national welfare. 

There has always been controversy as to how far a nation 
should maintain a standing army and how far it should depend 
upon levies raised for each special emergency ; whether or not 
special levies of the latter sort should be raised by conscription 
or on a volunteer basis ; and to what extent troops drawn from 
a particular locality should remain subject to the control of 
the local authorities. I mention these three questions because 
they have been especially troublesome in our own history. 
Each of our wars has raised them, ;ind it can hardly be said 
that a definite public opinion has yel crystallized with regard 
to them. Substantially the same questions present themselves 
in broader forms. What sort of military organization goes 
best with democratic government and most conforms to dem- 
ocratic ideals of individual conduct and national policy? What 
is the connection between the obligation to military service and 
civic obligation in general? What is the relation between the 
military organization of a nation and its industrial, commercial, 
and political organization? 

It is questions of this kind which arise in the field of facts 
to be covered in this book. The facts which will be dealt with 
raise such questions and tend to shed some light on them. 
The story which this book tells will not solve them; the point 
is only that, in the material we shall deal with, there is a certain 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 5 

unity which it will be well to realize at the outset in order 
to understand why some matters, rather than others, are se- 
lected for inclusion and why so much else that is interesting 
and important is omitted. Our attention will be directed to 
what may be called the political aspects, as distinguished from 
the technical military aspects, of army building. 



It is probably not generally realized how far back the move- 
ment really goes which finally culminated in the war-time 
Draft Act, It dates at least from March, 191 1. In that 
month disturbances on the Mexican border for the first time 
became critical enough to require the mobilization of American 
troops for patrol purposes. An attempt was made to organize 
a number of brigades of infantry, cavalry, and artillery into a 
manoeuver division, with results which caused the then chief 
of stafif, Major-General Leonard Wood, to write in his annual 
report that " the mobilization in Texas has brought out very 
forcibly the necessity for proper military organization and pre- 
paredness for war." ^ From that time forward the matter was 
never allowed to drop entirely from public attention. In the 
following year a scheme for a complete reorganization of the 
army was worked out by the War College and distributed as a 
public document.^^ This report called atention to the fact that 
political conditions affecting our country had changed very 
materially in the last twenty years, " and it can hardly be said 
that the development of our land forces has kept pace with 
these changing conditions. Gradually our external problems 
have been assuming larger and larger proportions. While we 
were expanding, other nations have been doing the like, and 
within the past few years it is found that practically the whole 
earth is now divided up among the principal nations. . . . Due 
to this world-wide expansion the contact between great nations 

1 War Department, "Annual Report," 1911; Vol. i, p. 157. 
i^Also printed in War Department, "Annual Report," 1912; Vol. i, 
pp. 69 flf. 



6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

and races tends to become constantly closer, due to the increase 
of population and national needs, and due especially to the 
vastly increased facilities for intercommunication. With this 
close contact thus so recently established comes a competition, 
commercial, national, and racial, whose ultimate seriousness 
current events enable us to gage. Since our conflict with Spain 
in 1898, practically all of the principal nations of the earth have 
either been actively engaged in war or else brought to the verge 
of actual war. The evidence is clear that the nations and races 
capable of maintaining and protecting themselves are the only 
ones who can flourish in the world competition." - The report 
went on to recommend that the United States, if it desired to 
maintain its position as a first-rate power, ought to put itself 
in a position to mobilize an army of at least 500,cx)0 
men immediately on the outbreak of a war. 

In 1912 troops had once more to be sent to the Mexican 
border, where they remained throughout the year 19 13. At 
the same time the Balkan Wars were going on in Europe, and 
mihtary matters were in the foreground of popular interest. 
The newspapers gave considerable attention to plans for army 
reorganization and to discussions of preparedness and unpre- 
paredness, and there was even talk in the air of compulsory 
service. In the summer of 1913 two camps were held by the 
War Department, at Gettysburg in Pennsylvania and at Mon- 
terey in California, for the military instruction of college 
undergraduates. The number of attendants at these camps 
was small, only 159 at Gettysburg and eighty-five at Monterey, 
but General Wood in his annual report declared himself satis- 
fied with the result for the reason that the young men who 
had participated and had acquired some insight into our mili- 
tary needs " would undoubtedly become nuclei of information 
in the student bodies of the various universities represented." ^ 

Meanwhile our relations with Mexico continued to grow 
more troubled. Those were the days of the Huerta regime, 

2 War Department, "Annual Report," 1912; Vol. i, p. 126. 
•War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. i, p. 191. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 7 

and of the special missions of John Lind and William Bayard 
Hale, when it seemed at times that the decision between peace 
and war hung by a thread. In November, 1913, a battle-ship 
squadron was sent to Vera Cruz, additional troops were 
moved to the border, and there were rumors that the National 
Guard would be called out. In the same month applications 
for enlistment in the Regular Army jumped to the unprece- 
dented figure of 5000, 2000 more than ever before in time of 
peace, showing the interest that was alive among the people. 
Secretary Garrison had made a two months' inspection tour of 
the army during the summer, and his proposals for reform and 
reorganization were followed with interest. Meanwhile the 
Infantry Association gave out an interview with Senator 
George D. Chamberlain, in which the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on MiHtary Affairs expressed himself as follows : 

As long as we maintain the Monroe Doctrine, retain the Philippines, 
control the Panama Canal, and dominate the Pacific, which is our 
manifest destiny, we must have an army adequate to care for these 
conditions and emergencies. There has been a great deal of general 
discussion as to the necessity of better preparation for sudden war 
emergencies, and there seems to be a quite unanimous opinion that 
at present our army is wholly inadequate. I am heartily in favor of 
such changes and improvements in the army as will meet existing 
conditions. We ought not to leave ourselves in an attitude where we 
fear the possibility of invasion by Japan on the Pacific coast, or by 
any other foreign country on our Atlantic coast, nor in apprehension 
as to what might happen to our troops in case of intervention in 
Mexico because the army is inadequate for emergencies. Little atten- 
tion has been given to National defense until the acute situation in 
Mexico has brought home to us the unprepared state of the nation to 
face a sudden war. If there should not be a peaceful termination of 
the Mexican trouble, temporary war measures and makeshifts would 
have to be adopted, as has been the case at the beginning of every 
other war in this country, all of which have been disastrous and ex- 
pensive on account of their experimental character.'* 

The upshot of this public interest was increased attention 
to military affairs on the part of Congress. A bill was passed 

*"New York Times," September 16, 1913; P- 16, column 2. 



8 T?TE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

in the House which made radical alterations in the provisions 
for raising volunteers in the event of an emergency. Another 
bill was prepared by the War Department providing for im- 
portant changes in the relation of the organized militia of the 
States to the Federal Government and the Regular Army. 
While Congress was still considering these measures there 
occurred the " Tampico incident." On April 20, 19 14, Presi- 
dent Wilson went before Congress and requested authority to 
employ the armed forces of the United States against Mexico. 
Under this influence, the Senate on the same day passed the 
Volunteer Army Bill, referred to above as having passed the 
House some months before. The entire Atlantic fleet was sent 
with a force of marines to Vera Cruz, and several days later 
the Fifth Infantry Brigade, under General Funston, followed 
to reinforce them. The country was put on the alert. The 
State governments made plans for mobilizing the National 
Guard in case its services should be needed. It required strong 
effort by the President to convince public opinion that actual 
war was not at hand. Throughout the summer the troops re- 
mained at Vera Cruz and the situation continued tense. Then 
at the beginning of August came the outbreak of the war in 
Europe. The resistless march of the German army through 
Belgium commanded the attention of every breakfast table, and 
people who had never before given the slightest attention to 
military matters traced on maps and charts the movements of 
the French army which ultimately ended in the providential 
victory of the Marne. In such a state of the public mind, the 
question of our own preparedness for war could not fail to 
come dominantly home to the minds of men everywhere. On 
December 2 the National Security League was formed, and 
an organized campaign for preparedness was on. 

3 

It is desirable to begin this book by reviewing our military 
situation as it stood at the end of 1914 and stating the reasons 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 9 

why it was generally felt that that situation left so much to 
be desired. 

The traditional policy of our Government had developed 
three sources of man-power on which to rely in time of war : 

1. The Regular Army. 

2. The National Guard, or organized militia of the several 
States. 

3. A volunteer army created dc novo to meet each particular 
emergency when it arose. 

To this system, thus constituted, there were two different 
classes of objections: (i) objections to defects in the exist- 
ing elements of the system which impeded its proper or ad- 
equate functioning, even admitting that as a system it was 
basically sound; (2) objections to the system as a whole, based 
on the theory that it was fundamentally unsound and required 
radical reformation. Each of these classes of objections will 
be glanced at briefly in turn. 



By act of February 2, 1901,^ the maximum authorized 
strength of the Regular Army was fixed at 100,619 men. 
Within this limit the figure was slightly varied by executive 
action from year to year," and after making deductions for the 
Philippine scouts and the quartermaster and the hospital corps 
it stood at 89,573 on June 30, 1913.^ Duing the decade be- 
fore the latter date, the actual strength of the army was always 
considerably below this authorized maximum. The following 
table shows actual strength for the year indicated : ^ 

'31 Statutes at Large; p. 748. 

^Authority was left in the executive to vary the size of the army 
within limits below the maximum ; ibid. 

7 War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. i, p. 221. 

8 Elxclusive of the hospital corps, and the Philippine scouts, and 
the enlisted privates of the quartermaster corps. This table is made 
up from figures presented in the annual reports of the adjutant-general. 



10 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 





Officers 


Men 


I90S 


3750 


56,064 


1907 


3750 


50,190 


1908 


41 16 


68,512 


"1909 


4366 


77,412 


I9I0 


4310 


67,459 


I9II 


4388 


70,250 


I9I2 


4470 


77,83s 


1913 


4665 


75,321 


19 14 


4572 


88,444 


I9I5 


4833 


87,877 



It thus appears that in 191 5 there was approximately one 
regular soldier in the United States army for every 11 50 in- 
habitants ; at the same time it was pointed out that the figures 
for Great Britain were one for every 205 ; Germany, one for 
every 70; France, one for every 50; Russia, one for every 190; 
Japan, one for every 230. It must also be remembered that 
of the American troops actually under arms a large number 
were on duty in the Philippines, in Alaska, and in our other 
outlying possessions, and that consequently the number avail- 
able for the defense of the continental United States proper or 
for service abroad was materially diminished. 

So that the first main objection taken to the existing military 
system as an instrument of preparedness was the small size 
of the Regular Army ; for it was to be expected that upon the 
regulars would fall the brunt of the fighting at the beginning 
of any war until the long process of organizing and equipping 
and training the volunteers had fitted the latter for eflfective 
service. Military opinion tended to the belief that it was 
mainly owing to the large proportion of regulars employed in 
our war with Spain that the war had terminated as successfully 
as it did; and for a sudden war, unexpectedly begun and 
carried to a rapid conclusion as modern wars are apt to be, 
it was argued that a greatly increased Regular Army was in- 
dispensable. 

As to the proper size for such an army, opinions diflFered 
widely, ranging all the way from the army of 500,000 recom- 



TRADITIONAL POLICY ii 

mended in the plan of the War College published in 1912 and 
mentioned earlier in this chapter,® down to the 115,000 ad- 
vocated by the " Infantry Journal " in November, 1913.^° Mr. 
Huidekoper's estimate of 250,000 represents an intermediate 
view.^^ The last-mentioned estimate was for the actual peace- 
time strength of the regular establishment to be kept at all 
times under arms and in readiness for an emergency. This 
suggests at once the second principal defect which was felt to 
exist in connection with the Regular Army — the absence of 
any adequate provision for the creation and maintenance of a 
reserve. 

This point came dominantly to the front at the time of the 
mobilization of 191 1 on the Texas border, which has already 
been referred to as supplying the initial impetus for subsequent 
interest in preparedness. It has been the practice in the Amer- 
ican army to maintain the various units of the Regular Army in 
times of peace at considerably less than half of their full war- 
time strength. The result as it stood out from the experience 
of the Texas mobilization is thus described in the report of 
the chief of staff: 

As the regiments were at peace strength when first assembled, the 
division was only a little over half the strength of a war division. 
To have brought this division up to war strength would have required 
the addition to the regiments of an excessive number of recruits, and 
imless a considerable period had been available to instruct and dis- 
cipline this new personnel, the result would have been disastrous to 
the efficiency of the regular organizations. The mobilization has em- 
phasized the fact that our regiments in peace should be kept at greater 

^ "In the light of present-day conditions it is estimated that at the 
outbreak of war with a first-class power we should be capable of 
mobilizing at once in the United States an effective force of 460,000 
mobile troops and 42,000 coast artillery; that this is the minimum of 
first-line troops necessary; and that to augment this force and replace 
its losses we should have plans made for raising immediately an 
additional force of 300,000 men." War Department, " Annual Report," 
1912; Vol. I, p. 126. 

10 "New York Times," November 3, 1913 ; p. 6, column 5. 

" *' Military Unpreparedness of the United States," ; p. 536. 



12 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

strength and it has also brought out very forcibly the necessity for a 
reserve with which to bring the regiments from mere peace strength 
to full war strength.^2 

This lack of a proper supply of reserves had been present 
in the minds of army ofificers and students of military affairs 
ever since our experience in the Spanish War, and the events 
of 191 1 convinced the War Department that the time had come 
to provide a remedy. An effort in this direction was accord- 
ingly made in the Army Appropriation Act for 1912.^^ Fol- 
lowing the example of foreign countries,^* it was felt that the 
most promising way of solving this problem was to alter the 
terms of the enlistment contract in such a way as to provide 
that a portion of every soldier's enlistment period should be 
spent with the reserves in addition to the period spent with the 
colors. Accordingly, the act in question changed the term of 
enlistment from the former term of three years, all of which 
was spent with the colors, to an enlistment term of seven 
years, four of which were to be spent with the colors and 
three in the reserve. In addition there was a provision per- 
mitting a soldier to apply voluntarily for transfer to the reserve 
at any time after three years with the colors. Commenting on 
this legislation. Secretary Stimson wrote in his next annual 
report : 

It has been our historical policy in the past to keep the regiments 
of the Regular Army in time of peace at only about half the strength 
in enlisted men required for its complement of officers. At the same 
time there is no provision made by law for filling the ranks of these 
regiments in case of war. When the Spanish War broke out, the 
efficiency of many regiments was greatly injured by throwing into 
them a large number of perfectly raw recruits, and in order to fill the 
ranks of other regiments it was necessary to consolidate two regiments 
into one. Such a system postulates the development of a reserve force 

^2 Report of chief of staff, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1911; Vol, J. pp. 156-157. 

13 37 Statutes at Large ; p. 569, Section 2, p. 590. 

1* See e. g., the "Life of H. O. Arnold-Foster," by his wife, pp. 238- 
239, for English attempts to deal with problem of creating a reserve. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 13 

of trained soldiers which, on the outbreak of war, can be called back 
from their civil occupations to bring our army up to its full strength 
and keep its ranks full during the inevitable losses of the first engage- 
ments. A reserve system is in effect in the armies of practically all 
nations of the civilized world except our own. 

Mr. Stimson then outlined the provisions of the act of 1912 
and went on to say: 

While the reserve created by this bill is far from perfect, it is in 
my opinion a long step in the right direction. The most serious defect 
in my opinion is that it creates too long a period of service with the 
colors. I believe that our experience, and the experience of nations in 
Europe, has shown that the soldier can be adequately trained for his 
duties in considerably less than three years. Thereafter economy de- 
mands that he should be transferred to the reserve as promptly as 
possible. I think our experience will gradually lead to a shortening of 
the period of training with the colors, and that by so doing we will 
greatly improve the character of the young men who will come into 
the army, while in no way diminishing the effectiveness of their mil- 
itary training.15 

Secretary Stimson's doubts as to the effectiveness of the 
provisions of the new legislation were more than borne out by 
the results. The adjutant-general reported that "approx- 
imately 21,000 men enlisted in the army betwen November i, 
1912, and August 31, 1913, and of this number sixty-one made 
application to be furloughed to the reserve at the expiration of 
three years of service, while on the date last named the reserve 
consisted of eight men." ^^ One year later the situation re- 
mained substantially the same. In his report for 1914 Sec- 
retary Garrison wrote : " We have a reserve — that is, men 
who have been trained in the army, and under the terms of 
their enlistment contract are subject to be called back to the 
colors in time of war — consisting of sixteen men." ^^ 

IS War Department, "Annual Report," 1912; Vol. i, pp. 16-17. For 
a more elaborate criticism, see report of the chief of staff, War 
Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. i, pp. 150 ff. 

^° Secretary Garrison in War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; 
Vol. I, p. 22. 

^"War Department, "Annual Report," 1914; Vol. i, p. 8. 



14 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The question of the most effective method of building up a 
really adequate reserve force occupied much of Mr. Garrison's 
attention during his tour of inspection of the army posts in 
1913, and the results of his observations were published in an 
interview in the " New York Times."^^ Mr. Garrison had 
been led to conclude that the best interests of the army would 
be served by having an enlistment term of three years, with an 
arrangement by which if a young man desired to return to 
civil life he could do so by passing an examination on military 
work and study. It was the secretary's idea to allow enlisted 
men to come up for these examinations for discharge at the 
end of twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, and thirty months of 
service. This would add, he thought, a large number of com- 
petent young men to the reserve military strength of the coun- 
try in a few years. He thought it would also draw into the 
army the sons of people of the better classes with more than 
ordinary education, give them a year or so of military train- 
ing, and send them back to civil life in plenty of time to 
continue their education and enter their professions, taking 
with them a good physical training and a capacity for executive 
work. These suggestions were never embodied in legislation, 
and Congress permitted the entire matter to rest in abeyance 
throughout the years 19 14 and 19 15. 

In addition to the problem of building up a reserve force of 
troops, there remained the equally vital matter of providing a 
reserve supply of officers. As General Leonard Wood put it 
at the time : " I invite attention to the necessity for building 
up with as little delay as practicable a reserve of officers quali- 
fied to sei^ve as company officers of reserves or volunteers. 
If we were called upon to mobilize to meet a first-class power, 
we should require immediately several thousand officers ; where 
should we get them? This is a matter of vital importance, 
and one which should be attended to at once and not left to 

18 "New York Times," September 16, 1913; p. 6, colimin 4. On June 
I, 1915, the reserve amounted to seventeen inen: Huidekoper, op. cxt.; 
p. 515- 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 15 

the rush, hurry, and confusion preceding a war."^^ It was 
with the idea of filling this need that the summer training 
camps at Gettysburg and Monterey were established, which 
have been referred to. (See above, p. 6) 

5 

The second source of military strength contemplated by our 
traditional policy was the organized militia of the States. The 
subject of the militia of the States was deemed of sufficient 
importance by the founders of our government to have two 
clauses of the Federal Constitution devoted to it. These 
clauses are as follows : " The Congress shall have power to 
provide fcr calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions ; to provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for 
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service 
of the United States; reserving to the States respectively the 
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the 
militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." ^^ 

In order to understand these provisions it must be observed 
that in its original conception the militia was primarily a local 
State force for State purposes, but a State force which, when 
need arose, could be called into the service of the Federal 
Government, and over which, for that reason, the Federal 
Government was given certain limited powers of direction and 
control. These limitations imposed by the Constitution have 
been criticized as operating throughout our history against the 
effectiveness of the militia as an element in the military strength 
of the nation as a whole. Thus while Congress may provide 
for organizing and arming the militia, and may prescribe the 
discipline for training them, their actual training according to 
the discipline so prescribed is not vested in the National Gov- 
ernment, but is reserved to the State authorities. Further- 
more, the latter are given the power to appoint the militia 

^^War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. I, p. 151. 
20 Article I, Section 8, clauses 15 and 16. 



i6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

officers ; and, most important of all, the militia can not be 
legally employed outside of the confines of the United States. 
Thus the militia have owed a sort of double allegiance to two 
separate sets of authorities, the boundaries between which 
have remained ill defined, and this separation of authority has 
thrown obstacles in the way of welding them into a uniform, 
organized, and effective force for purposes of united national 
action. 

In the period of wide-spread army reform which marked 
Secretary Root's term of office as secretary of war after the 
conclusion of the Spanish War, Congress took up the subject 
of the militia, and undertook to reform its organization to the 
fullest extent possible within the constitutional limitations. 
The result was the legislation known as the Dick Act, signed 
by President Roosevelt on January 21, 1903.-^ The principal 
object of this act was to bring up the organization, equipment, 
and discipline of the militia to the same standard as that of 
the Regular Army. For this purpose the act provided for the 
issuance of arms, ammunition, and other military supplies to 
the militia by the Federal Government; it directed regular 
inspection of the militia by officers of the United States army, 
detailed for that service by the secretary of war; it provided 
for the participation by the militia in joint manoeuvers w^ith 
detachments of the Regular Army; it required the militia to go 
through a definite amount of training of a prescribed character 
every year; and it provided that Regular Army officers might 
be detailed for service in connection with such training. 

Steps were at once taken to carry out the provisions of the 
act. During 1904 the first of a series of joint maneuvers were 
held in which the Regular Army and militia participated to- 
gether ; and more than 100,000 rifles were issued to the State 
troops together with ammunition and artillery equipment to 
take the place of the obsolete equipment which they had been 
using. The joint manoeuvers were repeated in subsequent 
years and became a settled feature of the army's program. On 
21 32 Statutes at Large ; p. 775. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 17 

the whole, so satisfactory did the results of the new policy 
appear to be at the outset that in 1905 Secretary Taft reported 
that " with few exceptions the militia now conforms to the 
organization of the Regular Army as far as practicable. While 
much remains to be accomplished as to organization, supply, 
discipline, and training of the militia before there will be any- 
thing like uniformity or a high average of efficiency, a general 
improvement was shown over conditions prevailing the year 
before, and continued improvement is confidently expected in 
consequence of the interest and pride exhibited generally by 
the State authorities." ^- 

In 1906 Congress passed an act appropriating a sum of two 
million dollars annually for the purpose of providing arms, 
stores, and equipment for the militia. This equipment was to 
remain the property of the United States and to be annually 
accounted for by the States receiving it; and no State was to 
participate in the appropriation unless the number of its militia 
was at least one hundred men for each senator and represen- 
tative.2* 

In 1908 there was an overhauling of the Dick Act in the 
light of the five years' experience which had accrued since its 
passage, and the result was the act of May 27, 1908,^* which 
governed the organization of the militia from that date forward 
until 19 16. Most of the changes brought about by the new 
act were in matters of detail and administration, but a number 
of them were of major importance. Thus the Dick Act had 
provided that the militia should not be callled into the service 
of the Federal Government for a longer period than nine 
months ; the new law enacted that " whenever the President 
calls the organized militia to be employed in the service of the 
United States he may specify in his call the period for which 
such service is required, and the militia so called shall continue 
to serve within the term so specified." The actual effectiveness 

22 War Department, "Annual Report," 1905 ; Vol. i, pp. 34-36. 
2334 Statutes at Large; p. 449. 
2*35 Statutes at Large; pp. 399-403. 



i8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of this enactment was greatly lessened, however, by the pro- 
viso that no member of the militia should be held to service 
beyond the term of his existing enlistment.^^' So with the 
provision that "on and after January 21, 1910, the organiza- 
tion, armament, and discipline of the organized militia shall be 
the same as that which is now and may hereafter be prescribed 
for the Regular Army of the United States ";^° a provision 
for enforcing which no means whatever were supplied. Lastly 
the act undertook to provide that the militia when called into 
the Federal service by the President should serve either within 
or without the territory of the United States,-^ This enact- 
ment, however desirable from the point of view of sound mili- 
tary policy, was palpably unconstitutional and was accordingly 
so pronounced by Attorney-General Wickersham when it came 
to be passed upon.^^ 

Coincident with the passage of the Act of May 2.J, 1908, 
two other measures were taken, looking toward promotion of 
greater effectiveness in the militia. The first of these was the 
creation of a national militia board, consisting of five officers of 
the organized militia appointed for a term of four years by the 
secretary of war and selected so as to represent so far as 
possible all sections of the United States. This board was to 
be called <^ogether from time to time in the discretion of the 
secretary of war for consultation respecting the condition, 
status, and needs of the whole body of the organized militia. 
The second innovation was the formation in the War Depart- 
ment of a division of militia affairs,-^ charged with the superin- 
tendence of the militia and particularly with its coordination 
with the Regular Army. This bureau afforded a means of 
keeping a closer watch than had before been possible over the 

25 Section 5. 
2° Section 3. 

27 Section 5. 

28 Opinion of the attorney-general in a letter to Secretary of War 
Stinison, printed in War Department, "Annual Report," 1912; Vol. i, 
p. 147. 

2» Organized as part of the general staff. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 19 

strength and organization of the militia, and its annual reports 
show the total strength of the militia forces in subsequent 
years to have been as follows : 

Officers Men Total 

1909 1 18,926 

1910 91SS 110,505 119,660 

1911 117,988 

1912 9142 112,210 121,352 

1913 91 10 111,162 120,273 

1914 8323 119,087 127,410 

More elaborate plans v/ere set on foot. In 1910, Secretary 
Dickinson reported : " The year has been notable in so far as 
the organized militia is concerned by the publication of a War 
Department order which, with the approval of the authorities 
of certain States, established a paper organization of combined 
regular and militia troops, organized into three military divi- 
sions, constituting a field army. This is an initial movement 
which looks ultimately toward providing a similar combination 
of regular and militia troops for the whole country suitable for 
mobilization for field operations in case of war." ^° The idea 
was that the United States should be divided into a number 
of territorial and tactical districts so that the organized militia 
of the States comprising such districts might be conveniently 
combined with the Regular Army stationed therein, into per- 
manent brigades, divisions, and corps for instruction and tacti- 
cal organization. " These various troops, both regular and 
militia, gathered together, should be permanently designated in 
name and organization with all the attendant systems which 
would be in existence in time of war. It is proposed to submit 
such a plan of organization to the governors of the States, 
asking their assent thereto, as all this system, so far as the 
National Guard is concerned, must be voluntary. Upon receiv- 
ing such assent from the governor, the War Department will 
designate in each district the exact organization, assigning the 

^0 War Department, "Annual Report," 1910; Vol. i, p. 50, 



20 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

various branches of the service to their proper brigades or 
divisions. While this will necessarily result in an incomplete 
organization, as there will be lacking in all branches certain 
organizations both in the Regular Army and in the militia, 
still it will be the first step toward carrying out this proposed 
creation. There is a shortage of various militia organizations 
to complete the proposed corps. In order to obtain these nec- 
essary organizations, the various States should be urged to 
add to their National Guard such organizations as would be 
required in such district." ^^ 

This ambitious scheme was never carried into actual opera- 
tion, and was supplanted in 1913 by another, based on pro- 
posals put forward in the report of the War College in 191 2 
on the " Organization of Land Forces." The new scheme 
contemplated the formation within the L^nited States of sixteen 
divisions at full war strength, of which four were to be 
supplied by the Regular Army and twelve by the National 
Guard. " The cooperation of the governors of the several 
States having been secured, a plan for the organization of the 
entire organized militia into military divisions has been in- 
itiated," wrote Secretary Garrison. " It remains now for the 
organized militia to complete their organizations both in num- 
ber and in strength, so as to render these divisions such in 
fact as well as in name. The War Department has issued in- 
structions calling for compliance with the militia law in the 
matter of organization. Proper organization of the organized 
militia is to be counted on as a dependable military Federal 
asset in time of national need, and the organizations existing 
as such in name only will be required to complete their com- 
ponent elements or lose Federal recognition of their character 
as such organizations." ^^ 

The governors of most of the States assented to the new 
scheme, but with two exceptions little was ever done toward 
carrying it out. The exceptions were the States of New York 

31 War Department, "Annual Report," igog; Vol. i, pp. 29-31. 
82 War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. i, pp. 3'^-i2. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 21 

and Pennsylvania, each of which was able to supply a virtually 
complete division made up of its State militia.^^ 

Meanwhile, as was bound to be the case, a certain amount 
of friction had developed between the War Department and 
certain elements in the National Guard. A National Guard 
convention was held at Chicago in October, 1913, which was 
attended by the commissioned personnel of the division of 
militia aflfairs, and many addresses were made by National 
Guardsmen voicing disagreement with the War Department's 
policy toward the militia. Situations had arisen in some of 
the States which aggravated this feeling. Thus the militia 
inspector for Arkansas reported that $54,000 worth of equip- 
ment lent by the Government to the Arkansas National Guard 
had disappeared, and no action having been taken by the State 
government within a year to make good the loss, the governor 
of Arkansas was summarily notified by the War Department 
that no further aid would be furnished by the Federal Govern- 
ment to the militia of that State.^* The total value of similar 
property shortages in nineteen States amounted to more than 
$800,000.*'' The whole matter came to a head in connection 
with the Militia Pay Bill which was prepared under the super- 
vision of Secretary Garrison for* submission to Congress 
during the winter of 1913-14. The feeling which existed in 
many quarters was reflected in an editorial in the "New York 
Times. " " The object of the Dick Act, " ran this editorial, 
" was to develop the militia into a reserve force which might be 
serviceable to the country in time of trouble. After five years, 
however, the States have not generally complied with the re- 
quirements of the Federal law. The War Department in- 
timates that if the Dick Lav/ is not complied with, the Federal 
financial support of the militia will bfe withdrawn. " ^° 

33 Huidekoper, op. cit.; p. 501. 

3* "New York Times"; November 4, 1913, p. 8, column 7. 

3^ War Department, "Annual Report," 1913; Vol. i, p. 173. 

3® Between 1903 and T917 the Federal Government disbursed 
$53,000,000 to the militia. War Department, "Annual Report," 1917; 
Vol. I, p, 853. 



22 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The Militia Pay Bill, just referred to, was prepared under 
the supervision of Secretary Garrison by the division of militia 
aflFairs of the War Department actinjr in consultation with the 
adjutants-general of thirty-two States.^*"^ It contemplated 
providing Federal pay for the enlisted men of the National 
Guard in time of peace, each enlisted man being paid one 
dollar for every drill attended, and the officers receiving a 
smaller sum. The pay was to be disbursed through the me- 
dium of the State governments. But the act had a broader 
scope. It was designed to convert the State militia into a 
force available for the use of the Federal Government abroad 
as well as for home defense. To escape the requirement of 
the Constitution that members of the State militia should not 
be called for service outside of the United States, it was pro- 
vided that those who enlisted in the militia should take two 
oaths, one covering service with the States, the other service 
abroad for the Federal Government. Thus the National Guard 
could be called into service at once upon the outbreak of a 
war, taking their place in the national army, not as State 
militia but as volunteer troops. This proposal contained the 
germs of more important subsequent legislation. The bill it- 
self was side-tracked for the time being in the excitement 
created by the Tampico incident, and the entire matter of 
militia organization remained in the unsatisfactory position 
where it was left by the failure of the policy of the Dick Act 
to achieve expected results. 



The third supply of troops contemplated in our traditional 
policy was an army of volunteers to be raised by special meas- 
ures on the actual outbreak of an emergency. The manner in 
which this policy operated in practice is shown by the example 
of the Spanish War. The Congressional resolution which 

3Ga Various proposals for Federal pay for the militia had been placed 
before Congress in 1912 by Secretary Stimson and others. War De- 
partment, "Annual Report," 1912; Vol. i, pp. 26, 150. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 23 

amounted to a declaration of war was adopted on April 19, 
1898. Three days later Congress passed an act ^^ empowering 
the President to issue a call for volunteers. This act began 
with a declaratory provision that " all able-bodied male citizens 
of the United States and persons of foreign birth who shall 
have declared their intention to become citizens of the United 
States are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, 
and, with such exceptions and under such conditions as may be 
prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty in 
the service of the United States." The act then went on to 
authorize the President to raise a Volunteer Army to be main- 
tained for the period of the war only; the term of enlistment 
was fixed at two years unless the war should sooner end; and 
it was provided that so far as practicable volunteers should be 
recruited from the various States in proportion to their popula- 
tion. All regimental and company officers were to be appointed 
by the governors of the States in which their respective organi- 
zations were raised. 

It was under the terms of this act that the 220,000 or more 
volunteers were raised who, together with some 60,000 reg- 
ulars, formed our army in the Spanish War. Two provisions 
of the act in particular gave rise to trouble and difficulty. The 
first of these was the provision fixing a definite term of enlist- 
ment, and a short term at that. The Spanish War was a 
short war; but, even so, it was found necessary to retain vol- 
unteers in the Philippines beyond the legal term of their 
service in order that the islands might not be wholly denuded 
of troops in the interval before the arrival of fresh forces. 
The error in policy which stands out in this instance is im- 
portant because it has characterized almost every similar meas- 
ure adopted at other like crises in our history. As one writer 
has expressed it : 

The policy of the United States with respect to the length of enlist- 
ments has uniformly been the incarnation of folly. Rare have been 
the occasions when they have not been for too short a term of service, 

3^30 Statutes at Large; p. 361. 



24 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

and seldom has Congress displayed the wisdom of taking advantage 
of the enthusiasm at the beginning of hostilities to prescribe that all 
enlistments shall be for the war. As a result of this failure troops 
which after long periods of training have developed into dependable 
forces have had to be discharged. The War Department has had to 
resort to innumerable shifts to extricate itself from the difficulties 
into which it was plunged by approaching or actual expiration of enlist- 
ments, and more than once our national destinies have been imperiled 
by the depletion of armies from this cause at the very time when 
troops were most imperatively needed. ^^ 

The second objection to which the Volunteer Act of 1898 
was open was in connection with its provision for the appoint- 
ment of officers in the Volunteer Army by the governors of 
the States. This provision was undoubtedly due largely to 
tradition. But the tradition has not been a happy one and has 
met with general disapproval at the hands of expert observers 
who have criticized it in the light of its results. 

A not unexpected deduction from our experiences in the Mexican 
and Civil Wars was that the efficiency of American volunteers was 
to be measured directly by the previous training, professional zeal, and 
soldierly discipline of their officers. The enlisted personnel has ever 
been of splendid natural quality, but trained officers have by no means 
been numerous. The Spanish War was no exception in this respect, 
because the same obsolete system of selection of officers (by the State 
authorities) was followed as in former wars, and naturally the same 
results followed. Such a method of selection was justified at the out- 
break of the Civil War on the ground that volunteers were militia 
and by the Constitution the appointments wore reserved to the States. 
That volunteers are not militia has now long been held. But both in 
the Civil and Spanish Wars the main reason for following the old 
system appears to have been that no better system had ever been 
carefully thought out which was acceptable to the States. In such 
emergencies as follow a declaration of war there is no time for new 
systems to be prepared. State patronage demands the appointment of 
officers regardless of qualifications, and so urgent are the necessity and 
straits of the National Government in such crises for the rapid mo- 
bilization of troops that all other considerations give way to it.^^ 

3s Huidekoper, op. cit.; p. 269. 

38 "Journal of the Military Service Institute," March-April, 1905; 
pp. 190-191. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 25 

Reference has already been made to the Volunteer Army 
Bill enacted into law on April 25, 1914, under the pressure of 
the Tampico emergency.*" This act superseded the act of 
April 22, 1898 as the fundamental law governing the raising 
of a Volunteer Army and was intended to remedy the defects 
of previous legislation. This it did in some important par- 
ticulars. Thus an alteration was made in the term of enlist- 
ment of volunteers. The new arrangement was that these 
troops should be enlisted for the same period as enlisted men in 
the Regular Army, provided, however, that the volunteers 
might be mustered out upon the termination of the emergency 
for which they had been called. Further, all officers of vol- 
unteers were to be appointed by the President, and not, as 
under previous acts, by the State authorities; and no volunteer 
officer was to be appointed above the grade of colonel. Pro- 
vision was made as in the act of i8g8 for converting units of 
organized militia into volunteer organizations so as to put them 
completely at the disposal of the National Government as units, 
and for this purpose it was enacted that whenever three-fourths 
of the minimum enlisted strength of a militia organization 
should volunteer, the organization might be incorporated as a 
unit in the volunteer forces. In this connection an effort was 
made to remedy a flagrant defect of the Militia Act of 1908. 
The latter had provided " that when the military needs of the 
Federal Government, arising from the necessity to execute the 
laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, or to repel inva- 
sion, cannot be met by the regular forces, the organized militia 
shall be called into the service of the United States in advance 
of any volunteer force which it may be determined to raise." *^ 
This provision was modified by the new act in such a way as 
to provide that " when the raising of a volunteer force shall 
have been authorized by Congress and after the organized land 
militia of any arm or class shall have been called into the mil- 
itary service of the United States, volunteers of that particular 



*0 38 Statutes at Large; p. 347. 

*^35 Statutes at Large; p. 396, Section 5. 



26 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

arm or class may be raised and accepted into said service in 
accordance with the terms of this act regardless of the extent 
to which other arms or classes of said militia shall have been 
called into such service." *- In short, whereas under the act of 
1908 no volunteers at all could be summoned for purposes for 
which the militia was available until all the militia had been 
called into service, it was now possible to summon vol- 
unteers into one branch of the service where they were needed, 
although militia organizations belonging to the other branches 
of the service which were not needed had not yet been called. 
The amendment by no means went as far as it should have 
gone, but it was a step in the right direction. The act also 
effected a number of desirable alterations in the rules cover- 
ing such matters as recruiting, promotions, and the relation 
between commissions in the Regular Army and commission*^ as 
officers of volunteers. 

7 

This brief review of legislation and governmental policy 
affecting the Regular Army, the militia, and the raising of 
volunteers during the years between the Spanish War and the 
close of 1914 has indicated the main points of controversy and 
criticism. In the Regular Army, the depletion in time of peace 
of its various units, the lack of a reserve, and the deficiency 
of officers; in the militia organization, the restricted availability 
of State militia as such for National purposes, the limited 
control over it possible to the Federal Government, and the 
almost insuperable obstacles in the way of securing uniformity 
of action among forty-eight States; in the machinery for rais- 
ing volunteers, the incubus of a bad tradition and the pos- 
sibility of confusion and conflict between the status of militia 
and volunteers — these were the matters which were pointed 
to as obvious defects in the actual arrangements at hand for 
carrying out our traditional army policy, even admitting that 
in its main outlines that policy was a sound one. 

*2 Section 3. 



TRADITIONAL POLICY 27 

But critics were not wanting who insisted on the broader 
proposition that the whole poHcy of a threefold dependence 
on Regular Army, State militia, and volunteers was in essence 
unsound. In the first place, under this policy, the ultimate 
dependence was bound to be placed upon volunteers. The 
figures for our Spanish War, quoted above, showing that 
220,000 volunteers participated as against 60,000 regulars, 
illustrates the tendency. Professional military opinion inclined 
to the conclusion that this main dependence on raw and un- 
trained troops, hastily got together and organized, was danger- 
ous, expensive, and wasteful, and had been so proved by 
repeated experiences in our history. Such troops, it was said, 
did not ev'en know how to live in camp properly, and to their 
ignorance in this respect was traced much of the illness, for 
instance, which lent such unpleasant notoriety to the Spanish 
War. Nor, as soldiers, could they become really effective and 
valuable until they had acquired some experience. Washing- 
ton's words were quoted that " to bring men to a proper degree 
of discipline is not the work of a day, a month, or even a 
year," and were followed out to his conclusion that " regular 
troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as 
well for defense as offense; and whenever a substitute, is at- 
tempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. The firmness 
requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained 
by a constant course of discipline and service." ^^ No matter 
how great the courage, self-reliance, and patriotism possessed 
by the American people as individuals, it was unreasonable to 
expect that these qualities without something more could 
suddenly transform them into soldiers capable of acting as 
organized troops in an hour of emergency; and the missing 
requisite was training, practice. In short, the basic defect 
which was felt in our existing policy of army building was, 
first, the crucially important role which it assigned to citizen 
soldiers, namely the volunteers ; and, secondly, its failure to 

*3 Letter to the president of Congress commenting on Gates's defeat 
at Camden, "Works of Washington," ed. Sparks; pp. 205-206. 



28 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

provide such training as would secure an adequate supply of 
citizen soldiers competently trained and seasoned. The great 
flaw in the policy was not merely its tailure to emphasize the 
value of training, but the fact that it virtually disregarded 
training altogether. As one critic put it : *' The crux of the 
entire question lies in the efficiency of our militia and vol- 
unteers, which can only be gaged by their training. One of 
the best National Guards in the country is that of Pennsylvania, 
yet its actual training is confined to one week in camp and 
about seventy hours of drill per annum.. At the beginning of 
hostilities this militia would furnish as good volunteers as the 
United States could hope to obtain, and how long does any 
reasonable man suppose that these troops would stand against 
the regulars of France, Germany, or Japan? How much faith 
would the officials of any corporation place in an agent or 
employee where training is limited to one week and seventy 
hours of work a year? Yet our national legislature has per- 
severed these many years in the delusion that an untrained 
citizen soldiery could not possibly jeopardize the destinies of 
the nation." "* 

** Huidekoper, op. cit.; p. 284. 



CHAPTER II 

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY PLAN AND 
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 



TIE organized campaign to arouse public sentiment on 
the subject of American unpreparedness for war was 
one of the outstanding features of the year 191 5. Carried on 
in newspapers and pamphlets and books, by speeches at ban- 
quets and addresses at public meetings, much of the effective- 
ness of the movement was due to the prominence and admitted 
public zeal of some of the leaders who put themselves at the 
head of it, as well as to the strong and effective organizations 
which were built up throughout the country to spread informa- 
tion and influence opinion. The object of the campaign was 
much broader than to effect a reform in our army system, 
though that constituted one of its important goals; it was to 
open up the whole subject of the nation's preparation for self- 
defense, the condition of the navy as well as of the army, the 
adequacy of our coast defenses, the stocks of ammunition on 
hand and the available sources of further supply, the efficiency 
of our artillery equipment as compared with that of other 
nations, and the necessity for the development of an air service. 
In accordance with this broad purpose. Congressman Gardner 
of Massachusetts, who was among the busiest advocates of 
preparedness, introduced in the House of Representatives a 
resolution calling for the appointment of a commission of in- 
quiry to look into the whole subject of our national defenses. 
In support of his resolution he made an extended statement 
before the House Committee on Military Affairs in which he 

29 



30 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

charj^ed a culpable failure on the part of the authorities to 
build up proper reserve supplies of ammunition, and to bring 
our artillery equipment into line with the most recent inven- 
tions. 

An insight into some of the considerations affecting the 
public mind and responsible for public interest in the pre- 
paredness campaign may be gotten from the speeches made 
at the meeting in New York at which the National Security 
League was formed. A hundred and fifty or more gentlemen 
met at the Hotel Belmont and adopted a resolution approving 
the commission of inquiry proposed by Congressman Gardner. 
One of the speakers pictured the ease with which Germany, 
having defeated England and desiring to invade Canada by 
way of the Hudson valley, would treat this country as she had 
treated Belgium. " It is thus not only our own loss we should 
suffer, but it would be a breach of neutrality," he pointed out, 
" if we did not succeed in preventing such an expedition. It is 
our duty to be in a position to live up to our obligations of 
neutrality ! " Another speaker alleged that the companies in 
our Regular Army had only sixty-five men as against their 
proper war-time complement of 150; that we had virtually 
no reserves; that we did not have ammunition enough for our 
field artillery to fight a single battle; that there was but one 
torpedo for each torpedo-tube in the navy; and that our de- 
fenses in the Philippines, Hawaii, and the Canal Zone were 
manned with only a fraction of their necessary strength. " We 
know that there are two nations," he concluded, " which could 
in two weeks land a force of 150,000 men each at a point on 
our coast, and a third which could land a force of that many 
men in four weeks. It would take us a month to mobilize 
130,000 soldiers, and only 30,000 of these would be regulars 
and the rest half-trained men." The National Security League, 
which was organized at this meeting, was the largest and most 
active of the various organizations working for preparedness. 
The statement of its aims and purposes as given out to the 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 31 

press by its president, S. Stanwood Menken, summarizes the 
point of view held by many advocates of preparedness : 

The National Security League has been organized by citizens who 
are convinced that the United States is not adequately prepared for 
defense. We feel that the question is one of serious import. We 
want this movement to result in initiating an inquiry capable of 
developing a scientific research into the whole broad question. Recent 
history shows that the development of the great nations is due to 
applying modern methods of organization to carry out plans arrived at 
after their best minds have, by conference and investigation, pointed 
the way. It is time we people of the United States adopted this plan 
as to all our great questions. Haphazard government cannot keep a 
nation like ours to the fore in competition with others rising under the 
modern method.^ 



Meanwhile a number of bills had been introduced in Con- 
gress at the instance of Secretary Garrison, One of these 
provided for the addition of 1000 officers to the Regular Army, 
so as to make possible the detailing of a sufficient number of 
Regular Army officers to the task of instructing the State 
militia and to other detached services without denuding the 
army itself of its proper complement of officers. Another bill 
provided for altering the period of the enlistment contract so 
as to supply a reserve. A third provided for increasing the 
statutory maximum of the Regular Army to 103,895 men ^ and 
for filling up the units to their maximum strength so as to 
bring the actual size of the army up to this figure. 

These bills were introduced by Senator Chamberlain, who 
took occasion, however, in a letter to Secretary Garrison to 
call the latter's attention to the fact that what was really 
needed was a comprehensive bill providing a general scheme 
of army reform. This feeling was wide-spread, particularly 
in the army itself, where it was felt that the reform needed 
should be in the direction of increasing the size of the Regular 

1 "New York Times," December 7, 1914; p. 4, column 4, 

2 Not including the Philippine scouts. 



32 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Army. Thus an army of 200,000 was recommended in a 
report submitted to the secretary of war by a committee of 
general staff officers. A similar increase had been recom- 
mended by General Witherspoon, the retiring chief of staff, 
a short while previously. It was probably with these recom- 
mendations in mind that Senator Chamberlain announced to the 
Senate ^ that he hoped in the following session to present 
legislation calling for a Regular Army of 250,000 men. The 
debate which this announcement instantly precipitated, and in 
particular, the speech of Senator Thomas of Colorado, is 
significant as representing another side of public opinion, which 
was being developed by the preparedness agitation as a sort 
of induced current of reaction. " He who seriously believes 
that war will come to us," said Senator Thomas, " indulges in 
idle chatter when he demands a standing army of 250,000 men 
and a reserve force of 500,000 and an occasional fort along 
our coast-line and three or four new battle-ships annually. 
Our national defense would require a fleet at least as powerful 
as those of Great Britain and France on the Atlantic and of 
Japan and Russia on the Pacific. We should have a standing 
army of 1,250,000 and a reserve of twice that many more. 
We should have a fleet upon the lakes and fortifications along 
our boundary and on our coast-lines wherever a landing force 
or a drive across the border could be made. We should keep 
in readiness of 200 aeroplanes, 250 dirigibles. 25,000 auto- 
trucks, and 10,000 motor-cycles; and we should make of the 
Almighty a tribal God." * 

This traditional American reluctance to place our main 
reliance on a regular army of professional soldiers was shared 
by many who were anxious to see the country put into a 
better state of defense. Full expression had been given to 

3 February 22, 1915. So reported in the newspapers. In the "Con- 
gressional Record," Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session; p. 4266, 
Senator Chamberlain is reported to have said 125,000 men. 

4 "Congressional Record," Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session; 
p. 4268. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 33 

it by President Wilson himself in his annual message to Con- 
gress in December, 19 14. 

"From first to last," said the President, "we have had a 
clear and settled policy with regard to military establishments. 
We never have had, and while we retain our present principles 
and ideals we never shall have, a large standing army. If 
asked, * Are you ready to defend yourselves ? ' we reply, 
* Assuredly, to the utmost' ; and yet we shall not turn America 
into a military camp. We will not ask our young men to 
spend the best years of their lives making soldiers of them- 
selves. Let us remind ourselves, therefore, of the only thing 
we can do, or will do; we must depend in every time of 
national peril, in the future as in the past, not upon a stand- 
ing army, nor yet upon a reserve army, but upon a citizenry 
trained and accustomed to arms. It will be right enough, 
right American policy, based upon our accustomed principles 
and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who 
will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with 
the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and manoeuver, 
and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should en- 
courage such training and make it a means of discipline which 
our young men will learn to value. Every means by which 
such things can be stimulated is legitimate and such a method 
smacks of true American ideas. It is right, too, that the 
National Guard of the States should be developed and strength- 
ened by every means which is not inconsistent with our ob- 
ligations to our own people or with the established policy of 
our government. More than this carries with it a reversal 
of the whole history and character of our country." ^ 

The emphasis of this passage is on two ideas — first, the 
idea of a citizen army, and second, the idea of training. Not 
a standing army of professional soldiers, but an army of 
citizens, as our main dependence in time of war; but not an 
army of citizens raw and wholly unused to arms, either, but 

5 "New York Times," December 9, 1914 ; p. 6, column 4. 



34 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

rather one fitted by practice and training to the task of de- 
fending home and country. This combination of ideas, 
presented in this form, commended itself to the more moderate 
opinion of tlie country. The idea took root, and many minds 
set about reasoning it toward some practical scheme of civic 
military training. In advocating a plan of intensive military 
training for college students, President Hibben of Princeton 
expressed the considerations lying behind this view : 

There may seem to be only two extreme policies possible for us as 
a nation, one of aggressive militarism, and the other a policy of indif- 
ference and inaction, which naturally weakens our power of defense to 
such an extent as to leave us helpless before the invasion of a foreign 
foe. The first is a policy of untold possibilities of evil and disaster; 
the second a policy of culpable short-sightedness and blind complacency. 
I do not believe, however, that we must needs commit ourselves to 
one or the other of these two extremes. There are two ways in 
which a great people such as ours may prepare for the defense of 
their country. One is a concentration of military knowledge and ex- 
perience in a large standing army, and the other is a diffusion of 
military knowledge and experience widely throughout the nation. 
What I would emphasize is the need of military strength without mil- 
itary display, a reserve power without the diminution of economic 
efficiency and the serious drain upon our resources which a large 
standing army necessitates. If we can obtain military knowledge and 
skill in a potential rather than actual form, we w-ill avoid all the 
dangers of a self-sufficient and arrogant militarism. That which cre- 
ates an aggressive war spirit is the elaboration of a war machine and 
the subordination of all other interests in the nation to it. Military 
strength, however, which is available but not visible, and therefore 
incapable of ostentatious display, will enable us to meet any critical 
emergency which may arise, and at the same time leave us free from 
domination by a military caste and a military policy. This plan of 
intensive training of our college men does not in any way tend to 
increase our standing army. It is on the contrary a most admirable 
method of decreasing it. Our actual strength in the fiel-d may be 
diminished in proportion to the increase of our potential strength in the 
growing military knowledge of our educated men.** 

This conviction, that in a democratic country the only 
ultimately safe source of military strength is in the citizen 
<5 "Nassau Literary Magazine," January, 1915. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 35 

body itself, trained and disciplined for national defense, led 
to a keen interest in the policy which other countries as 
democratic as our own, notably Switzerland and Australia, 
had developed to meet the same problem. Attention was 
called to the fact that Australia, under her recently adopted 
system of universal military training, commences the training 
of her soldiers at the age of twelve. The work is begun in 
the organization known as the junior cadets and is carried 
on in connection with education in the public and private 
schools. At fourteen every boy is subjected to a physical 
examination, which eliminates about 10 per cent., and all 
who pass this examination are promoted to the senior cadets, 
serving with this organization until the age of eighteen. The 
senior cadets, who number about 100,000, are an auxiliary 
part of the army of the Commonwealth, and subject to call 
for any duty. The young soldiers are provided with a uni- 
form and a light rifle ; their instruction consists of marching, 
musketry, drill, first aid, and sentry duty. The annual course 
includes four whole days, twelve half days, and twenty- four 
night drills. At eighteen the senior cadet passes to the citizen 
forces, with which he serves until reaching the age of twenty- 
six. A severe physical examination eliminates about 35 per 
cent. The course during the first seven years of service 
consists of sixteen days of training annually, of which eight 
are spent in camp. For artillery and engineers, twenty-five 
days are required, seventeen of these being in camp. From 
this compulsory service certain classes of the population are 
exempted, including the physically unfit, persons living in 
sparsely settled parts of the country remote from a training 
place, and school-teachers engaged in the instruction of the 
junior cadets. 

The Swiss system imposes a still more exacting duty on 
the citizen with a proportionately more thorough training. 
The constitution provides that every citizen is liable to mili- 
tary duty from the age of twenty to the age of forty-eight. 
Examinations are conducted for admittance to such duty, and 



36 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

every citizen on reaching the age of twenty is required to submit 
to these. They are both physical and mental, the latter includ- 
ing arithmetic, history, and geography, and result ordinarily in 
the elimination of about 50 per cent, of the candidates. Those 
who have been rejected are required to pay a tax, graded accord- 
ing to their incomes, for the support of the army. The military 
service of those who pass the examinations is divided into three 
periods. Between the ages of twenty and thirty-two the citizen 
serves in the elite, or citizen army proper; from thirty-two to 
forty he serves with the Landwehr and from forty to forty- 
eight with the Landstnrm. Recruits during their first year 
with the elite serve sixty-five days in the infantry, seventy-five 
days in the artillery, sixty-five days in the engineers, and ninety 
days in the cavalry. After the first year, soldiers in the, elite 
are called out every other year for service lasting from eleven 
to fourteen days. During service in the Landwehr the soldier 
is called out but once for a training period of about two weeks. 
After passing to the Landstunn there is no further military 
service except in the event of war.'^ 

Some such scheme as this for the military training of 
American citizens began to be advocated by many who were 
impressed with the need of preparedness and at the same time 
felt a democratic suspicion of the "militarism" involved 
in standing armies. General Leonard Wood, pointing out what 
he regarded as the failure of our traditional policy of volunteer 
armies raised on the spur of an emergency, definitely urged 
the adoption of the Swiss system, or something like it, by 
the United States.* Others maintained that we were faced 
with the plain alternative of choosing between a standing 
army of vastly increased size and a citizen army raised by 
conscription. But the adoption of the latter alternative even 
to such a limited extent as involved in the Swiss or Australian 

'' See Senate Document 796. Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session ; 
also "The Case for Compulsory Military Service," by G. G. Coulton, 
London, 1917; Chapter XII. 

8" New York Times," April 16. 1915; p. 14, column 2. Ibid; July 25, 
1915; Part VI, p. 3, column 1. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 37 

system still meant such a break with the whole trend of 
American policy and tradition as to be from a statesmanlike 
point of view impracticable. As Secretary Garrison put it: 

In proposing a military policy to be adopted at this time, the first 
thing to do must be to agree upon a proper basis. The subject could 
theoretically be approached without regard to existing institutions and 
sentiments. Undoubtedly this method would result in proposals that 
would be sound from a military point of view and would theoretically 
approach perfection. The necessity of making such a system prac- 
ticable, however, would require constitutional amendments, a reversal 
of existing institutions, and the changing of existing sentiments to 
such an extent as to make it a safe prediction that little if anything 
would be accomplished, and that only after the passage of a great 
length of lime. The other method of approaching the subject is one 
which recognizes existing constitutional and legal provisions, existing 
institutions and the sentiments of the people in so far as they concern 
vital portions of the system. As between the two methods of approach, 
it seems so clearly the part of wisdom to choose the one last stated as 
not to require elaboration of reason. The essential, the imperative 
thing is to make such wise military preparations, and take such wise 
precautions as are presently possible ; and this necessitates proceeding 
upon the basis of existing conditions and recognizing existing institu- 
tions and the feelings of the people concerning the general subject- 
matter.9 

In short, as the reform felt to be needed was urgent, it 
would have to be made not by way of new departure and a 
clean-cut break with the past, but with the inherited American 
army policy as a background and basis. This was the line 
to which the new policy would have to be hewn. The problem, 
then, was so to readjust the old system as to yield the thing 
felt to be imperative — such military training, namely, for 
civilians as would make available an efficient citizen army 
to reinforce the Regular Army in the event of a sudden 
emergency. Whatever materials were at hand in the existing 
system for the accomplishment of this result would have to 
be seized and utilized. Now, the instrument which the exist- 
ing system provided for the organization and training of a 

^War Department, "Annual Report," 1915; Vol. i, pp. 20-21, 



38 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

citizen force was, as we have seen, the mihtia of the several 
States. The mihtia was thus the logical basis and starting- 
point for the elaboration of a new and more effective citizen 
army; and the problem presented itself of how the transition 
could most effectively be made. That the mihtia itself was 
not an effective citizen army, and by virtue of its constitutional 
position never could be converted into one, the experience of 
the Dick Act was felt by many to have proved. The case was 
put as follows in the " Statement of Military Policy " prepared 
by the War College and submitted to the secretary of war on 
September ii, 1915: 

The minimum length of time of actual training considered necessary 
to prepare troops for war service is twelve months of 150 hours per 
month. Due to constitutional limitations Congress has not the power 
to fix and require such an amount of training for the Organized 
Militia. No force can be considered a portion of our first line whose 
control and training is so little subject to Federal authority in time 
of peace. No force should be considered a portion of our first line 
in war unless it be maintained fully organized and equipped in peace 
at practically war strength. This would exclude the Organized Militia 
from consideration for service' in the first line because of the im- 
possibility of giving in peace the training required for such function.^" 

Or, as another critic put it : 

Under the Constitution, nothing can be changed with respect to 
militia or any forces which our courts shall deem essentially such. 
Therefore, the Federal Government should stop supporting militia and 
permit the States to support and control such forces as they wish. 
It will then probably be found that small forces similar to the 
Pennsylvania constabulary will be what they will find most suitable to 
their purposes. The Federal Government should then organize forces 
under its constitutional authority to raise and support arirfies. These 
forces should be under the absolute control of the Federal Govern- 
ment, and should be organized, trained, and given proper pay. They 
should be enlisted for a term of years, and called out for such annual 
training periods as may be found necessary. This enlistment period 
might be for seven years, with training of about four weeks for the 
first year and two weeks for subsequent years. This force should 
receive a distinctive and appropriate name, free from association with 

10 War Department, "Annual Report," 1915 ; Vol. i, p. 128. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 39 

our term militia. The name of " United States Reserve " has been 
proposed for such a force. The term of "Federal Guard" is suggested 
as appropriate and free from connection with the present militia or 
Regular Army.^i 

In short, the idea was that for the existing militia, or- 
ganized and controlled by the States, and in the last analy- 
sis subject to them, there ought to be substituted a sort of 
National Militia wholly under the control of the Federal 
Government. This was the plan which was adopted by 
Secretary Garrison as the basis of his long-expected recom- 
mendations on army reform, which after careful consideration 
during the summer were put forward in his annual report to 
the President on November 15, 1915. This report, contain- 
ing the proposals which for the next few months were the 
center of a heated political discussion under the name of the 
Continental Army plan, is a document of first importance, 
not merely historically, but in connection with any considera- 
tion of national military policy in the future. 



"If the determination arrived at by those whose knowledge, 
skill, and experience makes their judgment practically conclu- 
sive is accepted, we should have in this country a force of at 
least 500,000 ^- men ready for instant response to a call in the 
event of war," wrote Secretary Garrison. "It is surely not 
necessary to state the many reasons why this force may not be 
supplied by a regidar standing army of that number constantly 
under arms. It is equally impracticable that this force should 
consist of the National Guard expanded to that number. There 
is no legal way that the National Guard can in time of peace 
be governed, officered, or trained by the National Government; 

11 Colonel E. E. Hatch in "New York Times," March 25, 1915 ; Part 
V, p. 9, column i. 

12 The number recommended in the "Statement of Proper Military 
Policy" prepared by the War College division of the general staff, 
submitted September 11, 1915. War Department, "Annual Report," 
1915; Vol. I, p. 129. 



40 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

and there is no legal way, except by volunteering, that it can be 
made available to the nation in time of war to any greater 
extent than specified in the Constitution, which confessedly falls 
short of the necessary uses to which an army may have to be 
put in the event of a war with a foreign nation, 

" It becomes necessary, therefore, to devise some method of 
making available for the use of the nation in time of war a 
national force in supplement of the Regular Army; a supple- 
mentary force, in other words, to be raised and maintained by 
Congress, and governed in all respects in accordance with its 
directions. . . . ^^ 

"It is proposed to supplement the army that is constantly 
under arms by a force of 400,000 men raised in increments of 
133,000 a year, obligated to devote a specified time to train- 
ing for a period of three years, and then to be on furlough 
for a period of three years without obligation excepting to 
return to the colors in the event of war or the imminence 
thereof. For the purpose of convenience this force has been 
designated the Continental Army. It is proposed to recruit 
it territorially according to population ; to have it subjected 
to short periods of intensive training; and in addition to 
what officers may be developed from its own operation, to 
obtain officers for it from those who have served in the 
National Guard, those who have served in the United States 
Army and are no longer upon its active list, and those who by 
training acquired in colleges and schools or in other ways 
have become equipped with sufficient military information 
and experience to make them available. It is the purpose to 
have the membership of this force assembled at convenient 
places and have there such portions of the Regular Army to 
assist in their training as are desirable and to have all the 
benefit which can be obtained from intensive training over 
such a period of time as is possible. For the purposes of the 
necessary figuring upon costs, etc., as well as for military 
reasons, the period proposed is two months. It is recognized, 

13 War Department, "Annual Report," 1915; Vol. i, pp. 22-23. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 41 

however, that with respect to this period of training and other 
features of the plan, a final wise determination can only be 
reached after the fullest interchange of views between those 
who collectively represent the wisdom, experience, and knowl- 
edge to determine these matters properly. With respect to 
pay, it is proposed^ that the officers and men shall receive pay 
on the same basis as the Regular Army for the time actually 
occupied. 

" With respect to the National Guard, it is proposed not 
only to continue the existing assistance rendered by the Fed- 
eral Government, but to increase it. . . . This body has a 
clearly defined and important part in the military system of 
the country, and it is proposed in the plan advocated to am- 
plify the Federal assistance in every way that it can be done 
constitutionally so as to make this force efficient for the 
purpose set forth in the Constitution and for the further 
purpose for which it is available in the event of war if it 
volunteers for Federal service. . . . From this outline of the 
policy proposed it will be observed that it has been framed 
in view of existing legal and other conditions. It provides 
for a standing army of minimum size to perform the necessary 
functions of such a force, including the very important one 
of training the other military forces. It provides a supple- 
m,ent to that army into which the citizens of the country who 
realize the necessity of patriotic action can go with a minimum 
of sacrifice. It continues available for all its legal purposes 
the National Guard, and provides for increasing cooperation 
therewith. It offers opportunity to the three great classes 
of the community that are considered available for military 
purposes in so far as training and preparation in time of peace 
are concerned ; namely, those who will undertake regular 
service, being constantly under arms ; those who desire to pre- 
pare themselves, but cannot take such preparations in intensive 
periods; and those who are so circumstanced that intensive 
training best meets their conditions. " ^* 

^*Ibid.; pp. 25-27 



42 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Turning to consider the possible objections that might be 
urged against these proposals, Secretary Garrison first ad- 
dressed himself to those who considered that the needs of 
national defense would be satisfied by nothing short of a 
permanent standing army of 400,000 or 500,000 men, and 
pointed out that such an army was impracticable on the score 
of cost and of the available barrack accommodations, if for 
no other reasons. " Those who continue to advocate an over- 
weighted establishment after the facts have been stated lay 
themselves open to the suspicion of being impractical if not 
insincere. Similar considerations arise with respect to the 
present adoption or adaptation of the so-called Swiss system or 
the so-called Australian system. Whatever degree of ex- 
cellence may be ascribed to either or both of said systems as 
applied to and operated in their respective spheres, it must be 
recognized that our present conditions diflFer radically there- 
from. Each of said systems requires compulsory service, and 
starts in the public schools; each calls for a large number of 
local officials whose conduct is controlled by the central 
authority. The Federal Government has no constitutional 
power to legislate with respect to the public school system of 
the States; it has no officials itself whose duties would permit 
them to do the things required to be done, and no power or 
right to require the State or local officials to do the same. 
Each locality would have to have a complete corps of such 
officials; and when the number and location of our public 
schools throughout the country are considered, some idea will 
be obtained of the magnitude of the task. These officials, 
under our system of government, would have to be Federal 
officials unless the Constitution were radically altered. In 
communities where the service of local mayors and other 
local officials can be utilized by the central government, things 
are possible which are not possible or practicable under our 
system of government. Enough has been said to demonstrate 
that to get something done now — something that is well worth 
while — the best course is to recognize and operate under exist- 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 43 

ing conditions. The other course is to imagine a vain thing 
and accomplish nothing." ^^ 

The general idea of this Continental Army plan of Secre- 
tary Garrison's at once met with wide acceptance. It was 
endorsed, for example, by the National Security League and 
in its main outlines by former Secretaries Root and Stimson. 
But opposition developed to it, as might have been expected, 
from two separate quarters. On the one hand there were 
those who felt that it did not go far enough. Among these 
the most prominent was Colonel Roosevelt, who called the plan 
" all wrong " and in the columns of the " Metropolitan Maga- 
zine " and in many public addresses carried on an emphatic cam- 
paign against it. On the other hand many others thought that 
the plan went very much too far. This group included some 
of the most influential members of the Democratic party in 
both houses of Congress. Representative Claude Kitchin, for 
example, the Democratic floor-leader in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, announced his opposition at the outset. On January 
II, after Secretary Garrison had explained his proposals in 
detail before the House Committee on Military Affairs, Chair- 
man Hay of that committee took the same position^ The opposi- 
tion of men like Representatives Hay and Kitchin was fortified 
by the development about this time of a concerted campaign 
to carry forward army reform in a different direction from that 
proposed by Mr. Garrison. The gist of this other plan was to 
provide for " nationalizing " or " federalizing " the State militia 
along the lines of the Militia Pay Bill proposed two years be- 
fore. The idea was that while the Dick Act had admittedly 
failed, it had failed not because of its fundamental policy, but 
because that policy had not been embodied with enough 
thoroughness in the detailed provisions of the legislation which 
had been enacted ; and that by extending the same policy, and 
providing against the mistakes which had been revealed by ex- 
perience, it was still possible that the country could be fur- 
nished with an adequate citizen soldiery without building up 

is/fciU; pp. 33-35. 



44 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

any new organization alongside of the National Guard or in 
substitution for it. This policy was pressed with insistence by 
influential National Guard officers, representing the National 
Guard Association, who throughout the month of January, 
1916, appeared repeatedly to present their views before the 
military committees of both houses of Congress, Their plan 
was opposed outside Congress by Mr. Root and Mr. Stimson 
and others; but the general feeling within Congress was such 
that the newspapers announced on February 7, that in any 
army bill which Congress was likely to pass the Continental 
Army plan was certain to be radically modified. Five days 
later Secretary Garrison resigned from office. 

It would be an instructive study to trace the trend of 
Congressional opinion during these months and follow the 
legislative history of the various proposals which finally 
emerged in the National Defense Act; but for such a study 
there is no room here. It is desirable, however, to outline in 
some detail the provisions of that act because at so many 
different points it supplied the basis for subsequent war legis- 
lation, and because in amended form it still remains in effect 
as the basic statute governing our current military organization. 

4 

The National Defense Act ^" which became law on June 3, 
1916, provided for four classes of troops: first, the Regular 
Army; secondly, the reorganized National Guard; thirdly, an 
" enlisted reserve corps " ; and fourthly, a volunteer army to be 
raised only in time of war. 

I. THE REGULAR ARMY. The maximum strength of the 
Regular Army was raised to approximately 298,000 men" ; 
but it was provided that in time of peace it should not exceed 
175,000. ^^ The increases were to be made in five annual in- 
crements beginning July i, 1916, and running to July I, 
1920. There were elaborate provisions for expanding each 

i«Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Statutes at Large; p. 166. 

17 This number was capable of increase by filling out the units pro- 
vided for to full war-time strength. 

18 War Department, "Annual Report," 1916; Vol. i, p. 29. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 45 

arm of the service in proper proportion with all the other arms 
and for increasing- the number of officers to keep pace with 
the increase in enlisted personnel. 

Secretary Garrison's long-continued insistence on the need 
for an alteration in the period of the enlistment contract to 
make provision for a reserve force bore fruit in some degree, 
and the provisions of the act of 191 2 were altered by the 
following section of the new act: 

Section 27. On and after the first day of November, nineteen hun- 
dred and sixteen, all enlistments in the Regular Army shall be for a 
term of seven years, the first three years to be in the active service, and 
the last four years in the Regular Army reserve hereinafter provided 
for : Provided that at the expiration of three years' continuous serv- 
ice, any soldier may be reenlisted for another period of seven years 
as above provided for, in which event he shall receive his final dis- 
charge from his prior enlistment; Provided, further, that after the ex- 
piration of one year's honorable service any enlisted man serving 
within the continental United States whose company, troop, battery, or 
detachment commander shall report him as proficient and sufficiently 
trained, may, in the discretion of the secretary of war, be furloughed 
to the Regular Army reserve, but no man so furloughed shall be elig- 
ible to reenlist in the service until the expiration of his term of seven 
years. 

This final proviso represents the total outcome of Secretary 
Garrison's recommendations,,^^ 

The large increase in the size of the Regular Army as well 
as the demand for officers to conduct the training of the State 
militia under the new provisions of the act made necessary 
some device for increasing the available supply of officers. 
To satisfy this need was the purpose of several sections of 
the act. It had already been provided that the number of 
cadets at West Point should be raised in four successive annual 
increments from 668 to 1332. ^^ But such an increase as this 
was insignificant in comparison with the requirements, and 
the National Defense Act accordingly made a new departure 
by authorizing an officers' reserve corps. The plan was to 

1^ See above ; p. 14 ; below, p. 374. 

20 Act of May 4, 1916, 39 U. S. Statutes at Large; p. 62. 



46 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

establish and maintain a trainini^-corps for reserve officers at 
various educational institutions throughout the country. By 
this means it was hoped to utilize the facilities of public and 
private educational institutions to give instruction to large 
bodies of students in the elements of military science and 
tactics. Officers of the army were detailed to many such insti- 
tutions as professors. It was pointed out that in 191 5 5200 
students in colleges who had completed courses of instruction 
under the supervision of officers were graduated from colleges, 
while the total number of students in colleges who had received 
some sort of military instruction in that year under officers of 
the army was 32,000. The total enrollment of male students in 
colleges to which it was possible to apply this sort of training 
was, however, much larger — about 170,000 — , and it was 
hoped that by an enlargement and development of the plan the 
benefit of military instruction might be given to a substantial 
portion of these students.^^ In this connection reference must 
also be made to the student summer training camps which, as 
already mentioned, had been inaugurated in 19 13 by General 
Leonard Wood. The plan had been later enlarged to permit 
the attendance of business men and had been carried forward 
year by year with increasing success. During the summer of 
1916 a series of five encampments were held at Plattsburg 
alone, besides two at Oglethorpe, one at Fort Terry, and six 
at Fort Wadsworth, all in the Eastern department, with a 
total attendance of 12,200. The success of the scheme was 
recognized in the National Defense Act, and provision was 
made for the continuance of the camps and payment of trans- 
portation and subsistence by the Federal Government for those 
who attended.-" 

The National Defense Act provided that the President 
should be authorized to commission as officers in the Reserve 
Corps, in all grades up to and including that of major, such 

21 War Department, "Annual Report," secretary of war, 1916; Vol. i, 
p. 36. 

22 Ibid.; p. 38. Act of June 3, 1916; Section 54. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 47 

citizens as on examination should be found physically, mentally, 
and morally qualified. The commission of all officers in the 
corps was to be in force for a period of five years unless sooner 
terminated in the discretion of the President; and on the ex- 
piration of their commission such officers might be recommis- 
sioned subject to such examination as the President might pre- 
scribe.-* In time of peace, reserve officers might be ordered to 
duty with troops or at field exercises, or for instruction, for 
periods not to exceed fifteen days in any one calendar year, 
and while so serving were to receive the pay and allowances of 
their respective grades in the Regular Army ^* ; but otherwise 
they were not to be subject to call in time of peace. In time of 
actual or threatened war, the President might order reserve 
officers, subject to such examinations as he might prescribe, 
to temporary duty with the Regular Army in those grades which 
could not be filled by promotion, or as officers in volunteer or 
other organizations which might be authorized by law, or as 
officers at recruit and rendezvous depots. 

One further section of that part of the National Defense 
Act which deals with the Regular Army deserves particular 
attention. It reads: 

In addition to military training, soldiers while in active service 
shall hereafter be given the opportunity to study and receive instruc- 
tion upon educational lines of such character as to increase their 
military efficiency and enable them to return to civil life better 
equipped for industrial, commercial, and general business occupa- 
tions. Civilian teachers may be employed to aid the army officers 
in giving such instruction, and part of this instruction maj'- consist 
of vocational education either in agriculture or the mechanic arts. 
The secretary of war, with the approval of the President, shall 
prescribe rules and regulations for conducting the instruction herein 
provided for, and the secretary of war shall have power at all times 
to suspend, increase, or decrease the amount of such instruction 
offered as may in his judgment be consistent with the requirements 
of military instruction and service of the soldiers.^s 

23 Section yj. 
2* Section 39. 
25 Section 27. 



48 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Commenting on this section, Secretary Baker wrote, in 
sentences instinct with the same humane vision as that which 
inspired the legislation : 

The primary purpose of the soldier when not in active operations 
is, of course, preparation for active operations ; but armies are made 
of young men, in a large number of cases a single enlistment only is 
served, and these young men with strong and vigorous bodies return 
to the commercial and industrial life of the nation often to find 
themselves at a disadvantage in securing industrial or commercial 
employment because other young men of their age have spent years 
in apprenticeship and are, therefore, more available and better trained. 
The army posts of the nation cannot suddenly be converted into 
schools. So far a system of voluntary educational opportunity has 
been offered. In some posts substantial progress has been made. 
Under the provision of the new act consistent plans can be made, and 
highly beneficial results should follow. Undoubtedly we shall come 
to a mode of army life which, while doing full justice to military drill, 
and to that physical training so necessary to give the soldier a robust 
endurance of physical hardship, will at the same time afford him an 
opportunity to acquire mental training and manual skill and round out 
his life with wholesome recreations and diversions so that member- 
ship in the military forces of the nation will have added to its 
patriotic usefulness a compensating opportunity for growth to the 
soldier and preparation for him which will make his non-military 
years useful and happy.^o 

2. THE NATIONAL GUARD. The sections of the National 
Defense Act dealing with reorganization of the State militia 
form the controversial portion of the statute. The views of 
the War Department as to what the new provisions could be 
expected to accomplish toward converting the militia into a 
really effective branch of the Federal service and toward 
remedying the defects which had previously worked against its 
usefulness were set forth in the annual report of the militia 
bureau for 1916. The chief defects in the situation existing 
under the amended Dick Act were there classified as follows: 

(i) While the Federal Government was empowered to 
establish the type of organization to which the militia was 

26 War Department, "Annual Report," secretary of war, 1916; Vol. 
I, p. 27. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 49 

required to conform, it could not require the organization of 
any unit. A State might maintain no miHtia whatever, or it 
could muster its entire force out of service after the expen- 
diture upon it of a large amount of Federal funds. As each 
State raised its own troops independently of the others, the 
composition of the organized militia as a whole was not based 
upon the requirements of army organization, and there was a 
general deficiency in the arms of service auxiliary to the in- 
fantry, such as artillery and cavalry. 

(2) No uniform qualification for the commissioning or pro- 
motion of officers could be established by the Federal Govern- 
ment. In most States the system of election of officers by the 
men was the rule. 

(3) There was a lack of uniform and efficient standards of 
physical examination. 

(4) There was no uniformity in the terms of enlistment in 
different States. 

(5) There was no proper means of insuring care of prop- 
erty lent by the Federal Government. 

(6) The periods of training provided for were insufficient 
for the development of an efficient force, and the attendance 
at drills and instruction assemblies was notoriously low. 

(7) Lastly, there was the crucial matter of a lack of Federal 
authority to order the National Guard as such beyond the 
boundaries of the United States.^'' 

What the act of June 3, 1916, did toward remedying these 
defects the militia bureau went on to summarize as follows : 

(i) In addition to the requirement of the Militia Law of 
1903 that the organization shall be the same as that prescribed 
for the Regular Army, etc., Section 60 of the National De- 
fense Act empowered the President to " prescribe the par- 
ticular unit or units, as to branch or arm of service, to be 
maintained in each State, Territory, or the District of Colum- 
bia in order to secure a force which when combined shall 
form complete higher tactical units." Section 62 further pro- 

27 War Department, "Annual Report," 1916; Vol. i, p. 938. 



50 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

vided " that new and existing units shall conform to such 
rules regarding organization, strength, and armament as the 
President may prescribe," and Section 64 that " for the purpose 
of maintaining appropriate organization the President may 
assign the National Guard of the several States to divisions, 
brigades, and other tactical units." The militia bureau felt 
that these powers as to organization were " absolutely com- 
plete," and that under them there was " no possible legal 
obstacle " to action by the War Department looking to the 
completion of the coast artillery contingent of the National 
Guard either by raising new units or by the conversion of 
existing infantry units. 

(2) A " practically complete remedy " for the difficulties 
incidental to the appointment of National Guard officers by the 
States was provided by Section 75, which enacted that " the 
provisions of this act shall not apply to any person hereafter 
appointed an officer of the National Guard unless he first 
shall have successfully passed such tests as to his phy- 
sical, moral, and professional fitness as the President shall 
prescribe." While the system of election of officers by their 
men was allowed to continue, the power granted by this section 
provided a remedy against the election of unqualified officers. 
Under Sections 74, 75, and y6 the President was empowered 
to approve or annul any commission issued by the governors 
of the several States. 

(3) The National Defense Act remedied the deficiencies of 
prior legislation by providing (Section 69) that "the quahfica- 
tions for enlistment shall be the same as those prescribed for 
admission to the Regular Army," and (Section no) that "no 
money appropriated under the provisions of this [act] shall be 
paid to any person who shall fail to qualify as to fitness for 
military service under such regulations as the secretary of war 
shall prescribe," and (Section 115) that " ever}^ officer and en- 
listed man of the National Guard who shall be called into the 
service of the United States under this act shall be examined 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 51 

as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the Presi- 
dent may prescribe." 

(4) Section 70 provided a uniform term of enlistment of 
three years in service and three years in the reserve. 

(5) As to care of Federal property, the Federal Govern- 
ment under the law of 1903 could not require a State to reim- 
burse it for Federal property lost or misappropriated. An 
attempt was made to remedy this defect in Section 87 of the 
National Defense Act, which provided that " if any State, 
Territory, or the District of Columbia shall neglect or refuse 
to pay or to cause to be paid the money equivalent of any loss, 
damage, or destruction of property charged against such State, 
Territory, or the District of Columbia by the secretary of war 
after a survey by a disinterested officer appointed as herein- 
before provided, the secretary of war is hereby authorized to 
debar such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia from 
further participation in any and all appropriations for the 
National Guard until such payment shall have been made." 
The real effectiveness of such a provision may be questioned, 
requiring as it does simply that the Federal Government shall 
deprive itself of the services of militia of the delinquent State 
instead of being vested with power to enforce its authority. 
The same criticism may be made of the enforcement pro- 
visions of the clauses respecting the organization of the militia 
into proper arm.s of service, and those touching the physical ex- 
amination of officers and men. There were no means pro- 
vided for compelling the States to conform to the regulations of 
the Federal authorities other than were involved in the power 
of the Federal Government to cut off financial aid to the militia 
of the delinquent State and thereby deprive itself of the only 
auxiliary citizen force supplied to it by the act to supplement 
the Regular Army. The states were thus virtually as free as 
before to defeat the building up of a coherent citizen force. 
This condition of affairs is inevitable in a policy which re- 
quires the Federal Government to put its reliance on troops 



52 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

whose main allegiance is to an authority over which that gov- 
ernment has no control, and serves to bring out the weakness 
of an army plan which does not embody Secretary Garrison's 
scheme of a national militia force national in character. 

(6) In order to enforce regular attendance at drills and 
assemblies for instruction, Section no of the act made pay- 
ment to enlisted men contingent upon attendance at the pre- 
scribed number of such drills and assemblies. This number 
the act set at forty-eight drills in each year together with 
fifteen days of encampment and manoeuvers. Reckoning each 
day of encampment or manoeuvers as comprising six hours of 
instruction, the total annual instruction of an enlisted man in 
the National Guard was thus equivalent to 162 hours, and 
for an enlistment of three years in active service to 486 hours. 
This training the militia bureau felt to be about half the amount 
needed properly to equip a soldier. 

(7) To get around the constitutional obstacle in the way of 
service by the militia as such outside the territorial limits of 
the country, a device was adopted which had been suggested 
in the Militia Pay Bill of two years before. Sections 70 and 
y^ of the act prescribed that all officers and men of the National 
Guard in addition to taking the usual State oath should take an 
oath to the United States, binding themselves to obey all orders 
of the President and to serve for a period of six j^ears, three 
with the reserve. The effect of this oath was to do three 
things : 

(i) To establish a uniform period of enlistment. 

(ii) To make possible the direct transfer of complete militia 
units to the Federal service without depending as heretofore on 
the voluntary enlistment of their individual members. 

(iii) To make invalid discharges granted by State author- 
ities and not in conformity with the regulations of the Federal 
Government, since the State authorities could not release a 
man from duty entered into toward the Federal Government 
without the consent of the latter. 

Under these sections of the act it ceased to be possible for 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 53 

a State at its own pleasure to muster out of service troops 
which had been organized, equipped, and trained at the expense 
of the Federal Government. 

Such are in effect some of the detailed features of the act 
designed to enlarge the area of Federal control and supervision 
of the militia. The broad purpose of the act was to build 
these troops into a citizen army forming a second line of de- 
fense behind the regulars and filling approximately the same 
place in the general army policy of the country as Secretary 
Garrison had proposed for his projected Continental Army. 
The act authorized the organization of National Guard units 
under its provisions to a maximum strength of about 440,000 
men, a figure which it was contemplated would be reached in 
eleven annual increments. ^^ Further, the act undertook to 
prohibit the maintenance by the States of other troops than 
those which should be subsidized and controlled by the Fed- 
eral Government under its terms.^^ The question of how the 
latter provision was to be interpreted gave rise subsequently to 
much doubt. The question was never directly passed on by a 
court of law, but Judge-Advocate General Crowder expressed 
his opinion that organized State militia were not troops within 
the meaning of the prohibition and that States might, there- 
fore, go on maintaining militia forces other than those sub- 
sidized and controlled by the Federal Government under the 
scheme provided by the act.^° 'B3' this interpretation, the effec- 
tiveness of the provision as a means of forcing State militia 
to come under Federal authority was seriously diminished. 

3. THE ENLISTED RESERVE CORPS. In addition to the Regular 
Army and the Federalized National Guard, the National De- 
fense Act provided further for an enlisted reserve corps. The 
purpose of this corps was to supply skilled men for the various 
technical branches of army service such as railway operatives, 

28 Section 62. War Department, "Annual Report," 1916; Vol. i, p. 27. 

29 Section 61. 

30 Testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs, April 
9, 1917; P- 63. 



54 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

telegraphers, chauffeurs, and bridge-builders, whom it was 
impracticable and uneconomical to keep in the Regular Army 
in adequate number in time of peace. It was accordingly pro- 
vided that duly qualified men of these descriptions might be 
enlisted in a reserve corps subject to be called into active 
service by the President on the outbreak or imminence of 
hostilities. 

4. A VOLUNTEER ARMY. The last sort of troops contem- 
plated by the act was a volunteer army. No new provisions 
were included for the enlistment and organization of such a 
force, which thus remained subject to the provisions of the act 
of May, 1914, already considered. In fact, however, the new 
act was at so many points inconsistent with the terms of the 
Volunteer Act that in the opinion of the Judge-Advocate Gen- 
eral it would have been exceedingly difficult to administer the 
two in unison.^^ 

5 

The central provisions of the National Defense Act, i. e. 
those dealing with the Federalizing of the National Guard, 
came to an early test. The act became law on June 3, 1916, 
and by June 18 the situation along the Mexican border result- 
ing from the revolutionary condition of Mexico had become 
such that the greater part of the National Guard was called 
into Federal service by the President and despatched to the 
border States, wdiere it remained for more than nine months. 
The question was at once raised as to whether men were 
subject to the call whose enlistments in existing militia units 
had not yet expired but who did not intend to bind themselves 
by the new Federal oath, which the law admittedly did not 
make compulsory. The point came before the courts in the 
Emerson and Lowell cases. Emerson and Lowell were militia- 
men enlisted in a Massachusetts National Guard regiment. 
They claimed that the National Defense Act discharged from 

3^ See his memorandum printed in "Hearings on the Selective Service 
Act before the House Committee on Military Affairs," April 7-17, 
1917; p. 90. 



THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 55 

all Federal obligation such State militia as did not bring them- 
selves under the terms of the act by taking the new oath. 
To support this contention reference was made to the provision 
of Section 70 of the act that " when any existing enlistment 
does not contain such obligation [the obligation assumed by 
the new oath to the Federal Government] the enlisted man 
shall not be recognized as a member of the National Guard"; 
and to Section 58, providing that the National Guard should 
consist of the regularly enlisted militia, armed and equipped 
as provided by the act of June 3, 1916. Hence, Emerson and 
Lowell claimed that not having assumed the obligation of the 
new oath, they were discharged from whatever Federal obliga- 
tions might have been attached to their preexisting enlistments. 
Their contention was sustained in the United States district 
court,^- but overruled by the circuit court of appeals. Speak- 
ing for the latter court, Judge Aldrich said : " It is quite true 
that Section 70 declares, as to members of the National Guard 
of the several States whose enlistment and oath do not contain 
the broader obligation, that they shall not be recognized as 
members of the National Guard until they have assumed that 
broader obligation by signing the enlistment contract and tak- 
ing the oath prescribed, but we look upon this as merely declar- 
atory of the fact that they shall not be recognized and classed 
in the National Guard distinctively designated as such, and 
we do not view such declaration as at all inconsistent with 
the idea that they shall remain in the class of service into which 
they belong, and in which they are still bound to perform 
certain Federal military duty." ^^ 

The effect of this decision was that militiamen who did not 
take the new oath remained subject to exactly the same Fed- 
eral duties as before the passage of the National Defense Act. 
The Federal Government was thus enabled to send to the 
border any existing National Guard unit irrespective of 

'2 "New York Times," August 5, 1916; p. 4, column 6. 

3^236 Federal Reporter; 161 and 169. The cases were taken to the 
Supreme Court, but were dismissed by consent of the parties. See 243 
U. S., 660. 



56 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

whether its members took the new oath or not. Only after 
the unit had been released from national service were its mem- 
bers to be permitted to withdraw from further Federal obliga- 
tion by declining to take the oath. 

Tlie new oath did not in fact prove popular among the 
militiamen. " Having entered the Federal service with a keen 
desire for active service, they found themselves scattered along 
the Mexican border and forced to undergo a much more seri- 
ous and extended course of training than any of them had 
ever undergone before. As a consequence, many were disap- 
pointed ; complaints of * we came down here to fight, not to 
sit around in camp,' were heard; criticism became rife; and 
appeals for permission to go home were voiced." ^* All this 
strongly discouraged such a definite commitment as the six 
years' enlistment which the new oath carried. The more ex- 
treme sentiment among the militiamen was expressed as fol- 
lows by a writer in the "Seventh New York Regiment Ga- 
zette" : 

" There is no question but that if legislation stands as it 
does to-day it will take only four years before the National 
Guard will be so reduced that it will be disbanded. Almost 
without exception every man in the Guard to-day, when his 
period of enlistment is up, is through for all time. Unless 
some provision is made to the effect that the National Guard 
cannot be called out by the President into the active service of 
the United States for a longer period than sixty days unless 
a state of war exists, the National Guard is doomed." ^^ 

Events did not give time enough for a fair trial of the policy 
of the National Defense Act; but during the brief period that 
was afforded, the promise shown by that policy did not appear 
especially reassuring. It must be remembered, however, that 
the test occurred at a very unusual juncture in our foreign 
affairs and in the state of public opinion. 

3* Report of the chief of the militia bureau, War Department, 
"Annual Report," 1917; Vol. i, p. 854. 
35 "New York Times," December 6, 1916; p. 11, column i. 



CHAPTER III 

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 



ON April I, 19 17, the strength of the Regular Army stood 
at 5791 officers and 121,797 enlisted men;^ while the 
National Guard numbered 7612 officers and 174,008 men.^ 
On the following day President Wilson appeared before Con- 
gress and recommended a declaration of war against Germany/'' 
A brief paragraph in his address was devoted to the question 
of supplying man-power for the army : " This step will in- 
volve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United 
States, already provided for by law in case of war, of at least 
500,000 men, who should in my opinion be chosen upon the 
principle of universal liability to service; and also the author- 
ization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so 
soon as they may be needed, and can be handled in training." 
There was as yet no clear idea among the public as to the 
extent to which the United States would participate in the war ; 
and the newspapers treated as debatable the question whether 
or not American troops would be sent to Europe.* In view 
of this uncertainty the farsightedness of the policy outlined by 
the President is as apparent now as its boldness was remark- 
able at the time. In a few days a bill embodying the adminis- 
tration's policy was drawn up in the War Department and 

1 Report of adjutant general, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1917; Vol. I, p. 171. 

2 Report of chief of militia bureau in ibid.; p. 919. 

3 War was declared April 6. 

* See "New York Times," March 30, 1917; p. i, column 5: March 
31 ; p. I, column 8. 

57 



58 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

submitted to the mi!Htary tommittees of both houses of Congress. 

What the administration proposed was to do two things: 

(i) Bring up the numbers of the Regular Army and Na- 
tional Guard to the maximum war-time strength authorized by 
the National Defense Act. This was in the neighborhood of 
900,000 men. The men needed for this purpose were to be 
procured by voluntary enlistment. 

(2) Raise by a process of selective draft additional forces 
in increments of 500,000 as needed, the first increment to be 
authorized at once. 

It was thought that by this twofold policy ample opportunity 
would be given for the volunteer spirit in the country to ex- 
press itself ; and at the same time the main dependence would 
not be placed upon it. In Secretary Baker's plain words, " the 
President was of the belief that the volunteer spirit and prin- 
ciple ought to be preserved to the extent of authorizing the 
filling up of the Regular Army and the National Guard to 
full strength by that process, if the process proved sufficient 
to accomplish that end; but that as to the additional forces to 
be raised, a policy ought to be adopted which without becom- 
ing the beginning of the practice of universal training or service 
and without committing the Government to a present decision 
of that problem, was yet so far assimilated to it as to call 
into the service of the United States for the additional forces 
a class of young men who would be relatively free from the 
business and domestic entanglements which have hitherto em- 
barrassed the country in the sudden calling of large forces from 
the body of the people, and who would be selected by a process 
sufficiently democratic to spread the strain over the entire 
country and at the same time reach men of ages within the 
limit of those who could be spared from the industrial uses of 
the country." ^ 

5 Statement of the Hon. Newton D. Baker, April 7, 1917, in "Hear- 
ings before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Rep- 
resentatives on the Selective Service Act"; April 7, 14, and 17, 1917; 
p. 5. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 59 

The. idea of universal military obligation had been growing 
familiar to public sentiment during the months which had 
just elapsed. There was coming to be fairly broad realization 
that " universal service for the nation, whether it be enrollment 
for the military, or for broader work of industrial efficiency 
for national purpose, is the only democratic principle of national 
life, and only by such service can justice and equality be 
obtained for all the citizens of the great community. " Every- 
where that I have been," said Robert Bacon, " I have found 
such views held and expressed with remarkable unanimity." 
Had it not been so, such a radical departure from our past as 
was involved in the Selective Service Act would certainly not 
have been effected so quietly and successfully. 

Undoubtedly the administration was led thus to sponsor a 
policy of compulsory service by a mixture of motives. First 
of all there was the immediate pressing problem of man-power. 
That this had a powerful influence on the decision cannot be 
doubted. This side of the matter was emphasized by Senator 
Chamberlain in the report with which he introduced the Selec- 
tive Service Bill in the Senate. 

" This measure," he wrote, " has left room for the operation 
of so much of the volunteer system as in our judgment is 
worthy of adoption. While it provides for the raising of 
additional forces in large numbers by selective draft exclu- 
sively, it also provides, through recruiting to war-time strength 
the Regular Army and the National Guard, for absorbing a 
force of more than 600,000 volunteers. Thus, happily, the 
bill, while placing the main national dependence upon the 
almost universally approved system of the draft, at the same 
time accommodates itself to such volunteer spirit as exists and 
is available in the early days of the war. In fact the bill 
provides for a volunteer army larger than any volunteer army 
ever before raised by this nation at any one time or as a result 
of any single piece of legislation. 

" The volunteer method has never proved adequate and effec- 
tual for national needs and will prove far less so now. War 



6o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

as now conducted is of a hitherto unconceived magnitude. 
MiUions of men are now demanded where formerly a few 
thousands were required. Yet in former times of national 
stress far less perilous than this, the volunteer method has 
never furnished the men needed for the emergency. History 
shows that, much to our detriment, we have begun our wars 
with this inadequate and ineffectual method and have brought 
them to a successful conclusion only by resort to a system based 
on proper principles. The volunteer method failed this nation 
in the Revolution, and it was only the material aid of France 
that gave us our independence. It failed us in the War of 
1812, and, had it not been for drastic draft laws and the 
diversion created by the Napoleonic Wars, we could not have 
concluded even such a peace as we did. It failed the Confed- 
eracy in the Civil War, and that Government, to its advantage, 
was quicker to perceive its inadequacy than our own. It like- 
wise failed the Federal Government and, volunteering having 
practically ceased by the end of 1862, was succeeded in the 
following year by the first of the Draft Acts. It failed us 
in the Spanish-American War, for the force then called for 
was never obtained. 

" The volunteer method has no fundamental legal basis for 
its existence. The universal liability to render military service 
is based upon the fundamental concept of the relation of a free 
man to the state. The frequency of resort to it has, however, 
established the tradition that the volunteer system is the only 
system of raising military forces compatible with that right 
and duty of equal participation in the affairs and burdens of 
state which characterize American political institutions. To 
render military service to the nation is a higher duty than to 
contribute to its financial support. Military service is indeed 
the highest duty of the citizen and is in no sense to be regarded 
as a voluntary offering. 

" Our experience with the volunteer system has revealed its 
deficiencies to all those who will view it candidly. England 
has had a like experience. The influence of the British tradi- 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 6i 

lion in this regard has brought her to the verge of national 
disaster in the gigantic struggle which now involves her life, 
as indeed it may involve ours. Under the incubus of that 
tradition, as compelling there as here, she set about this war 
first by sacrificing her regular establishment. Shoved to the 
brink of calamity, and after loss incalculable, she did what we 
have always belatedly done — turned away from the system 
which must inevitably bring such results in the face of an 
enemy who does not thus impede himself to a system based on 
dominant national principle. No effectual army was raised 
in Great Britain until the volunteer system was abandoned and 
compulsory service established in its stead. The British people 
to-day are, three years after the outbreak of the war, where 
they would have been at its outbreak had they been so well 
advised as they are now. It would be folly for us at this late 
day, in the light of their experience, to begin where they 
began. 

" In a word, the volunteer system, which this measure is 
designed to supersede, is undemocratic, unreliable, extravagant, 
inefficient, and, above all, unsafe. This is no time to tolerate 
uncertainty in the raising of the large numbers of men w^hich 
the present emergency is likely to require. This bill makes 
certain the raising and maintenance of the required forces with 
the utmost expedition." ^ 

So much for the argument from necessity. A second argu- 
ment was based on the fact that the life of a modern nation is 
knit together in such intricate ways that the withdrawal of 
men from certain vital occupations to go into the army may 
irreparably disrupt essential processes of production. This 
argument was put with force in a letter from President Wilson 
to Representative Helvering of Kansas. 

" Our object," wTote the President, " is a mobilization of all 
the productive and active forces of the nation, and their de- 
velopment to the highest point of cooperation and efficiency, 
and the idea of the selective draft is that those should be 

6 Reprinted in "New York Times," April 20, 1917; P- 3, column 4. 



62 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

chosen for service in the army who can most readily be spared 
from the prosecution of the other activities which the country 
must engage in, and to which it must devote a great deal of 
its best energy and capacity. The volunteer system does not 
do this. When men choose themselves, they sometimes choose 
without due regard to their other responsibilities. Men may 
come from the farms, or from the mines, or from the factories 
or centers of business, who ought not to come, but ought to 
stand back of the armies in the field, and see that they get 
everything that they need, and that the people of the country 
are sustained in the meantime. The principle of the selective 
draft, in short, has at its heart this idea, that there is a uni- 
versal obligation to serve, and that a public authority should 
choose those upon whom the obligation of military service shall 
rest, and also, in a sense, choose those who shall do the rest 
of the nation's work. The bill, if adopted, will do more, I 
believe, than any other single instrumentality to create the 
impression of universal service in the army and out of it, and, 
if properly administered, will be a great source of stimula- 
tion." ^ 

Finally, a letter from Secretary Baker to Chairman Dent of 
the House Committee on Military Affairs points to certain ad- 
ditional considerations which influenced the Government's 
decision. 

" I believe," wrote Mr. Baker, " that in every foreign coun- 
try when the volunteer system has been tried, whatever success 
it has had has been due to a system of compulsion more 
harassing and almost as drastic as the provisions of a law it- 
self. Old men, and young and old women, have united to 
urge young men to volunteer, appealing to local pride, and 
have enforced their appeal by social ostracism, by pinning 
yellow ribbons on the coats of young men, and by epithets 
and outcries which have finally driven the reluctant into the 
ranks and humiliated both the ready and the reluctant by the 
methods used. In the countries where the volunteer system 

7 "New York Times," April 20, 191 7; p. 3, column 5. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 63 

has obtained, those responsible for it were excused because 
they could not have foreseen at the beginning the results, but 
we have their experience to guide us, and I believe that those 
responsible in this country for repeating the costly errors which 
have been made abroad will not be able to make that explana- 
tion. This is the greatest war in the history of the world. 
Our participation in it is as yet undetermined in many of its 
modes, and wholly as to duration and extent, but we are called 
upon to inaugurate a system which in any event or contingency 
will place our country in a situation where it can contribute the 
trained men and the means necessary to bring this war to a 
conclusion which will mean a vindication of the principles upon 
which we entered it. We must therefore prepare to array 
the nation not by haphazard means, and not, if I may say so 
without offense, by volunteering either of persons or of prop- 
erty, but by an ordered systematic devotion of every man and 
every resource of our nation to the task, and this can be done 
only by placing upon the statute-books a system which assigns 
to our people each his part, according to his strength, and 
leads them to forego, in the interest of the common cause, all 
pride as to method and preference of service, allowing the 
organized agencies of our democratic government to judge 
where each can best serve his country." ^ 

These quotations indicate the extent to which British ex- 
perience was present in the thought of the heads of the Govern- 
ment, and the distinct part it had in shaping their policy. 
During the hearings on the Draft Bill before the Military 
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives a state- 
ment was made by Captain Percy Benson of the Somerset 
Yeomanry, which brings out the lessons of British experience 
that seemed to the administration leaders so compelling. 

" There were five main reasons," said Captain Benson, " that 
forced this universal military obligation on England. The first 
was the argument that the state gave equal privileges to every 
man, and that the obligation should also be equal. The vol- 

^'"N.ew York Times," April 22', 1917; Part I, p. 2, column 3. 



64 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

untary system savored of privilege because A and B come up 
and enlist, and C and D do not. The argument was, why 
should A and B bear an obligation that C and D do not bear, 
when their privileges of citizenship are exactly alike? That 
was one of the greatest arguments, and was urged chiefly by 
the Labor party and the mass of public opinion generally. 

" The second reason was that it was evident after a time 
that universal obligation secured infinitely greater efficiency, 
because the state, if it has every man of military age under an 
obligation to do his duty by the state, can tell him exactly 
what to do; and under our voluntary system at the beginning 
of the war, thousands of men from the coal mines, the ship- 
building yards, mechanics and farm laborers enlisted and went 
out. These men were to a very great extent skilled men. 
Afterward, when urgent need for these men arose, we had to 
withdraw a great many from the front line and bring them 
back to the workshops. Under a system of universal obliga- 
tion the state can simply say to A and B, ' You stay in the 
workshops,' and to C and D, ' You go to the front.' In other 
words, A and B were often the coal miners and farm laborers, 
and C and D perhaps were selling ribbons in a women's dress- 
making shop where they would not be missed. 

" The third point was economy, and this came under my 
own view. Very often A and B who enlisted were married 
men with large families, while C and D were single men. 
When the former were in service, the state had to pay separa- 
tion allowances and dependency allowances for the wives and 
children and dependents of A and B, and those allowances 
were a very serious factor.^ Under a system of universal 
military obligation, you can choose the single men and reject 
the married men with large families, and then, in the case of a 

" Great Britain is said to have expended $144,842,580 in one year 
for the support of dependent families of men in service. " Hearings 
before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representa- 
tives on the Selective Service Act," April 7, 14, and 17, iQi?: P- 298. 
These hearings will hereafter in this chapter be referred to as " Hear- 
ings." 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 65 

single man, you have no separation allowance to pay, and if 
he is killed, you have no pension to pay. But under a vol- 
untary system, the state is not in a position to pick and choose ; 
it has to take all who offer. 

" The fourth thing which drove England to this policy was 
the need for continuity of effort, and that was a very impor- 
tant thing. If we could have pressed home our advantage 
against the Germans at certain times with large bodies of men, 
we might have been very much better ofT ; but, as it was, you 
had to look at the recruiting, and see whether it was good or 
bad that week. Where the Zeppelins came over Scarborough, 
or something of that sort happened, it would be good. Under 
universal obligation, on the other hand, you can look ahead 
and make your plans just as in any other business. 

" Another point is equal distribution of efifort and obligation. 
In other words, we know that from some districts recruits have 
come in in tremendous numbers, and they would always come 
in from places that had been bombarded by Zeppelins, while 
other places would not send any recruits at all. This system 
of universal obligation makes possible a uniform distribution 
of effort throughout the country and a fair equalization of 
burdens." ^° 

2 

The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Represen- 
tatives conducted a series of hearings on the selective service 
proposals, at which Secretary Baker appeared and explained 
the views of the administration in detail. The discussions 
covered most of the points about which opposition to the ad- 
ministration's proposals tended to center, and they illustrate 
some of the more typical reactions of opinion as to the proposed 
policy throughout the country. The following colloquy is 
significant : 

Mr. Nicholls : " Mr. Secretary, is there any provision in this bill 
whereby a man can raise a regiment and be commissioned to com- 
mand it?" 

1* " Hearings " ; pp). 221 ff. 



66 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Secretary Baker : " No, sir ; there is no such provision in the bill." 
Mr. Nicholls : " My reason for asking that question was this : 
Very often, as you are doubtless aware, one man can raise troops for 
service or get them to volunteer where another man cannot. In other 
words, there are men in my district who could raise regiments of 
troops, whereas those men would not volunteer for service unless 
they knew who would be in command of them." 

Secretary Raker : " There is no provision in the bill for that." 
Mr. Nicholls : " Do you think it would be advisable to have such 
a provision? " 

Secretary Baker : " No, sir ; I think such a provision would be 
fatal to the efficiency of the force." ^^ 

There was much discussion as to the comparative miHtary 
efficiency of vokmteers and of soldiers drafted into compul- 
sory service : 

Mr. Wise : " Mr. Secretary, I should like to ask this question. 
Take the State of Georgia; suppose you wanted io,ooo men from that 
State, and suppose there were 40,000 on the registration, how or by 
what method are you going to say which ones shall go and which 
ones shall stay? " 

Secretary Baker: "The jury-wheel — that is, select them as juries 
are selected ; put their names in a wheel and select them by lot." 

Mr. Wise : " Why would it not be really better, if there are, out 
of the 40,000, 10,000 who want to go, to allow them to volunteer and 
go?" 

Secretary Baker : " For the double reason that it is frankly going 
to the volunteer system with whatever defects that system has ; and, 
in the second place, those who would not volunteer would be put 
under some humiliation, while those who did go would probably be 
the most spirited youths and ought not to be first taken to be sac- 
rificed." 

Mr. Wise : " Do you not believe a man who really wanted to go 
and was anxious to go would make a better soldier than the man 
who went in half-heartedly or did not want to go or for some reason 
felt like he did not want to fight at this time ? " 

Secretary Baker : " I do not think I would like to say that. I 
think some of the bravest men in the world, and some of the men 
who have done the best work, have been men who shrank from 
conflict rather than those who courted it." '- 

Mr. Nicholls: "Would the administration object to giving men, 

11 "Hearings" ; p. 16, 

12 "Hearings"; p. ^J. 



• THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 67 

say, thirty days in which to volunteer, and then, if they did not 
volunteer, use this draft method ? " 

Secretary Baker : " I do not think you would accomplish an3^hing 
l^y that. It is an academic thing to come to me and say, * You had 
better enlist within the next thirty days, or I will take you anyway.' " 

Mr. Nicholls : " I think you will find a good deal of pride involved 
in the matter. A man would not say, ' I enlisted because I had to 
go within thirty days.' I think good men would enlist if there was no 
limit to it, and then, after the limit expired, those who did not want 
to enlist could be forced to do so." 

Secretary Baker : " Then you would be organizing the army out of 
those who wanted to go, while those who did not want to go — " 

Mr. Nicholls (interposing) : " Those who wanted to go would make 
the best soldiers." 

Secretary Baker : " I am not so sure that lust for battle is nec- 
essarily a valuable asset for a soldier. Willingness to do his duty 
is enough." 

Mr. Caldwell : "In civil life when you get a man working at a job 
he loves, his work is always better." 

Secretary Baker : " I am not sure that is so in this case. The man 
who loves the cause for which the work is done is the man you want 
to get." 

Mr. Anthony : " Mr. Secretary, is it not true that in the Civil War 
in almost every instance when drafted regiments were sent to the 
front, that when they first went into battle they either laid down or 
ran away ? " 

Secretary Baker : " Even if that were so, Mr. Anthony, it might 
very well be one argument against the volunteer system because you 
would have combed the country of all those brave spirited men, and 
killed them off." " 

A recurrent point of discussion was naturally the compati- 
bility of compulsory military service with the free spirit of 
American institutions: 

Mr. Caldwell : " Some of us feel that there is a large sentiment in 
our country that men ought to be given an opportunity to volunteer 
before they are compelled to come in. Why would it not be wise to 
put in a clause of this kind, that if for any reason there shall not be 
enough volunteers, say, within a period of sixty days, conscription shall 
be resorted to? In other words, don't you think that the Anglo-Saxon 
idea of patriotism and service of country ought to be preserved in 
the statutory law of the land?" 

""Hearings"; p. 65. 



68 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Secretary Baker: "Frankly I do not think so with regard to this 
emergency." 

Mr. Nicholls : " Don't you tliink that the people ought to be allowed 
an opportunity to volunteer before there is any conscription?" 

Secretary Baker : " No, sir, I do not. But the volunteer principle 
has been preserved for a very large number of men by the provision 
which fills the ranks of the Regular Army and the National Guard." 

Mr. Nicholls : " Of course, there are a great many who would 
volunteer when the country goes to war who would not volunteer in 
time of peace in the National Guard." 

Secretary Baker : " So far as I am personally concerned, I think 
there is a distinct moral gain in a man's addressing himself to the 
question whether his country is worthy of sacrifice and determining 
that moral question in favor of the sacrifice. I think that a man is 
a better man who addresses himself to that moral question. But, so 
far as the volunteer principle is concerned, I think there is plenty of 
opportunity preserved in this bill." i* 

Secretary Baker went on to point out the possible conflict 
between an tinrestricted liberty of volunteering and the indus- 
trial and economic needs of the nation. " I think it is entirely 
likely we may not be able to take care of all who want to 
volunteer. I think it is very undesirable to take care of all 
of them; that is to say, there are a very large number of 
people in the United States who will want to volunteer who 
ought not to be in the military forces at present; their impor- 
tance in industry is too great. We are facing, for instance, 
the farm labor situation. Now it is wholly impossible to take 
away from the active industrial forces of a country like ours 
700,000 or 750,000 men without dislocating something. We 
ought to make that dislocation just as little as we possibly 
can." " 

This contention was challenged. 

Mr. Gordon : " Mr. Secretary, I was much impressed with your 
statement as to the volunteer system taking from the life of the coun- 
try the men who were most needed. My observation is that it is 
just the other way — that you take men under the volunteer system 
who can get away, or men who havei no fixed occupation." 

1* "Hearings" ; pp. 15, 16. 
IS "Hearings" ; p. 79. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 69 

Secretary Baker : " I believe you will be unable to prove that by 
the history of any system of volunteering conducted in any civilized 
nation of the world at any time. I think that the fine spirited women 
and the fine spirited men consult one another and agree that no 
private consideration ought to stand in the way of the public need, 
and that the unattached and dispensable people, by reason of their 
being unattached and dispensable, are the very persons least swayed by 
the spirit of those who early volunteer." 

Mr. Greene : " Let me add about three lines of personal experience 
as a recruiting officer in 1898. My observation v/as in line with what 
the secretary has stated. In the first place, the men who had arrived 
at an age of maturity, and who had passed out of the somewhat float- 
ing class of young men — that is, the men who had formed business, 
social, and domestic relations, — were the men who realized most 
strongly their duty to the country, and I, as a recruiting officer in 1898, 
turned down a great number of such men, because in that emergency 
it did not seem that they should be permitted to do this. I also found 
the greater number of slackers and shirkers came from among the 
young unattached men who have been described as dispensable 
people." 16 

The attitude with which public opinion throughout the coun- 
try would receive a law imposing compulsory service was felt 
to be another major consideration: 

Mr. Tilson : " Mr Secretary, would you give your attention for 
a moment to a side of the question which I think is the strongest 
point, if there is any point, against your method of raising troops, 
and that is the question of its effect upon public sentiment and the 
people themselves? Is there not something to be said in favor of 
accepting a system that is known to be bad, that is known to be in- 
efficacious and inadequate, rather than to create the efifect which 
might be created by a very unpopular measure?" 

Secretary Baker : " I am very glad to have you refer to that, 
because that is democracy, and the people of this country are entitled 
to have what they want, and it is your duty and mine to give them 
what they want. Now, that does not mean either that we have any 
way of tabulating their opinion, or pleasing an uninformed judgment, 
but you all know America, and what America wants is to be efficient 
at this moment. Now, if you pass such a measure as is here provided, 
and send it out to the country as the expression of your judgment 
that this task is so large and that we must prepare for it so seriously 

1*^ "Hearings" ; p. 153. 



70 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

as to establish this orderly system that will automatically develop 
larger and larger forces, the people of the country will accept your 
judgment. It may be somewhat shocking to them to find that you 
regard this as so serious a task, but they will instantly realize that 
it is a grave task, and it will have a sobering effect upon the judgment 
of the country. It may be unpopular when you first pass it, but it 
will not be a tithe as impopular as a system which will arouse every 
community and set neighbor against neighbor, and friend against 
friend ; and while this measure may have a certain amount of un- 
popularity on the day of its passage, the volunteer system will have 
a tenfold unpopularity just as soon as it begins to get out its whip and 
stir neighborhood sentiment into a frenzy." i'' 

It was suggested that the unpopularity of the measure luight 
be lessened by the use of some less objectionable words than 
" draft " or " conscription." 

Mr. Olncy: "The words 'draft' and 'conscription' are rather 
unpopular, and you would not object, would you, to changing that 
wording of the bill so it might read, say, ' personal obligation to 
service '? " 

Secretary Baker: "I think it would be very unfortunate to change 
that." 

Mr. Olney : " You think we should use the words ' draft ' and 
' conscription '? " 

Secretary Baker : " I think we should use the word that challenges 
attention to the thing, and not attempt to evade it in any way. I 
think we ought to say frankly what we are doing." ^^ 

One of the purposes of the administration in desiring to 
have the policy of the draft adopted at the very outset of the 
war was to prevent it from being looked upon as a penalizing 
measure with the consequent opprobrium that would attach to 
drafted men. This would be the inevitable effect of any draft 
system which would go into effect only after volunteering 
had failed. As Representative Anderson subsequently put it 
in a debate in the House: "The draft has always hitherto 
been a last resort, when all who were willing to serve, and all 
who could be persuaded or ridiculed or threatened into serv- 

1^ "Hearings"; p. ^Tj. 
""Hearings"; p. 288. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 71 

ing, had joined the colors. It was odious, therefore, because 
it differentiated the patriot from the slacker, and branded the 
drafted man with the stigma of a coward. It is not the prin- 
ciple of universal military obligation but the application of the 
draft as a last resort which is repugnant." ^^ By imposing a 
universal obligation of service at the outset, the difference 
between drafted man and volunteer was wiped out, and 
whether a man volunteered under the provisions of the act 
making it possible for him to do so, or took his place in a draft 
contingent, became a mere matter of detail. 

The particular feature of the administration's bill which met 
with the greatest opposition was the provision setting the age- 
limits^ men to be drafted at nineteen and twenty-five. It 
was widely felt that both limits were too low. 

Mr. Field : " Mr. Secretary, I have been in the country while this 
discussion has been going on, and I am frank to say that I beheve 
that the age limit of twenty-five will not meet the approval of the 
country ; neither do I believe the age limit of nineteen will meet the 
approval of the country. Here is the way the people of the country 
generally talk about it : ' This is a man's war, and the men of Amer- 
ica should fight the war and not the children.' " 

Mr. Lunn : " Why not make the limit forty years ? " 

Secretary Baker : " We would then be interfering too much with the 
industries." 20 

Mr. Garrett : " Then what service would the other millions of men 
above the age of twenty-five be rendering to their country as compared 
with the service rendered by those called to the colors ? " 

Secretary Baker : "You will have that distinction unless you put 
a gun in every man's hand. There is no answer to that unless you 
have a whole nation of soldiers. Some process of selection has to 
be devised." 

Mr. Garrett : " In fixing the age between those years are you 
basing it upon the question of ability to render service, or is it on 
the basis that these men are the men who can best be spared?" 

Secretary Baker : " On the two laws that all experience with every 
war in history shows to be correct. First, that that is the best 
military period in a man's life, the time when young men are best 
adapted to training and service. The second consideration, and one 

19 "New York Times," April 25, 1917; p. i, column i. 
2° "Hearings"; pp. 149, 144. 



72 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

which is not less important, is that those ages dislocate the com- 
mercial, industrial, and agricultural establishments of the country, 
upon the success of which the war depends, least of all." 21 

Another source of opposition to the bill was the fear that 
it might commit the country definitely to a permanent policy 
of compulsory military service^ Every efifort was made to allay 
this fear. In a public statement the President declared: 
" This legislation makes no attempt to solve the question of 
a permanent military policy for the country, chiefly for the 
reason that in these anxious and disordered times a clear view 
cannot be had either of our permanent military necessities, 
or of the best mode of organizing a proper military peace 
establishment." -^ So also Secretary Baker, in his letter of 
April 22, to Chairman Dent : " I have no alarm on the sub- 
ject of militarism in America, and particularly no fear of 
any such consequence from the pending measure, temporary 
as it is, and designed for the emergency. Militarism is a 
philosophy; it is the designation given to a selfish or ambitious 
political system which uses arms as a means of accomplishing 
its objects. The mobilization and arming of a democracy in 
defense of the principles upon which it is founded and in 
vindication of the common rights of men is an entirely different 
thing." 23 



The Selective Service Bill as prepared by the War De- 
partment was accepted by the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs in virtually unaltered form. Almost the only change 
of importance made was specifically to exempt from the 
draft persons engaged in agriculture. On the other hand, 
the bill failed of adoption in the House committee and was 
reported out with amendments, the effect of which was to 
leave with the President responsibility for resorting to a 

21 "Hearings" ; p. 238. 

22 "New York Times," April 7, 1917; p. 3, column i. 

23 "New York Times," April 22, 1917; Part 1, p. 2, column 5. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 73 

selective draft. The President was given authority to employ 
that system, but was also authorized to employ the alternative 
of the volunteer system if he should so choose, thus relieving 
Congress of the burden of making the decision. A second 
amendment altered the age-limits of persons subject to draft, 
extending the liability to all males between twenty-one and 
forty. After the bringing in of this report there was a week of 
almost continuous debate in both houses. An objection which 
made its appearance was that the selective draft would require 
an elaborate administrative machinery to put it into operation 
which would materially delay getting American troops to 
Europe. This argument was urged in favor of an amendment 
introduced in the Senate by Senator Harding of Ohio and de- 
signed to enable Colonel Roosevelt to lead a volunteer army to 
France. The Harding amendment empowered the President in 
his discretion to raise not more than four volunteer divisions to 
go to France at once, with the restriction that no smaller unit 
than a division should be accepted for such service. Colonel 
Roosevelt had announced his desire to form such a division on 
the day following the President's war message,^* and had had a 
conference with the President in regard to it.-^ The plan had 
aroused much enthusiasm, and the colonel had explained his 
ideas in greater detail : "It is all wrong not to send an expedi- 
tionary force abroad at the earliest possible moment, within the 
next few weeks. We should put one division on the front at 
once, keep its numbers full, and put other divisions side by side 
with it just as rapidly as it is possible to send them over, and 
not try to keep the whole army back to send over in a single 
mass. The only wise course is to vote for the administration's 
bill and to vote for Mr. Harding's plan or some similar plan not 
as a substitute, but as an addition." ^^ The Roosevelt division, 
having been injected into the debate, naturally became a storm- 
center of controversy. " It is impossible for one to conceive," 

2* "New York Times," April 4; p. 14, column 7. 
'^^ Ibid., April 11; p. i, column 2. 

2*5 Interview, published in "New York Times," April 28; p. 2, 
column 6. 



74 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

said Senator Lodge, " why the administration or Congress 
should refuse to Colonel Roosevelt and his volunteers the op- 
portunity to give their lives for their country if they so desire. 
Colonel Roosevelt does not seek the command except as a sub- 
ordinate officer. It is not a matter of personal self-seeking." ^'' 
The bill came to a vote on Saturday, April 28. The Senate 
adopted the Harding amendment by a vote of fifty-six to 
thirty-one, and voted down the McKellar amendment, which 
embodied the House committee's proposal to throw on the 
President the onus of choosing between the selective draft 
and the volunteer system, by a vote of sixty-nine to eighteen. 
The House rejected the same proposal by 313 to 10, and 
adopted the administration bill with amendments as to age 
limits by 397 to 24. The bill then went into conference, 
where it remained for more than two weeks. The 
main points at issue between the two houses were the question 
of age-limits, the Roosevelt division, and an amendment 
adopted by the Senate prohibiting the sale of liquor near army 
training-camps. Agreement was reached on these points on 
May 10. The Harding amendment was eliminated, and age- 
limits were fixed at twenty-one to thirty by the conferees. 
In this shape the bill was reported back. Sentiment in the 
House of Representatives had by this time so altered with 
respect to the Roosevelt division that the conference report 
was rejected and the bill returned to conference with in- 
structions to the House conferees to accept the Harding 
amendment. Another change forced by the House was a 
provision adding fifteen dollars a month to the pay of all 
enlisted men receiving less than twenty-one dollars a month, 
together with other increases for men receiving higher pay, 
these increases being graduated down to an addition of six 
dollars a month to the pay of men receiving forty-five dollars 
a month or more. In this shape the bill was passed by both 
houses and approved by the President on May 18. ^^ 

27 " New York Times," April 29 ; Part I, p. 2, column 3. 
2840 Statutes at Large; pp. 76-83. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 75 

The President did not avail himself of the authority given 
him by the Harding amendment to accept divisions of vol- 
unteers, and thus assumed the responsibility shifted to him by 
Congress of disappointing Colonel Roosevelt's plan. Whatever 
merit the plan had, the Harding amendment can certainly not 
be considered as in harmony with the general policy of the act. 

4 

The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, entitled "An 
Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the 
Military Establishment of the United States," provided for 
the building of an army by the simultaneous use of three 
separate methods. First of all, the Regular Army was to be 
expanded at once ^^ to the full number of units contemplated by 
the National Defense Act, and all units, including those added 
by the foregoing provision, were to be raised to war-time 
strength. It was estimated that this would result in an in- 
ciease of the Regular Army to 18,033 officers and 470,185 en- 
listed men.^° Secondly, the President was authorized to draft 
into the military service of the United States, under the pro- 
visions of the National Defense Act, the National Guard of the 
States, expanding it at once, as in the case of the Regular Army, 
to the full number of units contemplated by the National De- 
fense Act, and raising all units to war strength. This, it was 
expected, would yield a total of 13,377 officers and 456,800 
enlisted men. ^^ 

The men needed for this expansion of the Regular Army 
and National Guard, more than 600,000 in all, were to be 
raised if possible by voluntary enlistment. Recruits were 
to be between the ages of eighteen and forty years, both in- 
clusive, at the date of their enlistment; and such enlistments 
were to be for the period of the emergency unless sooner 
discharged. At the same time, it was provided that all en- 

29 Not by instalments as contemplated by the National Defense Act. 
3° Report of secretary of war, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1917; Vol. I, p. 12. 
31 Ibid. 



^6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Hstments in force at the date of approval of the act should be 
automatically extended to cover the period of the emergency. ^^ 
These provisions represent a great advance over the 
provisions of the Volunteer Act of 1914, which had merely 
provided that volunteers should be enlisted for the legal term 
of enlistment in the Regular Army. ^^ The conception of 
" enlistment for the war " had at last found its way into 
legislation, and a parity had been established between the period 
of enlistment and the period of national need. 

There was some discussion as to the use of the word "emer- 
gency" in this connection. Members of the House Committee 
on Military Affairs wanted to know why the word "war" was 
not used as in most previous legislation. Secretary Baker 
explained that the war might well be terminated and the emer- 
gency still drag on. The treaty of peace might impose certain 
duties of a military kind. "For instance, after the Franco- 
Prussian War, there was kept in France quite a large force for 
a certain length of time until additional portions of the indem- 
nity were paid. There may be certain places that we will have 
to fortify, or certain prisoners that we will have to keep, and 
other duties of that kind flowing out of the situation." The 
term "emergency" was used advisedly.^* 

If the enlisted men required to increase the Regular Army 
and National Guard to the full strength contemplated by the 
act could not be procured by voluntary enlistment, the Presi- 
dent was authorized to raise them by selective draft; and he 
was further authorized to raise additional forces by selective 
draft in increments of 500,000 each, at such time as he should 
determine upon. The basic principles of the draft program 
were embodied in the act. 

"Such draft as is herein provided shall be based upon liability 
to military service of all male citizens or male persons not alien 
enemies, who have declared their intention to become citizens, 

32 Act of May 18, 1917; Section 7. 

33 See above, p. 25. 

3* "Hearings"; p. ^2. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT y-j 

between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, 
and shall take place under such regulations as the President 
may prescribe." Quotas fixing the number of men to be drafted 
from the several States were to be determined in proportion to 
population, and, in calculating such quotas, credit was to be 
given for the number of men who were in the military service 
as members of the National Guard on April i, 19 17, or who 
after that date had enlisted in either the National Guard or the 
Regular Army.^^ 

After providing that no person liable to military service 
should be permittted to furnish a substitute for such service, 
the act went on to deal with the question of exemptions from 
draft liability. Persons exempted fell into two groups, those 
exempted absolutely by the terms of the act, and those whom 
the President was authorized to exempt in his discretion. In 
the former group were included the legislative, executive, and 
judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, 
Territories, and the District of Columbia; ordained ministers 
of religion; students who at the time of the approval of the 
act were preparing for the ministry in recognized theological 
schools ; persons in the military and naval service of the United 
States; and members of any well-recognized religious sect in 
actual existence whose creed or principles forbid its members 
to participate in war.^'' The President was further authorized 
to exclude or discharge from the draft persons of the following 
classes : county and municipal officials ; custom-house clerks ; 
persons employed in the United States mail service; workmen 
employed in armories, arsenals, and navy-yards; pilots; mari- 
ners in the actual employ of American merchants ; " persons en- 
gaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary 
to the maintenance of the military establishment or the effective 
operation of the military forces or the maintenance of the 
national interest during the emergency" ; persons with financial 

3^ Act of May 18, 1917; Section 2. 

^*'' Rut the last class of persons were not to be exempt from such 
service as the President should declare to be non-combatant. 



78 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

dependents rendering their exemption or discharge advisable; 
and persons found to be physically or morally unfit,^^ 

It was provided, however, that in figuring the quotas for the 
States no allowance was to be made for exemptions under the 
above provisions, but that the quotas should be proportioned 
absolutely to population. When the act came to be applied 
this rule proved obviously unfair, "laying the burden of fur- 
nishing men for the army without regard to actual availability. 
Gross population included aliens who under the terms of the 
law were exempted from draft. In districts with a large alien 
population, the population rule, therefore, resulted in a grossly 
disproportionate withdrawal of citizen-population which in 
some instances was little short of calamitous." ^^ Accordingly 
the population basis of the quotas was ultimately abandoned, 
and by a joint resolution of Congress, adopted May 6, 1918, the 
number of men immediately available for draft service, and 
not the whole population, was made the basis of contribution 
among the States. 

The persons exempt from draft liability having been defined, 
the act provided a skeleton outline of the machinery necessary 
for putting the draft system into operation. The President 
was empowered to name by proclamation a day for the regis- 
tration of all male persons in the country who had attained 
their twenty-first birthday and not yet attained their thirty- 
first birthday; and all such persons were declared subject to 
registration with the exception of officers and enlisted men in 
the Regular Army, the navy, the National Guard, and the 
Naval Militia. For failure to register, a penalty of not more 
than one year's imprisonment was prescribed, and all persons 
guilty of such failure were on arrest to be duly registered.^^ 
The last provision and the short term of imprisonment were 
designed to thwart the intentions of persons who would 
deliberately incur a prison sentence if by doing so they might 
definitely escape liability to military service. 

37 Act of May 18, 1917; Section 4. 

38 " Second Report of Provost-Marslial General," 1919; p. 5- 

39 Act of May 18, 1917; Section 5. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 79 

For the administration of the act, the President was author- 
ized to estabhsh throughout the country two different sets of 
administrative boards, of which the first were local boards. 
Where practicable and desirable in the President's discretion, a 
local board was to be established for each county or similar 
subdivision of a State, and likewise for approximately each 
30,000 of population in every city of 30,000 or more inhabitants 
according to the census of 1910. These local boards were to be 
appointed by the President and were to consist of three or more 
members, none of whom was to be connected with the military 
establishment. They were to have power within their respec- 
tive jurisdictions to hear and determine in the first instance all 
claims for exemption except such as were based upon employ- 
ment in an essential industry or vocation. Original jurisdic- 
tion over claims of the latter kind was vested in the district 
boards, the second sort of administrative bodies which the 
President was authorized by the act to establish. There was 
to be one such district board in every Federal judicial district 
of the country, appointed by the President, and consisting of 
such a number of persons, not connected with the military 
establishment, as he should determine. The district boards 
were to review on appeal, with authority to affirm, modify, or 
reverse, any decision of any local board within the area of 
their district; and were to have original jurisdiction over all 
claims for exemption based upon occupation in an essential in- 
dustry. The decisions of the district boards were to be final, 
except that the President might establish rules allowing in such 
classes of cases as he should see fit a further appeal to him- 
self,*" 

The wisdom of the statutory provision vesting in the district 
boards original jurisdiction over claims based on industrial and 
agricultural employment had been doubted.*^ "In many in- 

■*°Act of May 18, 1917; Section 4. 

*i The reason for this provision was the fear that in the exercise 
of this jurisdiction the local boards might be subject to improper 
local influences or tempted to show favoritism. "Congressional 
Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, First Session; p. 2201. 



8o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

stances," says General Crowder in his second report as provost- 
marshal, "such boards were too far removed from the locality 
of the individual registrant to be able to know or to ascertain 
the actual economic conditions of his community. Many dis- 
trict boards followed substantially the cursory recommendations 
of local boards in occupational cases, while other district boards 
ignored such recommendations, relying on data which were 
often incomplete and artificial. The provision made in Sep- 
tember, 1918, for the appointment of three industrial advisers 
for the respective district boards went far toward remedying 
these conditions, though the cessation of hostilities and the 
resultant suspension of mobilization prevented a full test of 
the wisdom of this plan. On the whole, a more just and effec- 
tive classification would have been secured had original jurisdic- 
tion in all cases been better vested in local boards, reserving to 
district boards a jurisdiction of a strictly appellate character. 
This would have effected a fairer coordination of industrial 
and dependency deferments," ^^ 

The last provision of the Selective Service Act which it is 
necessary to notice here is the interesting provision authorizing 
the President in the administration of the act to employ the 
services of any or all of the agents and officers of the State 
governments and requiring the persons so designated to perform 
such duties as the President should direct. The constitution- 
ality*^ of this provision was questioned during the exam- 

1*2 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General," 1919; p. 10. 

*3 The power of the Federal Government to impose duties on State 
officers w^as discussed by Chief Justice Taney in the case of Kentucky 
vs. Dennison, 24 Howard, 66. He said : "We think it clear that the 
Federal Government under the Constitution has no power to impose 
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to 
perform it, for to possess this power it might overload the officer 
with duties which would fill up all his time and disable him from 
performing his obligations to the State, and might impose on him 
duties incompatible with his rank and dignity. . . . Congress may 
authorize a particular State officer to perform a particular duty, but 
if he declines to do so, it docs not follow that he may be coerced or 
punished for his refusal." 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 8i 

ination of Secretary Baker before the House committee: 

Mr. Gordon : "Mr. Secretary, the duties and penalties imposed 
upon State and local officers in connection with the administration 
of this draft are somewhat arduous and stringent. Has the judicial 
department given you an opinion as to the power of the Federal 
Government to impose those duties upon such people?" 

Secretary Baker : "It constitutes pro tanto a draft, and if you 
authorize it as a part of the draft power, the President would pro 
tanto be drafting them for that service. I am speaking now only to 
the question of power." 

Mr. Gordon : " Yes, but you have a general exemption exempting 
these officers from the draft, and, as I understand it, you could 
not very well by another provision of the act draft them." 

Secretary Baker : " They are exempted in their quality as executive 
officers of a subordinate division of the Government from being 
drafted into the military service as such, but a subsequent provision 
which imposes civilian duties on them, and which was in the nature 
of a draft, would not be inconsistent with that." 

Mr. Gordon : " Do you not think there is some question about the 
power of the government, under its power to draft for military 
purposes, to prescribe duties for officers of local subdivisions?" 

Secretary Baker : "No, sir ; I have no doubt about that as a matter 
of law. It may be interesting to say that I should suppose go per 
cent, of the governors of the States have notified me of their very 
zealous readiness to place not only themselves but all State agencies 
in immediate cooperation with the government to accomplish the 
purposes enumerated." 

Mr. Gordon : "Of course, the duties of State officers are pre- 
scribed by law, and they are not under the orders of the governor, 
except — " 

Secretary Baker (interposing) : " Well, curiously enough, there 
are statutes in most States which authorize governors to call upon 
assessors and persons of that kind to make enumerations for military 
purposes." 

Mr. Gordon: "But in the absence of a statute?" 

Secretary Baker : "I say there are statutes which authorize that 
in most cases." ^* 

The point was never tested, for the remarkable willingness 
and eagerness of the State executives to do their utmost in 

""Hearings"; p. 85. 



82 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

cooperating with the Federal Government was one of the out- 
standing features of the administration of the draft system. It 
is a matter of which more will be said later on.*° 

The Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, was amended by 
an act passed by Congress and approved by the President on 
August 31, 1918. The military situation had by that time come 
to demand an even larger reservoir of man-power than that 
supplied by the act of 19 17, with the result that it was found 
necessary in the new act to extend the draft ages to include all 
persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The act 
of August, 1918, will be considered in more detail in the fol- 
lowing chapter/'^ 



The constitutionality of the Selective Service Act came be- 
fore the Supreme Court in the case of Arver vs. United 
States, decided January 7, 1918, and again in the case of Cox 
vs. Wood, decided May 6, 1918. In the first of these cases 
it was urged that the power conferred upon Congress to raise 
armies was only coterminous with United States citizen- 
ship, and could not be exerted so as to cause that citizenship 
to lose its dependent character, and dominate State citizenship. 
The inference which it was sought to draw was that civic 
obligation to military service was an obligation owed to the 
State Governments alone and was therefore not one which the 
National Government could impose or enforce. The court, how- 
ever, pointed out that the power of Congress to raise armies, 
being by the terms of the Constitution an expressly granted 
power, is supreme. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment 
has broadened the national scope of the Government under 
the Constitution by causing citizenship of the United States 
to become paramount and dominant instead of being subor- 
dinate and derivative. To the further contention that the power 
of Congress to raise armies was limited to calling for volunteers 

45 See "Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 262. 
4G Below, pp. 108 ff. 



THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT 83 

and could not include the power to exact enforced military 
service by the citizen, the court replied that such a view 
challenged the existence of all power in the Government, 
" for a governmental power which has no sanction to it, and 
which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen con- 
sents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. " The 
power is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict 
with the guarantees of the Constitution as to individual liberty. 
Such a pow'er to impose military service on the citizen was 
recognized and enforc'ed in England before the Norman Con- 
quest. Throughout the course of English constitutional history 
the existence of this pow'er was unquestioned, whether it resided 
in the Cro^yn or in Parliament. In the American colonies be- 
fore the separation from England the right to enforce military 
service was unquestioned, as it was in the several States under 
the Articles of Confederation. It was obviously the intention 
of the framers of the Constitution to take this power from the 
States and delegate it to Congress ; in fact the want of power 
in Congress to raise armies was one of the recognized defects 
which led to the adoption of the Constitution. Nor are any of 
the specific provisions of the act 'of May 18, 1917, repugnant 
to the Constitution. The contention that the act is void as a 
delegation of Federal powers to State officials because of some 
of its administrative features is wholly without merit; nor is 
it void as vesting administrative officers with legislative discre- 
tion or with judicial discretion. Finally, the court points out 
that the contention that the prohibition of the Thirteenth 
Amendment against involuntary servitude is violated 
by the exaction by the Government fr'om the citizen of his 
supreme duty to contribute to the defense of his country in 
time of war is refuted by its mere statement.^^ 

In Cox vs. Wood the chief contention was that the power of 
Congress to call out the military forces is granted exclusively 
under Article i, Section 8 (the militia claus'e), of the Con- 
stitution, and that, therefore, compulsory service beyond the 

*'' Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S., 366. 



84 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

limits of the United States is prohibited. The Supreme Court 
overruled this contention, holding (i) that the power of Con- 
gress to' compel military service is derived from the authority 
given to Congress by the Constitution to declare war and to raise 
armies; (2) that those powers are not qualified or restricted 
by the provisions of Article i, Section 8; (3) that the power to 
impose military duty is in no way limited by the subordinate 
provisions of the Constitution concerning the militia.*^ 

48 247 U. S., 3. 



CHAPTER IV 

ONE ARMY 

THE American army which wore khaki in the war with 
Germany was originally made up of three kinds of 
troops : the Regular Army, recruited to about twice its former 
size by enlisted volunteers ; the National Guard of the States, 
increased by the same method ; and a National Army of drafted 
men raised in the manner prescribed in the Selective Service 
Act, For more than fifteen months a formal distinction was 
preserved between these three forces, growing gradually more 
artificial as men were transferred from one force to another 
for purposes of training or to fill the gaps caused by such 
transfers ^ ; with the result that on the scene of the actual fight- 
ing in Europe virtually no unit was made up entirely of men 
recruited in the same way. The fact of this amalgamation was 
recognized by a general order of August 7, 1918,^'' abolishing 
the distinction between Regular Army, National Guard, Na- 
tional Army, and reserve corps and consolidating all the military 
forces of the nation into a single "United States Army. " The 
purpose of this chapter is to trace the building up of the three 
forces which were thus finally consolidated; to show, in other 
words, the practical results of the act of May 18, 1917, in 
terms of its man-power yield, reserving for subsequent treat- 
ment the working of its selective draft provisions. 

It may be desirable at the outset to refer to the enlisted 
reserve corps which was created by the National Defense Act 

1 It was stated that as early as January 31, 1918, there were 51,000 
drafted men in Regular Army and National Guard organizations. See 
" Hearings before House Committee on Army Appropriation Bill for 
191Q"; Vol. I, p. 137. 

la 1918, General Order No. "j},. 

8S 



86 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

for the purpose of supplying the army with its needed quota of 
technically trained men, telegraphers, chauffeurs, railway men, 
and so on. Nine volunteer regiments were organized for rail- 
road work abroad composed of men obtained through the 
enlisted reserve corps, with an addition of two forestry regi' 
ments. The men composing the twenty-seven field battalions, 
twelve telegraph battalions, and six depot companies organized 
as a part of the signal corps were also secured from the enlisted 
reserve corps, as were 235 wagon companies, 106 auto-truck 
companies, eighty bakery companies, and twenty-four j^ack-train 
companies organized as a part of the quartermaster corps. 
Fifty base hospitals, and a number of ambulance sections, with 
a strength of nearly 15,000, were formed by the medical de- 
partment. The organization of the reserve corps performed 
another useful service in enabling the aviation section of the 
signal corps to enlist candidates and give them a test at ground- 
schools organized at a number of large universities. Those 
who failed to qualify as candidates for final training as aviators 
were discharged and returned to the jurisdiction of their local 
draft boards. The strength of the enlisted reserve corps was 
approximately 35,000 men on June 30, 1917, and 80,000 on 
June 30, 1918.^ 



On April i, 1917, the Regular Army numbered 5791 officers 
and 121,797 enlisted men. The Selective Service Act permitted 
voluntary enlistment by persons between the ages of eighteen 
and forty, and at the outset enlistment was freely open to per- 
sons registered for the draft, the only restriction being that 
such registrants should not yet have been called up for examina- 
tion by their local boards. By regulations issued on December 

2 See report of adjutant-general, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1917. Vol I, p. 194; ibid., 1918; Vol. i, p. 174. Under the provisions 
of the National Defense Act creating the enlisted reserve corps, the 
term of enlistment was four years, but during the war enlistments were 
authorized with the provision that a discharge would be granted at 
the termination of the existing emergency. 



ONE ARMY 87 

15, 19 17, voluntary enlistment in the army was prohibited to 
draft registrants, irrespective of whether or not they had been 
called for examination. After this date recruiting went on 
among men above and below the draft registration ages. 

Within three months after the declaration of war, i. e. by 
June 30, 19 1 7, the enlisted strength of the Regular Army had 
grown to 238,455,^ representing a voluntary enHstment of 116, 
658 men in the interval. Between July i, 1917, and April 30, 
1918, the total number of men accepted for enlistment was 
230,509."* Further enlistments brought the total for all en- 
listments subsequent to April i, 1917, up to 390,874. On the 
arrival of American troops in Europe in considerable force, 
large numbers of drafted men were assigned to Regular Army 
organizations, bringing the total number of men in organ- 
izations classed as belonging to the Regular Army up to 
709,251, exclusive of officers, by June 30, 1918.^ 

2 
At the date of the declaration of war the National Guard 
numbered 7612 officers and 174,008 enlisted men. Of these, 
3733 officers and 76,713 men were already in Federal service; 
3879 officers and 97,895 men were in State service.® On July 
3 the President by proclamation exercised the power conferred 
on him by the Selective Service Act to draft the entire National 
Guard into the Federal service. Under this authority the 
National Guard of the several States and of the District of 
Columbia to which Federal recognition under the terms of the 
National Defense Act had been extended by the War Depart- 
ment before midnight of August 4 were drafted into Federal 
service on August 5. In the four months intervening between 
the declaration of war and that date, voluntary enlistment in 

3 Report of adjutant-general, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1917; Vol. I, p. 170, Table B. 

* Report of adjutant-general. War Department, "Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, p. 216. 

''Ibid.; p. 171. 

" " Hearings on the Army Appropriation Bill for 1919 before the 
House Committee on Military Affairs"; p. 1321. 



88 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the Guard had been going on at a rapid rate, and the total 
number of Guardsmen inducted into national service stood at 
12,115 officers and 366,956 enlisted menJ This represented 
an enlistment of 192,948 volunteers since April i. Subsequent 
enlistments brought the total of all enlistments in the National 
Guard up to 296,978. The total number of troops classed as 
National Guard amounted on June 31, 1918, exclusive of 
officers, to 417,431 men.* 

3 

The figures given in the preceding sections convey some idea 
of the extent to which advantage was taken of those provisions 
of the Selective Service Act permitting voluntary enlistment. 
In addition to enlistments in the Regular Army and National 
Guard, enlistments in the Enlisted Reserve Corps have to be 
taken into account. The total voluntary enlistment in all 
branches of the land service by months have been tabulated as 
follows by the provost-marshal general ® : 

1917 April 86,405 

May 119,470 

June 95,818 

July 7zm 

August 59,556 

September 24,367 

October 31,216 

November 45,699 

December 141,931 

igiB January 41,226 

February 26,197 

March 25,268 

April 23,165 

May 25,794 

June 27,583 

July 19,028 

August 16,859 

' " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 227. 
8 Report of chief of militia bureau, War Department, "Annual 
Report," 1918; Vol. I, p. 1 107. 
^ " Second Report of the Provost-Marshal General-" ; p. 223, Table 79. 



ONE ARMY 89 

On August 9 further volunteering was suspended by order of 
the War Department. The figures show that the number 
of volunteers forming part of our land forces in the war was 
883,519. This was the extent of the man-power yielded by the 
volunteer provisions of the Selective Service Act. It affords, 
however, no adequate criterion of the number of men who would 
have volunteered in the absence of the compulsory service ; for 
the reciprocal influence of the draft on enlistment and of enlist- 
ment on the draft was everywhere apparent. 

Thus the figures show that at certain stages the draft stimu- 
lated voluntary enlistment. In April, May, and June, 19 17, 
enlistments ran high, but dropped sharply after July. " This 
change was apparently influenced by the announcement of the 
order-numbers of the draft late in July; for thereafter the 
certainty, implied by high order-numbers, of not being liable to 
early call in the draft, removed for many persons the motive to 
enlist." ^'' Again in December the enlistment figure suddenly 
rose; this was undoubtedly due to the issuance of the order that 
after December 15 no further enlistment of registrants in the 
army was to be allowed. " In order to afford registrants an 
opportunity for voluntary enlistment before the prohibition 
against such enlistments became effective, authority was given 
on December i for the acceptance of voluntary enlistments of 
registrants not needed for current quotas of their local boards. 
This resulted in such a large number of applications for en- 
listment that the capacity of the recruiting depots was over- 
taxed, and it was necessary to divert a considerable number 
of applicants to various camps and stations for physical exam- 
ination and enlistment." ^^ 

" In short, the selective draft, in its indirect compulsory in- 
fluence, was an effective stimulant to enlistment. In spite of 
the general popularity of the selective service system as such, 
there persisted always, for many at least, the desire to enter 
military service, if needs must, by enlistment rather than by 

1"" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 224. 
^^ Report of adjutant-general. War Department, "Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, p. 210, 



90 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

draft — that is, to enter voluntarily in appearance at least. 
Thus, whenever the prospect of the draft call seemed near, 
enlistments received the benefit of the dilemma thus created," ^^ 
It seems to have been chiefly in connection with enlistments 
in the navy that freedom of enlistment operated to interfere 
with the orderly working of the draft. In the spring of 1918 
the number of men remaining liable to draft began to grow 
exceedingly limited. After December 15 draft registrants 
could no longer enlist in any branch of the army, but enlist- 
ment in the navy still remained open to them. The result was 
a rise in naval enlistments to unprecedented figures with a 
corresponding reduction in the number of men available for 
draft call. This is shown by the following table of enlistments 
in the navy and Marine Corps : 

Navy and Marine Corps 

Reserves and Reserves 

1917 April 24,593 2,635 

May 22,174 5.284 

June 50,502 3,929 

July 8,69^ 3,253 

August 4,641 1,975 

September 2,025 1,178 

October 15,292 458 

November 8,458 517 

December 31,076 i,373 

1918 January 26,860 2,149 

February 10,258 i,459 

March 11,362 677 

April 19,921 2,626 

May 24,537 5,070 

June 97,158 4.900 

July 2Zn2>'2. 8,510 

August 48,137 5,030 

Total 429,424 51,223 

In consequence of the situation thus resulting, a Presidential 
order of July 27 prohibited further enlistments of Class i 
registrants — i.e., of men immediately liable to call under the 

12 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General '' ; p. 224. 



ONE ARMY 91 

draft — in the navy or Marine Corps, and on August 8 the 
secretaries of war and of the navy suspended all further vol- 
untary enlistments altogether. 

The provost-marshal general has indicated his disapproval of 
the whole policy of combining the privilege of voluntary en- 
listment in any degree with a system of obligatory selective 
service. " Recruiting," he reports, " played havoc for a time 
with the orderly process of selection. During the period in 
which enlistments were permitted, 1,300,000 men were with- 
drawn from the available source of supply upon which the 
selective service organization relied. The volunteer plan took 
no heed of economic value ; it received as readily the man in- 
dispensable to production as it did the industrially worthless. 
We were presented with the strange anomaly of a nation which 
had entrusted its man-power to a selective organization at the 
very same breath turning over the same sources to an indis- 
criminate withdrawal by the agencies of recruitment. The 
task of accounting became highly difficult; an equitable or 
efficient apportionment of man-power between the military and 
industrial realms was imposible. Recruitment disturbed every 
phase of the scientific administration of our task and impaired 
the efficiency of the whole." ^^ 

From the sheer point of view of efficiency, this criticism is 
undoubtedly justified, but it must be remembered that there are 
other considerations which, in a democracy in particular, must 
at times be taken into account. Theoretically the principle of 
selective compulsory service produces the most equitable and 
efficient application of the man-power of the nation and con- 
sequently represents a policy which ought to be applied to the 
very limit of what is practicable ; but on the other hand human 
nature and the attitude of mind and feeling bred among Ameri- 
cans by a long course of contrary practice require imperp^tively 
to be allowed an outlet. Although to do this may some- 
what impair the maximum of efficiency theoretically attainable, 
it at the same time dissolves obstacles and opposition which 
might otherwise have threatened the success of the whole draft 

13 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 6. 



92 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

system, and to that extent a seeminof sacrifice of efficiency in 
the abstract may well have enhanced the measure of efficiency 
actually attained in fact These are at least considerations 
worth taking- into account in weighing the merits of General 
Crowder's criticism. 

4 
Turning now from the forces produced by the voluntary 
enlistment features of the act, there remain to be considered 
those raised by the draft. Men entering the army under the 
draft provisions of the act were said to be " inducted " into the 
service, induction being distinguished from enlistment. En- 
listment was voluntary and was under the direction of the 
adjutant-general of the army. Induction was under the direc- 
tion of the provost-marshal general and was. generally involun- 
tary in the sense of being upon order from selective service 
officials. The first inductions took place in September, 1917. 
The figures for that and subsequent months were as follows^* : 

1917 September 296,678 

October i63,493 

November 35.721 

December 20,320 

1918 January 23,288 

Februa^ry ....... 83.799 

March 132,484 

April 174,377 

May i . . . 372/^^3 

June 301,941 

July 401,1147 

August 282,898 

September 262,984 

October ....... 107,363 

November ........ 7,j33i 

Total 2,666,867 

I. REGISTRATION. The process by which these forces were 
raised began with the registration provided for by Section 5 

1*" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 223. 



ONE ARMY 93 

of the Selective Service Act. It had been the original idea of 
the War Department to have the registration take place through 
the same machinery that was to be employed for the process 
of selection — i. e., through the local boards. The intention had 
been to pass complete responsibility for both registration and 
selection to the States, vesting in the State governors as much 
control as possible, and making them responsible for the ap- 
pointment of all officials who were to be charged with local 
administration of the act. Congress had. however, inserted 
provisions requiring that the selective boards should be ap- 
pointed by the President. It still remained possible, however, 
to organize the registration machinery under the direct control 
of the State executives, and this was done.^^ For purposes of 
the registration, each governor was authorized to divide his 
State into geographical districts. Considerable latitude was 
allowed, the only restriction being that approximately 30,000 
inhabitants should be included within the limits of a district. 
In practice such a district corresponded generally to the limits 
of a county. In each of these districts a registration board was 
appointed by the governor. Usually this board consisted of 
the sheriff, the county health officer, and the county clerk. 
The actual unit for registration purposes was made the election 
district, so that the normal election machinery might be utilized, 
and a registrar for every 800 of population in every such 
voting precinct was appointed by the registration board. Over 
these registrars the registration boards exercised supervision, 
and the registration boards themselves were supervised by the 
governors. Each State was constituted a separate unit, and 
each governor w^as charged with the execution of the law in 
his State.^*' In actual practice the adjutant-general in each 
State was the central administrative authority of the registra- 
tion system of the State. 
By proclamation of the President dated May 18, 1917, it was 

15 "First Report of Provost-Marshal General," 1917; p. 11. 

'"Annual report, secretary of war, War Department, "Annual 
Report," 1917; Vol. i, p. 15. See also "Letter of Announcement to the 
Governors " in " First Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 7. 



94 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ordered that Tuesday, June 5, should be registration day 
throughout the United States. On the morning of that day a 
coordinated mechanism which had been created in little more 
than a fortnight stood ready for the task ; and by nightfall 
virtually the entire male population of the country between 
the ages of twenty-one and thirty had presented themselves and 
been enrolled. The total number registered, with accretions 
from tardy registrants and transferred cards up to November 
12, 1917, was 9,586.508.^^ The average number of registrants 
within the jurisdiction of a local board was 2500, the highest 
being 10,319.^^ 

2. APPORTIONMENT OF QUOTAS. The total number of men 
to be raised by the first levy of the draft was fixed at 687,000.^^ 
The next task was to apportion this national quota among the 
States in accordance with the provisions of the act. This ap- 
portionment was carried out under regulations issued by the 
President on July 5. It will be remembered that the basis of 
apportionment was to be gross population, and that each State 
was to be credited with the number of certain classes of en- 
listed men which it had already furnished. Accordingly for 
the purpose of apportioning quotas there was added to the 
total number of 687,000 men to be raised by draft the further 
number of 465,985, by way of credit, the latter figure being 
composed as follows: (a) 164,293 men who were in the mili- 
tary service as members of the National Guard on April i, 
1917; (b) 183,719 men who entered the military service of the 
United States as members of the National Guard during the 
period from April 2 to June 30, 1917, both inclusive; (c) 
117,974 men who enlisted in the Regular Army during the same 
period. It is to be observed that in apportioning quotas and 
credits no credit was given for enlistments in the naval service. 
Marine Corps, or enlisted reserve corps. This was due to the 

1'^ " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 22. 
18 Annual report, secretary of war. War Department, "Annual Re- 
port" 1917; Vol. I, p. 17. 
1^ " First Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 27. 



ONE ARMY 95 

fact that the act made no provision for crediting such enlist- 
ments. 

It will also be observed that the figure representing credits 
was added to and not subtracted from the total number of 
men to be raised as fixed by the President's call. This addition 
was necessary in order to secure the full number of men. If 
only the 687,000 had been treated as the gross quota, and the 
credits of 465,985 had then been subtracted from this gross 
total, the number of men left would have been only 221,015, 
and a further draft would have been necessary to raise the 
465,985 lacking. To prevent this circuity of operation the 
method of addition was employed. The gross quota having 
been fixed by adding 687,000 to 465,985, it was then appor- 
tioned among the States according to population, and the gross 
quota for each State was thus obtained. From this was then 
deducted the number of men whose enlistments were to be 
credited to that particular State, and in this way the net quota, 
or actual number of men to be furnished from that State by 
the draft, was arrived at. The average percentage of credits 
for enlistment to total gross quota was for the whole United 
States 40.42 per cent. For some States it was much higher, 
for others much lower. Thus Oregon was credited with over 
90 per cent, of her gross quota, leaving only 10 per cent, to be 
raised by draft. Oklahoma's credits, on the other hand, 
amounted to only 22 per cent. 

The system of credits in apportioning men to be furnished 
by the draft was carried below the States to the local regis- 
tration units or counties. The task of apportioning the States' 
draft quotas within their boundaries was entrusted to the 
governors. Each governor apportioned the State's gross quota 
among the local subdivisions on the basis of their population. 
He then determined the net quota for each subdivision by de- 
ducting from its gross quota the credits to which it was 
entitled. It thus turned out that there were a number of locali- 
ties throughout the country which had furnished by way of 
voluntary enlistment a number of men in excess of their gross 



96 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

quota and which in consequence were reheved from further 
HabiHty to furnish men by draft. Fourteen counties of the 
State of Oregon alone were included among these " banner " 
localities.^" 

The plan of thus carrying the credit system of apportion- 
ment directly down to the local community is an instance and 
illustration of one of the outstanding features of the whole 
idea of our draft — that is, its respect for and insistence upon 
the rights and interests of the local geographical unit. In the 
present instance the plan sought to secure not merely that each 
State but that each local community should not be drained of 
a larger proportion of its man-power than any other; and to 
that end each was given the benefit of the credits to which it 
was entitled. Had the State been the lowest unit entitled to 
credit, the result would have been that in filling the net quota 
of the State, communities which had already furnished a large 
number of men by enlistment would have been called on to 
furnish as many men for the draft as other communities where 
enlistments had been much fewer; with the consequence that 
the former would have been subjected to a much heavier drain 
on their available man-power, and would have had their local 
life more seriously interfered with than the latter. The method 
adopted served to prevent this and to safeguard the interests 
of all local communities equally. 

3. DETERMINING THE ORDER OF LIABILITY, The qUOtaS fof 

each subdivision having been fixed, the next task was to fill 
them by inducting the proper number of registrants into ser- 
vice. The whole number of registrants for each community 
was of course far in excess of that community's quota liability 
on the first levy ; and it was accordingly necessary to determine 
the order in which the registrants should be called. In speak- 
ing of the way in which this would be done Secretary Baker, 
in a passage already quoted. ^^ had referred to the jury-wheel. 
This was the method which had been used in the Civil War 

20 " First Report of Provost-Marshal General"; pp. 15-20. 
21 Above ; p. 66. 



ONE ARMY 97 

draft, the men from each locality having been selected by a 
local drawing. It was felt, however, that to entrust the draw- 
ing to the localities might well open a door to possible fraud 
and manipulation, and that if a central lottery could be ar- 
ranged in Washington under circumstances negativing any sug- 
gestion of favoritism, the effect on public opinion would be 
more satisfactory.^^ The method worked out was as follows : 
Each registration board caused to be numbered all the regis- 
tration cards in its possession, beginning with the number " i " 
and continuing consecutively until all the cards were numbered. 
For each board there was thus a separate series of numbers 
beginning with " i " and running parallel with the series of 
every other board. These serial numbers were assigned to the 
cards at random and without regard to alphabetical arrange- 
ment of the registrants' names in order to prevent the possi- 
bility of manipulation. The largest number of men within a 
single registration area turned out to be approximately 10,500, 
and hence the series of this board, running from i to 10,500, 
was the longest series which required to be taken into account. 
Accordingly, the numbers in the series running from i to 10,500 
were placed in a bowl and drawn out at random, the order in 
which they were drawn determining the order of liability of the 
holders. The drawing took place on Friday, July 20, in the 
public hearing-room of the Senate office building, with all the 
solemnity of a great public occasion. Each of the 10,500 num- 
bers was stamped on a slip of paper, and the slips were en- 
closed in black capsules. The capsules were then placed in a 
large glass bowl and mixed with a ladle. They were drawn 
out one at a time by blindfolded men, the first number being 
drawn by the secretary of war. The order in which any par- 
ticular number came from the bowl determined the relative 
order of liability of the man whose card bore that number. 
In short, the order of the drawing determined a series of " call- 
numbers " or " order-numbers " of the registrants. Thus if 
Serial No. 458 was the sixth number drawn from the bowl, 

22 " First Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 14. 



98 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

then in every local area the registrant whose card bore that 
number stood sixth in order of liability for draft service among 
all the registrants in that area.^^ And so on. 

4. SELECTION FOR SERVICE. The quotas of each registration 
unit and the order of liability of the registrants having been 
thus determined, the next task was that of selection — i. e., the 
elimination of men found unfit for service or entitled to ex- 
emption on one or another of the grounds provided in the act 
or specified by Presidential regulation. The machinery pro- 
vided for this purpose and the principles followed will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Here it is only necessary to 
refer to the main features of the process. The administrative 
area of approximately 30,000 of population was preserved as 
far as possible, and for each such unit a local board of three 
members was appointed by the President upon the recommen- 
dation of the governor of the State. The board members were 
residents of the districts where they served, and the personnel 
usually included a licensed physician. In many cases regis- 
tration boards were reappointed to be local boards. These 
boards examined the registr.ants and eliminated those entitled 
to exemption. 

Immediately on the completion of the order of call lists, the 
local boards began to summon registrants to fill their quota, 
beginning with the man who was No. i on the list of call- — 
or order — numbers and continuing in numerical sequence. 
The average number summoned was about twice the number re- 
quired — i.e., if a board's quota was 105, the first 210 regis- 
trants in order of liability were called up, in order to 
provide a sufficient number of men to make up for men who 
should be exempted. The quotas having been filled by elimina- 
ting the men entitled to exemption, everything was in readiness 
for the next step in the process, namely mobilization. 

5. MOBILIZATION. The mobilization of the National Army 
took place in accordance with orders issued by the adjutant- 

23 See "First Report of Provost-Marshal General," p. 14; "Second 
Report," ibid. J p. 41. 



ONE ARMY 99 

general. The latter would send to the provost-marshal general 
a requisition for a certain number of drafted men to report 
to particular camps, and the provost-marshal general would 
thereupon issue a call for these men to the local boards in the 
appropriately situated States.'* The local boards in turn would 
notify the number of men called for to report for transporta- 
tion to the mobilization camp or military post specified. When 
a man so reported he was regarded as ipso facto inducted into 
the service. The contingent, having been assembled, was there- 
upon entrained for camp. 

The time set for entrainment was generally made by the local board 
an occasion of formality and ceremony, and in most communities it 
took on the marks of public festivity. The men were assembled at the 
office of the local board, which was sometimes the court-room of the 
county-seat, or a large hall, a public school, or a municipal building. 
When the contingent was a large one, it was dr.awn up in ranks in the 
street or public square. A photographer officiated to preserve for the 
participants' families a pictured memento of the occasion. The chair- 
man made an address, reminding them of the significance of the occa- 
sion, and calling attention to the various regulations to be observed in 
their progress from home to camp. Usually other short addresses 
were made, sometimes by the mayor of the town or by other notables. 
Friends were already waiting at the railroad station. Often in the 
large cities the entire contingent was transferred from the office of 
the board to the railroad station in automobiles, lent for the purpose 
and gaily decorated. Where the contingent marched on foot to the 
station, the town band, if there was any, usually led the procession; 
crowds of friends and relatives, with mingled cheers, laughter, and 
tears, watched their passage; and a combined resonance of music, 
singing, shouting, and the din of horns announced the transit of the 
contingent through the streets. At the station sometimes the whole of 
the town would be found assembled to cheer the parting moments of 
" the boys." For the town felt that these men represented its own 
honor and patriotism ; it looked proudly upon its contribution to the 
national defense; and it was keenly desirous to make them feel that 
they represented the honor of the town, the country, and the State 
in the new service to which they were called. 

2* The call was issued to the State headquarters, which would pro- 
ceed to allocate it among the respective local boards. See " Second 
Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 236. 



100 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

This celebrative aspect of the day and moment of departure of the 
selectives became a notable feature of the system. It was in strong 
contrast with the casual and uncelebrated departure now and then of a 
single enlisted man — unnoticed except by his family. The departure 
en masse of a large contingent of selectives made it natural to focus 
publicly on this single moment the local patriotism for the war. And 
it is an undoubted fact that as the mobilization became more frequent 
and this feature became more and more noticeable, there were often 
heartburnings in the families of those other men who had enlisted, 
when they reflected upon the public applause that was given to the men 
called in the draft. 

This public celebration on the day of entrainment counted for a 
great deal in accumulating popularity for the draft; for the general 
sentiment of military patriotism came thus to be associated in an 
open and emphatic manner with the processes of the draft.^^ 

The first requisition for drafted men was issued by the 
adjutant-general on August 25, 1917, calHng for 5 per cent, of 
the national quota to be delivered at camp beginning Septem- 
ber 5. The second call was for 40 per cent, to be delivered 
beginning September 19. Because of the delay met with in 
completing certain cantonments, the third call, which was for 
men to be delivered October 3, was unevenly distributed, as 
many as 40 per cent, of the quota being called from territory 
tributary to certain cantonments, while a much smaller per- 
centage was called to others.-*' By December 20, 191 7, the 
total number of drafted men mobilized amounted to about 
527,100, or 76.72 per cent, of the 687,000 called in the first 
levy. 

5 

Before going on to deal with the mobilization of drafted men 
during 1918 and with the extension of draft liability in that 
year, it seems desirable to say something about the plant 
provided for organizing the draft contingents into a military 
machine. This plant was made up of a system of great mo- 
bilization-and training-camps distributed more or less evenly 
through the country. Another series of camps was estab- 

25 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 237. 
28 "First Report of Provost-Marshal General"; pp. 26-27. 



ONE ARMY 



lOT 



Hshed for organizing and training the National Guard ; and the 
two may be considered together. 

The plans of the general staff called for the organization of 
the National Guard into sixteen army divisions, each to be 
mobilized and trained at a separate camp.^^ At the same time 
it was planned to mobilize the National Army of drafted men 
in sixteen camps, one to be located in each of the military 
divisions of the country. The plans thus called for the con- 
struction of thirty-two cantonments. Because of lack of ap- 
propriations, however, and for other reasons, it was determined 
not to construct wooden cantonments for the National Guard, 
but to house them under canvas. This required that the Na- 
tional Guard camps should be virtually all situated in the 
Southern States, where reasonably warm weather during the 
winter months might be expected.^^ Accordingly the follow- 
ing National Guard Camps were established: 



Division Number 



Consisting of Na- 
tional Guard 
following States 



Location of camp 



Twenty- Sixth 



Twenty- Seventh 



New Hampshire 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode Island 
Connecticut 

New York 



Camp Greene, Char- 
lotte, North Carolina 



Camp Wadsworth, 
Spartanburg, South 
Carolina 



Twenty-Eighth 



Pennsylvania 



Camp Hancock, Au- 
gusta, Georgia 



New Jersey 
Virginia 
Twenty-Ninth -| Maryland Camp McClellan, An- 

Delaware niston, Alabama 

District of Columbia 

27 1917, General Order No. loi. 

28 Report of secretary of war. War Department, " Annual Report ' 
1917; Vol. I, p. 25. 



102 



THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



Thirtieth 



{Tennessee 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 



Camp Sevier, Green- 
ville, South Carolina 



Thirty-First 



[Georgia 
J. Alabama 
[ploridia 



Camp Wheeler, Ma- 
con, Georgia 



Thirty-Second 



Michigan 
Wisconsin 



Camp MacArthur, 
Waco, Texas 



Thirty-Third 



Illinois 



Camp Logan, Hous- 
ton, Texas 



Thirty-Fourth 



'Minnesota 
Iowa 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 



Camp Cody, Deming, 
New Mexico 



Thirty-Fifth 



Missouri 
Kansas 



Camp Doniphan, Fort 
Sill, Oklahoma 



Thirty-Sixth 



I Texas 
Oklahoma 



Camp Bowie, Fort 
Worth, Texas 



Thirty- Seventh 



Thirty-Eighth 



Thirty-Ninth 



Ohio 



Indiana 
Kentucky 
West Virginia 

("Louisiana 
' ]Mississippi 
Arkansas 



Camp Sheridan, Mont- 
gomery, Alabama 



Camp Shelby, Hatties- 
burg, Mississippi 



Camp Beauregard, 
Alexandria, Louisiana 





ONE ARMY 


103 




California 






Utah 




Fortieth 


Colorado 


Camp Kearney, Linda 




Arizona 
New Mexico 
Nevada 29 

"Washington 


Vista, California 




Oregon 


Camp Fremont, Palo 


Forty-First 30 


Montana 
Idaho 
^Wyoming 


Alto, California 



The foregoing table ^""^ illustrates the adherence of the War 
Department to its poHcy of organizing the army as far as pos- 
sible on the principle of geographical neighborhood. By ex- 
press provision of the Selective Service Act, the same policy 
was carried out in the case of the National Army. The draft 
contingents from the various States were concentrated in can- 
tonments as follows : ^^ 



Name of 



Location 



Camp 
Devens Ayer, Mass. 



Drafted Men Number of drafted men 



from 

Maine 

New Hampshire 

Vermont 

Massachusetts 

Rhode Island 

Connecticut 

New York (part) 32 



received, September- 
December, 19 I 7, in- 
clusive 

37,141 



Upton Yaphank, N. Y. New York (part) 22 23,210 

29 Nevada furnished no National Guard contingent. 

80 An additional division, the Forty-Second or Rainbow Division, 
whose organization was authorized in August, 1917, was made up 
of scattered units from twenty-six States and the District of Columbia. 

80a Prom report of chief of militia bureau. War Department, "An- 
nual Report," 1918; Vol. i, p. 1103. 

31 See report of surgeon-general, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, pp. 367-404. 



104 



THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



Dix Wrightstown. New 

Jersey 



Meade Annapolis Junction, 
Maryland 



Lee Petersburg, Virginia 

Taylor Louisville, Kentucky 

Sherman Chillicothe, Ohio 

Custer Battle Creek, Mich- 
igan 

Grant Rockford, Illinois 
Dodge Des Moines, Iowa 

Funston Junction City, Kansas 



New Jersey 


25,818 


Delaware 




New York (part) 32 




Pennsylvania 


36,850 


Maryland 




District of Columbia 




Pennsylvania (western) 


39.859 


West Virginia 




Virginia 




Kentucky 


27,507 


Indiana 




Illinois (southern) 




Ohio 


36,161 


Pennsylvania (western) 




Michigan 


27,516 


Wisconsin (eastern) 




Illinois (northern)' 


26,343 


Wisconsin 




Iowa 


24,179 


Minnesota 




North Dakota 




Illinois (central) 




Kansas 


39,836 


Missouri 




Nebraska 




South Dakota 




Colorado 




New Mexico 




Arizona 





32 Men from northeastern New York were sent to Camp Devens; 
men from New York City and the adjacent counties of Westchester, 
Putnam, and Dutchess, and from Long Island were sent to Camp 
Upton; men from west of the Hudson River to Camp Dix. 



ONE ARMY 



105 



Lewis American Lake, 
Washington 



Jackson Columbia, South Car- 
olina 

Gordon Chamblie, Georgia 
Pike Little Rock, Arkansas 

Travis San Antonio, Texas 



Washington 

Oregon 

Idaho 

Montana 

Wyoming 

Utah 

Nevada 

California 

North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Florida 



45,463 



18,892 



21,600 



Georgia 
Tennessee 
Alabama (eastern) 

Arkansas 24,974 

Louisiana 

Mississippi 

Alabama (eastern) 

Texas 17,805 

Oklahoma 



The construction of the National Army cantonments was one 
of the great engineering feats of the war. Each cantonment 
was virtually a city designed to house 40,000 men. When 
complete, it comprised between 1000 and 2000 wooden build- 
ings and covered about 2000 acres of land. Rifle-range, drill, 
parade, and manoeuver grounds covered 2000 acres more. In 
many cases all, or a large part, of the site had to be first 
cleared of woods and stumps. About twenty-five miles of 
roads had to be built at each cantonment, and sewers, water- 
supply, and lighting systems installed. Contracts were let dur- 
ing June, and by October ^^ every cantonment was virtually 
ready to receive its initial contingent of drafted men. The 
construction of the National Guard camps was not so great an 
undertaking because at these camps the men were housed 
under canvas and not in wooden barracks. Only wooden store- 
houses, kitchens, mess-rooms, and hospitals had to be built. 

33 Report of secretary of war, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1917; Vol. I, p. 29. 



io6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The difTerence is reflected in the comparative costs of the two 
classes of camps. The total cost of the sixteen National Army 
cantonments amounted to $140,726,473, or an average of more 
than $8,000,000 apiece. The cost of the sixteen National 
Guard camps was only $38,375,272, or an average of not quite 
$2,500,000 for each.^* 

At each of the National Army cantonments steps were taken 
to organize an infantry division. ^'^ Sixteen divisions of drafted 
men were thus provided in addition to the sixteen National 
Guard divisions already mentioned. The class of troops of 
which each division was composed was indicated by the des- 
ignating number assigned to it. Thus all divisions composed 
of Regulars were to be numbered from i to 25, inclusive ; the 
National Guard divisions were numbered from 26 to 42 inclu- 
sive; while the National Army divisions consisting of drafted 
men were numbered from 76 upward.^*' The National Army 
divisions, and the camp at which each was organized, were as 
follows : ^'' 

Division Number 38 Organized at Camp 

Seventy-Sixth Devens 

Seventy-Seventh Upton 

Seventy-Eighth Dix 

Seventy-Ninth Meade 

34 "Hearings before the House MiHtary Affairs Committee on the 
Army Appropriation Bill for 1919"; Vol. i, p. 895. The National 
Army cantonments were intended to be more or less permanent, receiv- 
ing a continual influx of drafted men to replace those sent overseas 
while, on the other hand, the purpose of each National Guard camp 
was accomplished when the division which it housed embarked for 
Franco. 

3s 1917, General Order No. 101. 

36 1917, General Order No. 88; General Order No. 115. 

37 1917, General Order No. 95. 

38 For the States from which the men forming these divisions came, 
see list of cantonments, pp. 103 ff. above. 



ONE ARMY 107 

Eightieth Lee 

Eighty-First Jackson 

Eighty-Second Gordon 

Eighty-Third Sherman 

Eighty-Fourth Taylor 

Eighty-Fifth Custer 

Eighty-Sixth Grant 

Eighty-Seventh Pike 

Eighty-Eighth Dodge 

Eighty-Ninth Funston 

Ninetieth Travis 

Ninety-First ^sa Lewis 

The composition of an infantry division was the same for 
the Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army, and 
by general order of August 3, 1917, was prescribed as fol- 
lows : ^^ 

I division headquarters 

1 machine-gun battalion of 4 companies 

2 infantry brigades of 2 regiments and 

I machine-gun battalion (3 companies) each 
I field artillery brigade of 3 regiments and 

I trench motor battery 
I engineer regiment 
I field signal battalion 
I train of headquarters and military police 
I ammunition train 
I supply train 
I engineer train 

I sanitary train of 4 field hospital companies 
and 4 ambulance companies. 
A division so composed numbered about 27,000 men.^" 

With the arrival of the drafted men in camp, they were 
subjected to a physical examination which resulted in the re- 

3®^ An additional division, the Ninety-Second, was made up of negro 
troops. 

2^ 1917, General Order No. loi ; General Order No. 109. 

^•^ " Hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee on the 
Army Appropriation Bill for 1919"; Vol. i, p. 1348. 



io8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

jection of many men who had successfully passed the tests given 
by their local boards.*^ Such men as it was thought possible to 
get into fit condition for ultimate military service were assigned 
to " development " battalions ; and to these battalions were also 
assigned illiterates and non-English speaking drafted men.^^ 
Special schools were established at the cantonments for bakers, 
cooks, horseshoers, teamsters, saddlers, and packers,^^ and to 
these were assigned men with the necessary qualifications in 
sufficient numbers to meet the needs of the cantonment for 
these classes of service. When the training of a division had 
been completed, it entrained at the cantonment for an embarka- 
tion-camp, where it took shipping for service abroad ; and steps 
were taken to form another division at the cantonment which it 
had left. 

To care for the troop movement two embarkation-camps 
were established near New York and a third at Newport News, 
Virginia. The Northern camps were Camp Merritt, at Tenafly, 
New Jersey, and Camp Mills, on Long Island. Each of these 
had a capacity of approximately 40,000 men.** Camp Stewart 
at Newport News had a capacity of about 20,000.*^ 



In the spring of 1918 it was feared that the yield of eflfec- 
tive troops from the first draft registration would not be 
sufficient to meet the severe demands made so obvious by the 
great German drive then in progress. Accordingly Congress 

1*1 Report of secretary of war, War Department, "Annual Report," 
191 7; Vol. I, p. 30. 

42 Report of chief of staff. War Department, "Annual Report," 1918; 
Vol. I, p. 151. 

43 See 1917, General Order No. 99; General Order No. 144: 1918, 
General Order No. 4; General Order No. 82. 

*4 Report of secretary of war. War Department, "Annual Report," 
191 7; Vol. 1, p. 30- 

'*•• "Hearings Before House Military Affairs Committee on Army 
Appropriation Bill for 1919"; Vol. i, p. 934. 



ONE ARMY 109 

passed a joint resolution, which was approved by the President 
on May 20, requiring the registration of all males who should 
have attained the age of twenty-one between June 5, 19 17, and 
the day which the President should set for their registration.*^ 
Under this authority was conducted the second registration,*^ 
which resulted in the enrollment of approximately 735,834 new 
registrants. A further supplementary registration was held on 
August 24, which added 159,161 additional names to the enroll- 
ment."** Under the classification system which will be de- 
scribed in the following chapter, men subject to immediate call 
in the draft were placed after December 15, 1917, in Class I. 
These men constituted the actual efifectives among the regis- 
trants. Their number, rather than the total number of regis- 
trants, represented the actual reservoir of man-power which 
was at hand to draw upon. In order, then to' discover the 
resources of man-power made available to the nation for its 
military effort by the first three registrations, it is necessary to 
look to the number of men in Class I. The figures are as 
follows :*" 

Total registrants June 5, 1917- September 11, igi8 10,679,814 
Inductions, cancellations, and desertions before Dec- 
ember 15, 1917 ^° 727,079 
Net classified after December 15, 1917 9,952,735 

Deferments and exemptions 6,973,270 

Placed in Class I as of record November i, 1918 2,979,465 

Deductions for non-effectives ^^ 839,315 

Net effectives in Class I after December 15, 1917 2,140,000 

■*^ "Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, Second Session ; 
p. 6765. 
47 Held June 5, 1918. 

*s " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; pp. 22-24. 
■*9 Tables 63 and 64, " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; 

pp. I73-174. 

50 When the classification system went into efl^ect. 

^'^ This group included delinquents, persons qualified for only a 
limited service, members of non-combatant religious bodies, persons 
suspended in Emergency Fleet employment, etc. 



no THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

As against this fiugure of 2,140,000 effectives, the total induc- 
tions from January i to September i, 1918, amounted to 
1,772,977, leaving a remainder of less than 400,000. This 
total was dangerously near to being offset by the withdrawal 
of a large number of Class I men who enlisted in the navy and 
the Marine Corps. Making allowance for such enlistments, 
less than 100,000 effectives would have been available by Sep- 
tember. This was the prospect which became evident to the 
War Department in the course of the summer of 1918, and 
made essential the formulation of some plan to increase the 
supply of man-power. There were only two ways in which 
this could be done, by dipping for future needs into the 
deferred classes, or by extending the draft ages. The first 
course would have produced exactly the economic disturbance 
which the draft system was intended to prevent, so that only 
the second was open. How far the draft ages would have to 
be extended depended upon the number of troops which it was 
necessary to supply. The answer to this question was given 
by the new military program which the chief of staff laid 
before the President on July 18, 1918, and which called for an 
army of eighty divisions in France and eighteen at home by 
June 30, 19 19. To bring the army up to this figure required 
a further addition of 2,000,000 men to our forces between 
October, 1918, and June, 1919.''''^ It was necessary to determine 
what combination of age groups would yield the largest number 
of effectives. A computation made by the office of the provost- 
marshal general estimated that 1,569,720 effectives would be 
afforded by extending the draft to cover all males between nine- 
teen and twenty, and between thirty-two and forty; that 1,722,- 
870 would be afforded by the groups between nineteen and 
twenty, and thirty-two and forty-five ; and 2,398,845 by the age 
groups from eighteen to twenty and from thirty-two to forty- 
•'•2 See testimony of General March in "Hearings Before the House 
Military Affairs Committee." August 19, 1918; p. 43. A division of 
27,000 men required support troops back of the line in such numbers as 
io bring the total necessary force up to about 45,000 men for each division. 



ONE ARMY III 

five. Only the last and most extensive of these three com- 
binations would meet the requirements of the program.^^ 

In accordance with these considerations, a bill was drafted 
and introduced into Congress on August 5, 1918, to extend the 
I'egistration ages down to eighteen and up to forty-five. There 
was a very great reluctance on the part of Congress to draft 
into the army youths of as low an age as eighteen; but on its 
becoming clear that only by so doing could the military program 
be met, other considerations gave way before the necessity, and 
the bill was psassed. ^* It extended the act of May 18, 1917, by 
making liable to military service all male citizens and persons 
who had declared their intention to become citizens between the 
ages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive. It further de- 
fined these persons as those " who shall have attained their 
eighteenth birthday, and shall not have attained their forty- 
sixth birthday on or before the day set for registration," and 
it provided for future expanding needs by authorizing 
the President at later intervals to require the registration 
of those who from time to time should reach the age of 
eighteen. 

On the passage of the act the President named September 
12 as registration day; and on that day 13,395,706 persons 
were enrolled. ^^ Because of the conclusion of the armistice on 
November 11, none of these were inducted into the service; 
but classifications and examinations had progressed so rapidly 
that on that date 270.000 effectives from the new registration 
were available for call.^^ 



This seems the appropriate point at which to take a general 
view of the mobilization of man-power effected under the pro- 

53 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; pp. 24-25. 

^■* August 31, 1918; 40 Statutes at Large; p. 955. 

^^ Including tardy registrations to October 30. 

''G" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 177. 



112 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

visions of the two Selective Service Acts of May i8, 1917, 
and August 31, 1918. The figures are as follows: 

Estimated total male population of United States, all ages, 

September 12, 1918 54,340,000 

Ages 18-45 registered June 5, 1917-September 12, 1918 23,908,576 

Military forces raised April i, 1917-November 11, 1918 3,891,540 

Military forces in existence, April i, 1917 291,880 

Estimated Class I available November 11, 1918 2,340,000 

Total military forces capable of being put into the field 6,523.420 

In order to appreciate the relation of the last figure to the 
total population of the country we must add to it the 605,952 
men in the navy and Marine Corps on November 11, 1918, 
thus bringing up to 7,129,372 the total number of men then 
actually in fighting branches of the service or available for such 
service under existing law. This represents about 28 per cent, 
of the male population of the military ages from eighteen to 
forty-five and a little over 13 per cent, of the total male popu- 
lation. With this may be compared the following figures for 
Great Britain: 

Estimated total males, all ages, 1918 22,827,261 

Estimated males, 18-45 9,800,000 

Called to the colors up to November, 1918 5.854.359 

Percentage of males 18-45 called to the colors 59-74 

Another set of figures shows the parts played in the increase 
of our army between April i, 1917, and November 11, 1918, 
by voluntary enlistment and the selective draft respectively :^^* 

Increase Per Cent, of 

Total Increase in the Army Total Increase 

April 4, 1917-November II, 1918 3,893,340 100. 

By commissions granted 203,786 5.23 

By induction 2,810,296 72.18 

By enlistment 877,458 22.54 

Regular Army 390,874 10.04 

56a This talkie is reprinted from "Second Report of the Provost-Mar- 
shal General " ; p. 227. The figures display certain obvious inconsis- 
tencies which the provost-marshal general explains as due to duplica- 
tion. 



ONE ARMY 113 

National Guard 296,978 7.63 

Reserve Corps (and 

National Army) 189,606 4.87 

United States Guards ^'' 

As has already been remarked, these figures afford no de- 
pendable criterion of the number of men who would have vol- 
unteered in the absence of compulsory liability because of the 
strong influence of the draft on vclunteering. 



Under the quota system of apportionment with its accom- 
panying allotment of credits, the ratio in which the various 
States contributed to the enlargement of the army between 
April I, 1917, and November 11, 1918, was proportioned so far 
as possible to their available supply of man-power. The larg- 
est number of men was accordingly contributed by New York 
— 342,620 in all, of whom 89,031 entered the army by volun- 
tary enlistment and 253,589 by draft. Pennsylvania came sec- 
ond with a total of 279,882 — 78,671 by enlistment and 
201,211 by draft. The third place was occupied by Illinois 
with a total of 239,421 — 61,938 by enhstment and 177,483 by 
draft. These were the only three States contributing more 
than 200,000. Ohio, Texas, Michigan, Missouri, Massachu- 
setts, and California in the order named contributed each 
more than 100,000. Full figures for all the States are given 
in the footnote.^^ 

s^ This was a body organized from rejected selectives, persons above 
the draft age, etc., for guard duty and plant protection in the United 
States. See report of chief of militia bureau. War Department, 
"Annual Report," 1918; Vol. i, p. 1154. 

^8 Contributions of the States to the increase of the army, April i, 
1917-November II, 1918, in the order of number of men contributed: 





By Voluntary 


By 


Induction 


Total 




Enlistment 








New York 


89,031 




253,589 


342,620 


Pennsylvania 


78.671 




201,211 


279,882 


Illinois 


61,938 




177,483 


239,421 


Ohio 


48,885 




138,148 


187,033 



114 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Quotas for the first levy of 687,000 drafted men were 
allocated among the States on the basis of gross population. 
This method, as has been pointed out, was essentially unfair, 
in that it bore with undue heaviness on States and localities 
having a large population of aliens or persons for other reasons 
exempt from draft service. This became the more evident 
with the adoption of the classification system, whereby all 
men immediately available for military service were grouped 
in Class I, the other classes being deferred on the ground of 
dependency, of occupation in an essential employment, or some 
similar reason. The adoption of this system carried with it as 
a necessary corollary the basing of quotas upon immediate avail- 
ability for service. Without such a rule we should have been 
before long confronted with the intolerable situation of hav- 
ing one community furnishing its contingents from Class I 





By Voluntary 


By Induction 


Total 




Enlistment 






Texas 


37,704 


117,395 


155,099 


Michigan 


32403 


96,480 


128,883 


Missouri 


29,863 


92,843 


124,706 


Massachusetts 


41,985 


76,567 


118,552 


California 


38,992 


67,067 


106,059 


New Jersey- 


28,333 


71.390 


99,723 


Indiana 


25.847 


69.749 


95,596 


Minnesota 


20,272 


73,680 


93,952 


Wisconsin 


22,349 


70,982 


93,331 


Iowa 


26,389 


66.864 


93,253 


Georgia 


14,160 


66,841 


81,001 


Oklahoma 


14,105 


64,941 


79,046 


Tennessee 


13,563 


59.878 


73,441 


Kentucky 


13,934 


58,330 


72,264 


Alabama 


9,562 


59,755 


69,317 


North Carolina 


10,573 


58,441 


69,014 


Virginia 


10,556 


58,337 


68,893 


Louisiana 


7.570 


56,205 


63,775 


Arkansas 


11,699 


49,312 


61,011 


Kansas 


18,217 


41,705 


60,122 


West Virginia 


7,359 


45,355 


52,714 


Mississippi 


9,044 


43,362 


52,406 


South Carolina 


6,505 


44,059 


50,564 



ONE ARMY 



"5 



while another locahty would have been drawing upon, say, 
Class IV. Such a result was contrary to the whole spirit and 
purpose of the classification system. Class I had to be ex- 
hausted nationally before a more deferred class could be made 
subject to military duty.^^ Accordingly a joint resolution 
was introduced in Congress on January 15, 1918, authorizing 
the President to apportion quotas not by population but by 
the number of men in Class I. As further voluntary enlist- 
ment of men in this class had already been prohibited, the 
resolution also provided for a repeal of the provision requiring 
the deduction of credits for enlistments.*^'' This resolution was 





By Voluntary 


By Induction 


Total 




Enlistment 






Connecticut 


13-151 


32,539 


45,690 


Nebraska 


14,416 


21,807 


44,223 


Maryland 


10,144. 


33,867 


44,011 


Washington 


12,761 


28,686 


41,447 


Montana 


7,331 


27,340 


34,671 


Colorado 


9,670 


22,858 


32,528 


Florida 


6,834 


24,916 


31,750 


South Dakota 


7,083 


21,255 


28,338 


Oregon 


10,626 


16,158 


26,784 


North Dakota 


6,611 


18,595 


25,205 


Maine 


7,290 


15,266 


22,556 


Idaho 


4,955 


12,556 


17,511 


Rhode Island 


5,436 


11,176 


16,612 


Porto Rico 


7S6 


15,734 


16,490 


Utah 


5.335' 


10,788 


16,123 


District of Columbia 


4442 


9,631 


13,073 


New Hampshire 


4,408 


8,404 


12,812 


New Mexico 


3,649 


8,862 


12,511 


Wyoming 


3>554 


7,923 


11,477 


Arizona 


1,854 


8,113 


9,967 


Vermont 


3,088 


6,629 


9,717 


Delaware 


2,003 


4,993 


6,996 


Hawaii 


267 


5,466 


5,733 


Nevada 


1,888 


3,164 


5,052 


Alaska 


143 


1,963 


2,105 


Not allocated 


254 





254 



59 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 5. 
«o/&i</.; p. 216. 



ii6 



THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



finally passed on May i6, 1918.*'"'' The three months' delay 
between the introduction of the resolution and its passage 
brought about a situation which well illustrates the adminis- 
trative confusion and uncertainty entailed by the leisurely 
processes of Congressional action. In the interval new calls 
had to be apportioned on the old population basis and subse- 
quently rectified after the final passage of the resolution. 
This threw an increased and unnecessary burden of account- 
ing work on the office of the provost-marshal general. 



The first units of the American Expeditionary Force reached 
France in June, 19 17. The subsequent growth of the army 
overseas as compared with the strength of the army in the 
United States in corresponding months is shown in approxi- 
mate figures by the following table^^ : 



Date 




In United 
States and 


In the 
American 


Total 






Foreign Pos- 


Expeditionary 






sessions 


Force 




1917 April I 




190,000 




190,000 


July I 




480,000 


20,000 


500,000 


August I 




516,000 


35,000 


551,000 


September 


I 


646,000 


45,000 


691,000 


October i 




883,000 


65,000 


948,000 


November 


I 


996,000 


104,000 


1,100,000 


December 


1 


1,160,000 


129,000 


1,189,000 


1918 January i 




1,149,000 


176,000 


1,325,000 


February 


I 


1,257,000 


225,000 


1 ,482,000 


March i 




1,386,000 


253,000 


1,639,000 


April I 




1,476,000 


320,000 


1,796,000 


May I 




1,529,000 


424,000 


1,953,000 


June I 




1,300,000 


722,000 


2,112,000 


July I 




1,384,000 


996,000 


2.380,000 


August 1 




1,365,000 


1,293,000 


2,658,000 


September 


I 


1,425,000 


1,576,000 


3,001,000 


October i 




1,599,000 


1,834,000 


3,433.000 


November 


I 


1,672,000 


1,993,000 


3,665,000 


♦""»40 Statutes at 


Large ; 


p. 554- 






•'i Secretary of war, annii 


lal report, in 


War Department, " Annual 


Report," 1918; Vol. i 


[, p. II. 









ONE ARMY 117 

This table shows the marvelous troop movement v^hich 
took place in the late spring and summer of 1918 — a move- 
ment worthy to be called, as Secretary Baker has called 
it, the " transport miracle." To tell the story in his own 
words : 

Movement of troops overseas began, at the earnest solicitation of 
our co-belligerents, very soon after our entrance into the war. May, 
1917, saw the despatch abroad of a selected personnel to the number 
of 1718. In June 12,261 troops and 2798 marines were embarked. By 
the end of the year, as the former German liners came into service, 
embarkations increased to a rate of 50,000 a month. By the end of 
December 187,916 troops and 7579 marines had been embarked. At 
this point negotiations were entered into with the British Government 
by which three of its big fast liners and four smaller troop-ships 
were definitely assigned to the service of our army. In March the 
movement jumped to 83,782 troops and 1081 marines. It was in this 
month that the great German spring drive took place in Picardy, 
with a success that threatened to result in a German victory. Every 
ship that could be secured was pressed into service, and the aid fur- 
nished by the British was greatly increased. It was then that the 
transport miracle took place. In April 117,205 troops and 1432 marines 
were embarked ; in May 244,344 troops and 1606 marines ; in June 
the numbers were 277,gyi and 777. Before the first of July, 1,000,000 
men had been embarked. The July record exceeded all expectations, 
the number of troops embarked being 306,185, and before the end of 
October the second million men had sailed from our shores. During 
the three months, June, July, and August, 875,753 men were embarked, 
and if May be added, the total for the four months is 1,121,703. When 
the armistice was signed, the total embarkations amounted to 2,005,169 
troops and 30,665 marines. 

No troop movement such as that of last summer [1918] had ever 
been contemplated, and no movement of any such number of troops 
by water such a distance and in such a time ever occurred. The 
performance stands unique in the world's history. Furthermore, this 
performance wrought a decisive effect upon the world's history at one 
of its great critical junctures. 

Credit for this movement must be shared with the Allies, and with 
the British in particular, since approximately half of the troops were 
carried in their ships. At the same time it must be recognized that 
under the pressure of the critical situation on the western front, ways 
were found to increase the loading of our own transports by as much 
as 50 per cent., and that our transports exceeded those of the Allies 



ii8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

both in the extent to which they were loaded and the speed of their 
turn-around. ''^ 

Secretary Baker's report contains an interesting comparison 
between the development of the British and American expe- 
ditionary forces. " The British forces in France chmbed 
to one milhon men in the fall of 191 5, and to a high figure 
of slightly more than two million troops in the summer of 
1917, three years after England entered the war. In nine- 
teen months after the United States entered the war, we 
were represented overseas by an army of two million men. 
The growth of the American force was thus twice as rapid 
as that of the British force. It must be borne in mind that 
the British practically from the beginning used large numbers 
of men to fill gaps left by casualties, while the American 
troops could for many months apply practically every man 
to building up the force. But, considering the difficulties of 
overseas shipment, of establishing thousands of miles of 
communication, of mobilizing and supplying such an enormous 
army operating on foreign soil, the building up of the Ameri- 
can Expeditionary Force must rank as one of the great military 
achivements of all time." ^^ 

The growth of the various arms of the service from the 
outbreak of the war to the conclusion of the armistice is 
shown by the following table"*: 

March, November, 
1917 1918 

Infantry and machine-gun 85,000 974,ooo 

Engineer 3.000 394.000 

Field artillery and ammunition train . . 9,000 389,000 

Medical 7,000 300,000 

Quartermaster 8,000 228,000 

Coast artillery 21,000 I37,ooo 

Ordnance 1,000 64,000 

«2 Annual report of secretary of war, in War Department, "Annual 
Report," 1918; Vol. 1, p. 30. 
^3 Ibid.; p. 12. 
^*lbid.; p. 13. 



ONE ARMY 



119 



Signal . . . 
Air sen'ice . 
Cavalry 

Motor transport 
Militia Bureau 
Chemical warfare 
Tank .... 
Men in training . 
All other . . 



March, 
1917 
3,000 

22,000 



31,000 



November, 
1918 

52,000 

202,000 
29,000 

103,000 
27,000 
18,000 
14,000 

549,000 
185,000 



Total 190,000 3,665,000 



10 

The immense and rapid expansion of the army outlined in 
the foregoing paragraph confronted the War Department from 
the outset with the problem of providing a sufficient supply 
of officers. Statutory authority was given in the Selective 
Service Act of May 18, 191 7, the provision reading as fol- 
lows :^^ 

The President is hereby authorized ... to provide the necessary 
officers ... for the forces hereby authorized ... by ordering members 
of the officers' reserve corps to temporary duty in accordance with the 
provisions of [the National Defense Act], from the members of the 
National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, from 
those who have been graduated from educational institutions at which 
military instruction is compulsory, or from those who have had honor- 
able service in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or in the 
volunteer forces, or from the country at large ; by assigning retired 
officers of the Regular Army to active duty with such force . . .; 
or by the appointment of retired officers and enlisted men, active or 
retired, of the Regular Army as commissioned officers in such forces. 

The officers' reserve corps had been established, as we have 
seen, by the National Defense Act of 1916; but the number 
of officers who had been commissioned in it in the short 
ten months of its existence was naturally insufficient to meet 
the demand caused by the increase of the army for the war. 
It was decided therefore to offer a three months' course of 

fi^Act of May 18, 1917; Section i, sub-section 3. 



120 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

intensive training to qualified civilians at summer training- 
camps modeled on the Plattsburg idea. These camps were 
established under authority of Section 54 of the National 
Defense Act: 

The secretary of war is hereby authorized to maintain upon mili- 
tary reservations or elsewhere, camps for the military instruction 
and training, of such citizens as may be selected for such instruction 
and training upon their application and under such terms of enlist- 
ment and regulation as may be prescribed by the secretary of war. 

Sixteen camps were established, located at Plattsburg 
Barracks, New York (two camps) ; Madison Barracks, New 
York; Fort Niagara, New York; Fort Myer, Virginia; Fort 
Oglethorpe, Georgia ; Fort l^IcPherson, Georgia ; Fort Benja- 
min Harrison, Indiana (two camps) ; Fort Sheridan, Illinois 
(two camps) ; Fort Logan H. Roots, Arkansas; Fort Snelling, 
Minnesota ; Fort Riley, Kansas ; Leon Springs, Texas ; and 
the Presidio of San Francisco, California. 

Before the opening of the training-camps, 7957 officers had 
been commissioned in the officers' reserve corps. They were 
required to attend these camps, either as instructors or students, 
and were subject to regrading or discharge in accordance 
with the War Department's policy of commissioning officers 
only on the basis of demonstrated ability after three months' 
observation and training. 

In addition to these reserv^e officers, somewhat more than 
30,000 candidates, selected from a much larger number who 
applied, reported at the camps for training, a rough attempt 
being made to apportion the accepted candidates among the 
States. At the conclusion of this first series of camps in 
August, 1917, a total of 27,341 candidates were graduated and 
commissioned. The great majority — more than 25,000 — 
were commissioned in the officers' reserve corps. The re- 
mainder, selected by a special examination,^" were given 
provisional commissions as second lieutenants in the Regular 

«6 Report of adjutant-general, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, p. 176. 



ONE ARMY 121 

Army^''; and in this way was filled up the roster of officers 
of the latter organization, to which substantial additions were 
made necessary by reason of the increase in its size authorized 
by the Selective Service Act. The results obtained from the 
first series of camps were so satisfactory that a second series 
was held, lasting from August 27 to November 2^, 19 17, which 
were attended by approximately 20,000 students and which 
resulted in the commissioning of 17,237 officers. A third 
series of camps began on January 5, 1918, and lasted until 
April 19. From this series of camps 11,657 candidates were 
graduated and commissioned. 

The first two series of camps were made up almost entirely 
of candidates drawn from civil life, and because of the need 
for officers of all grades commissions were granted up to the 
grade of colonel. Approximately 90 per cent, of the students 
admitted to the third series of camps, on the other hand, were 
selected from the enlisted personnel of the army, and the other 
10 per cent, from civilians of draft age who had received 
military training at educational institutions where such train- 
ing was conducted under the direction of an army officer. 
The candidates in this series of camps were, upon successful 
completion of the course, all listed as eligible for appointment 
as second lieutenants. Because of the character of the at- 
tendants, the third series of training camps were situated at 
National Guard camps and National Army cantonments."^ 

The commissions issued to successful candidates at the first 
three series of camps were distributed among the several 
grades and arms of the service as follows : 

Lieu- 
Col- tenant- 







First 


Second 






Cap- 


Lieu- 


Lieu- 


Aggre- 


Major 


tain 


tenant 


tenant 


gate 


185 


3,379 


7.66s 


23,346 


34,578 


18 


251 


258 


1,371 


1,898 



Infantry 2 i 

Cavalry 

"^ Under Section 23 of the National Defense Act. 

^^ Twenty-two of the schools were located at such camps and canton- 
ments, one was located at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, and one at Leon 
Springs, Texas. 



122 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 





Lieu- 






First 


Second 




Col- 


tenant- 




Cap- 


Lieu- 


Lieu- 


Aggre- 


onel Colonel 


Major 


tain 


tenant 


tenant 


gate 


Field artillery 




Z7 


849 


2,128 


8,540 


11,554 


Coast artillery- 




I 


329 


575' 


1,158 


2,063 


Engineers 




50 


419 


747 


750 


1,966 


Quartermaster 










3,067 


3,067 


Statistical 








75 


77 


152 


Ordnance 




2 


147 


407 


211 


767 


Signal corps 


j I 


I 

294 


55 
5,429 


519 


687 


1,262 


Total i 


12,374 


39,207 


57,307 



A fourth series of officers' training schools was estabhshed 
on May 15, 1918, with an initial enrollment of 13,114. These 
schools were located in twenty-four National Guard and 
National Army divisions. Under the regulations, they were 
an integral part of the division wherein located, and if the 
division moved, the school was to accompany it. Because, 
however, of the urgent need for line officers in this country to 
conduct the training of the draft army, these schools were 
separated from their divisions. Five central training schools 
were subsequently established at permanent replacement-camps, 
and candidates from such of the divisions as were scheduled 
for early shipment overseas were transferred to these central 
schools. The schools were specialized, some being devoted 
to the training of infantry officers exclusively, others to train- 
ing for machine-gun, and field and coast artillery service. On 
November i, 1918, there were about 46,000 candidates for 
commissions in officers' training schools."^ 

When the final military program, calling for an army of 
eighty divisions in France and eighteen at home by June 30, 
19 19, was adopted, the problem of the supply of officers became 
acute. The plan devised to meet it was the students' army 
training corps. This scheme called for inducting into military 
service the student body of virtually all the colleges and uni- 
ts' For details as to officers' training-camps and schools, see War 
Department, "Annual Report," 1917; Vol, i, pp. 21, 166; ibid., 1918. 
Vol. I, pp. 17, 17(>, 183. 



ONE ARMY 123 

versities of the United States, 518 in all, and for the use of 
their plants to fit these students for officers, to be drawn on as 
qualified. Under this scheme approximately 145,000 youths 
were inducted into service in September, 1918, for military 
training during the continuance of their studies. '^° 

When the National Guard was inducted into Federal service 
on August 5, 1917, 12,115 officers came in with their organi- 
zations. Between that date and May 10, 1918, a considerable 
number of these officers were discharged, or resigned, or were 
otherwise separated from the Federal service. The figures are 
as follows" : 

Grades Cause of Separation 







Action of 






Physical 


Resig- 


Efficiency 


Other 


Total 


Disability 


nation 


Board 


Causes 




Major-general i 


• • • 


• • • 




I 


Brigadier-general 10 


3 


3 




16 


Colonel 18 


9 


15 




42 


Lieutenant-colonel 17 


5 


II 




33 


Major 57 


33 


30 




120 


Captain 148 


175 


83 




406 


First lieutenant 171 


246 


108 


2 


527 


Second lieutenant 89 


177 


102 




368 



Total SI I 648 352 2 1513 

Virtually all discharges were made under the provisions of 
Section 9 of the Selective Service Act, which authorized the 
President to discharge such officers of the temporary forces 
raised under the act as he deemed it desirable to discharge in 
order to promote the public service. The discharges were made 
upon recommendation of boards of examining officers after the 
proceedings and all papers in each case had been reviewed by 
the War Department. It was natural that a certain amount 

^° See War Department, "Annual Report," 1918; Vol. i, p. 160; 
" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 4. 
71 See War Department, "Annual Report," 1918; Vol. i, p. 1109. 



124 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of dissatisfaction should have resulted in certain quarters, 
which called forth from the Militia Bureau of the War De- 
partment the following explanation: 

Some newspapers and a few high officials in public life were inclined 
to criticize the War Department for discharging so manj-^ National 
Guard officers, and were wont to call attention to the fact that the 
proportion of officers discharged from the National Guard was much 
greater than that discharged from the Regular Army, National Army, 
and reserve corps. While this is an undisputed fact, it can be satis- 
factorily explained. A large number of National Guard officers re- 
signed and many new ones were commissioned in the National Guard 
after the Mexican border service to fill vacancies and to supply officers 
for the new NatioJial Guard units organized just prior to the draft, 
who were not carefully selected by the States and who had very little 
or no military training. Some lacked the necessary basic education 
and physical qualifications for officers. The appointment of these officers 
was authorized subject to examination prescribed by the War Depart- 
ment under the act of June 3, 1916, but owing to the demand for 
Regular Army officers for other important duties, this bureau was 
unable to secure sufficient Regular Army officers for duty as inspector 
instructors with the National Guard, to take up the matter of examin- 
ing officers to determine their fitness for commissions. . . . Thus little 
opportunity was afforded the new National Guard officers to qualify for 
their grades. After three or four months' active field service under 
Federal supervision, it is natural that a large number would be elimina- 
ted on account of physical and pro'fessional disqualifications, especially 
since a large number of them commissioned by the several States had not 
been carefully selected. 

Officers of the Regular Army are very carefully selected, and are re- 
quired to undergo a physical examination each year, and a severe 
mental and physical examination for each grade. Those unfitted are 
being constantly weeded out and only those who are professionally and 
physically qualified for active service are retained. In the case of the 
reserve officers, who constituted the bulk of the officers needed in the 
organization of the National Army, and to fill vacancies in the National 
Guard, these men were carefully selected as to basic education and 
physique. Then, after three months of intensive, practical field train- 
ing, only those who passed the severe tests as to professional and 
physical qualifications were commissioned. So that, for these reasons, 
it is obvious that there should have been a much larger proportionate 
number of National Guard officers discharged on account of physical 



ONE ARMY 125 

and professional disqualifications than there were from the United 
States Army and reserve corps. ^^2 

In addition to the supply of officers drawn from the above- 
mentioned sources, a large number of technically qualified 
persons were commissioned directly from civil life for special 
duty with the various staff corps, the quartermaster corps, 
ordnance corps, signal corps, engineer corps, medical corps, 
chemical warfare service, and general staff. The entire number 
of persons commissioned between April i, 1917, and November 
II, 1 91 8, was 203,786." 

II 

It is beyond the province of this book to tell the story 
of military operations ; but in order to indicate the comparative 
parts played in France by organizations made up mainly of 
regulars. National Guardsmen, and drafted troops respectively, 
a few notes seem desirable to designate the divisions which 
participated most actively in the fighting. It will be remem- 
bered that divisions numbered below 25 were Regular 
Army divisions, those numbered from 26 to 42 were National 
Guard divisions, and those numbered from 76 upward were 
composed of drafted men. The States from which particular 
divisions of Guardsmen and drafted men were drawn can be 
found by referring back to the tables on pages loi and 106. 

The first American division to go into line on the actual 
fighting front as a complete unit was the First, which took its 
place in the Montdidier salient on the" Picardy front on April 
26, igi8. This was the division which on May 28 captured 
the town of Cantigny. 

When the Germans made their great offensive at the end 
of May and pushed rapidly forward toward the river Marne 
and Paris, the Second and Third Divisions went into line on 
the Marne. It was the Second. Division with a detachment of 

'-Report of chief of mihtia bureau of War Department, "Annual 
Report," 1918; Vol. I, p. nil. 
^3 "Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 227. 



126 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

marines which met the advancing Germans on June 15 in 
the Belleau Woods, and checked their progress. 

Elements of the Forty-second Division were in the Hne east 
of Rheims against the German offensive of J-uly 15. The 
Third Division and elements of the Twenty-eighth Division 
also took part in meeting this advance. 

On July 18 the great allied counter-offensive toward 
Soissons began, and in this the First and Second American 
divisions were given a leading position. As the movement 
advanced the Twenty-sixth and Third Divisions came into 
action, and later the Forty-second and Thirty-second. When 
the movement was concluded, the Forty-second was relieved by 
the Fourth and the Thirty-second by the Tw'enty-eighth, while 
the Seventy-seventh also was given a position in the line. 

The Soissons counter-offensive resulted in the reduction of 
the great Marne salient. The attention of \he Allies was 
next directed toward reducing the St. Mihiel salient. In this 
movement three American corps participated, including the 
following divisions: First, Second, Third, Fifth, Twenty- 
sixth, Thirty-ninth, Eighty-second, and Eighty-ninth. The 
movement was successful and resulted in the establishing of 
a new line. 

The St. Mihiel offensive was at once succeeded by an 
American offensive along the Meuse and in the Argonne. In 
the first phase of this offensive the divisions making up the 
American army were the following: Fourth, Twenty-eighth, 
Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-ninth, 
Eightieth, Eighty-seventh, Ninety-first. The Third, Thirty- 
second, and Ninety-second served as corps reserves, and the 
First, Twenty-ninth, and Eighty -second as army reserve. 

The offensive in the Argonne, which was notably successful, 
lasted from September 26 to November 6. In all, the follow- 
ing divisions were engaged : First, Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty- 
third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, Forty-second, Seventy- 
seventh, Seventy-eighth, Eightieth, Eighty-second, Eighty- 



ONE ARMY 127 

ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. The First, Fifth, Twenty- 
sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, Eighty-ninth, 
and Ninetieth were in the line twice. Of this offensive Gen- 
eral Pershing said: "Although some of the divisions were 
fighting their first battle, they soon became equal to the best." 

In addition to the divisions already mentioned, which fought 
with the American army proper, certain others were detached 
for service in British and French sectors of the front. This 
was the case with the Twenty-seventh, Thirtieth, and Ninety- 
first, which fought with the British in Belgium, and the 
Thirty-sixth, which saw service with the French before 
Rheims."* 

This brief statement covers only major operations, and other 
units besides those above enumerated saw actual combat serv- 
ice ; but what has been said indicates how Regular Army units. 
National Guard units, and units composed of drafted troops 
fought indiscriminately side by side. This was the situation 
which was recognized by General Order No. y^y issued from 
Washington, August 7, 1918: "This country has but one 
army, the United States Army. It includes all the land forces 
in the service of the United States. Those forces, however 
raised, lose their identity in that of the United States Army. 
Distinctive appellations, such as the Regular Army, reserve 
corps. National Guard, and National Army, heretofore em- 
ployed in administration and command, will be discontinued, 
and the single term, the United States Army, will be exclu- 
sively used. " 

■^^ The material of these paragraphs is from General Pershing's 
report to the secretary of war, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, pp. 74-S2. 



CHAPTER V 

SELECTION FOR SERVICE 

THE foregoing chapters have attempted to trace the evolu- 
tion of a policy. The first two chapters outlined the 
plans which were proposed and the measures which were taken 
in peace years to provide for the raising of troops in the 
event of a possible emergency. The two following chapters 
sketched the steps which were actually taken when the emer- 
gency broke. What stands out is the size of the crisis when 
it came. No mere increase in the strength of the Regular 
Army and no mere auxiliary force such as ]Mr. Garrison's pro- 
posed Continental Army would have gone far toward meeting 
it. It called for an effort of the nation such as could not 
be anticipated and such as is not likely to be needed more than 
once or twice in a century. It is the nature of emergencies 
to demand exceptional measures peculiar to their own circum- 
stances, and thus to furnish no dependable criterion for normal 
policy. For the United States to be prepared at all times to put 
in immediate readiness an army of the size which it contributed 
to the war with Germany would involve unnecessary and un- 
thinkable economic waste. But the United States may perhaps 
at some unexpected moment be again called on to make another 
such effort, and the success of the measures taken in 19 17-18 
accordingly makes the policy of those years worth study 
as a possible model for action in the future. 

There is another reason why the Selective Service Act de- 
serves to be studied. An immediately available supply of effi- 
ciently trained soldiers is not the only or surest element of 
national defense. What is needed is something more impal- 
pable and deeper. It is a national spirit — a spirit of unity 

128 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 129 

and fellowship, a feeling among the citizen body of being 
common partners in a common national enterprise. This is a 
spirit whi'ch becomes peculiarly explicit and articulate in times 
of war, but the basis of it must be laid down deep in the 
national life in time of peace for it to be truly effective when 
the war-time need arises. Where such a basis does not exist, 
military effort, however well organized, is likely to prove 
ruinous. Rather, where it does not exist, military effort sim- 
ply cannot be well organized. Accordingly, the best prepara- 
tion for war is the creation in peace years of a real and solid 
national unity. The most essential requirement of this task 
is emphasized in the central idea of the Selective Service Act. 
The idea behind that statute was that the life of the nation is 
an organic whole, which can only be effective when the needs 
and claims of each of its constituent groups or classes are 
coordinated with the needs and claims of the rest. The act 
was a recognition that in time of war the claims of the 
fighting forces must be balanced against the claims of pro- 
ductive industry and of dependent classes of the population. 
It thus points the way to a recognition in times of peace as 
well that national effectiveness depends on a just balancing of 
the claims of competing interests and competing groups. The 
act was framed on the theory that in war-time there is a 
particular post for which each citizen is best fitted by capacity 
and training, and that every effort should be made to place 
him there. The principle of selective service is not less im- 
portant to the peace-time effectiveness of the nation. In short, 
the act rested on an insight into one of the first principles of 
sound politics; and accordingly an examination of its detailed 
applications of that principle to practice ought to prove fruit- 
ful. 

There is one more reason why a study of the way the act 
operated should be of interest. The coordination of effort 
which it called for required a survey and classification of the 
nation's human resources which yielded information of first- 
rate importance. This information is of value for other than 



I30 TPIE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

military purposes, and sheds light on conditions which students 
of public questions must henceforth take into account. It 
yielded a mass of national statistics the significance of which 
should be appreciated. 

The purpose of the present chapter is to deal with the 
working of those features of the act which were designed to 
promote selection for service. The rules will be outlined 
which were applied to determine that one man should bear 
arms, that another should remain in industrial employment, 
and that a third should be transferred from one occupation to 
a different one regarded as more essential. Under the provi- 
sions of the act some of the considerations bearing on de- 
cisions of this kind were (i) alienage, (2) conscientious 
scruples against war, (3) dependency, (4) industrial occu- 
pation, and (5) physical fitness. Each of these will be taken 
up in turn. 



Under international law a neutral or friendly alien who is 
a permanent resident of a country is liable to military service 
at the call of that country, as otherwise he would be receiving 
the benefits of national life without sharing in its burdens.^ 
The Selective Service Act, however, imposed draft liability 
only on such aliens of friendly or neutral nationality as had 
declared their intention to become citizens of the United 
States.^ Aliens who had not declared such an intention were 
exempted from liability. All male persons, however, of the 
stipulated ages were required by the act to register.^ The 
registration figures accordingly show the proportion of aliens 

1 By international law an enemy alien cannot be forced to serve, as 
otherwise he would be compelled to fight against his own country. See 
E. M. Borchard, " Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad," New 
York., 1916 ; pp. 64-69 : John Bassett Moore, " Digest of International 
Law"; Vol. IV pp. 51 ff- 

2 Section 2. 
8 Section 5. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 131 

to citizens among male persons of the draft ages. The 
figures are as follows : 

Total persons registered, June 5, 191 7 . . . 9,780,535 

Native-born citizens 7,904,253 

Naturalized citizens 259,470 

Aliens 1,616,812 

Total persons registered, June 5 — August 24, 1918 . 899,279 

Native-born citizens 801,870 

Naturalized citizens 11,215 

Aliens 86,194 

Total persons registered, September 12, 1918 . 13,228,763 
Native-born citizens ......... 9,988,703 

Naturalized citizens 1,065,982 

Aliens 2,174,077 

Total persons registered, all three registrations . 23,908,576 

Native-born citizens 18,694,526 

Naturalized citizens 1,336,967 

Aliens 3,877,083 

These figures * indicate that of male persons in the country 
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 16.22 per cent, 
were not citizens. The large number of aliens in the third 
registration, including the older groups, is especially striking. 
Another interesting set of figures are those which show the 
proportion of aliens who had declared their intention to be- 
come citizens to the total number of alien registrants^ : 

Number Per- 
centage 

Aliens registered June 5, 1917 1,616,812 .... 

Declarants 518,216 32.05 

Non-declarants 1,098,596 67.95 

Aliens registered, June 5-August 24, 1918 . 86,194 

Declarants 20,147 23.37 

Non-declarants 66,047 76.63 

Aliens registered, September 12, 1918 . . 2,174,077 

Declarants 731,819 33.66 

* " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 89. 
^"Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 89. 



132 



THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



Number Per- 
centage 

Non-declarants 1,442,258 66.34 

Total aliens, all three registrations . . . 3,877.083 .... 

Declarants 1,270,182 32.76 

Non-declarants 2,606,901 67.24 

Here again the figures are challenging. More than 67 per 
cent, of the male aliens of draft age in the country had not 
taken out their first papers— had made no step, that is, 
toward acquiring American citizenship. 

Of the 3,877.083 aliens registered, 1,011,502 were of enemy 
nationality and therefore not available for draft service. Of 
the remainder only declarants were available. The problem 
then arose of developing a procedure which would enable 
non-declarant aliens to take advantage of the exemption 
created by the law in their favor. The office of the provost- 
marshal general determined to go on the theory that Congress 
intended to establish a presumption that every registrant was 
a citizen of the United States; that this presumption should 
stand until the contrary was proved; and that therefore an 
alien claiming exemption must establish his case. This posi- 
tion was, except in a single case,^ sustained by the Federal 
courts. In Angelus vs. Sullivan, 246 Fed., 54, the court says : 
"Whether a person is a non-declarant alien or not is a question 
of fact, exactly the same as whether a person is an ordained 
minister of religion, or a student for the ministry in a rec- 
ognized theological school, and the clear purpose of the act 
was that the fact should be ascertained by the administrative 
boards which the President was authorized to create. Any 
other method would have made the act unworkable.'^ ... It 
must be further assumed that it was impossible for the local 
and district boards or any other Government agencies iiidepend- 
ently to ascertain whether or not a relator was a non-declarant 

« Ex parte Beck, 245 Fed., 967. Contra, ex parte Lamachia, 250 Fed., 
814: Naporc vs. Rowe, 256 Fed., 832. 
^As to the finality of the findings of a draft board, see below. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 133 

alien; for siioh an inquiry would involve a search of the records 
of the naturalization courts, Federal and State, throughout the 
entire country to ascertain a negative — to wit, whether a per- 
son had not declared his intention — an obviously impossible 
and absurd inquiry. The whole plan of the act is undoubtedly 
to require that those who claim exemption shall affirmatively 
present their claim to the appropriate body, so that that body 
can determine as a fact whether the person falls within the 
exempted classes. When, therefore, no such claim is pre- 
sented, and the proceedings of the local and district boards 
are regular in every respect, the court cannot go outside the 
proceedings of the boards to determine independently some- 
thing which the act required should be determined by these 
boards. " Only when the boards, having jurisdiction, failed 
to give the complainant parties a fair opportunity to be heard 
and present their evidence was the action of such boards to 
be reviewed by the courts of law.^ 

The instructions to the local boards required them to give 
every alien a full opportunity to be heard on any claim of 
exemption that he might have. Furthermore, local boards 
were authorized to inquire into the status of any registrant 
when they had reason to believe that he was a non-declarant 
alien who had failed through ignorance to claim exemption, 
and if they found that to be the case, the boards were re- 
quired to exempt him. Fifty-three thousand cases were re- 
ferred to the Naturalization Bureau by local boards in efforts 
to establish whether or not particular aliens had filed declara- 
tions of intention. The regulations of November 8, 1917, 
provided that no non-declarant alien should thereafter be 
inducted until he had expressly waived his right to exemption. 
At the same time legal advisory boards were established 
for the purpose of aiding registrants, and this measure 
eliminated a good deal of the misunderstanding which 

^ See Department of Justice, " Interpretation of War Statutes, Bul- 
letin," No. 67; p. 9. 



134 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

had previously existed. " Without a doubt," says the provost- 
marshal general, "there were local instances of carelessness 
and bias which led to improper inductions." " These produced 
a number of diplomatic protests which resulted in the taking 
of administrative measures. One of these consisted in author- 
izing, at the mere request of the proper diplomatic representa- 
tive, the discharge from the army of individual non-declarant 
aliens already inducted. The total number of discharges re- 
ported as having been made under this authority between 
February lo and November 22, 1918, totaled, however, only 
621. 

If some non-declarant aliens were thus improperly inducted 
into the army and retained there, the objection to this course 
is to be based solely on the fact that it was a violation of the 
provisions of the Selective Service Act. If Congress had in- 
tended such aliens to be liable for service, the law should have 
so provided ; in fact, it provided the contrary. From the 
point of view, however, of the aliens themselves, it cannot 
be maintained that they were subjected to any unusual or un- 
just hardship in being called on to bear arms in behalf of the 
country where they had chosen to make their homes and liveli- 
hood, and whose protection they enjoyed. 

With respect to declarant aliens, a difficulty arose concerning 
nationals of foreign countries which had treaties with the 
United States providing reciprocal exemptions from military 
liability for citizens of either country residing in the other. 
The rights arising under such treaties were of course more 
insistently pressed by countries which remained neutral in the 
war than by our co-belligerents. With the latter a series of 
conventions were concluded during 19 18 which provided that 
alien residents should be allowed a fair opportunity to enlist 
in the forces of their own governments,^" and that, failing to 
do this within a prescribed time, they should become subject 
to the military service regulations of the country in which they 

^ Second report ; p. 97. 

10 Forty-eight thousand men were recruited in the United States for 
the British army. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 135 

were residing. Such conventions were concluded with Great 
Britain, France, Greece, and Italy. ^^ 

Diplomatic representatives of neutral treaty countries pro- 
tested against subjecting their nationals, even though declarants, 
to the operation of the selective service law. It was impossible 
for the President to go counter to the terms of the act by ex- 
empting such declarants, but it remained within his authority as 
commander-in-chief to discharge them after induction. This 
was the course adopted, and on April 11, 1918, a Presidential 
order was issued providing that both declarant and non-declar- 
ant aliens from treaty countries should be discharged upon re- 
{ quest of the diplomatic representatives of the countries of which 
3 they were citizens.^^ 

The chief problem which arose in connection with alien 
r enemy registrants was how to deal with persons who, while 
p citizens of an enemy country like Austria-Hungary, belonged 
h to an oppressed nationality like the Poles, the Jugo-Slavs, and 
the Czecho-Slovaks, and who were in fact only too eager to 
^ aid the cause of the United States and their allies.^^ The 
Poles M^ere early provided for by the permission which was 
granted them to recruit a Polish legion.^* The Army Ap- 
propriation Act, approved July 9, 1918, authorized the organi- 
zation of a Slavic legion into which Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo- 
Slavs, and Ruthenians could be enlisted who were otherwise 
exempted 'Under the draft. ^*^ Arrangements were completed 
for local boards to act as recruiting agencies for this legion, 
when the cessation of hostilities caused the abandonment of 
the plan. 

The finest indication of the spirit of loyalty among the 
country's alien population was furnished by the large number 

11 With Great Britain, July 30, 1918; with France, November 8, 1918; 
with Italy and Greece, November 12, 1918. 

12 See " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 99. 

^3 Alien enemies were excluded from military service by the provi- 
sions of the Selective Service Act. 
1* Eighteen thousand men were recruited for the Polish legion, 
"a 40 Statutes at Large; p. 868. 



136 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of alien registrants naturalized during the war period. The 
process of naturalization was made easier by an act approved 
May 9, 191 8, which enabled aliens, whether declarants or non- 
declarants, who had either enlisted or been drafted into service, 
to become full citizens at once. ^'^^ Between the passaj^e of this 
act and November 30, 1918, the number of naturalizations 
carried out in camp under its provisions was 155,246. When 
it is considered that during this period only 414.389 aliens 
had been placed in Class I, and that a large number of these 
had already been sent abroad before the act came into opera- 
tion, its eflfectiveness is obvious, as well as the patriotism and 
loyalty of the mass of our foreign population. ^^ 



The Selective Service Act exempted from active combat 
service persons who, at the date of its passage, were members 
of well-recognized religious sects, the creed of which altogether 
forbade participation in warfare. Such persons, however, 
remained liable for kinds of service which the President should 
designate as non-combatant. Accordingly, registrants claiming 
relief from service on this ground were classified without 
regard to their claim, and, if otherwise qualified, were inducted 
into the army and assigned to duties of a non-combatant 
character — e. g., service in the medical corps, quartermaster 
corps, engineers' corps, etc.^*^ On the ground of religion 
64,693 claims for non-combatant classification were made, and 
of these 56,830 were admitted by the local boards. Of such 
claimants, 29,679 were placed in Class I, and on examination 
found to be physically fit; and of these, 20,873 were actually 
inducted into the army before November 11, 1918. 

The Selective Service Act limited exemptions on the ground 

I*'' 40 Statutes at Large; p. 542 

^^' For the whole matter of ah"cnage and the draft, see " Second Re- 
port of Provost-Marshal General " ; pp. 86-108. 

I*' These services were declared non-combatant by Presidential order 
of March 20, 1918. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 137 

of conscientious objection to persons whose scruples against 
war were outwardly attested by previous membership in a 
body publicly professing such scruples. In this respect the 
law followed the Draft Act of 1864 and departed from the 
provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916, which had 
allowed exemptions based on individual personal conviction.^' 
It soon became evident, however, that the latter sort of ob- 
jectors would have to be dealt with. As the drafted men were 
received at the cantonments a considerable number were found 
among them who, while not members of a religious body op- 
posed to war, professed an opposition to it based on purely 
personal scruples. The behavior of these men as well as of 
some of the recognized religious objectors became a matter of 
annoyance at the camps. Not only did they object to service 
of a directly military character, but when assigned under the 
provisions of the Selective Service Law to non-combatant 
duties, many of them refused to perform even these. " The 
matter of the uniform was often a sticking-point Many an 
i objector expressed himself as ready to take non-combatant 
^ service except for the fact that he was required to wear the 
\ uniform. This, he said, identified him with the military es- 
1! tablishment. . . . Several testified that they could work in a 
1 civilian hospital, but could do nothing in a military hospital. 
J They conceived it to be their duty to help the wounded and 
-^ suflfering provided the wounded and sufifering were in civilian 
J clothes, but it was to them absolutely wrong to do anything 
i which would aid or comfort a man in uniform. Several ob- 
i jectors have told me that if a private soldier in camp were 
\ to be run down and severely hurt by an automobile, they would 
j not pick the soldier up and carry him to a hospital because, 
i the man being in uniform, such a service would be a military 

1 ^^ National Defense Act, section 59; 39 Statutes at Large, p. 197. 
I This ornamental part of the act after declaring that the militia should 
I consist of all able bodied citizens and declarant aliens between the 
! ages of eighteen and forty-five, went on to exempt specifically certain 
classes of persons "from militia service in a combatant capacity." 



138 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

duty and contrary to their conscientious scruples."^^ In deal- 
ing with people of this sort the War Department was con- 
fronted with a problem none the less large or important be- 
cause of the comparatively small number of persons involved. 
The problem of the conscientious objector is significant, not 
because of its bearing one way or the other on the question 
of man-power, which it hardly aflFected at all, but because of 
the delicacy of the moral issues at stake and because it serves 
to illustrate the wise tolerance and broad humanism of the 
War Department's policy throughout. In most instances the 
scruples of the objector seem to have been the result of a 
somewhat warped and narrow outlook on the world, produced 
by a life spent in strange and isolated communities.^^ The 
Mennonite objectors, of whom there were a large number, 
afiford an illustration of objectors of this type. Major Kel- 
logg, in his interesting book, says of these objectors : " The 
Mennonite is possessed of singular characteristics. His hair 
and beard are unkempt. He takes Leviticus 19:27 with abso- 
lute literalness : * Ye shall not round the corners of your 
heads, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard. ' His 
trousers open only at the side and do not button, but hook 
together. He wears no jewelry of any kind. He shuffles 
awkwardly into the room — he seems only half awake. He 
rarely has received any education beyond the fourth or fifth 
grade. He has never held public office of any kind, and takes 
no interest in the social life of his community. He cares 
nothing about good roads or any form of social uplift, and 
in most cases he has never voted. He will tell you, perhaps, 
that he has 'led a sinful life'; and when you inquire into the 
particular variety of vice that he has practised, you find that 
on one or two occasions he has attended moving-pictures, 
which he seems to think are very wrong indeed. . . . He will 
in all likelihood testify that if some brute were to break into 

18 W. G. Kellogg, "The Conscientious Objector," New York, 1919; 
pp. 58-60. 

19 See Major Kellogg's book, particularly Chapters VI, VII, VIII, 
X, XIII, and XIV. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 139 

his mother's or sister's room and attempt to rape her, he 
would allow his mother or sister to be raped before he would 
shoot or otherwise injure her assailant. . . . He professes to 
be a great reader of the Bible, and is capable of disclosing 
a surprising knowledge of its contents. His Bible, well- 
thumbed, is sure to be somewhere in his deep pockets, and he 
can turn readily to almost any chapter that may be in ques- 
tion." =^° 

To sympathize with an objection to war resting on the mental 
outlook of a man of this type requires an uncommon degree 
of patience. Yet, after all, if the man is sincere, as the Men- 
nonites generally were, his objection represents, in however 
strange and warped a form, a straining after the best of which 
he is capable — a stunted sort of idealism, which is idealism 
none the less because it is twisted. On the other hand, a 
number of the objectors were men of keen minds and thorough 
education, whose objections flowed from a theoretical social 
philosophy. In both cases, to crush the will of the objector 
by a policy of crude compulsion would have been to disre- 
gard the very motives and forces from which, in the long 
run, all betterment must proceed. To let the objectors shirk 
their duty as citizens altogether was impossible; but forceful 
persecution is hardly the best instrument of civic education. 
Sympathetic guidance is apt to prove more effective; and a 
realization of this dictated the tenor of the War Department's 
policy. 

On October 10, 1917, the secretary of war issued a confiden- 
tial order to the commanders of all camps in which he directed : 
(i) That religious objectors should be segregated and 
1 placed under the supervision of ofificers specially selected with 
I a view of insuring that the objectors would be handled with 
\ tact and consideration. 

(2) That these men in their attitude of objecting to military 
service should not be treated as violating military laws and 
thereby subjecting themselves to the penalties of the Articles 

20 Kellogg, op. at.; p. 38. 



140 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of War, but that their attitude should be quietly ignored, and 
that they should be handled with kindly consideration. 

Attention was called to the fact that in a certain division a 
number of objectors, when treated in this manner, had re- 
nounced their objections and voluntarily offered their services 
as soldiers. Directions were given that this order should not 
be given out to the newspapers, as a public knowledge of the 
attitude of the department might well become the means of 
creating a large body of insincere objectors. On December 19 
the provisions of the order were extended to objectors whose 
scruples were personal and individual, and this class of ob- 
jectors was thus put on the same footing as members of organ- 
ized religious bodies opposed to war.-^ 

The policy of the War Department was on the whole faith- 
fully and sympathetically carried out by the officers in the can- 
tonments. " I have in mind, " says Major Kellogg, " a major 
who was detailed to this work in a Southern camp. Desirous 
himself of overseas service, and deeply disappointed with the 
nature of his assignment, he yet gave to it the very best that 
was in him. He learned to know the men under his care, their 
particular obsessions, and something of their home environment. 
He made it his business to be with them, and understand them, 
and the record of his particular camp as regards the objector is 
a brilliant one. He succeeded in impressing the spirit of the 
War Department regulations upon his men, and in making them 
realize that there were distinct limitations to the department's 
tolerance. His men made little trouble and endeavored in all 
ways to be obedient to the rules. His greatest success was 
attained with those men who simply thought they were con- 
scientious objectors or with those whose objections were not 
deeply and firmly rooted. Many who had, upon their arrival 
in camj), announced themselves as objectors, were under his 
guidance persuaded to see the truth as he saw it, and, in time, 

21 Colonel J. D. Easby-Smith in "Statement Concerning the Treat- 
ment of Conscientious Objectors in the Army"; prepared and published 
by direction of the secretary of war, Washington, 1918; p. 17. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 141 

to abandon their objections and take their places in general 
service. Some of these men later served overseas in the fight- 
ing forces. The results which he was able to accomplish 
through gentleness and a humane intelligence, inspirited by real 
patriotism, is ample evidence of the value such officers have 
been to the administration of the army. The late Major- 
General J. Franklin Bell, when in command of Camp Upton, 
designated himself as the ' specially qualified officer in charge 
of objectors,' and took direct personal charge of the objectors 
in his camp. Upton, perhaps because of its proximity to large 
cities, had more than its share of Socialists. General Bell spent 
much time and energy with his objectors, and, as a result, many 
of them, including not a few Socialists, were induced to take 
up combatant service." ^" 

The same testimony comes from an entirely different source. 
In a pamphlet entitled " Facts about Conscientious Objectors," 
issued by the National Civil Liberties Bureau, an organization 
with a strongly sympathetic attitude toward the objectors, it 
is said : " Most of the officers and a very large proportion of 
the soldiers have shown a humane regard for objectors and 
respect for the secretary of war's policy. A number of cases 
of brutality were reported. All were called to the attention of 
the War Department and, in most cases, satisfactorily and 
promptly attended to. Everything considered, the number of 
such cases was surprisingly small (perhaps forty in all, up to 
April I, 19 1 8). In several cases, the officers and men guilty 
of brutality were severely disciplined." -^ 

On the other hand, the War Department found its path by 
no means free from obstacles to the success of its policy. " As 
a result of our efforts to see that these men got a square deal," 
says Assistant Secretary Keppel, " it was sometimes charged 
that we were more interested in them than in the men who were 
willing to fight. In newspaper stories and addresses made by 

22 Kellogg, op. cit.; p. 86: 

23 "Facts about Conscientious Objectors in the United States," pub- 
lished by the National Civil Liberties Bureau, New York, June 
I, 1918; p. 20. 



142 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

excited people some preposterous accusations were advanced; 
as that my wife was a Mennonite, which she is not; that the 
department had printed an order in German for the convenience 
of slackers ; that the whole policy was I. W. W. propaganda in 
disguise. The opinion was freely expressed that the announced 
policy of the department would breed a million slackers for 
the next draft. " ^* Furthermore, there was a lack of uniformity 
in the way in which the department's orders were executed in 
different localities. " You will recall," says Mr. Keppel in his 
report to Secretary Baker, " the contrast in the manner in which 
these men were treated at the different camps. Where their 
sincerity was taken for granted, as for example by General 
J. Franklin Bell at Camp Upton, out of a division made up 
from a cross-section of the population of New York City, only 
thirty-odd men refused to accept military service. At another 
camp, where it was assumed they were insincere, forty men 
were court-martialed and given long sentences for refusing to 
sow grass-seed and plant flowers around the base-hospital, an 
order obviously framed purely for the purpose of revealing 
the insincerity of the objector. At another camp the sanitary 
regulations regarding these men were interpreted in such a 
manner as to call forth a severe condemnation from the inspec- 
tor-general of the army." ^■' 

The policy of the War Department resulted in bringing most 
of the objectors in the camps to accept in the course of time 
some sort of service, combatant or non-combatant. Pressure 
of many kinds was brought to bear to that end. Most of those 
who upon arriving in camp had held themselves out as con- 
scientious objectors ultimately accepted some fonn of service. 
By March 20, 19 18, only about 4000 remained through the 
whole country who persisted in thejr attitude. To deal with 
these men a special board of inquiry was constituted,^® consist- 

2* " Statement concerning the Treatment of Conscientious Objectors 
in the Army," prepared and published by direction of the secretary of 
war, Washington, 1918; p. 9. 

25 Ibid; p. 8. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 143 

ing of Major R. C. Stoddard of the judge-advocate general's 
office, Judge Julian W. Mack of the Federal courts, and Dean 
Harlan F. Stone of the Columbia University Law School. The 
board was appointed solely to inquire into and determine the 
sincerity of objectors. Its function was to examine personally 
all objectors who persisted in declining to perform non-com- 
batant service, or who had not been assigned to non-combatant 
service by their camp commander because in his judgment they 
were insincere. For such men as the board should find to be 
sincere a new alternative was opened by extending to their 
case the provisions of an act of Congress passed March 16, 
ipiS."'' This act permitted the granting of furloughs to in- 
ducted men to enable them to engage in agriculture. By virtue 
of this authority an order of June I provided that such object- 
ors as should be adjudged sincere by the board of inquiry might 
be furloughed without pay to agricultural service, on condition 
(i) that a monthly report as to the industry of each person so 
furloughed should be received from a disinterested source, and 
that the furlough should terminate automatically on the receipt 
of a report that he was not working to the best of his ability ; 
(2) that no person should be recommended for such furlough 
who did not voluntarily agree that he should receive for his 
labor an amount no greater than a private's pay plus an esti- 
mated sum for subsistence if subsistence was not furnished 
by his employer. In exceptional cases the board might recom- 
mend furlough service in France in the Friends' Reconstruction 
Unit. 

The board of inquiry made ten extended trips, in the course 
of which it visited all the camps in the country from Devens in 
Massachusetts and Gordon in Georgia to Kearney and Lewis on 
the Pacific coast. In all, 2294 cases were looked into. In 
1978 cases the board determined that the objectors were sincere 
and made the following recommendations : 

28 By order of the secretary of war, June i, 1918. See " Second Re- 
port of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 60. 
2740 Statutes at Large; p. 450. See also 1918, General Orders No. 31. 



144 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Furlough to agriculture or industry 1500 

Furlough to Friends' Reconstruction Unit 88 

Assignment to non-combatant service 390 

Total 1978 

The remaining cases (316) were found to be insincere, or 
else no final disposition of the case had been made before 
demobilization was begun. One hundred and twenty-two ob- 
jectors found not to be sincere were recommended for and 
assigned to combatant service.^^ 

The sorest spot in the whole question of the conscientious 
objectors is presented by the cases of the 450 objectors who 
were court-martialed for their behavior and sentenced to terms 
of imprisonment in the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leaven- 
worth. Of these prisoners 113 were discharged in January, 
1919. on recommendation of the board of inquiry. This action 
of the War Department was the occasion of much adverse criti- 
cism and misunderstanding. The men were discharged because 
they had been court-martialed either before their cases could be 
studied by the board of inquiry or in direct violation of its 
recommendations. " It is of interest," writes Secretary Kep- 
pel,^'"^ " that the situation in which these men found themselves 
does not imply that there was a general ignoring of the War 
Department's orders by camp commanders. Four-fifths of the 
men came from three court-martial jurisdictions. Of the thirty 
men who had been definitely recommended for farm furloughs 
by the board of inquiry, but were court-martialed in spite of 
the recommendation, all but three came from one such juris- 
diction." Fifty-three additional objectors, who had been sen- 
tenced to imprisonment at Leavenworth, were subsequently dis- 
charged on recommendation of the special clemency board of 
the judge-advocate general's office. 

28 Colonel Easby-Smith in "Statement Concerning the Treatment of 
Conscientious Objectors"; p. 24. 
29 /bu/; p. 13. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 145 

The real importance of the problem raised by the conscien- 
tious objectors is not military but social. The experience of 
the War Department with these people discloses the existence 
of groups and communities in the nation which challenge pub- 
lic attention — groups and communities which are not caught up 
into the organic connections of national life. What is needed 
is not force, or repression, but measures of a more fundamental 
and effective helpfulness. The nature of the need is illustrated 
by what Major Kellogg says of the Mennonites : 

The Mennonite faith may derive much from the inheritance of the 
ages, but a considerable body of Mennonites surely need serious con- 
sideration both by their church authorities and by the Government. 
It is difficult to realize that we have among our citizenry a class of 
men who are so intellectually inferior and so unworthy to assume its 
burdens and its responsibilities. I doubt extremely if 50 per cent, of 
the Mennonites examined [by the board of inquiry], because of their 
ignorance and stupidity, ever should have been admitted into the army 
at all ; I am certain that 90 per cent, of them need a far better prepara- 
tion for citizenship than they have ever received. They are good 
tillers of the soil ; they are doubtless, according to their light, good 
Christians, but they are essentially a type of Americans of which 
America cannot be proud. The problem of the conscientious objector, 
as applied to the Mennonites, is particularly and forcefully one of edu- 
cation, not more in the rudiments of schooling than in the inculcating of 
the social and national spirit.^" 

3 

In dealing with the matters of alienage and conscientious 
objection to war, we have been considering the effect given 
in the selective service policy to what may be called political 
and ethical considerations. We come now to consider the 
weight given to economic considerations, and the determining 
influence which these were allowed to have in fixing the status 
of registrants in whose cases political and ethical difficulties 
were not raised. Most registrants, of course, fell into the 
class of those whose status was governed altogether by these 

30 Kellogg, op. cit. 



146 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

economic factors, and hence in dealing with the latter we are 
at the heart of the selective process. 

The Selective Service Act was primarily a means for raising 
an army, but for raising an army in a particular way. Its 
object was to sort out for military service those persons whose 
withdrawal from industrial and domestic connections would in- 
terfere least with other necessary kinds of war-time activity 
and have the least disturbing effect on the general life of the 
nation. But the task did not end here. " The remainder far 
outnumbered those who went into the fighting forces. The 
residue, the deferred classes, formed the great army behind the 
lines whose efforts had so to be directed as to contribute most 
eflfectively to the fighting forces. How to mold this vast group 
of man-power; how to weave its energies into a general pattern 
of national effectiveness, attaining a maximum of production 
with a minimum of disturbance — this was the problem to 
which the selective organization had to address itself. ^^ " 

In order that this task might be discharged effectively, com- 
plete information was necessary regarding the qualifications 
and the industrial and domestic status of each man registered, 
that a basis might be at hand for classifying the registrants in 
the order of their military availability. In short, what was 
needed was a comprehensive statistical inventory of man-power. 

The immediate need for men, however, made it impossible to 
employ this scientific procedure at the outset in the case of the 
first draft call. What was done was simply to have each local 
board call, in the sequence of the registrants' order-numbers, 
about twice as many men as would be needed to fill the board's 
quota, and then eliminate by examination from these men all 
who could show themselves entitled to discharge or exemption. 
This was the procedure followed until December 15, 19 17. By 
that time about as many men had been delivered to the camps as 
the supply departments could, for the time being, provide for. 
Advantage was taken of the ensuing lull to effect a classifica- 
tion of all remaining registrants which should serve as the basis 
for future assignments to service. 

31 "Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 12. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 147 

The key of this new classification system was a questionnaire. 
Each registrant was required to file answers to a series of 
questions designed to show a simple inventory of his qualifica- 
tions and circumstances-. If on the basis of these he desired to 
make a claim for exemption or deferred service, he indicated 
this intention in his answer. If he made no such claim, he 
was at once classified as available for immediate service. All 
claims made were examined by the board, and either granted 
or refused.^^ Failure of a registrant to make a claim, or final 
adjudication of his claim, resulted in fixing his ultimate posi- 
tion in one of five classes into which the entire body of regis- 
trants was graded in the inverse order of their liability for call 
into service. Class I included those registrants whose situation 
offered no obstacle to their immediate induction into the army. 
Classes II, III, and IV included persons whose occupation or 
domestic status rendered inexpedient their immediate employ- 
ment in military service, graded in the order in which they 
could most readily be spared for such service. Thus Class II 
included registrants who, while having some claim to exemption 
which made it desirable to defer calling them until after the 
exhaustion of all registrants in Class I, were yet less indispen- 
sable to the economic life of the nation than were persons in 
Class III, and who were thus subject to be called ahead of 
registrants in the latter class. Class III registrants stood in 
the same relative position with regard to registrants in Classes 
II and IV as was held by Class II registrants in comparison with 
men in Classes I and III. In Class V were placed registrants 
who, because of physical unfitness or other disqualifications, 
(such as the fact that they were non-declarant aliens), were 
totally unavailable for military service. 

The introduction of the classification system brought with it 
a number of improvements upon the more informal method 
follov/ed in raising the first levy. Thus it greatly decreased 
the labor involved in the task of physical examination. Under 
the original procedure all registrants called before the boards 

32 The matter of appeals will be considered in the following chapter. 



148 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

were subjected to such an examination. Only after they were 
found to be physically qualified were they given an opportunity 
to submit claims for exemption or discharge. This method 
required the physical examination of more than 2,500,000 
registrants, of whom 1,780,000 were found to be physically 
qualified. Of these, more than 700,000 were subsequently 
granted exemption. The physical examination of these 
700,000 men was thus a pure waste of labor. Under the new 
classification system a man was not subjected to a physical 
examination until he had been placed in Class I — i. e., until 
his availability for immediate service had been definitely 
fixed.^-^ 

Another improvement introduced by the classification system 
was a greater flexibility in the equitable distinctions affecting 
the order of liability for service. " Under the original plan, 
the registrant was either accepted on the one hand, or dis- 
charged or exempted on the other; whatever the varying 
degrees of equity in difTerent cases, virtually there was only 
a choice between these two alternatives. It is true that all 
discharges were in form temporary and provisional, and were 
therefore revocable in case of need. Nevertheless, the method 
did not specifically point out any grades of distinction between 
the various ones thus discharged ; and had it become necessary 
to revoke the discharges, and to resort to this group for heavier 
drains for military purposes, the establishment of futher dis- 
criminations would have been a cumbrous and tedious process. 
The new plan established five groups representing the equitable 
order of liability for military service, and thus made once for 
all an inventory of all registrants by placing them in one or 
another of these five groups. This made it possible to recog- 
nize, by difTerences in the order of liability for the difTerent 
groups or classes, the equitable distinctions which might well 
obtain between the suitability of one or another group for 
earlier or later call. . . .^^ 

32a "Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 45. 
S3 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 46. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 149 

" A further advantage resulting from the classification sys- 
tem was that for the first time it enabled the respective con- 
tributions of men due from the different areas to be allotted 
in just proportion to the ability of each area to make that con- 
tribution. If Class I throughout all boards represented the 
reservoir of man-power available equitably for the earliest call, 
then the quotas of each State and each board could be allotted 
at the time of making each levy, in proportion to the size of 
that reservoir. And if it had become necessary to proceed 
into Class II, after exhausting Class I, then similarly the pro- 
portion of quotas could have been equitably made in ratio to 
the size of Class II in each State and each board. In other 
words, the classification system furnished an opportunity for 
abandoning the inequities of the population basis for levying 
quotas — inequities which had given rise to complaint under 
the act as administered in 1917." ^* This change was made 
possible by joint resolution of Congress, approved May 16, 
1918.3^ 



4 

The results of the classification of registrants under the 
questionnaire are presented in the following table, ^'^ which 
shows the distribution among the five classes of all registrants 
classified after December 15, 1917: 

Total registrants classified after December 15, 1917 . 9,952,735 

Placed in Class I 2,979,465 

Placed in Class II 989,568 

Placed in Class III 407,125 

Placed in Class IV 3,026,178 

Placed in Class V 2,123,825 

Undistributed! 426,574 

The specific grounds responsible for all cases of exemption 

34/fciJ.; p. 47. 

3540 Statutes at Large; p. 554. See above, p. 116. 

80 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 170. 



150 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

or deferred classification granted between June 5, 1917, and 
September 11, 191 8, were as follows: 

Total registrants, June 5, 1917-September 11, 1918 . 10,679,814 

Total deferments on all grounds 6,973,270 

Dependency 3>903.733 

Alienage 1,033,406 

In military and naval service 619,727 

Physically disqualified 521,606 

Necessary agricultural and industrial occupation . 364,876 

Sundry specified vocations 37 76,497 

Morally unfit 18,620 

Undistributed 434,8 15 



The outstanding thing which these figures show is that on 
one ground or another more than 65 per cent, of all registrants 
were exempted or given deferred classification. Other con- 
clusions are less reliable. A given registrant was often in a 
position to present claims for exemption on a number of 
different grounds, yet only one — that entitling him to the most 
deferred classification — would appear on the face of the 
record. Thus the comparatively small number of occupational 
deferments is undoubtedly due to the large number of persons 
who, although entitled to such deferments, were actually de- 
ferred on the ground of dependency. The distribution of total 
deferments among the various grounds therefore shows little; 
what is of more significance is the policy pursued with regard 
to each ground of deferment and the light shed by administra- 
tive experience on the needs and situation of the country. 

5 
The chief ground of exemption from immediate military 
service was dependency. This is- significant when it is remem- 
bered that one of the arguments urged for the adoption of the 
selective service policy had been the economic one that it would 
eliminate from the army men having dependents who -would fall 

^■^ Clergymen, pilots, mariners, policemen and firemen. Federal and 
State ofiiccrs, etc. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 151 

upon the government for support. ^^ In working out a defini- 
tion of what constituted dependency of such a character as to 
afford a ground for exemption, the draft officials were presented 
with some of the nicest and most delicate of all the questions 
that confronted them. At the outset, when the chief considera- 
tion was to get together an army as rapidly as possible and 
before an effective body of rules had been formulated, the bur- 
den of responsibility was left upon the local boards ; and the 
natural result was a great unevenness of policy. This is in- 
dicated by the figures in the first report of the provost-marshal 
general showing the exemptions of married men for depend- 
ency. In some States the ratio of married men accepted for 
service to married men discharged for dependency was as high 
as 38 per cent.,^^ while in others ^° it stood as low as 6 per 
cent.*^ This diversity of policy was done away with by the 
establishment of fhe classification system. 

Two classes of married registrants could be disposed of with- 
out difficulty. Those married men not usefully employed and 
whose families were not dependent on them for support, or 
who habitually failed to support their families, had no proper 
claim for deferment, and belonged clearly in Class I. Likewise 
those registrants with wives or children wholly or mainly de- 
pendent on them were with equal clearness entitled to the limit 
of deferment and were accordingly placed in Class IV. It was 
intermediate cases which caused difficulty. There was first of 
all the case of the married man with children who was usefully 
employed, but whose wife or children were not dependent on 
him for support. Here there was no economic reason for 
deferment, but it was felt that there was a social reason. " It 
was not thought that the head of a family of children, although 
his responsibility in providing for their livelihood was negli- 
gible, should be classified in Class I so as to be liable for 
military service at the same time as was the man with no 

^^ See above ; p. 64. 

39 This was true of Louisiana and Mississippi. 

*" North Dakota and Wisconsin. 

<^" First Report of Provost- Marshal General"; appendix; Table 22. 



152 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

domestic obligations." *^ A man of this description was accord- 
ingly placed in Class II-A. A similar case was that of the 
married registrant without children, whose induction into serv- 
ice would not deprive the wife of reasonably adequate support. 
This case raised the question of what amounted to depriving 
the wife of reasonably adequate support. It was recognized 
that the wives of many registrants were qualified by special 
skill to support themselves, and that in such a situation a wife 
without children could spare her husband with far less hardship 
than when she was dependent on his support. Accordingly 
husbands in this situation were classified in Class II-B. The 
present writer is inclined to doubt the justice of so advanced 
a classification, particularly in the light of the remarkable le- 
niency shown to the class of husbands who were placed in Class 
II-A, Nevertheless, the draft officials seemed to feel that it 
was justified by public opinion, arrd cite in this connection the 
following letter from a Massachusetts mill town : 

Perhaps I have no right to speak to you about this matter, and I 
realize I have nothing to say about making the laws concerning the 
army. But did you ever stop and think of the poor and aged mothers 
that are giving up their boys, while next door are young married 
couples enjoying life to the fullest extent? That poor mother had to 
save, and m«iny times do without the necessities of life, to bring her 
boys to manhood. Now when she is old and broken down in health, 
do you think it right to take all her boys? There are in Class II right 
here men working every day demanding large salaries. Their wives 
also work in most cases, and the mills are paying well now. They 
go to the pictures, beaches, and enjoy life, while it really seems 
to rrre they could serve their country as well as young men in Class I 
These mothers that I refer to, some of them, have had to go to work ; 
really it seems some laws are unjust. One young wife says, "I won't 
work now; if I did they would take my husband in the army." Surely 
she can work far more easily than those poor mothers. Do you think 
it is a just law that allows these men and their lazy wives to stay 
at home while the poor old mother gives her three or four sons?*' 

A large number of married men were deferred on other 

■*2" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. in, 
*^Ibid.; p. 112, 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 153 

grounds than that of dependency. The figures are as follows : ** 

Total married registrants, June 5, 1917-September 11, 1918 . 4,883,213 

Total married registrants deferred on all grounds . . . 4,394,676 
Total married registrants deferred on grounds of . . . 

dependency of wife or children . . . 3,619,466 

Placed in Class II-A 183,770 

Placed in Class II-B 503,221 

Placed in Class IV 2,932,475 

One of the points of greatest difficulty in the wiiole adminis- 
tration of the draft was the question of dependency claims 
arising out of recent marriages. There was great unevenness 
in the attitude of different localities toward such claims. Thus 
in Texas 2.7 per cent, of the entire registration of the State 
were granted deferred classification because of dependency 
arising from marriages entered into after the passage of the 
Draft Act, while in Tennessee only seven-tenths of i per cent, 
of the registrants were deferred on that ground. It was esti- 
mated that deferments on the ground of such marriages had 
resulted by May i, 19 18, in a loss of 167,148 soldiers to the 
army; in other words, 1.74 per cent, of all registrants were 
granted deferred classification because of dependency claims 
resulting from marriages entered into after May 18, 1917. To 
render available as many of these men as possible a Presidential 
order was issued on June 13, 1918, providing that dependency 
resulting from such marriages should be disregarded, unless 
there was a child of the marriage, born or unborn by June 9, 
1918. This order resulted in the reclassification of 91,299 men 
into Class I. 

Provision for deferred classification was made for single men 
having dependent parents, brothers or sisters, or adopted 
children. The figures are as follows : ^^ 

Total single men registered June 5, 1917-September 11, 1918 5,796,601 

Total deferments for dependency 3,903,733 

Single men deferred for dependency 284,267 

Single men deferred for dependency of parents .... 236,553 

**Jbid.; pp.. 116-117. 
*5Ibid.; p. 118. 



154 



THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 



Single nien deferred for dependency of brothers or sisters . 32,898 
Single men deferred for dependency of adopted children . 14,816 

These registrants were placed in Class III. The noteworthy 
lesson of the figures is the small number of unmarried men of 
draft age who were burdened with dependents. 

6 

Attention has already been called to the fact that deferments 
on the ground of dependency covered the cases of by far the 
largest number of those necessary industrial and agricultural 
workers who would otherwise have had to be specially deferred 
on the ground of their occupation. Indeed it has been estimated 
that 90 per cent, of the workers in any given industry remained 
untouched by the draft, either because of dependency defer- 
ments or because these workers were either v/omen or men out- 
side the draft ages. So far as male workers within the ages 
from twenty-one to thirty are concerned, deferments for agri- 
cultural workers are shown by the following figures : *^ 

Total workers of all ages engaged in agriculture . . . I3.777.454 

Males, age 21-30 classified in first registration .... 2,509,698 

Deferments as necessary workers . ,. 180,363 

Deferments on other grounds 1.575-937 

Placed in Class I, 1918 753,398 

With respect to industrial workers the figures are as fol- 
lows : *' 

Total of all ages in industries other than agriculture . . 29,429,458 

Males, age 21-30 classified in first registration . . . 6,068,021 

Deferments as necessary workers 119,060 

Deferments on other grounds 4,022,362 

Class I, icfi8 1,926,599 

A combination of these tables results as follows : 

Number Percentage 

Workers of all ages 43,206,912 loo 

Ages 21-30 as classified within Selective 

Service Law to June, 1918 .... 8,577,719 1985 

48 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 137. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 155 

Number Rercentage 

Placed in deferred classes 5,897,722 13.65 

Placed in Class I 2,679,997 6,2a 

In short, the total inroad made by the draft upon man-power 
engaged in agriculture and industry between December 15, 191 7, 
and June, 19 18, was slightly more than 6 per cent. To this 
should be added something like 1.5 per cent, for the inroad 
made before December 15, 1917, and a little less than that per- 
centage for the inroad made by taking in the members of the 
new twenty-one year group in June and August, 1918. 
Against this increase must be offset the men placed in Class 
I who, having been found physically defective, were reclassified 
into Class V, and were thus free to return to their former 
employments. 

The special deferments granted on occupational grounds 
were necessary to protect industry from the loss of indispen- 
sable workers who could present no other claims for deferment. 
The object was to exclude from military service all " key " or 
" pivotal " men whose removal from their positions would dis- 
locate industrial processes essential to the nation's war ef- 
fort. These men were graded in the inverse order of their 
importance. Thus in Class II, the least deferred class, were 
placed registrants found to be necessary skilled farm laborers 
in a necessary agricultural enterprise, or necessary skilled in- 
dustrial laborers in a necessary industrial enterprise. In Class 
III were placed registrants found to be necessary assistants, 
associates, or hired managers of a necessary industrial or 
agricultural enterprise; also registrants found to be necessary 
highly specialized technical or mechanical experts of a necessary 
industrial enterprise. In Class IV were placed registrants 
found to be necessary sole managing, controlling, or directing 
heads of a necessary agricultural or industrial enterprise. 
Classification on these principles resulted in the distribution of 
occupational deferments as follows : 

Class II 194,972 

Class III 65,213 



156 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Class IV 39^238 

Total 299,423 

The administrative policy adopted to control the granting of 
these occupational deferments aimed at dealing with each case 
of deferment individually on the basis of the peculiar personal 
and local circumstances attending it. Deferments in mass of 
whole classes of persons were strictly avoided. The idea was 
to sort out and defer " key " or " pivotal " individuals as indi- 
viduals. The agencies entrusted with this task were not the 
local boards but the district boards. This selection has met 
with the disapproval of the provost-marsh^tl general. " The 
statutory provision vesting in district boards the original juris- 
diction in industrial and agricultural cases was of doubtful 
wisdom. In many instances such boards were too far removed 
from the locality of the individual registrant to be able to 
know or to ascertain the actual economic conditions of his 
community. Many district boards followed substantially the 
cursory recommendation of local boards in occupational cases, 
while other boards ignored such recommendations, relying upon 
data which were often incomplete and artificial. . . . On the 
whole, a more just and effective classification would have been 
secured had original jurisdiction in these cases been vested in 
the local boards.""** 

The philosophy lying behind this criticism is elaborated at 
another point in General Crowder's report and is as significant 
as it is interesting. " It is true that all of the larger problems 
of a great war are national and must be solved with the end of 
obtaining the greatest national efficiency. But we can not afford 
to lose sight of the fact that all w^rs eventually come to an 
end, and that sooner or later the nation must return to a peace- 
time basis. This nation at bottom is one of local entities. . . . 
The solidarity and prosperity of the nation are, under our 

*^ " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 10. The reason 
for locating this jiTri.sdiction in the district rather than the local boards 
was the fear that the latter would be more subject to improper 
influences and to local favoritism. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 157 

peculiar organization, dependent upon the well-being of the 
local community. To disrupt the whole economic structure of 
the community for the single purpose of promoting the maxi- 
mum of national efficiency is not only a harsh rule, but, with 
the return of peace, a ruinous one. . . . We must leave in 
each community the framework of its normal economic struc- 
ture. In this way alone is an easy readjustment possible. Yet 
the overwhelming consideration, during an emergency, is 
national and not local effectiveness. How to attain the greatest 
national good with the least local harm, therefore, becomes the 
nicest and most delicate problem which can present itself. With 
this end in view the selective service administration consistently 
entrusted to local agencies the duty of determining the indus- 
trial usefulness of registrants. The criterion was always 
national necessity, but no attempt was ever made arbitrarily to 
define those necessities. ... As a result we secured a classifica- 
tion of skilled labor which kept local life going while at the 
same time national industrial development proceeded at a rapid 
pace. Skilled labor was classified from a national viewpoint 
so tempered by a local one that national development was un- 
hampered while communities retained the roots of their eco- 
nomic life." 4^ 

The result of leaving the determination of occupational de- 
ferments to a large number of local agencies resulted in a wide 
variation of policy. Some district boards narrowly confined 
their definition of a necessary industry to agriculture and enter- 
prises directly engaged in productive war work, hesitating even 
to include transportation. Others included undertakings of a 
commercial character important to the economic life of the 
locality. It was frequently urged that a list of necessary in- 
dustries and occupations should be issued by the provost-mar- 
shal general's office or some other central agency for the guid- 
ance of the boards, but the administration steadily refused to 
take such a course, believing that the elasticity gained by the 
free exercise of judgment by each board as to the needs of its 

*^Ibid.; p. 19. 



158 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

own community overbalanced the loss of the uniformity that 
would liave arisen from a rigid classification of preferred em- 
ployments.^"* 

From this policy, however, it was found necessary to depart 
in one outstanding instance. From the very outset employment 
in ship-building was recognized as constituting, without more, 
a reason for deferred classification. The basic importance of 
the ship-building program to our military effort does not re- 
quire explanation. Before the entrance of the United States 
into the war, about 47,000 men were engaged in ship-building. 
This force was entirely inadequate to carry out the building 
program essential to the transportation of troops and to the 
success of other parts of our military program. It was as im- 
portant to draw men into the ship-yards as to draft them into 
the army. The same need existed for mariners to man the 
ships when built. Accordingly deferred classification was 
granted to all registrants engaged in the building of ships or in 
the manufacture of ship-fittings, and to all who were employed 
as mariners or in training for such service under the super- 
vision of the United States Shipping Board, These registrants 
were enrolled on what was called the Emergency Fleet classifi- 
cation list, and their special deferment obtained only so long as 
they remained in the above-mentioned occupations. The net 
total of registrants on the list on October 15, 1918, was 146,- 
435, of whom 48,374, or about one-third, had no other ground 
for deferment and would otherwise have been available in 
Class I. 

Numerous complaints were made by individuals and by local boards 
with respect to a supposed abuse of the privilege extended under these 
regulations. . . . There is no doubt that there were some abuses of 
this privilege. Some registrants sought employment in the ship-build- 
ing industry in such manner as to clearly demonstrate that they were 
actuated by their desire to evade military service. An attempt, which 
from the newspaper reports seemed to be an organized plan, was made 
by some professional baseball players to get on the Emergency Fleet 
classification list in order to avoid being called for military service, 

^o/fcid.; p. 270. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 159 

and thus to continue to play ball. . . . Investigation showed that in a 
few instances baseball players had actually been placed on the list and 
were being permitted to continue to play ball by their employers, who 
required them to do only a nominal amount of work in connection 
with ship-building. This practice was promptly ended. Where an 
abuse of this nature was found the registrant was removed from the 
list, thereupon automatically becoming subject to call for military serv- 
ice in the sequence of his class and order-number.si 

On the other hand, complaints were made by the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation that local boards failed to honor Emergency 
Fleet requests and removed registrants from the fleet list ar- 
bitrarily and without authority. The boards acted under try- 
ing conditions and often in the face of a natural resentment 
aroused in some communities on account of individual cases of 
abuse of the regulations by registrants or their employers. 

The question of how far the deferment provided by the 
Emergency Fleet classification list served its purpose of draw- 
ing labor into the ship-yards is not an easy one to determine. 
Certainly it kept in the yards the 48,000 men who otherwise 
would have fallen into Class I. These men represented only 
about 6 per cent. 0i the total employed in shipping and ship- 
building, but undoubtedly many others were influenced to some 
extent to enter the industry by the inducement of deferred 
classification. 

As the year 1918 advanced, it became evident that certain 
other industries vital to the war were no longer adequately 
manned with labor-power. The Railroad Administration and 
the Fuel Administration in particular looked to the draft as the 
main source of depletion and urged a blanket deferment for 
railroad workers and coal miners. This request was steadily 
refused by the draft administration on the ground that a 
blanket deferment would inevitably afiford a retreat for many 
persons who should rightfully be in the military service, and 
would also result in lodging a power, which properly belonged 
to the draft authorities, in the hands of various employers and 
civil government agencies. Nevertheless, regulations were 

51/feirf.; p. 70. 



i6o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

issued enjoining a more rigid scrutiny by district boards of all 
deferment claims made by miners and railroad employees. 
District boards were advised that cases within their original 
jurisdiction might be reopened and reconsidered up to the hour 
of induction into the army. As a result of these measures, 
the Railroad Administration and the Fuel Administration ex- 
perienced less difficulty in the case of employees whose services 
they deemed essential. The drain of the draft upon coal min- 
ing is shown by the following figures : ^- 

Total mine operatives in the United States 706,012 

Registered to June, 1918 177.502 

Placed in Class I 46,253 

A further safeguard against utilization in the army of men 
whose services were more valuable in an industrial capacity 
was provided by the Furlough Act passed by Congress and 
approved on March 16, 19 18." This act permitted the grant- 
ing of furloughs to enlisted men in the army for the purpose 
of engaging in civil occupations whenever the interests of the 
national security and defense rendered it necessary or desirable. 
General Order No. 31, issued under the authority of this act, 
provided for the granting of furloughs to individual soldiers 
whose application showed they were needed on some farm ; to 
" specially qualified experts in agriculture needed in the service 
of the United States Department of Agriculture" ; and to ex- 
perts "in the service of agricultural colleges established under 
Federal law and regularly receiving Federal funds." A great 
number of these agricultural furloughs were granted, and they 
served substantially to relieve the agricultural situation during 
the harvesting season. 

A somewhat similar scheme was adopted for the protection 
of industry late in the summer of 1918. There was at that 
time established in the adjutant-general's office a section known 
as the industrial furlough section. The primary purpose of 
this agency was to return indispensable employees to plants, 

^2 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 141. 
53 See above, p. 143; 40 Statutes at Large; p. 450. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE i6i 

factories, and concerns that were operating under government 
contracts for war supplies and materials. When it appeared 
that either through enlistment or through the operation of the 
draft skilled workmen had been taken from such industrial 
concerns, the plant would make an application for the return 
of the man through the government department with which it 
had contracts ; the furlough section would investigate the case, 
and either approve or disapprove the application. If it was 
approved, and if the soldier was willing to accept a furlough 
and was not a member of a military organization under orders 
for overseas service, the adjutant-general ordered the furlough. 
In this way between 16,000 and 17,000 men were furloughed 
back to their former occupations.^* 

So far we have been considering the matter of protecting 
the labor supply of essential industries from undue depletion 
by withdrawals of men into the army. There remained the 
further problem of augmenting the labor supply of those in- 
dustries to the necessary figure. Strictly speaking, this was 
not a military problem in the same sense as the former; yet 
the selective service regulations provided a mechanism for 
dealing with it which was to some extent employed and which 
showed itself capable of indefinite further utilization. This 
mechanism was set in operation by the famous " work or fight " 
order, issued May 17, 1918. 

The " work or fight " order aimed to strike at two classes 
of registrants. " The spectacle had been not infrequent of a 
contingent of selectives, taken by the incidence of their order 
numbers from farms and factories, and marched for entrain- 
ment down the streets of their home town, past crowds of 
sturdy idlers and loafers standing at the street corners and 
contemplating placidly their own immunity. What gave these 
idlers their immunity? They were in Class I; but they had 
chanced to receive high order-numbers in the drawing, and thus 
became immune in their idleness until their number should be 
reached. The remedy for this was simple ; viz., to let no man 

^* " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 45. 



i62 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

who was idle be deferred in the draft merely because his 
order-number had not been reached; to require him to go 
promptly to work, or be inducted immediately into military 
service, his high order-number being cancelled. 

" Another class of fruitless immunes was represented by 
registrants who obtained deferment in Class II, III, or IV on 
grounds of dependency, but who were not engaged in produc- 
tive industries. Those deferred classes were meant to protect 
domestic relations and also economic interests. But thousands, 
if not hundreds of thousands, of men thus deferred for de- 
pendency were in obviously non-efifective occupations, and thus 
their deferment serv^ed no economic war purpose whatever. 
If they were to retain their immunity, they should transfer 
into useful and efifective occupations, or else forfeit their 
deferment." ^^ 

To effect this result was the object of the " work or fight " 
order.^'' The order provided that any registrant in Class I, II, 
III, or IV who was found by his local board after due notice 
and investigation to be wholly idle or engaged in a non-pro- 
ductive occupation as defined by the regulations, and who was 
unable to present a reasonable excuse, should lose his deferred 
classification, if any, and his order-number, and become liable 
to immediate induction into the army. The princiole extended 
potentially to all non-essential occupations, but its application 
was limited at the outset to the following classes of persons: 

(a) Persons engaged in serving food and drink in public 
places, including hotels and clubs, but not including dining- 
cars. 

(b) Operators of passenger elevators, and doormen, foot- 
men, carriage-openers and other attendants in clubs, hotels, 
stores, apartment-houses, office-buildings, and bath-houses. 

(c) Persons, including ushers and other attendants, em- 

^^ " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 75. 

56 " Selective Service Regulations," second edition; Sections 121 A ff. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 163 

ployed in connection with games, sports, and amusements, 
except owners and managers and actual performers in 
legitimate concerts, operas, and motion-pictures, and the 
theatrical performers and skilled persons necessary to such 
performances. 

(d) Persons employed in domestic service. 

(e) Sales clerks and other clerks in stores and mercantile 
establishments. This class did not include executives or 
persons engaged in skilled employments, e. g., buyers, registered 
druggists, electricians, etc. 

Certain excuses were admitted, such as. lack of reasonable 
opportunity for employment in any other occupation, or the 
fact that change from a non-productive to a productive em- 
ployment would require the removal of the registrant from his 
place of residence, entailing unusual hardship upon his family. 
Further, the boards were authorized to withhold action for a 
reasonable time in cases where it appeared that the registrant 
was in good faith seeking productive employment and that 
postponement would probably enable him to secure it. 

The measure of effectiveness of the order is indicated by 
the following figures showing the action of the boards : ^^ 

Total registrants notified by local boards under the order . 118,541 

Registrants changing their occupation without further action 54,3,13 

Action postponed 50,451 

Certified as non-productive to district boards .... "^^3,777 

Held by district boards to be non-productive .... 2,695 

Held (by district boards not to be non-productive - . 5,600 

Cases not disposed of 5,474 

The efifect of the order on the different classes of employment 
designated as non-productive is shown by the following table : ^® 

Total registrants notified to appear 118,541 

Total changing without further action 54,3i3 

(a) Food and drink service 17,889 

^""Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 79. 
58 Ibid.; p. 82, 



i64 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

(b) Door attendants, etc 4,725 

(c) Amusements 3,7i5 

(d) Domestic service 4,429 

(e) Clerks, etc 17,321 

The publication of the rules aroused much popular interest in 
their bearing upon the status of professional baseball players. 
In the case of Edward Ainsmith, which was appealed from the 
district board of the District of Columbia to the President, 
the decision of the district board holding baseball playing to be 
a non-productive occupation was affirmed. ^^ The chief argu- 
ment made on behalf of the appellant was that the discontin- 
uance of professional baseball, which afforded wholesome out- 
door recreation to such large numbers of the American people, 
" would work a social and industrial harm far out of propor- 
tion to the military loss involved." On. this contention the 
secretary of war, in announcing the decision of the President, 
commented as follows: " The stress of intensive occupation in 
industry and commerce in America in normal times is such as 
to give the highest importance and social value to outdoor 
recreation. It may well be that all of the persons who attend 
such outdoor sports are not in need of them; but certainly a 
very large preponderance of the audiences a-t these great 
national exhibitions are helped, physically and mentally, and 
made more efficient by the relaxation that they there enjoy. But 
the times are not normal ; the demands of the army and of the 
country are such that we must make all sacrifices, and the non- 
productive employment of able-bodied persons, useful in the na- 
tional defense, either as military men or in industry and 
commerce, cannot be justified. The country will be best sat- 
isfied if the great selective process by which the army is re- 
cruited makes no discriminations among men except those upon 
which depend the preservation of the business and industries 
essential to the sucessful prosecution of the war." 

The " work or fight " order was very limited in its applica- 
tion, the number of employments designated as non-productive 

69 July 20, 1918. " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General "; p. 82. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 165 

including only the minimum of the most obviously non-essen- 
tial occupations. But the possibilities of the principle itself 
were virtually without limit. " They are as wide as the field 
of labor itself. The * work or fight ' principle had been only 
sparingly applied when the war ended, but it had already suc- 
ceeded in cleaning out the idle class and the small group of 
occupations declared to be non-productive," reports General 
Crowder.^** " The labor thus diverted turned of necessity into 
the field of necessary or productive industry. The ship-yards, 
for example, were materially aided by the increased supply of 
labor. We had only to extend the scope of the * work or 
fight ' regulations to produce added effectiveness. As time 
went on, more and more occupations would have been cata- 
logued as non-productive, and the evacuation of labor from 
them would have been initiated. The labor thus affected turns 
naturally for reemployment to the fields of highest wages. 
Since the highest wage-scale is found in the purely war-time 
industries, the labor thus diverted turns almost as a unit to 
these very industries. Thus at one stroke is accomplished the 
elimination of the non-producer and his transformation into 
the most effective producer." 

By means of the " work or fight " principle, the Selective 
Service Law offered a partial substitute for an industrial draft. 
But in certain directions the principle did not go quite far 
enough. It drove man-power into the essential industries, but 
it provided no means of allocating the supply to particular in- 
dustries in proportion to the relative need. " It is conceivable 
that situations might arise where it is possible to obtain abun- 
dant labor for the ship-yard and insufficient labor for the 
munitions factory, and where the ' work or fight ' principle will 
not adequately serve to divert the required labor to the muni- 
tions factory." Means were at hand for effecting this result 
by an extension of the principle involved in the industrial 
furlough order. In practice the industrial furlough had been 
granted only on an individual basis, but there was no obstacle 

^^Ibid.; p. 15. 



i66 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

to applying it to groups. " It was quite feasible to call into 
service all or any part of a group of skilled labor and to 
offer tbe men thus called the option of remaining in the army 
for military duty or accepting an indefinite furlough dependent 
upon taking employuTcnt in a certain definite work. . . . The 
result of such a method is easily visualized. The necessary 
labor would have been secured, and the uncertain shifting of 
it that might otherwise have ensued would have been stabilized. 
The adoption of such a plan," reports General Crowder, " was 
not foreign to my thoughts when hostilities ceased." ^^ 

This view discloses the significance of the Selective Service 
Law not merely as a means of building up an army out of the 
human material best adapted to military service, but also as an 
instrument for the larger task of " weaving the man-power 
of the nation into the general pattern of greatest national effec- 
tiveness " ; as an instrument, in short, for organizing the whole 
of the nation's human resources into an organism of which the 
army was an essential part, but only a part. The policy of the 
law regarded military effectiveness from the larger point of 
view of national effectiveness. " Before hostilities ceased, the 
time was rapidly approaching when we would have been com- 
pelled to take the final step in the process and to have denied 
absolutely to the registrants deferred upon industrial grounds 
all rights to military service. We had almost reached the time 
when it would have been necessary to make it as impossible 
for the man deferred for industrial reasons to secure military 
service as it had been for the registrants in Class I to avoid 
it. This was the logical end to which we were inevitably tend- 
ing." «2 

The importance of the Selective Service Act in the aspect 
we are considering — that is, in its bearing upon the industrial 
effectiveness of the nation at war — cannot be overestimated. 
It was a pioneer statute. It represents the first thorough 
attempt to coordinate purely military effort with that national 

61 Ibid.; p. i6. 
6- Ibid.; p. 14. 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 167 

economic effort which the conditions of modern civiHzation 
have made at least an equally important element of warfare. 
The Civil War draft measure contained no provision for in- 
dustrial deferment. The British Military Service Acts suc- 
ceeded so little in systematizing industrial classification that 
they resulted rather in confusion than in an orderly correlation 
between the army and industry. ^^^ The Selective Service Law 
was therefore a major experiment in a direction which will 
certainly have to be more and more followed in the future. 



Every registrant summoned in the draft was subjected to 
physical examination by his local board. Of the registrants 
examined, 29.11 per cent, were pronounced unfit before Decem- 
ber 15, 1917; for the period after that date, the figure was 
29.59. Registrants passed by local boards and inducted into 
service were reexamined on arrival at a mobilization-camp; of 
these 5.8 per cent, were rejected in 1917, 8.1 in 1918. The 
rejection at the camps of men passed as fit by local boards was 
due to a number of causes — the hurried character of the ex- 
amination which the local board often had to make, the greater 
strictness of the army doctors at the camps, and perhaps also to 
no small extent to consideration stated in a letter from a local 
board to the office of the provost-marshal general: 

Our rejections from the beginning to the end amounted to 7 per cent, 
rejected at camp. This percentage would have been smaller had it not 
seemed expedient in many cases to send certain men, even though we 
felt satisfied that they would be rejected. This was done in a number 
of instances to satisfy a critical public, on the one hand, and in other 
instances in order to secure the men themselves from any stigma ; in 
other words, to give them a better discharge than a local board dis- 
charge would amount to in the eyes of the general public. '^s 

62a por an account of the British system of deferments see "a Study 
of Conscription in the United Kingdom, 1914-18," by Challen B. Ellis, 
printed as Appendix K in " Second Report of Provost-Marshal Gen- 
eral " ; p. 379. 

"2 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 157. 



i68 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

On the other hand the frequency of the cases in which the 
rejections made at camp were for obvious defects — amount- 
ing to about 50 per cent, of such rejections °* — points to a 
carelessness on the part of certain local boards which requires 
comment. A case is on record of a negro being sent to one of 
the camps who was so blind that he had to be led about. 

Before December 15, the registrants examined were either 
absolutely accepted, or totally rejected. This resulted in the 
rejection of many men who, while unfit for the rigor of general 
military service, were yet physically qualified to perform 
limited service of a useful kind. Accordingly, the new regula- 
tions taking effect on that date provided that registrants should 
be classified on physical examination into four groups : Group 
A, fully qualified; Group B, those having remediable defects; 
Group C, men qualified for limited service only ; Group D, men 
totally disqualified. Of the 3,208,446 men examined under 
these regulations, 339,377 men were placed in Group C, and 
521,607 in Group D. Of the Group C men, 91,867 were 
actually inducted and assigned to various sorts of limited serv- 
ice, clerical work and the like, in supply departments and else- 
where. ''•^ 

Interesting comparisons are on record of the proportion of 
rejections among different groups of registrants. Under the 
first series of examinations — that is, before December 15, 
1917 — Connecticut, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Vermont 
showed rejections of more than 40 per cent, of all registrants 

^* Ibid.; p. 162. Compare also the following account from Camp 
Devens : "There were some cases of colossal stupidity or laziness 
or ignorance. From some of the Boston draft boards came men who 
were actually cripples. One man had only one hand. Another man 
Iiad only one eye, and one chap was so near death from heart disease 
that the doctors ordered that he be rushed back to his home as 
quickly as possible. . . . After a while the boards found that they 
were only making more work for themselves by sending such men, 
as others had to be sent afterwards to replace those found unfit. 
Then an improvement set in." — "Forging the Sword; the Story ot 
Camp Devens," by William J. Robinson; p. 27. 

"•' See table, " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. is'-'- 



SELECTION FOR SERVICE 169 

examined. The States showing the same high percentage, 
under the second series of examinations were Arizona, Colo- 

. rado, Connecticutt, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. On the first examination. South Dakota held the 
low record for percentage of rfejections — only 14 per cent. In 
the second series, tl\is place was held by Oklahoma with 17.2 per 
cent.*"' 

A larger proportion of colored registrants examined were 
found to be physically qualified than was the case with the 
whites, the percentage of rejections being 25.4 for the colored 
groups, 30.3 for the whites.*'^ A special comparison w.as made 
to determine the relative proportion of rejections in alien and 
native communities, the result indicating a somewhat higher 
percentage of rejections among the aliens.*'^ Similarly a higher 
percentage of rejections was indicated in urban as compared 
with rural communities.^^ The examination of registrants 
newly arrived at the age of twenty-one in 19 18 resulted in only 
23 per cent, of rejections as against 30 per cent, among the 
registrants aged between twenty-one and thirty who were ex- 
amined between December 15, 191 7, and June 5, 1918. These 
figures are another indication of the greater fitness of men of 

( the lower age f oi* military duly. 

I Figures showing the nature of the defects causing disquali- 
fication are available for dates* between February 10 and Octo- 
her 15, 1 9 18. They are as follows, listed in the order of 
importance : 

1 Number Percentage 

1 Total for all causes 467,694 100.00 

' Heart and blood-vessels 61,142 13.07 

j Bones and joints- 57,744 12.35 

! Eyes 49,801 10.65 

' Pulmonary tuberculosis 40,533 8.67 

i *6 Compare tables in " First Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; 
! p. S3 : and " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 417. 
I *^ " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 159. 
' ^^Ibid.; p. 160. 
^^Ibid.; p. 159. 



170 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Number Percentage 

Deficiency in height, weight, etc 39,i66 8.37 

Hernia 28,268 6.04 

Mental deficiency 24,514 5.24 

Nervous and mental disorders 23,728 5.07 

Ears 20,465 4.38 

Flat foot i8,aS7 3^87 

Teeth 14.793 310 

Skin 12,519 2.68 

Thyroid 8,215 176 

Respiratory (non-tubercular) 7,823 i!67 

Genito-urinary (non-venereal) 6,309 1.35 

Genito-urinary (venereal) 6,235 1.33 

Tuberculosis (non-respiratory) 4,136 .88 

Digestive system 2476 .53 

Alcohol and drugs 2,007 -43 

All others 39>7i3 8.50 



CHAPTER VI 

A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 

NO feature of the draft was more notable than the success- 
ful working of its administrative machinery. This is 
challenging in view of the fact that the ground principles on 
which that machinery was designed presented several novel 
and interesting departures. These principles were, first, a 
civilian administration; secondly, administration of a national 
policy through the medium of local agencies, vested with a 
high degree of ultimate discretion; and, thirdly, a- frank ap- 
plication of the method of administrative as contrasted with 
judicial control. The first two principles tended to increase 
efficiency by rendering the draft process delicately answerable 
to the variant currents of local opinion; while the third com- 
pensated for weaknesses inherent in the first two by promoting 
speed and energy in functioning. 

The Draft Acts of the Civil War and the British Military 
Service Acts of 191 6 had operated through a civilian adminis- 
tration. The point had been pressed by members of the House 
Committee on Military Affairs when the Selective Service Act 
was in process of framing. To its final adoption General 
Crowder largely attributes the success of the draft. " Since 
the foundation of the republic our people have inherited a 
deep-seated prejudice against anything akin to compulsory 
military service. This tradition, to be sure, was offset by the 
popular will to win the war, so imbued were they all with the 
determination to perpetuate democratic ideals, so impressed 
with the knowledge that not only was it necessary to raise an 
army but to raise it quickly. Nevertheless, such a stupendous 
undertaking could not have been accomplished through a 

171 



172 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

system not in harmony with the national spirit. And the most 
influential feature in bringing about this harmony was the fact 
that the selective draft system was mainly placed in the hands 
of men taken from the people themselves — a civilian organiza- 
tion without previous experience except in diverse civilian 
pursuits. The knowledge that the privilege and the responsi- 
bility belonged to them made the draft more popular with the 
citizenry than if it had been effected by purely military proc- 
esses." ^ 

The keystone of the administrative structure was the local 
board. It was here that responsibility impinged, power lodged, 
and the fulcrum of effectiveness rested. Virtually every 
question was primarily a question for the local boards. Ex- 
cept for the initial registration in 1917, these boards had charge 
of every step in the movement of selectives from home to 
camp. Their determination as to the status of registrant? was 
subject to review by district boards, which were also civilian 
bodies chosen like the local boards with nice regard for the 
principle of locality. These district boards had, besides, an 
original jurisdiction over claims for exemption based on oc- 
cupational considerations. In certain cases an appeal was open 
from their decisions to the President. At the head of the 
hierarchy of which the local boards formed the base, and bring- 
ing the activities of the entire system into unity by laying down 
nation-wide regulations, was the office of the provost-marshal 
general of the army, who had been designated as chief draft ex- 
ecutive by Presidential proclamation of May 22, 1917. From 
this office were issued the instructions, rulings, and regula- 
tions of a general character which served to guide the policy 
of the local agencies. The provost-marshal general also ex- 
ercised a certain administrative supervision over the action of 
the local authorities. But between this central draft executive 
for the whole nation and the district and local boards there 
stood an intervening agency, novel in character and surpris- 
ingly effective in its working. Contact between the provost- 

1 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 8. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 173 

marshal general's office and the boards was not maintained 
directly, but through the medium of the governors of the 
States, who were called on by the President to superintend the 
execution of the Selective Service Act within their several 
jurisdictions. This employment of the mechanism of State 
government for the administration of Federal policy is a fresh 
departure in constitutional development, far-reaching in its 
possibilities ; and the success which attended it in practice en- 
courages the hope that new ways may be found for the 
continued utilization of so promising a political instrument. 

The purpose of the present chapter will be to consider the 
constitution, work, and powers of the local and district boards, 
to glance at the way in which they performed their duties, 
and to describe the mechanism provided for coordinating and 
controlling them. 



In order to carry out the spirit of the draft act it was neces- 
sary that it should be administered by men having intimate 
knowledge of the registrants with whom they were to deal. 
It was also desired to make the units of draft administration 
conform as far as possible to known and familiar units of 
political administration so that the strength of existing loyal- 
ties might be given full eflFect. For both these purposes an 
area including in the neighborhood of 30,000 people, which 
about corresponded to the average county, seemed adapted. 
Accordingly, this figure was named in the act as defining the 
area of jurisdiction of each local board.^ The total number of 
boards finally stood at 4648. 

It was further realized that board members should be chosen from 
the standpoint of environment rather than with reference to their 
professions or calling. Neither legal nor governmental training was 
the essential qualification. An intimate knowledge and appreciation of 
all varieties of local conditions being necessary, a composite board of 
capable, reputable, and representative men, having different careers 
and experiences, would be the best judges of the equities of the law 

2 Section 4. 



174 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

in its application to their neighbors. Local boards were constituted 
on the principle of their peerage with the men whose cases they werC 
to decide.^ 

The act provided for a district board in each of the 155 
Federal judicial districts. The constitution of these boards 
was determined in view of their duties. They were to act first 
in an appellate capacity as a check on the decisions of their 
local boards; and, secondly, in their original jurisdiction over 
claims for occupational deferments, they were to protect the 
agricultural and industrial interests of their own community 
and of the nation. Accordingly the typical district board con- 
sisted of five members — an agricultural member, a member 
familiar with the industrial situation in the district, a labor 
member, a physician, and a lawyer.* 

To give further assurance that the members of the boards, 
both local and district, would be persons familiar with and 
acceptable to their localities, their selection was left by the 
President in the hands of the State governors, whose recom- 
mendations were followed as to appointments, removals, and 
substitutions." In this way an administrative body was built 
up identified in character with their own areas of jurisdic- 
tion and as far removed as could be from a centralized bureau- 
cracy. 

I. Simply expressed, the duty of the local boards was to 
classify their registrants, summon and examine them in suffi- 
cient numbers to meet current calls for men, and mobilize them 
for entrainment. Each of these processes involved dozens of 
others. The case of every individual was peculiar to himself 
alone and ramified out into special personal considerations and 
inquiries. This was exactly the theory of the act, which 
provided administrative areas small enough to admit of just 
this measure of personal contact and consideration of individ- 

8 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 276. 
*Ibid.; p. 268. 
'^Ibid.; p. 276. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 175 

ual details. Obliged by their duties to become acquainted with 
the intimate family life of their neighbors, the boards fre- 
quently found themselves forced into the position of social 
welfare agencies for their communities. Through the power 
which they held in reserve they were able to compel delinquent 
husbands or sons to support wives or mothers ; they patched up 
family quarrels, found jobs for idlers, and acted as bureaus 
of information regarding all matters military and industrial. 
The labor entailed by such a variety of duties was enormous, 
and the faithful and untiring service of the local board mem- 
bers won the merited commendation of the provost-marshal 
general." 

The following letter from a local board to a State adjutant- 
general, which is printed in the "Second Report of the Provost- 
Marshal General" (page 280), serves to illustrate, under its 
humorous tone, the weight and variety of duties which fell 
to the lot of the local boards : 

Sir : Because this board and its meager staff is so busy 

Counseling registrants — 

Reconciling mothers — 

Patiently answering dozens of inquiries by mail, telephone, and 
telegraph — 

Issuing permits for passports — 

Writing to transfer boards and telling them what to do with Form 
2008-A — 

Making out induction papers for S. A. T. C. registrants — 

Copying our 4439 registration cards — 

Writing up cover sheets — 

Hunting up questionnaires without order-numbers in order to append 
additional late arrival affidavits of the X. Y. Z. Co. for deferred indus- 
trial classification in Class II of aliens (who are sure to be in Class 
V)- 

Preparing routings and transportation requests for individual induc- 
tants under competent orders, who are to be entrained for Kelly 
Field, San Antonio, Texas, or Carlstrom Field, Arcadia, Florida — 

Counseling the poor innocents as to how many "suits of underwear 
shall I take ? " — 

" Second report ; p. 290. 



176 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Advising them firmly though with kindness that while requests for 
tourist sleeping-car accommodations will be issued to them, our ex- 
perience is that there will be no tourist-cars available, and that they 
will sleep on the floor — 

Preparing seven meal tickets, three copies for each man — 

Issuing new registration cards and new final classification cards to 
men w-ho have " had their pocketbooks stolen '' ( ?) and are afraid 
of being rounded up — 

Issuing certificates of immunity to forty-six year old men who pre- 
sent proofs of birth date so that they won't be rounded up — 

Advising colored ladies (to their manifest satisfaction) as to pro- 
spective government allotments and allowances to come from their 
casual spouses when in service — 

Telling the anxious Y. M. C. A. recruits how they can apply to have 
their cases reopened and claims for occupational exemption considered — 

Advising by mail the assistant district attorney of — county, who de- 
sires to prosecute a registrant for not supporting his wife — 

Trying to keep several thousand questionnaires and registration cards, 
minus order-numbers as yet, out of irremediable chaos due to lack of 
filing cabinets or other facilities — 

Reconciling our hard working limited service man to writing up his 
" daily morning reports " on a form adapted for a full company of 
men, including mules — 

Conducting voluminous correspondence with perturbed mustering-in 
officers at distant cantonments about registrants who have been picked 
up without Form 1007 in their possession and shot into camp without 
proper induction papers in order that some yap deputy sheriff can get 
the $50 reward because he needed the money — 

Futilely registering ex-soldiers and sailors discharged for physical 
disability — 

Getting into a corner occasionally and going crazy trying to strdy 
out an abstruse legal problem from an interesting 433-page text-book 
called " Selective Service Regulations," second edition, Form 99-A — 

Classifying questionnaires — 

Engaging, for physical examinations of several hundred men, doctors 
who are already bereft of their wits on account of the Spanish 
influenza — 

Preparing dozens and dozens and dozens of Form loio for these 
examinations, three copies of each — 

Postponing the examinations after all, because the doctors simply 
can't come, and redating all the Forms loio — 

Doing dozens more things daily and nightly and Sundays and holi- 
days, of which the foregoing are mere samples — 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 177 

Because, I sa}% the board and its meager staff are so busy with 
a number of such matters, I beg to report: 

That, though probably about half the questionnaires of the " first 
series, registrants of September, 1918," have been classified, we have n't 
the time or inclination or energy to count them, even approximately; 
about half the physical examinations have been concluded, and on 
Sunday we are going to try to catch up with our correspondence, 
if the master-list does n't come, which we presume it will, however, 
in which event, we hope to have four volunteer typists pound out five 
copies of Form 102 (the churches are all closed, so it won't matter), 
— and, anyhow, we lost the "progress chart" the very day it arrived. 
And it is our opinion, if we may be permitted the liberty to express 
it, that what the Government wants (or ought to want in the present 
urgency) is men, not classifications, and we firmly believe that the 
boys on the firing line in France don't care a whoop in hades how 
many registrants Local Board No. 3 of Union County classifies in 
Class V or in Class IV, Division A, so we called out every man who 
made no claim or who waived all claims, or who had a manifestly in- 
sufficient claim, classified him at once, and called him for physical 
examination ; if it were not for the blasted epidemic, we should be 
ready to report practically full completion of physical examinations 
now; but we shall be in any event, within a week, even if we explode 
in the attempt and incapacitate for all time the few remaining dis- 
traught doctors that are still available to cajolery and patriotic 
urging; in the meantime, we shall classify now and then, when we can, 
an alien or two, to swell our general list of classifications. 

The fact is, we have been wanting to write this letter since we 
were appointed in May, 1917, so excuse it, please. Furthermore — and 
we say this in no mood of rancor or in undue pride of spirit — we 
don't care if you send it to the provost-marshal general. In fact, we 
wish you would. No more benevolent attention could accrue to the 
members of local boards than the gentle joys of court-martial, and 
''ool retirement somewhere in nice quiet cells, fed and cared for, 
during the period of the balance of the Emergency. 

And further deponent saith not (because his wife has just telephoned 
as to why the deuce he doesn't come home; he'll surely be sick), 
and will now quench the midnight shining bulb and go, and try to 
get around early in the morning and endeavor to find that lost "prog- 
ress chart" (drat it). 

2. Each district board had within its jurisdiction an average 
of thirty local boards and a total of about 70,000 registrants. 
At the outset, the district boards were swamped with appeal 



178 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

cases. In time, this appeal work diminished and the task of 
the boards as arbiters between the army and industry advanced 
to first importance. This work was unusually heavy. In 
order to handle it, boards with a large membership had often to 
be provided, the board for New York City, for instance, num- 
bering thirty members and being the largest board in the whole 
country. A practice much followed was to divide up the work 
among the members, the agricultural member taking care of 
agricultural claims, the industrial member of industrial claims, 
the lawyer of alienage claims, and so on. About one-fifth of the 
membership of these boards served without remuneration. 



It was provided in Section 4 of the act that the decisions of 
the district boards " shall be final, except that in accordance 
with such regulations as the President may prescribe, he may 
affirm, modify, or reverse any such decision." This matter of 
the finality of the decisions of the boards raises the question 
of their power, and consequently of their standing under our 
constitutional system. Examination shows that the operation 
of the act resulted in an extension of that principle of the 
finality of administrative determination, which in recent years 
has been making gradual headway against currents of constitu- 
tional tradition. 

It requires to be pointed out that the boards were not courts 
— they were administrative bodies. While in a sense their 
action in passing on such questions as whether a registrant was 
a citizen or an alien, or was entitled or not to a dependency 
exemption, was a judicial act," they were not courts because 
they were not bound by the ordinary judicial rules as to pro- 
cedure and evidence; and because the whole purpose and object 
of their determinations was different from the purpose of a 
court of justice. This is well brought out in the preliminary 

7 Hough, J., in United States ex rel. Roman vs. Rauch, Department 
of Justice, " Interpretation of War Statutes, Bulletin," No. 147. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 179 

letter of instruction addressed by the provost-marshal general 
to the local boards on July 26, 1917 : ^ 

You are not a court for the adjustment of differences between two 
persons in controversy. You are agents of the Government, engaged 
in selecting men for the Government, and there is no controversy. 
You, acting for the Government, are to investigate each case in the 
interests of the nation and never in the interests of an individual. 
There is not one exemption or discharge in the law or regulations that 
is put there for the benefit of any individual. All are there for the 
benefit of the nation and to the end that "the whole nation may be 
a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best 
fitted." There should be no rules like those of court procedure, no 
technical rules of evidence. You should proceed to investigate cases 
about which you are not satisfied exactly as you, as an individual, 
would proceed to inform yourself of any fact about which you are 
in doubt. 

To vest with conclusive finality the decisions of a body of 
this kind, acting solely in the interests of the Government, runs 
counter to the traditional doctrine in common-law countries 
that every citizen is entitled to have his rights adjudicated in 
a court of law. The point was naturally raised when Secre- 
tary Baker was before the House Committee on Military 
Affairs : 

Mr. Gordon : " This draft system is an invasion of the right of 
personal liberty of the citizen, and we have always been taught to 
believe in this country that the courts must determine the validity 
of any restraint put upon the individual citizen, and there is no pro- 
vision in the bill for any such determination by a court." 

Secretary Baker : " I have already said that I have not the slightest 
objection to the writ of habeas corpus or any other civil process being 
in the hands of the civil courts to determine all questions of fact 
with regard to the inclusion of anybody who has the right of ex- 
emption." 

Mr. Gordon: "I am very glad to hear you say that; I did not 
understand that." ^ 

Accordingly, the question narrowed down to one of what 

8 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 283. 
°" Hearings"; p. 307. See also ibid.; p. 131. 



t8o the building OF AN ARMY 

supervision the courts would exercise over the determination 
of the boards. There were already in the books a number of 
precedents in point. In Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land 
and Improvement Co. ^° the Supreme Court had decided that 
the due process guaranteed by the Constitution does not re- 
quire that personal and property rights shall in all cases be 
finally determined in a court of law ; and it was accordingly held 
in that case that Congress was free to vest an administrative of- 
ficer with authority to determine the amount due from a gov- 
ernment official, and to provide for the collection of the sum 
without any intervention of the courts, by a mere distress- 
warrant issued by the solicitor of the treasury. The question 
had arisen more pointedly in the Chinese exclusion cases ; and in 
the leading case of United States vs. Ju Toy ^^ it was decided 
that an administrative decision by the immigration officials as 
to whether or not the petitioner was an alien was, in the absence 
of a showing of abuse of authority, final and conclusive. On 
the other hand it had been, held that if such a question as 
alienage or citizenship is dependent upon the determination of 
a point of law, and does not merely involve a finding of fact, 
the matter will be reviewed by the courts, and accordingly that 
it was for the court to determine in the last instance whether or 
not a native of Porto Rico who was an inhabitant of the island 
at the time of its cession to the United States was legally an 
alien and to be treated as such on arrival at a port of this coun- 
try after the date of cession.^^ 

Under the Selective Service Act the main question was first 
raised and passed on in the case of Angelus z's. Sullivan. 
John Angelus, a citizen of Austria, claimed exemption before 
a local board on the ground that he was a non-declarant alien, 
and filed a supporting affidavit. The local board denied his 
claim, and its action was affirmed by the district board. There- 
upon Angelus brought a bill in equity to enjoin the local board 

10 18 How., 272. 

11 198 U. S., 253. 

12 Gonzales vs. Williams, 192 U. S., i. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION i8i 

from certifying his name to the mihtary authorities for serv- 
ice. The district court dismissed the bill in an opinion which 
laid down extremely broad principles : 

I think Congress had no intention that the courts should inter- 
fere with this drafting proposition. It is a mihtary measure in time 
of war, and it would be most subversive of military control and the 
proper disposition of this extremely difficult new problem if the courts 
should interfere in this situation. If Congress had intended that the 
courts should review the action of the local and district boards, it 
would have so provided, and unless an appellate court says to the 
contrary, I am of the opinion that a district court of the United 
States should resolve any doubt in favor of the Government; any 
other view might tend seriously to embarrass the work of raising an 
army with its manifold difficulties and tremendous detail. If those 
who believe they are entitled to exemption were able to apply to the 
courts, it would be a most disturbing situation and directly contrary 
to my understanding of the intent of Congress. Congress intended 
this to be an executive measure, carried out by the executive branch 
of the Government without interference of the courts. 

On appeal the circuit court of appeals affirmed the order of 
the district court, but on much narrower grounds. 

It is argued that tlie act is unconstitutional in that it deprives the 
complainant of his liberty without due process of law, contrary to 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has, 
however, held that a judicial trial does not prevail in every case, 
Murray's Lessee vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., i8 How., 
272; and in United States vs. Ju Toy, 198 U. S., 253 at 263, the court, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes respecting the Chinese Exclusion 
Act, under which the decision oi the Department of Labor is final as 
to the exclusion, said : " If for the purposes of argument we assume 
that the Fifth Amendment applies to him and that to deny entrance 
to a citizen is to deprive him of liberty, we nevertheless are of the 
opinion that with regard to him, due process of law does not require 
a judicial trial. " That the decision of the question whether a person 
of Chinese descent was born in the United States and therefore en- 
titled to enter the country, or whether he was born in China and under 
the Exclusion Act not entitled to enter, may be entrusted to an executive 
official whose decision is final, and that this is due process of law, 
is established. We see no reason why the same doctrine is not equally 
applicable to the case in hand. And we therefore hold that the com- 
plainant is not deprived of due process of law by being compelled to 



i82 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

submit to the final decision of the local and district boards the ques- 
tion whether he has not declared his intention to become a citizen of 
the United States. ... If the complainant is, as he alleges, a subject 
of Austria-Hungary, and has never declared his intention to become 
a citizen of the United States, as he also alleges, it is perfectly clear 
that he is not subject to the draft. Whether his allegations in this 
respect are true or not must, however, be determined in the manner 
prescribed by the act. 

It appears from the allegations of the complaint that the complainant 
filed an afiidavit claiming exemption by reason of the fact that he was 
an alien and that the local board denied his application, and that he 
appealed to the district board, which afiRrmed the decision of the 
local board. It thus appears that the complainant was heard, and it 
is nowhere alleged that he was denied a full hearing, or that the 
board rejected or refused to consider any evidence that he was en- 
titled to present. In the absence of such a showing, we have no doubt 
that the decision of the board is final and cannot be interfered with 
by the courts. 

We do not, however, agree with the statement of the district judge 
that there can be no interference by the courts with the action of 
these boards. We think a decision of the boards is final only where 
the board has proceeded in due form, and where the party involved 
is given a fair opportunity to be heard and to present his evidence. 
But if an opportunity to be heard should be denied, there can be no 
doubt as to the right of the aggrieved party to come into the courts 
for the protection of his rights. And we do not believe that the 
district judge meant to say that a decision must be regarded as final 
under such circumstances. The law courts have a general superintend- 
ing control by certiorari over all inferior tribunals acting in a judicial 
or quasi-judicial character. And jurisdiction is not entirely taken away 
by the words of a statute which declares that the judgment of the 
inferior tribunal shall be final.^^ 

This position was developed by other district courts in the 
cases of Boitano ^* and Kitzerow.'^ These were both cases 

i^Angelus vs. Sullivan, Circuit Court of Appeals for Second Circuit, 
October, 191 7, 246 Federal Reporter, 54. 

1* United States District Court for the Northern District of Cal- 
ifornia, 250 Federal Reporter, 812. 

15 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 
Department of Justice Bulletin No. 98. This case is apparently not 
reported in the Federal Reporter. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 183 

where dependency claims were denied. In the Kitzerow case 
the petitioner represented that in his answer to the question- 
naire he had made proper claim for exemption on grounds 
of dependency, filing the supporting affidavits required, but 
that the local board had erroneously classified him in Class I 
contrary to the plain proofs which he had submitted and 
which entitled him under the regulations to deferred classifi- 
cation; and that the district board had erroneously affirmed 
the decision of the local board. The petitioner sought a writ 
of certiorari to review the action of the boards. The court 
refused to issue the writ, saying: "With this as the case, 
should the courts exercise jurisdiction by certiorari to correct 
the misapplication of the executive regulations and to enforce 
as the petitioner's right the regulations as they may be applic- 
able to the facts presented by him in court? ... It is my 
view that Congress never intended, by conferring on the execu- 
tive the full power and discretion to determine the matters 
which are now comprehended within the executive regulations, 
to reserve to the individual who is within the scope of the 
law, as a matter of legal right subject to be enforced and 
vindicated in the courts, those very regulations which, in execu- 
tive discretion, need not have been made at all, or, in like 
discretion, may be varied from day to day. The draft boards 
are purely executive agencies, and their error, committed 
against those who are within the- draft law, is executive error 
in the enforcement of discretionary regulations; and I do not 
believe that it was or could be the Congressional intent that 
these executive agencies, constituted to carry out an unlimited 
discretion, are to be considered in the light of quasi-judicial 
tribunals discharging functions which pertain to the every-day 
legal rights of a citizen. It would imperil the whole scheme, 
Congressional and executive, in respect of the working of the 
Selective Service Law ; and for these reasons I shall decline to 
takie jurisdiction of the application for the issuance of the writ^" 
It is to be noted that in this case the right claimed by the 
petitioner was a right granted by the selective service regu- 



i84 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

lations which had been formulated by the President in the 
exercise of the executive discretion vested in him by the 
statute, and not a right conferred by the statute itself. In 
the light of the facts of the case and the language of the 
opinion, the ruling seems thus to have been that in the case 
of rights of the former sort the court would not even examine 
whether there was any evidence to support the decision of a 
board. On the other hand with respect to exemption for 
alienage, which was a right conferred directly by the statute, 
it was said in Ex Parte Blazekovic that the findings of 
the board would be conclusive only " where there is any evi- 
dence to support them," but that absence of such evidence 
must be shown, and " mere general allegations of a denial 
of a fair hearing are insufficient.^" So in Pascher vs. Kinkead, 
where a writ of habeas corpus was denied to a petitioner 
claiming exemption on the ground that he was an alien enemy, 
the court places its decision on the ground that the hearing 
before the board was fair and adequate, " and there was evi- 
dence to support the finding." " But " even if the court 
would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence 
if the case were presented to it in the first instance, that fact 
cannot be held sufficient to warrant the court in holding that the 
hearing accorded the registrant by the board was unfair," ^* 
On the other hand, where in the opinion of the court there 
was a departure from the procedure prescribed in the act, 
as in the case of McDonald, a writ of habeas corpus was 
granted. In that case after the petitioner was notified by his 
local board to report for military duty, but before the time 
set for such appearance, he applied to the district board for 
exemption on occupational grounds, and his claim was granted. 
Notwithstanding this determination, the local board, on his 

^^ United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
February 20, igiS, 248 Federal Reporter, 327. 

1'^ United States Circuit Court of Appeals for Third Circuit, March, 
1918, 250 Federal Reporter, 692. See also Ex parte Romano, 251 Fed- 
eral Reporter, y62,. 

IS Boitano vs. District Board, 250 Federal Reporter, 812. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 185 

failure to report, issued an order for his arrest and he was 
placed in jail. The court took jurisdiction of the question 
whether the right of the district board to entertain a claim for 
exemption was cut off by notice from the local board to the 
registrant to report for service. In his decision Judge Geiger, 
the same judge who rendered the decision in the Kitzerow 
case mentioned above, says : " The courts are bound to re- 
spect the determination of any of these tribunals under the 
Selective Service Law of all matters within their jurisdiction, 
and that limits the courts at the outset to determine whether 
there has been action under the law. . . . But the question 
whether the boards have acted at all; and, secondly, to what 
effect have they acted, is a question always open to judicial 
determination. ... I say that this petitioner can come in here 
for the purpose of having a judicial determination of the 
question as to what these boards have determined, and what 
the quality of their determination is. ... I am ready to deter- 
mine that there is nothing in the law or regulations which 
cuts off the pov/er of the district board to exercise its original 
jurisdiction at any time prior to the induction which is de- 
fined in the regulations, namely the hour specified in the notice 
of the local board." " 

These decisions, and numerous others under the act, go 
far toward building up a body of law as to the extent and 
limits of administrative determination which may prove a 
useful guide for the further application of the principle in 
the solution of problems arising in time of peace. 



On the whole the draft boards performed their highly 
responsible duties in accordance with standards of conduct 
equal to the demands of public opinion. Instances of gross 
favoritism or corruption were rare. In the summer of 1917 
improper practices were discovered in a number of the local 

^'^ Matter of McDonald, United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin, 253 Federal Reporter, 99. 



i86 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

boards in New York City and some of their members had to 
be removed. A number of these men were subsequently 
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. This was the only 
instance throughout the country of conduct flagrantly crimi- 
nal. On the other hand the work of the boards measured up 
to the standard of efficiency required by the army authorities. 
To quote again from General Crowder's report : 

Time developed the necessity for the removal of only a very 
limited number of members. In a few instances this action was called 
for by the discovery of irregularities either in connection with 
compensation or in dealing with registrants. Occasionally a member 
was found to lack the requisite administrative capacity. In other scat- 
tered instances neglect of duty required removal. The aggregate of these 
cases, however, was so negligible from a national standpoint that the 
efficiency of the draft administration was never threatened, and the 
high average quality of public service rendered by the boards was not 
appreciably lowered. . . .20 

The responsibility of local boards was staggering. . . . Any other 
than a democratic government would have scouted the idea of in- 
trusting to civilians, in most cases untrained in administrative capaci- 
ties, such an enormous and complex task. The tremendous menace of 
the German military machine was never more obvious than at the 
time America took up arms. Many wise men of our own Govern- 
ment doubted the feasibility of creating an army entirely through 
civilian agencies. It is an irrefutable proof of the high capacity of 
our people for self-government, and an everlasting indication of true 
democracy, that a system so intimately affecting the lives of our 
people should have been entrusted to untrained representatives of 
the local community and that it should have been so well executed.^i 

The concentration of power and responsibility in the local 
boards, composed as they were of persons identified with the 
locality, served one very useful purpose which brings out 
strongly the advantages of a localized system of administra- 
tion. " The boards became effective buffers between the in- 
dividual citizen and the Federal Government; they attracted 
and diverted, like grounding wires in an electric coil, such 
resentment or discontent as might have proved a serious ob- 

20 Second report ; p. 279. 
21/fctrf.; p. 284. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 187 

stack to war measures had it been focused on the central au- 
thorities. Its diversion and grounding at 5000 local points 
dissipated its force, and enabled the central war machine to 
function smoothly without the disturbance that might have 
been caused by the concentrated total of dissatisfaction. A 
disappointed claimant for exemption met a board member one 
day on the street, and burst out, ' Your ruling was rank and 
damnable.' The board member replied, * We did our duty in 
the light of the facts.' ' All the same,' replied the irate citizen, 
* you went wrong. And if I only took the time and trouble 
to appeal to Washington, they would tell you that you were 
wrong, and I would get justice. They would never stand for 
such a ruling. They know what 's right, and they would 
soon see that you were made to do the right thing. But I am 
not going to appeal. Only, I want you to know what I think 
of your board.' This was typical of the board's function as 
a buffer — a decentralizer of individual discontent with the 
enforcement of the law. The war value of this function was 
enormous." '^ 

No adequate appreciation can be acquired of the tasks and 
accomplishments of the local and district boards without 
reference to the text of General Crowder's second report at 
pages 276-290, from which most of the foregoing facts have 
been taken, but which there is not room to reprint here in full. 



It has long been apparent to observers of current politics 
that one of the most pressing needs of a government con- 
fronted with the task of adjusting the problems of a complex 
modern society is its need for a body of expert advisers to 
supply technical information and advice regarding each of the 
many specialized problems with which government to-day must 
deal. Unhappily the public officials charged with the conduct 
of government have in too many instances not fully recognized 
this need. One of the outstanding excellences of General 

22 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 277. 



i88 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Crowder's administration of the draft was the full provision 
made at every point for the application of expert knowledge 
to the solution of technical problems requiring such knowledge. 
The first illustration which comes to mind is afforded by the 
medical advisory boards. There were 13 19 of these boards, 
each functioning in an area whose boundaries were dictated 
by considerations described in the " Selective Service Regu- 
lations " as follows : 

Each State shall be carefully districted with due regard to 
communication and hospital facilities for the erection of a number 
of medical advisory boards compacted with a view to the equitable 
and the practical distribution of the work of reexamination as pro- 
vided herein and to the convenience of registrants and economy to 
the Government in sending registrants before such boards. Members 
of medical advisory boards will be nominated by the governor and 
appointed by the President in accordance with instructions to be 
hereafter communicated to the governors.-^ 

The function of these boards was to give a physical reex- 
amination to registrants in those cases where the result of 
the previous examination was contested either by the registrant 
or the board, or by the appeal agent who acted for the Govern- 
ment, Each board consisted of three or more members. An 
attempt was made to include in the membership a specialist 
in each of the following lines: internal medicine; eye, ear, 
and throat; orthopedics; surgery; psychiatry; radiography; 
and dentistry. " To these boards were referred doubtful 
cases of registrants having obscure physical defects. By 
means of this highly trained technical agency, many obscure 
physical defects were detected, thereby materially assisting the 
local boards, which were not equipped to conduct an exhaustive 
examination, to reduce materially the number of rejections 
at mobilization camps, and also to detect malingerers." -* 

A second instance of the utilization of expert advice was 
the establishment of legal advisory boards. Like the medical 

23 "Selective Service Regulations," second edition; Section 29. 
""Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 293. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 189 

advisory boards, these legal boards functioned in districts 
mapped out, not to conform to the local board areas, but 
determined by considerations of convenience : 

The governor shall constitute legal advisory boards in sucb 
numbers and within such districts that there shall be convenient 
to every registrant who is to appear before a local or district 
board within the State a legal advisory board to which such regis- 
trant may apply for all necessary advice and assistance in preparing 
claims, questionnaires, or any other papers required by these regu- 
lations to be submitted by a registrant. After determining the 
number and location of legal advisory boards necessary to accom- 
plish this purpose, the governor shall nominate, for appointment 
by the President, three representative lawyers, to be permanent 
members of such boards, to take charge of this work within each 
such district, and to be held responsible that there shall always 
be a competent force of lawyers or laymen available to such regis- 
trants at any time during which the local or district boards within 
such district are open for business. The governor shall nominate 
one of such three persons to be chairman of each legal advisory 
board ; and the member so nominated shall, whenever practicable, 
be a judge of the county court, or of the common pleas court, or 
of a court of similar jurisdiction.^^ 

A formal call to the members of the legal profession was 
made by the President on November 8, 1917,^''' requesting them 
to oflFer their services for the purpose of instructing regis- 
trants concerning their rights and obligations and of assisting 
them in preparing answers to their questionnaries. At the 
same time the provost-marshal general appealed to the good 
offices of the American Bar Association and suggested the 
formation in each State of a central committee consisting of 
the vice-president of the association for that State, the State 
member of its general council, the president of the State bar 
association, and the attorney-general of the State to assist the 
governor in the organization of legal advisory boards. Largely 
owing to the energy of the association, these boards were in 

25 "Selective Service Regulations," second edition ; Section 30. 

26 In his foreword to the "Selective Service Regulations." 



190 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

many States functioning within a week after the issuing of 
the President's call. Their number ultimately grew to 3646, 
including 10,915 legal members and 108,367 lay members. 

Wide publicity was given to the existence of legal advisory 
boards and their purposes, every effort being made to bring to the 
attention of registrants the fact that gratuitous professional advice 
might be had as to the requirements of the Selective Service Law. 
Letters of instruction were issued along with questionnaires to regis- 
trants showing exactly where free legal advice might be secured from 
legal advisory members in filling out questionnaires, as well as any 
other information concerning the operation of the selective service 
law and corollary acts. . . . 

Legal advisory members were constantly consulted with reference 
to legislation cognate to the Selective Service Act. Particularly was 
this so in the case of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights Acf-'^ 
and the War Risk Insurance Act. Some boards published articles 
explanatory of the above statutes, and did everything in their power 
to secure to drafted men the benefits thereof. 

The question of compensation was early considered by the American 
Bar Association and by this office, and it was unanimously decided 
that men leaving their homes and oflFering their lives for their country 
should not be charged fees in connection with the filling out of 
papers required by the selective service regulations. Comparatively 
little difficulty was encountered in this respect. Wherever it was 
found that an attorney had charged a fee for assisting a registrant, 
he was requested by his bar association or by the State legal ad- 
visory board to discontinue the practice and restore the fees collected. 
In practically every instance the reasonableness of this demand 
was seen, and compliance ensued. A very few scattered prose- 
cutions against members of legal advisory boards for charging fees 
were instituted ; and where the practice was clearly established, con- 
victions ensued.28 

The cooperation of the American Bar Association in the 

27 See "Selective Service Regulations" ; p. 359. This was an act 
(Sixty-Fifth Congress, Public Statute No. 103) providing for the 
temporary suspension of the operation of certain legal rules as against 
persons in the military service. Subjects included are matters con- 
nected with appearances in suits, judgments by default, eviction for 
unpaid rent, instalment contracts, mortgages, insurance, etc. 

28 " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 296. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 191 

organization and functioning of the legal advisory boards is 
no more noteworthy than that of the American Medical Asso- 
ciation in connection with the medical advisory boards. Here 
we come upon another novel and effective feature of adminis- 
trative policy. For government to be able to rely on the 
voluntary assistance of professional associations and to operate 
through them as its agencies for administering its own statutes 
represents the realization of the basic ideal of free govern- 
ment. Such a method makes possible that measure of govern- 
mental control which is coming to be demanded by the com- 
plex facts of modern social organization while eliminating 
at the same time the chief evil of government control — the 
growth of a specialized and devitalizing bureaucracy. If gov- 
ernment control is to be effective and is to escape degenerating 
into harmful interference it must be exercised through agents 
who are not mere government officials. During the war this 
ideal was achieved in countless fields of administration; it was 
the basis, for instance, of the organization of the War Indus- 
tries Board and the Food Administration; but nowhere was 
the principle more boldly applied or applied with greater suc- 
cess than in connection with the administration of the draft. 

A third instance of the application of expert knowledge to 
the problems of draft administration was in the establishment 
of industrial advisory boards. These boards were not or- 
ganized until September, 1918, so that they had little oppor- 
tunity for positive accomplishment; but the principle they 
represent is important. 

The experience of the first year of the draft in fields involving 
large industrial establishments revealed the necessity of more system- 
atic attention by the large employers to the deferment of necessary 
employees and of more direct cooperation between them and the dis- 
trict boards. It was found that many employers, in their desire to 
conserve the interests of their own work, had treated these claims 
merely as individual cases of individual necessity, and had given 
little or no thought to the larger aspects of their establishment as 
an entirety, in its relation to the industry as a whole, to other in- 
dustries, and to military necessities. 



192 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

This office [the office of the provost-marshal general] found itself 
obliged to put certain material inquiries calculated to stimulate 
reflection on the part of representatives of industry: How many 
employers had hitherto taken pains to inform themselves systematically 
which of their employees are registrants and which are not? How 
many had studied carefully the required conditions for occupational 
deferment as laid down in the President's regulations pursuant to 
statute? How many had made it a point to survey their entire 
plant so as to single out the really indispensable individuals? With 
the oncoming of a more intensive registration, an even larger out- 
look was necessary. The general industrial conditions, the supply 
of skilled men in the industry at large, the possibilities of training 
substitutes, the availability of women workers — these were some of 
the considerations which bore directly on the need of occupational 
deferment as related to the need of the army. . . . 

With a view, therefore, to handling the industrial situation with 
maximum intelligence and efficiency, and in view of the new regis- 
tration of 13,000,000 more men on September 12, 1918, provision was 
made in a new regulation for assisting boards in rulings upon industrial 
claims for deferment. There were appointed by each district board 
three persons known as industrial advisers to the district board. 
These industrial advisers were to acquire full information as to the 
necessities of individual establishments; to keep informed as to the 
priority lists of industries and products as determined by the War 
Industries Board ; to observe the general conditions of labor and 
industry; and to give to the district boards the benefit of their knowl- 
edge and judgment on these matters. One of the advisers was 
nominated by the Department of Labor, representing both employer and 
employee ; one was nominated by the Department of Agriculture 
with similar relations representing agricultural employments ; and 
one selected by the district board, whose function was to consider the 
remaining employments or occupations, such as education, newspapers, 
insurance, banking, etc. . . .29 

These advisers were to confer with tlie managers and heads of 
various industries and those familiar with the needs of other oc- 
cupations, including agriculture ; to instruct such persons as to their 
right to file claims for deferred classification for registrants in their 
employ; and to furnish to the district boards all information in 
their possession which might be of use in the work of classification. 
Any adviser was authorized to initiate a claim for deferred classification 
on any ground within the jurisdiction of the district board although 
no claim had previously been made for the registrant; and this 

^°Ibid.; pp. 142-143. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 193 

right could be exercised up to the day and hour fixed for the 
registrant to report for military duty.^o 

Significant light is cast on another interesting feature of 
draft administration by the provision just referred to that 
claims might be entered by the industrial advisers in behalf of 
individuals who had made no claims themselves. This is an 
illustration of how emphatically it was intended that procedure 
before the draft boards should not be regarded as a two-sided 
controversy between litigants each insisting on his rights. 
Just as the Government was determined to secure the induction 
into military service of persons whose service on considerations 
of national policy was most needed there, so it was equally 
determined to keep out of military service, even against 
their will, persons who were more needed elsewhere. In the 
language of the provost-marshal general quoted earlier in this 
chapter, it was not a question of any " controversy." Draft 
officials were " agents of the Government, engaged in selecting 
men for the Government," and were to " investigate each case 
in the interests of the nation and never in the interests of an 
individual." So if the interests of the nation demanded that 
an individual should be prevented from entering military serv- 
ice, it was the place of the draft ofificials to take the initiative 
in seeing that he was exempted. This comes out very clearly 
in connection with the duties of the government appeal agents. 
The main duty of these officials, of whom there was one for 
approximately every local board, was to take appeals on behalf 
of the Government in cases where the board had granted 
exemption if, on information acquired of the appeal agent's 
own motion or brought to his attention by other persons, he 
believed that the best interests of the Government and justice 
to other registrants required that the exemption should be 
overruled. In short, his main duty was to secure the setting 
aside of exemptions. But he was also " to care for the inter- 
so /6iW.; p. 275. On the date of the armistice 126 out of the total of 
155 district boards had reported the appointment of their full quota 
of industrial advisers. 



194 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ests of ignorant registrants, and where the decision of the 
local board is against the interests of such persons and where 
it appears that such persons will not take appeals, due to their 
own non-culpable ignorance, to inform them of their rights 
and assist them to enter appeals to the district board." ^^ 

A procedure in which such a result is possible — a pro- 
cedure, that is, whereby an official of the Government can 
take it into his own hands to claim, for an individual, privileges 
which the individual does not claim for himself — must appear 
very strange to those brought up in the view which has been 
expressed by Professor Dicey: 

"It is an idea absolutely foreign to English law that the relation of 
individuals to the state is governed by any other principles than those 
rules of private law which govern the rights of private persons towards 
their neighbors." ^2 

5 

The 4648 local boards, and 155 district boards with their 
auxiliaries, the medical, legal, and industrial advisory boards, 
were coordinated into one system through the common super- 
vision and control exercised by the office of the provost- 
marshal general of the army in Washington. But this control 
was not exercised directly. Between the provost-marshal 
and the boards stood the draft executives of the States. 

On April 23, 1917, nearly a month before the Selective 
Service Act became law, the President issued a circular letter 
to the State governors, calling attention to the provision of 
the act which authorized him to use State agencies in the en- 
forcement of the act and expressing the belief that such 
agencies " promise the swiftest and most effective possible 
execution of the law." A plan was outlined which, " vis- 
ualized in recapitulation, may be stated as follows : first, a 
central bureau in Washington ; second, a collection of State 
and Territorial systems decentralized as far as possible under 
the control of the governors; third, county and city boards 

31 "Selective Service Regulations," second edition ; Section 49. 
82 "Law of the Constitution," eighth edition ; p. 383. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 195 

of control; fourth, for the purpose of registration, a registrar 
for each voting precinct. . . . 

" The next thought in coordinating local organizations under 
a central control indicates yourself, as chief executive of the 
State, functioning of course through some appropriate office 
that will relieve you of detail. The office that suggests itself 
is that of your adjutant-general. The President has the firm- 
est confidence that in the execution of this law of devoted 
sacrifice by the people themselves, our genius for self-govern- 
ment will transcend all prior expressions. For this reason it 
is desired to make the point of actual application of the law 
non-military, but as the system centralizes, its military object 
is emphasized, and your adjutant-general's office is excellently 
adaptable to the integration of the State system with the War 
Department." ^^ 

In accordance with this suggestion, most of the governors 
appointed the adjutants-general of their States as State draft 
executives. In order to provide for the increased duties which 
soon devolved on State draft headquarters, and to establish 
closer connections with Washington, it was decided to attach 
to them officers of the army on Federal pay. At the same 
time, in order to carry out the idea of local self-government 
which runs through the act, these officers were to be selected 
for commissions from among civilians recommended by the 
governors from persons already connected with the ad- 
ministration of the draft law. It also became necessary to 
place a medical officer at the disposal of State headquarters. 
"Consequently, each governor was asked to recommend for ap- 
pointment as an army officer a physician and surgeon who pos- 
sessed particular skill and training, and who could immediately 
acquaint himself with the army physical examination regula- 
tions so that he might become the adviser of the governor along 
those lines and thereby secure a uniform application through- 
out the State of the rules for physical examinations." ^* 

33 " First Report of Provost-Marshal General"; pp. 7-8. 
'* "Second Report of Provost- Marshal General"; p. 265. 



196 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The functions of State headquarters were summarized in 
the selective service regulations as follows : 

The governors shall be charged with general supervision over 
matters arising in the execution of the selective draft within the 
States. The determination of questions of exemptions and deferment 
classifications is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the local and 
district boards, subject only to review by the President, but other 
functions and duties of boards, departments, officers, agents, and 
persons within the State, except departments, officers, and agents of 
the United States not appointed, designated, or detailed under author- 
ity of the Selective Service Law, shall be under the direction and super- 
vision of the governor.-''^ 

These general duties may be classified roughly as follows: 

( 1 ) Purely administrative : 

(a) The selection and nomination of members of all 
the various selective service boards. 

(b) The purchase and distribution of supplies, the pay- 
ment of accounts, and various duties of disburse- 
ment connected with the expenses of the boards 
within the State. 

(2) Functions of coordination: 

(a) The interpretation of regulations, including the 
preparation and distribution of bulletins and circulars 
for the information of the boards. 

(b) General supervision of the work of the boards in- 
volving trips of inspection and meetings for con- 
ference and interchange of views. 

(c) The investigation of charges against boards or mem- 
bers thereof. 

In addition, the State headquarters were charged directly 
with certain very important steps in the draft process itself. 
These were: 

(a) The apportionment of quotas within the State, and 
the allotment of calls. 

(b) The details of the routing and entrainment of regis- 
trants and other matters connected with mobilization. 

85 " Selective Service Regulations," second edition ; Section zy. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 197 

(c) The handling of cases of delinquency and desertion. 

By Section 25 of the selective service regulations, it was 
provided that there should be no direct communication be- 
tween the local and district boards within a State and the 
office of the provost-marshal general, but that all such com- 
munications should be through the medium of the State draft 
headquarters. Apart from the necessity of this rule as a 
matter of practical convenience, it made possible a measure of 
equality and uniformity of draft administration in each State 
which could not otherwise have been secured. 

Thus, through the State headquarters, the various strands 
of draft administration in all its aspects were brought to- 
gether and unified for each large territorial unit before passing 
finally into the central clearing-house of the provost-marshal 
general's office. The medical examiners of the draft boards 
were in constant touch with the medical advisory boards, and 
both were under the common supervision of the medical aide 
at State headquarters. Inspectors from State headquarters 
brought local boards and legal boards and industrial boards 
into touch; and thereby many tangled wires were uncrossed 
on the spot which would have produced inextricable confusion 
had the tangle been allowed to reach into the delicate mechan- 
ism of the central draft agency. By way of summary. General 
Crowder has said : " The system which has proved so success- 
ful has been essentially one of national supervision but of 
State control. In the light of the accomplishments that stand 
out, and with knowledge of the problems that have arisen, it 
is fair to indulge in the opinion that the demands of this war 
for man-power could not have been met under a system con- 
trolled and supervised in every respect by one central office." ^® 

6 

With regard to the functions of the provost-marshal gen- 
eral's office, not much remains to be said. It was here that 
the rules and regulations were shaped and promulgated which 

^'^ " Second Report of Provost-Marshal General " ; p. 267. 



198 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

guided the policy of the local and district boards. Here quotas 
were allocated and calls issued. Here were referred knotty 
legal problems regarding alienage, citizenship, and treaty 
rights sent up from the local boards. From this general head- 
quarters went out national inspectors who at one time or 
another visited every State headquarters and many boards, 
linking the entire system into harmony of action. 

Holding as it did a strict control over all matters of general 
rules and policies, the central office of the draft machine 
firmly refused to meddle in individual or particular cases. 
Many appeals were made for action of this kind, but the 
answer always made was : " Go back to your local authorities. 
There is probably some equity in your case, which deserves 
to be carefully considered by your local board. Abide by their 
decision, because under the law and the regulations the provost- 
marshal general has nothing whatever to do with this case." 
The results were satisfactory ; acquiescence ensued. " The ex- 
perience of this office is a new proof that the conferring of 
authority upon local civilian boards to pass upon these ques- 
tions was the master-stroke of the Selective Service Act. It 
was simply the carrying over to the raising of an army, of 
the familiar Anglo-Saxon principle of a local jury trial. The 
principle was understood by the people, and therefore it was 
accepted by the people. Any reasonable and fair method of 
drafting an army, if based on this principle, would have suc- 
ceeded." ^^ 

When the Provost-Marshal General was first designated chief 
draft executive, his staff consisted of eight officers and a small 
clerical force. At the date of the armistice it had increased 
to forty-five officers, twenty-nine enlisted men, and 343 
civilians.^^ When the size of the task is considered, the 
striking thing is that a force relatively so small was able to 
accomplish it; for it is coming to be clear that General 

^^" Second Report of Provost-Marshal General"; p. 260. 
^^Ibid.; p. 253. 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 199 

Crowder's achievement is one of the very greatest administra- 
tive triumphs of modern times. 



It may be helpful to see at a single glance the characteristic 
features of the draft administration which have just been re- 
viewed : 

(i) It was a civilian administration. 

(2) It was a local administration, with final responsibility 
resting essentially on agencies of the locality where 
action was taken and hence responsive to their needs and 
wishes. 

(3) It was an administration through existing agencies. 
The units of administration were familiar established 
units — the State, the county, the voting precinct. The 
administrative officials were in many cases recognized 
officials of government, State governors, sheriffs, 
prosecuting attorneys, and county judges. 

(4) It was an administration guided by expert advisers — 
legal and medical and industrial, boards. 

(5) It was an administration operating in some of its func- 
tions through voluntary associations — the bar associa- 
tion and medical association. 

(6) It was an administration centrally supervised but not 
centrally operated. 

(7) Administrative determinations were in a high degree 
final. 

All of these things are characteristic of good as distin- 
guished from bad administration; and in the draft they proved 
their worth. There has accordingly been a strong hope and 
desire that the lesson will be applied, and that they will be 
introduced more or less widely into the administration of the 
peace-time functions of government. General Crowder in his 
recent book has himself expressed this hope. ^^ The result is 

39 "The Spirit of Selective Service," New York, 1920, 



200 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

one to be wished for; but it must be remembered that there 
are a number of considerations to be taken into account. 
First, administration on the principles on which the draft was 
conducted demands a heavy measure of participation by private 
/ citizens. Such participation is the ideal of democracy. It was 
secured during the war; but during the war forces were 
at work, which do not operate in peace. Patriotism was 
aroused; there was a very keen sense of the meaning of 
commonwealth and of participation in a common task. War 
is a tangible emergency which can awake and focus this feel- 
ing; in time of peace it is normally apt to be dormant. 

Secondly, the aim of the draft was single and relatively 
simple. It was to get as many men for the army as could be 
spared from the other activities of national life. This is a 
task which can be understood and appreciated by almost every 
one, citizen and official alike. In almost every branch of peace- 
time administration the case is relatively different. Conserva- 
tion, labor administration, health administration, the control of 
industr)', are all far more complex. Being complex, they 
awaken less interest and provoke less unanimity of sentiment 
and support. 

Thirdly, the aim of good administration is primarily effi- 
ciency. In time of war the need for efficiency is so compelling 
as to be appreciated ; in peace, in democratic countries espe- 
cially, efficiency is normally not merely at a discount, but it is 
even likely to be under suspicion. The average citizen is much 
more content with an administration which keeps out of his way 
than with one which does its job well. 

Accordingly, it seems impossible to expect that the 
conditions will be present which will make possible the wide 
application of the principles of the draft administration to the 
ordinary functions of government. A more or less centralized 
bureaucracy of specialized officials seems the only way of 
carrying forward and keeping in motion the operations of 
government against the inertia and indifference of the citizen 
body in ordinary times. The defects of administration 



A TRIUMPH OF ADMINISTRATION 201 

conducted on this principle are patent enough to disinterested 
observers; but it is only as they become more so to the public 
at large that any effective steps can be taken toward supplying 
a remedy. When this occurs, the improvement will no doubt 
proceed by applying principles which proved their worth so 
well in the administration of the draft. 



CHAPTER VII 

AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 

"TTHINK it is safe to say that no army ever before assembled 
J^ in the history of the world has ever had so much thought 
given to its social organization. . . . These boys are going to 
France; they are going to face conditions that we do not like 
to talk about, that we do not like to think about. ... I want 
them armed; I want them adequately armed and clothed by 
their Government ; but I want them to have invisible armor to 
take with them. I want them to have an armor made u-p of a 
set of social habits replacing those of their homes and communi- 
ties which will protect them overseas." ^ 

These words of Secretary Baker refer to a side of the 
Government's policy of army-building which deserves not to be 
overlooked because it represents a thoughtfulness and an effort 
so unique and at the same time so representatively American. 
The task which lay ahead of the War Department when these 
words were spoken was the building of an army; the tremen- 
dous task of assembling a fighting force of unprecedented size 
and training it with lightning speed to become an effective 
military machine. Such a task might well seem, and did in 
fact seem to many, engrossing enough to warrant throwing to 
the winds all considerations not bearing on sheer military 
efficiency. The task was to turn millions of men into soldiers ; 
what had social organization to do with that? But what the 
administration did not forget was that these men were to be the 
soldiers of a democracy; men who were to fight a war on 
behalf of free principles of government and then return and 

1 Speech at the national conference on War Camp Community Rec- 
reation Service, Washington, October 23, 1917, printed in " Frontiers of 
Freedoin " ; pp. 84 ff. 

202 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 203 

take their places in a democratic society. To turn them into 
mere fighting machines by suppressing and crushing out other 
sides of their natures would involve losing the war in order to 
win it : it would lead directly to a degradation of our war aims 
and methods, and ultimately to a perversion of our national 
spirit and institutions. For the old type of soldier, bullied and 
dragooned and paralyzed into a kind of mere fighting animal, 
and turned loose sporadically to vent his passions in animal 
excesses, there is no room in a democracy ; and no war won by 
such soldiers, can result in advantage to free government. 
Accordingly the administration took very seriously to heart the 
responsibility of safeguarding and conserving the human side 
of the soldier; of keeping alive so far as possible in the midst 
of ferocity and carnage the better side of his nature as a man, 
by surrounding him with substitutes for the social forces which 
in ordinary American life operate as the strongest inhibitions 
against license and excess. As Secretary Baker said : 

We are interrupting the normal life of the nation, we are summon- 
ing out of their communities and their homes a vast number of 
young men. We are taking men from their normal environments, 
from their usual occupations. Now, everybody knows, of course, 
that one of the great social restraints, one of the things that make 
ordered society possible at all, is the existence of a state of social 
habits on the part of a people; that those social habits are the 
things we acquire as we grow up in a community. They are en- 
forced by the sanctions of personal approval of the people wifh 
whom we have to deal. They are enforced by the approval of 
neighborhood opinion. They constitute the chief force for the 
preservation of order and for the progress which society makes. . . . 

Now, that state of mind, which exists in every community and in 
every individual, is being violently disturbed by our withdrawal of 
large numbers of young men from their homes, from their families, 
from their social organizations, from their communities, from their 
church organizations, from all the various affiliations which the 
young men have made as a part of their social education. . . . 

Everywhere there is a demand that these young men whom we are 
talcing from their homes and families, from wives and children, from 
mothers, sisters, and intimates, should come back with no other 
scars upon them than those won in honorable warfare. . . . 



204 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The United States is a civilized country. Nobody realized how 
civilized, until there came from all parts of the country a demand 
that this army should not be raised as armies hitherto had been; 
that it should not be environed as armies hitherto had been ; but 
that such arrangements should be made as would insure that these 
soldiers, when actually organized into an army, would represent and 
carry out the very highest ideals of our civilization. 2 

The administration was the more keenly alive to the nature 
of the task facing it because of the experiences of 1916 when 
the militia was encamped along the Mexican border. Mr, Ray- 
mond B. Fosdick subsequently described that situation to a 
committee of the House of Representatives : 

I represented the War Department down on the Mexican border in 
1916 as special agent of the secretary of w^r in looking up the con- 
ditions around army camps^ I suppose you gentlemen are familiar 
with conditions that existed there at that time. Our men were 
scattered from Brownsville over to the Gulf of California — some- 
times in the neighborhood of towns, and sometimes out in the mesquite. 
There was not a camp that did not have its red-light district. Of 
course it was not officially run, but it was generally in the town near- 
by. Drunkenness among the troops was very prevalent, and con- 
ditions were thoroughly bad. We had an extraordinarily high rate 
of venereal disease down there.^ 

In this statement the two central evils are emphasized which 
it was necessary to guard against — drunkenness and sexual 
immorality. It is common experience that both are likely to 
be rife among soldiers. Suddenly transplanted into the excite- 
ment of a new way of life, and subjected to a grueling discipline 
with intermittent periods of absolute idleness, the men find 
themselves without any of their usual resources to occupy their 
spare time and gravitate rapidly into practices which have 
always been the resort of idle and excited men — drunkenness 
and vice. " The fellows went to the devil on the Mexican 
border because there was absolutely nothing to do. . . . Out of 

-"Frontiers of Freedom"; pp. 85-88. 

3 " Testimony before House Committee on Military Affairs, Hearing 
on Camp Activities, March 14, 1918"; p. 4. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 205 

sheer boredom, they went to the only places where they were 
welcomed, the saloon and the house of prostitution." * 

Venereal disease was accordingly widely prevalent and freely 
disseminated. In San Antonio the rate of soldiers diseased 
was 288 per thousand,'^ and the ineffectiveness of prophylactic 
treatment was evidenced by the fact that despite the employ- 
ment of prophylaxis one regiment alone developed nineteen new 
cases in two months.*' 

The likelihood that these conditions would repeat themselves 
on a proportionately larger scale with the mobilization of mil- 
lions of drafted men in training camps was obvious. A medical 
specialist told the House Committee on Military Affairs that 
war conditions always result in a great increase of venereal 
disease. " I think I may safely predict that with the segrega- 
tion of large bodies of young men in camps there will be an 
enormous increase of venereal diseases. The experience of 
the world has shown that this always takes place." ^ Weight 
was given to this prophecy by the experience of England, 
France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Russia after the outbreak 
of the war. At one hospital clinic in France, these diseases 
increased 50 per cent, during the first year of the war, and 
almost 67 per cent, during the following eight months.^ There 
were statistics to the effect that Austria had had the equivalent 
of sixty divisions, or 1,500,000 men, rendered ineffective at 
some time or other by venereal diseases.^ 

The size of such figures indicates the importance of the prob- 
lem which they illustrate; but an even more important thing 
to he realized was that this problem was not a purely medical 
one. As one expert put it : " The transmission of the disease 

■i Ibid.; p. 8. See also* "Literary Digest," November 18, 1916; p. 1332. 

5 Fosdick, loc. cit.; p. 7. 

^ For an article on venereal disease among the troops on the border 
see " Social Hygiene " ; Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 212-220. 

"^ Dr. Sigmund Pollitzer, " Hearings Before Sub-committee on Mili- 
tary Affairs," Sixty-Fourth Congress, second session; pp. 502-503. 

s " Journal of the American Medical Association ".; Vol. 68, No. 5, 
p. 384- 

^Fosdick, loc. cit.; p. 5. 



2o6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

itself is only part of the problem. From the social point of 
view the question is not only one of the effect of venereal 
disease upon the social body, serious as that is. The more far- 
reaching evil is the state of mind and character which lies back 
of it. The greatest evil to society results from the shattered 
ideals, lowered standards, sensualized minds, and perverted 
practices which are brought into home life and society by these 
men who represent in large measure the cream of the young 
manhood of the nation. To safeguard the home and society 
against these basic evils, we must not only abolish venereal 
disease, but minimize, so far as possible, prostitution itself." ^° 
Apart from these far-reaching social implications, the problem 
had an immediate military side. Diseased soldiers are not 
efficient soldiers; and the startling figures quoted above for 
Austria show the tremendous inroads which bad social condi- 
tions can make into military effectiveness. Accordingly, as 
Mr. Fosdick told the House committee, the administration 
" felt from the beginning that inasmuch as this war was going 
to be won by man-power, we could not afford to lose a single 
man through any cause that modern police science could effec- 
tively grapple with. . . . We are tremendously interested in 
having lOO per cent, efficient men going to France. General 
Pershing cabled over, not long ago, ' You are sending me 7 per 
cent, venereally diseased, and that is too high.' Of course it 
is too high. It is a great deal lower than it ever was before; 
but it is too high, and we have got to send men over to France 
who are in better condition than 7 per cent." ^^ 

From every po.int of view, then, the need was pressing to 
protect the new army of drafted men from the usual vices of a 
soldiery. In order to meet it, Secretary Baker drew upon his 
own previous experience as an' administrative official of a large 
American city. To quote his own words : 

For a long time we tried a perfectly wrong-headed process about 
the city; we tried to pass laws which would cure all these ills, and 
to enforce them by policemen. I do not mean that we ought not 

10 " Social Hygiene " ; Vol. 3. No. 2, p. 220. 

11 Fosdick, loc. cit.; pp. 5-7. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 207 

to have some policemen, but we imagined that our sole salvation 
lay in the passage of laws and the employment of policemen. . . , 
Then the discovery was made that the way to overcome the temptations 
and vices of a great city was to offer adequate opportunity for whole- 
some recreation and enjoyment; that if you wanted to get a fire- 
brand out of the hand of a child, the way to do it was neither to 
club the child, nor to grab the firebrand, but to offer in exchange 
for it a stick of candy. . . . And so there has grown up in America 
this new attitude, which finds its expression in public playgrounds, 
in the organization of community amusements, in the inculcation 
throughout the entire body of young people in the community of 
substantially the same form of social inducement which the Ameri- 
can college in modern time has substituted for the earlier system of 
social restraints. . . .^^ 

We learned that where there was a healthily conducted and adequate 
recreational opportunity, it was impossible for the old downward 
tendency of young men to continue ; that in the presence of that 
opportunity the natural and spontaneous tendencies of young men as- 
serted themselves. We learned this other thing, that the way to keep 
young people from doing bad things is to give them an opportunity to 
do good things. . . . 

I am not idealist enough to imagine that the time is at all 
near when we can dispense with some admixture of force in the en- 
forcement of police regulations, and I am heartily in accord with the 
belief that there should be segregation and isolation and quarantine. 
We must diminish as far as we can by repressive measures oppor- 
tunities for vicious infections which would enfeeble the army. Yet 
I am idealist enough to believe that we have already passed many 
milestones since we left the old conditions, and that our progress, our 
substantial and tremendous progress, is going to be along the line 
of healthy and whalesome and stimulating and strengthening sub- 
stitutes as counter-weights to temptation.^^ 

The paragraph last quoted summarizes the policy of the War 
Department for the protection of the social welfare of the 
soldiers. That policy had tvv^o sides, a negative and a positive 
one. On the negative side it consisted- in the enforcement of 
prohibitory regulations framed to eliminate temptations and 
opportunities for vice and drunkenness. On the positive side 

^2 " Frontiers of Freedom"; p. 90. 

13 " Expression versus Suppression," in " Frontiers of Freedom " ; pp. 
231-235. 



2o8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

it called for the building up of a vast and elaborate organization 
to supply the soldiers in some measure with the same kind of 
diversions and pastimes for their idle hours as they had been 
accustomed to in their home surroundings. 



The authority of the War Department to carry out the 
repressive side of its policy was given by Sections 12 and 13 
of the draft act. These sections read as follows: 

SECTION 12. The President of the United States, as commander- 
in-chief of the army, is authorized to make such regulations govern- 
ing the prohibition of alcoholic liquors in or near military camps, 
and to the officers and enlisted men of the army as he may from 
time to time deem necessary or advisable ; provided, that no person, 
corporation, partnership, or association shall sell, supply, or have in 
his or its possession any intoxicating or spirituous liquors at any 
military station, cantonment, camp, fort, post, officers' or enlisted 
men's club, which is being used at the time for military purposes un- 
der this act, but the secretary of war may make regulations permit- 
ting the sale and use of intoxicating liquors for medicinal purposes. 
Tt shall be unlawful to sell any intoxicating liquor, including beer, 
ale, or wine, to any officer or member of the military forces while 
in uniform, except as herein provided. Any person, corporation, 
partnership, or association violating the provisions of the section or 
the regulations made thereunder shall, unless otherwise punishable 
under the Articles of War, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
be punished by a fine of not more than $1000 or imprisonment for 
not more than twelve months, or both. 

SECTION 13. The secretary of war is hereby authorized, empowered 
and directed during the present war to do everything by him deemed 
necessary to suppress and prevent the keeping or setting up of houses 
of ill fame, brothels, or bawdy-houses within such distance as he may 
deem needful of any military camp, station, fort, post, cantonment, 
training or mobilization place; and any person, corporation, partner- 
ship, or association receiving or permitting to be received for immoral 
purposes any person into any place, structure, or building used for 
the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution within such 
distance of said places as may be designated, or shall permit any such 
person to remain for immoral purposes in any such place, structure, or 
building as aforesaid, or who shall violate any order, rule, or regula- 
tion issued to carry out the object and purpose of this section shall, 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS '209 

unless otherwise punishable under the Articles of War, be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine of not more than 
$1000 or imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both. 

Neither of these sections was in the bill as originally intro- 
duced into Congress. Section 13 embodies substantially, with 
some verbal alterations, an amendment introduced by Senator 
Jones of Washington and adopted without debate and without a 
roll-call.^* The legislative history of Section 12 is longer and 
more interesting; and it repays study for the light which it 
sheds on the methods and mental attitude of Congress. 

After a week of debate the Senate had adopted a rule to 
reach a vote on the Selective Service Bill before adjournment 
on Saturday, April 28. On that day the Senate was at once 
to proceed to the consideration of the bill, each speaker was 
to be limited to five minutes, and there was to be no adjourn- 
ment until the bill had been acted on. At the commencement 
of the session Senator Chamberlain introduced from the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs the following amendment, which was 
recommended by a majority of the committee: 

No person, corporation, partnership, or association shall sell, 
supply, or have in his or its possession any intoxicating or spirituous 
liquor at any military station, cantonment, camp, fort, post, officers' 
or enlisted men's club which is being used at the time for military 
purposes under this act; but the secretary of war may make regu- 
lations permitting the sale and use of intoxicating liquors for 
medicinal purposes. [The amendment then went on to provide a 
penalty.] ^^ 

Senator McKellar of Tennessee, speaking for the minority 
of the committee, objected to the proposed amendment as not 
sufficiently stringent. After all, the real problem was not going 

1* " Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, first session ; p. 
1615. The constitutionality of Section 13 was attacked on the ground 
that the delegation of authority to the secretary of war was unconstitu- 
tional. The validity of the section was upheld by the Supreme Court 
in McKinley vs. United States, 249 U. S., 397. 

^-'^"Congressional Record," Sixty- Fifth Congress, first session; p. 
1448. 



210 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

to be how to keep men from getting liquor inside the camps, 
but how to keep them from getting Hquor outside. Accord- 
ingly he proposed to add to Senator Chamberlain's amend- 
ment, after the words " medicinal purposes," the following : 

It shall be unlawful to sell, furnish, or give away any intoxi- 
cating liquor, including beer, ale, or wine, to any officer or member 
of the military forces while in uniform, or to knowingly furnish 
to such person or persons intoxicating liquors whether in uniform 
or not, or to any person in the employ of the army.^*'' 

Senator Curtis of Kansas emphasized the need for such a-n 
extension : " Any person who has lived in the neighborhood of 
a fort knows that the young men in the army need protection 
from the joints in the neighborhood, and from the boot-leggers 
who hang around on the outside and induce the young man 
to go to houses where he can get intoxicating liquor." ^^ 

On the other hand some senators felt that the McKellar 
amendment, as worded, went altogether too far. "This 
amendment," said Senator Williams of Mississippi, " would 
absolutely punish me for giving to my son-in-law or one of my 
sons a toddy in my own home at -my own sideboards It is 
fanaticism run mad." 

A vote was taken, and the McKellar amendment was incorpo- 
rated into the Chamberlain amendment by fifty-seven to thirty. 
Those voting in the negative were Brandegee, Broussard, 
Calder, Colt, Culberson, Fletcher, France, Frelinghuysen, 
Gerry, Harding, Hardwick, Hitchcock, Hollis, Husting, James, 
Johnson, Lodge, McLean, New, Penrose, Pittman, Pomerene, 
Reed, Thomas, Underwood, Wadsworth, Warren, Watson, 
Weeks, and Williams. 

On the vote being announced. Senator Underwood of Ala- 
bama, who had voted against the McKellar amendment, gravely 
proposed to amend it by inserting after the words " while in 
uniform" the additional words "and the members of Con- 
gress." The effect of this would be to prohibit absolutely the 

i« Ibid. ; p. 1449. 
1^ Ibid.; p. 1452. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 211 

furnishing of intoxicating liquor to members of the Senate and 
House. " Cool heads are as much needed under the dome of 
the Capitol as in the camps. If the Senate is going to the point 
of invading the rights of these men when out of camp, when 
they have got their uniforms off, I think if we want to be 
good soldiers, we had better stand with them." ^^ 

Other amendments were facetiously offered extending the 
prohibition to the press gallery, to members of the cabinet, to 
the officers of the executive and judicial branches, and to 
" everybody else," but were ruled out as being amendments to 
an amendment and hence not in order. The question stood 
upon the adoption of the Underwood amendment. 

Senator Smith of Georgia : " Mr. President, so far as I personally 
am concerned, I am perfectly willing for this amendment to pass; 
but, Mr. President, let us not be misled as to the value of what 
we have just done by this effort to throw ridicule upon it." 

Senator Underwood disclaimed any intention to throw ridi- 
cule upon the McKellar amendment. 

Senator Smith : "Soldiers are boys who need protection ; senators 
ought to be able to control themselves. Whatever is the motive of 
the senator from Alabama, the public will look on this amendment as 
an attempt to throw ridicule on the bill." 

Senator McCumber : " This amendment of the senator from Alabama 
is an insult to the Senate." 

The argument that if the Senate proposed to deprive the 
soldier of his right to get liquor, it ought to show good sports- 
manship and not refrain from applying a self-denying ordi- 
nance to itself prevailed, however, and the Underwood amend- 
ment was adopted by a vote of forty-five to forty- three. 
Twelve of the strongest opponents of the McKellar amendment 
voted for the Underwood amendment. ^^ 

At this point Senator Harding of Ohio entered the debate : 
" I have voted to sustain the attitude of the senator from A\3r 

^^Ibid.; p. 1453. 

'® " Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, first session; p. 

1457- 



212 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

bama because I thought it becoming to make the amendment 
adopted previously a ridiculous thing in the eyes of the people 
of the United States. What a spectacle it is that the Senate 
of the United States on our entry into a world-wide war, while 
sitting as a deliberate body, should be giving hours to questions 
like these and collateral amendments, when we ought to be 
passing this bill which provides for an American army for 
defense." -" Senator Harding then offered as a substitute for 
the McKellar amendment as amended what was substantially 
the original amendment introduced by Senator Chamberlain at 
the beginning of the session. 

Senator Nelson of Minnesota: "This amendment offered by the 
senator from Ohio, like the original amendment, is of no value 
whatever. They can put a zone right around the camp, or the 
soldiers will go to the cities adjoining the camp, to the saloons, and 
get liquor there. If you want to do anything for the soldiers you 
have got to adopt the McKellar amendment." 21 

Senator Jones of Washington: "In my judgment, we cannot do 
a more important thing in connection with this legislation than to 
throw safeguards around our soldiers, who, the experience of all wars 
has shown, will be the special prey of this deadly traffic. It is not 
frivolous for us to try to put important provisions into this bill in 
order to do that." 

Senator Sheppard of Texas : " Mr. President, after inveighing 
against the introduction of amendments which he pronounced frivolous, 
the Senator from Ohio proceeded to introduce the most ineffective 
and indefinite amendment that has been presented here to-day. The 
additional amendments that have been unnecessary and frivolous have 
been introduced by those who opposed the McKellar amendment. The 
consumption of time they have occasioned is not chargeable to those 
of us who favor this amendment, but to those who opposed it. " 

Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia proposed to amend the 
Harding substitute by adding to it the words of the original 
McKellar amendment, omitting, however, the provision which 
forbade the furnishing of liquor to soldiers not in uniform. 
" I have eliminated the clause which applies to them when not 

2o/6id.; p. 1458. 
21 Ibid.; p. 1460. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 213 

in uniform. I think if we extend protection to the uniform, 
together with the provision in the amendment of the senator 
from Ohio which permits regulation by the President, we cover 
the whole subject." Senator Harding accepted the amendment, 
and in this form his substitute was adopted by fifty-one to 
thirty-five. 

The net result was thus exactly the same as if the clause in 
the McKellar amendment applying to men not in uniform had 
been struck out at the beginning and the rest of the amendment 
adopted. To reach this result several hours were spent in a 
debate which fills about twenty pages of the " Congressional 
Record." But in the meanwhile the Senate had its " little 
joke," in the end a satisfactory result was reached, and for- 
tunately the loss of time produced no bad consequences. 

In the course of the debate the arguments advanced for 
prohibition of liquor-selling to soldiers were just those which 
weighed with the administration : ( i ) the efificiency argument ; 
and (2) the duty owed by the Government to the families of 
the boys drafted into the army, " We must waste nothing. No 
food should be allowed to go to waste. No exertion of mind 
or body should be wasted. Drilling men with whisky in them 
is worse than time wasted." -- " We are going to take their 
boys, and put them into the service of their country. We are 
going to take them where they will be subjected to the worst 
temptations and we ought to throw about them every guarantee 
that we can," ^^ Kitchener was quoted as saying that liquor 
was a worse foe to England than all the opposing armies in 
the field. On the other hand, one of the opponents of the 
proposed legislation pointed out that it was a practice in the 
allied armies to serve out a regular rum ration to the men in 
the trenches, and that liquor, so far from making against mili- 
tary elificiency, was actually an aid to it. 

In conference, a certain amount of opposition developed to 
the two amendments. As one prominent member of the House 

" Senator Myers of Montana, ibid.; p. 1449. 
23 Senator Jones of Washington, ibid.; p. 1450. 



214 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of Representatives, who was a member of the conference com- 
mittee, later said, the provision " in my judgment indicts the 
American people of drunkenness and immorality. I was will- 
ing to write into the legislation a provision which would have 
given the President, as commander-in-chief, full authority to 
make all needed regulations for the protection of the young 
men against the use of liquor and against the social evil. That 
would have been sufficient. ... In San Francisco there was 
an exposition two years ago. There were nineteen million 
admissions at that exposition. It ran nearly a year. There 
were only eighty-three arrests for drunkenness during the 
entire period. That speaks volumes for the sobriety of the 
American people, and I will never sign any report which by 
wholesale indicts my fellow-citizens before the whole world of 
intemperance and immorality." -* 

The amendments were, however, written into the conference 
report and with the rest of the bill adopted by both Houses. 



Before the passage of the Selective Service Act, the adminis- 
tration took steps to provide for carrying out the two sides, 
negative and positive, of its policy for the social protection of 
the soldier. In April the secretary of war appointed a non- 
salaried Commission on Training-Camp Activities with Mr. 
Raymond B. Fosdick, a recognized expert in police science, at 
its head. The functions of the commission were twofold : in the 
first place, to supervise and coordinate all the agencies and 
organizations that would want to work in the camps providing 
recreation for the troops, and, secondly, to assume responsi- 
bility for eliminating vicious influences from the neighborhood 
of the camps. The money needed for the work was drawn 
from the funds available for military post exchanges. Ten 
months later Mr. Fosdick was called upon to give an account 
of the commission's work before the House Committee on 

2* " Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, first session ; p. 
2205. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 215 

Military Affairs. It is from the published report of his testi- 
mony that the following details are taken. 

Mr. Fosdick first went into the negative or repressive side of 
the commission's activities. " One of our main functions — 
I would not call it the principal function — has been to see 
that red-light districts and prostitutes, as far as possible, are 
swept out of existence and kept away from men in uniform; 
and that Section 12 of the draft act, forbidding the sale of 
liquor to men in uniform, is rigidly enforced. To effect this 
result we have saddled up all the law-enforcing agencies in 
that work: that is, the Department of Justice, the local police 
officers, and any other agency that could be brought in to en- 
force those laws. And we have had, too, rather extraordinary 
success, because we have had splendid cooperation, for the most 
part, from the local governments affected. Over sixty red- 
light districts have been closed around the country. There is 
not a red-light district near any military camp in the United 
States at the present time, and the prostitutes have been chased 
out of town, and locked up or sent to reformatories. You can 
see the result in the constantly decreasing rate of venereal 
disease in the army." ^^ 

In carrying out this policy, the commission found itself con- 
fronted with a number of peculiar difficulties. Closing up the 
red-light districts went far toward improving conditions, but 
it did not go the whole way. " We found venereal disease 
coming not from prostitutes, but from the type of girl known 
in military camps as the flapper — that is, young girls who were 
not prostitutes, but who probably would be to-morrow, and 
who were promiscuous and diseased. Of course, that was an 
exceedingly difficult situation to get at; but in order to do so, 
we formed a committee that we called, for lack of a better 
name, a committee for protective work among girls, with Miss 
Maud Miner of New York as chairman. After a pretty 
thorough study of the way they were getting at it in England, 

2^ "Hearing on Training-Camp Activities before the House Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, March 14, 1918," Washington, 1918; p. 4. 



2i6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

we adopted the English system of women protective officers in 
the neighhorhood of the camps. The ordinary pohcemen can- 
not deal successfully with these girls. He cannot send them 
home, while a woman protective officer can, and we have been 
stimulating, through this committee, the appointment of women 
protective officers in the neighborhood of the military camps, 
and we have about sixty-five of these officers now. In most 
cases, they are paid by the municipality, in some cases by the 
State governments, and there are two or three in each camp. 
They patrol the environment of the camp — that is, the woods 
near-by, or the streets in the town. They know the girls, for 
the most part, because it is only the exceptional case where we 
have a very large city in the neighborhood of the camp, and 
three or four women patrolling the streets can get in touch with 
these girls and take them home to their mothers." 

A second difficulty was met with where it was found neces- 
sary to commit girls who were persistent offenders to a re- 
formatory. Authority for this was found in Section 13 of the 
draft act. "We found we were crowding the jails and reform 
schools. In Newport News, for example, the place provided 
for women who are convicted was built to house fourteen. In 
two weeks we had thirty-six in there, and lacking accommoda- 
tions for any more, the judges refused to convict them." 
Twenty-four girls from the neighborhood of Camp Wadsworth 
and Camp Sevier were convicted in the Federal district court 
for South Carolina where the accommodations were already 
crowded. The local district attorney brought the girls to the 
reform school of the District of Columbia, where room was 
found for them. " So it was a very immediate situation that 
we had to confront. I talked with the secretary of war about 
it, and the President gave me $250,000 out of his $icxd,ooo,ooo 
emergency appropriation with which to supplement funds 
which may be granted by the States to put up reformatories 
to meet these conditions. We got tliat fund two or three 
weeks ago, and are just starting work now," 

A second expedient was adopted. " It is useless to send a 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 217 

girl up for thirty or sixty days and then turn her loose on the 
community if she is diseased, because she just goes back, and 
tries to make up what she has lost in point of money, and 
thus continues to spread the disease, and it is the disease end 
we are trying to reach, because it is the efficiency end. ... So 
we are opening up clinics in connection with the Red Cross and 
the Public Health Service, the Red Cross supplying the funds. 
We are opening up these clinics in the neighborhood of the 
camps, and if a girl is sent up, for example, for thirty days, or 
if she is fined, she is put on probation by the Federal judge 
under obligation to report to the clinic for treatment, and she 
is not released from her probation until she is cured. By that 
means we are getting really at the seat of the venereal disease 
problem." 

This policy involved skating on the thin edge of the law, 
as appears from the following colloquy between Mr. Fosdick 
and some of the members of the committee : 

The Chairman (Mr. Dent) : " What authority have they to put 
them on probation ? " 

Mr. Nicholls : " I understand the Supreme Court has held they 
have not that authority." 

The Chairman: "The Supreme Court has recently held that a 
Federal judge has not power to commute a sentence." -^ 

Mr. Fosdick : " As a matter of fact, Mr. Dent, I have not asked 
about the authority of the judges because I am afraid it is a bit weak. 
The judges are doing it, though, and I sincerely hope no questions 
will be asked." 

The Commission on Training-Camp Activities executed its 
supervisory powers over vice-prevention in the camps through 
officers commissioned in the sanitary corps of the surgeon- 
general's office. These officers, generally men who in civil life 
had been lawyers, after receiving their commissions were as- 
signed to the Commission on Training-Camp Activities for duty. 
" As a result we have a commissioned lieutenant in every camp, 
and we get prosecuting officers wherever we can, men who 
know the game, and we have them in every large community in 

26 See 242 United States, Reports, 27. 



2i8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the neighborhood of a military camp in the United States. 
We have something Hke thirty-six such men now." ^'' 

In its preventive program the commission on training-camp 
activities worked in coordination with the medical department 
of the surgeon-general's office. At the beginning of the war, 
this office drew up an elaborate sketch of the policy which it 
believed necessary for dealing adequately with the situation. 
This policy was outlined under four principal headings : 

A. Social measures to diminish sexual temptations. 

(i) Repression of prostitution and the liquor traffic. 

(2) The provision of proper social surroundings and rec- 
reation both within and without the military 
establishments. 

B. Education of soldiers and civilians in regard to venereal 
diseases and the moral hazards related thereto. 

(i) For soldiers, through official lectures, pamphlets, ex- 
hibits, and correlated educational work of the chap- 
lains and representatives of religious and social 
agencies under the supervision of the Commission 
on Training-Camp Activities. 

(2) For civilians, through encouragement and assistance 
to professional, business, coYnmercial, religious, 
men's and women's organizations, and social welfare 
organizations. 

C. Early treatment (or prophylactic measures) against vene- 

real diseases. 

( 1 ) Through treatment stations established in regimental 
infirmaries and in cities accessible to large numbers 
of troops. 

(2) Through follow-up measures adapted to individual 
cases to discourage subsequent exposure to infection. 

D. Medical care of those infected. 

(i) Through hospitalization of all cases requiring such 
action for the best interests of the patient, for 

27 These statements of Mr. Fosdick are from pp. 4-8 of the "Hear- 
ings " above referred to. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 219 

shortening of the non-effective period, and for the 

protection of other soldiers. 
(2) Dispensary treatment and follow-up supervision for 

those who do not require admission to or further 

detention in the hospital.^^ 
The program laid special emphasis on educational work. 
" Since no practical methods of immunization against this 
group of diseases exist, special emphasis has been placed on 
the development of educational measures. Five million copies 
of pamphlets and educational leaflets explaining the Govern- 
ment's social hygiene program and restating the essential parts 
of it in many different ways have been distributed, either 
directly by the Medical Department, or by the Commission on 
Training-Camp Activities or other agencies, with the approval of 
the surgeon-general. Officers of the section have been detailed 
to the demonstration of special methods of education through 
the use of these pamphlets, placards, lantern slides, and illus- 
trated posters. Officers have also been detailed to the develop- 
ment of special motion-pictures. These officers, in cooperation 
with others similarly detailed by the Army Medical Museum 
and with representatives of the Commission on Training-Camp 
Activities, the American Social Hygiene Association, the Young 
Women's Christian Association, and other volunteer associa- 
tions, have produced two films. One of these has been widely 
utilized in the educational program with the soldiers and has 
been increasingly in demand for promotion of the civilian cam- 
paign against venereal diseases which has been conducted simul- 
taneously with that of the army. The other film was intended 
primarily for use in civil communities to aid in the education 
of women and girls upon the importance of combating venereal 
diseases and maintaining moral standards. This film has like- 
wise been increasingly in demand by military as well as civil 
authorities." ^^ 

28 Report of surgeon-general, War Department, " Annual Report," 
1918; Vol. I, p. 655. 
29/fczi.; p. 657. 



220 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Further the medical department assigned officers to direct 
special social hygiene education in the camps, supplementing the 
required talks on this subject by the company commanders 
and the medical instruction given by the regimental surgeons.*" 

4 
So far there has been described merely the negative side of 
the administration's social policy for the army. Vastly greater 
stress vi^as laid on the positive side, the supplying of activities 
which would compete with those which it was desired to elimi- 
nate. As Mr. Fosdick phrased it, " it is not going to do any 
good just to set up ' Verboten ' signs such as we have done in 
connection with Sections 12 and 13 of the act, and tell red- 
blooded American soldiers that they must not do this or that 
or the other thing, unless you are going to give them something 
positive to do ; and therefore we have been trying to fill every 
moment of leisure time that the soldiers have in the training- 
camps." What steps were taken toward doing this may also 
be stated in Mr. Fosdick's words: 

We started out with the idea that we would not create any more 
machinery than we absolutely had to; that we would work through 
existing organizations. The first thing we did was to ask the 
Y. M. C. A. to assume a large part of the responsibility for erecting 
the clubs on the inside of the army camps ; and it is well known how 
generously the Y. M. C. A. responded. Afterwards the Knights of 
Columbus and the Jewish Board for Welfare Work (the Young 
Men's Hebrew Association), and other organizations came in to 
share this responsibility. Then we asked the American Library As- 
sociation to put up a well-equipped library in every camp. I remember 
on the Mexican border when the train would stop at a watering- 
tank the boys would come in and ask if we had anything to read, 
an old book or an old magazine or anything of that sort. They had 
nothing to read down there at all. In every large camp there is 
now a well-equipped library which has been erected at the expense of 
the American Library Association. They raised $1,500,000 for that 
purpose. There is in camp every book a man wants to read, every 
book for which there is a demand. ... I was talking with General 
Kuhn over at Camp Meade the other night about it, and he said, " I 

30/6id.; p. 656. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 221 

have a regular university over here." It is true, because the men 
are beginning to read and then a good many of the men in our 
training-camps had their courses of study interrupted. They were 
electrical engineers or mechanical engineers when they were drafted 
into the service, and some of them in their spare time want to keep up 
their work and are asking for technical books. The American 
Library Association is supplying all the technical books for which 
there is a demand. 

Then we asked the Young Women's Christian Association to put 
up hostess-houses in every camp. I have seen on the American border 
and at Plattsburg the women relatives of the men standing around the 
windy corners of the camp streets hunting for their men relatives, 
with no place to meet them and no place to go to talk with them when 
they did meet them. The hostess-house is a unique institution. It 
was not very favorably received when we first suggested the idea; 
that is, up at the War College. They thought it was a sort of high- 
brow affair and unnecessary, but now there is not a commanding 
officer who is not asking for a hostess-house, and we receive com- 
plaining telegrams from commanding officers asking why they have 
not a hostess-house in their camp. It is an institution which is filling 
a decided need in the military camp, and it does not cost the Govern- 
ment a cent, because the Y. W. C. A. have assumed the entire cost and 
have been backed up by their organizations in this work.^i 

The activities which Mr. Fosdick's commission undertook to 
introduce into the camps may be roughly classified under the 
two broad heads of recreational and educational. The chief 
recreational activities were athletics, mass-singing, and enter- 
tainments. 

I. ATHLETICS. Mr. Fosdick reported on camp athletics as 
follows : " We have put an athletic-director in every large 
camp in the United States, and also a boxing-instructor. This 
idea we got from France, where it had been followed in the 
French army and in the English army. It is very important 
that the fellows should know how to play, and that they should 
all play. It is important for this reason : When they come 

2^ " Hearings on Training-Camp Activities Before the House Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, March 4, 1918"; pp. 8-9. The buildings 
were put up with private funds. Testimony of General Littell, " House 
Hearings on the Army Appropriation Bill for 1919 " ; Vol. i. p. 940. 



222 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

out of the trenches they are completely upset, deranged men- 
tally, and there is nothing like play to get them back on a 
normal mental level. One of the English officers was telling 
me the other day that just after the Vimy ridge was stormed 
by the Canadians, they staged a baseball game right on what 
had been ' No-Man's Land,' and it was done deliberately. 
They were fighting out some championship, and thousands of 
men were out there to see this baseball game between a couple 
of the nines. The commanding officer did that deliberately 
because he wanted to get those men back on a normal basis. 
The Canadian and English and French officers have empha- 
sized to us the necessity of getting them to learn to play hard ; 
to play games for which no equipment is needed, so that they 
will fall instinctively into play. I was down at Camp Hancock 
the other day, and Walter Camp, Jr., who is our athletic-direc- 
tor down there, was at work with some of his people. The men 
had been out on a hard march, a hike, a whole division of them, 
and they were tired and footsore, and perhaps a little mentally 
sore, too. Then the athletic-director, standing up on a plat- 
form as high as this room, first put the whole division through 
hard calisthenic exercises for fifteen minutes, and then they 
started on what he called organized play, doing all sorts of 
things which would look very foolish on first glance. They 
played leap-frog, using a large number of ropes with lead 
weights on the ends, one man standing in the center of a group 
and spinning the rope around, and the men would have to 
hop over it at the right time or it would cut their legs from 
under them. At the end of fifteen minutes those men went 
back to their barracks singing. The desired psychological 
result had been obtained." ^- 

The commission laid special emphasis on instruction in box- 
ing. " The boxing-coaches have perhaps a more immediate 
bearing on the military side. Boxing is very like bayonet- 
fighting. The movements are the same ; the thrust with the right 
arm in boxing is the same as the jab with the bayonet. We 

82 " Hearings " ; pp. 9-10. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 223 

had a film made the other day showing the intimate relation- 
ship between the two. We had Kid McCoy and a captain 
from the Canadian army who is an expert in bayonet fighting 
go through the motions together to bring out the similarity. 
We want to develop boxing in the army for all it is worth. 
And the men are taking to it wonderfully. They are boxing 
now in all the camps in the United States." ^^ 

2. MAS.S-SINGING. Secondly, the Commission undertook to 
develop mass-singing in the camps. At the outset, said Mr. 
Fosdick, it was looked on in some quarters as " a high-brow 
performance," and " the chief of staff was very uncertain about 
the wisdom of it. We put a song-coach in every camp in the 
United States. We have never had a singing army in Amer- 
ica. The foreign armies have all been singing armies. When 
I was over in France, and particularly in Germany before the 
war, I remember those regiments coming along the roads, 
singing their marching songs. When a regiment goes out on 
a hike and sings, it comes in 33i/1{ per cent, fresher, our army 
officers are telling us now, and we wanted, just as an experi- 
ment in building up the morale of the troops, to try out this 
song business." ^* Some of the experienced officers in the 
Regular Army gave mass-singing their enthusiastic support 
from the very outset. Thus General Leonard Wood, in organ- 
izing Camp Funston, charged his staff officers : " It is just as 
essential that the soldiers know how to sing as that they know 
how to carry rifles and shoot them. It sounds odd to the 
ordinary person when you tell him every soldier should be a 
singer. But when you know the boys as I know them, you will 
realize how much it means to them to sing. There is n't any- 
thing in the world, even letters from home, that will raise a 
soldier's spirits like a good catchy marching-tune. ... I have 
seen men toiling for 'hours through mud and rain, every one of 
them dejected, spiritless, tired, cold, and wet, cursing the day 
they entered the arrmy, suddenly transformed into a happy devil- 

33 " Hearings " ; p. 10. 

34 " Hearings " ; pp. lo-ii 



224 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

may-care frame of mind through a song. Their heads pop up 
in the air, their eyes sparkle, and the spring comes back to 
their step. Singing makes a man feel that the clouds have a 
cheerful lining." ^'^ 

The song-coaches got $1800 a year. Many of them were 
men with reputations which commanded a far higher figure in 
civil life. It was another instance of sacrifice in the interest of 
the Government. Until funds were made available by Con- 
gress, the work was carried on with the proceeds of private 
subscriptions. 

3. ENTERTAINMENTS. The Commission on Training-Camp 
Activities was of the opinion that "there is nothing like a good 
show at night for a man who is tired out to keep him in good 
condition," and also out of mischief. Accordingly in each of 
the sixteen National Army cantonments the commission built a 
fully equipped modern theater building, seating 30DO people 
and costing about $35,000. In the National Guard camps, 
where there was not the same guaranty of permanence, audi- 
toriums were provided that v/ould seat about 1200 people and 
cost only $5500 to build and equip. Tents were also provided 
in both camps and cantonments for Chautauqua entertain- 
ments. 

The work of arranging dramatic programs for the " Liberty 
theaters," as they were called, was in charge of Marc Klaw, 
of Klaw & Erlanger, who was a member of the Commission on 
Training-Camp Activities, and who was assisted by a committee 
of twenty-three prominent theatrical men.^*' More than a 
dozen companies were put on the road to tour the cantonments, 
presenting musical shows such as " Baby Mine " and " Kick 
In." Where the cantonment was located in the neighborhood 
of a large city, arrangements were often made to have one of 

35 See " Report of the Camp Music Division, Commission on Train- 
ing-Camp Activities"; Washington, Government Printing-Office, 1919, 
p. 9. 

36 See "Hearings"; p. 11: "Hearings Before the House Military 
Afifairs Committee on the Army Appropriation Bill for 1919, December 
7, 1918- February 8^ 1918"; Vol. I, p. 941- 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 225 

the companies playing there present its show on Sunday after- 
noon in the Liberty theater. When no " real " plays were 
offered, moving-pictures were shown, making it unnecessary 
for the soldier to leave camp to seek amusement.^'' 

The soldiers were charged a small fee, ranging from five to 
twenty-five cents, for admission to the regularly scheduled 
shows. Further funds for the support of the theaters were 
raised from private subscriptions through the country by a 
so-called " Smileage Fund " campaign.^® 

In a few of the camps which were first organized, conces- 
sions for supplying theatrical entertainment had been granted to 
private persons, and, in one instance at least, the result was 
unsatisfactory. Soldiers reported that the performances were 
so vulgar that they could not attend them. The commission 
intervened, and the show was "reformed." "Most of the 
shows are of the right sort," Mr. Fosdick told the Military 
Affairs Committee. " We are opening up at the embarkation- 
camp in Hoboken with ' Turn to the Right,' which is a good 
show. Then we borrow shows occasionally — Maude Adams 
and shows of that kind — and moving-pictures are kept run- 
ning all the time, and the soldiers are very enthusiastic about 
them." 39 

The commission recognized that however much was done to 
provide wholesome entertainment in the camps, the soldiers 
would inevitably spend part of their time in the near-by com- 
munities and that something would have to be done there also 
to provide a tempting and proper environment. Accordingly 
the Playground and Recreation Association of America, of 
which Mr. Joseph Lee of Boston, a member of the commission, 
was president, was asked to take charge of this work and see 
that the social and recreational facilities of the communities 
adjoining the camps at the disposal of the soldiers were of the 

2^ " Forging the Sword ; The Story of Camp Devens," by W. J. 
Robinson ; p. 27. 

^'^ Three million dollars were raised. War Department, " Annual 
Report," 1919; Vol. i, p. 34. 

39 " Hearings on Training-Camp Activities " ; p. 12. 



226 THE BUILDING OF AN AKMY 

best. The association sent out a hundred representatives and 
succeeded in organizing a " War Camp Community Service " 
in about the same number of communities. The plan was to 
estabHsh in every town or city near a camp a committee of 
leading men and women to organize for the soldier's use the 
various social and recreational opportunities which the com- 
munity afforded. Through these committees clean entertain- 
ments and wholesome environments were thrown open to sol- 
diers on the vast scale necessary to provide for the large 
number of men wlio were spending some of their leisure in 
towns near the camps. "*" 

4. PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES. The StepS 

taken by the commission to provide books and library facil- 
ities for the soldiers have already been touched on. A special 
library building was put up in each cantonment and National 
Guard camp, the cost being defrayed out of a fund of more 
than a million dollars raised by the American Library Associa- 
tion for the purpose. In addition to this, definite educational 
opportunities in the form of organized courses and classes were 
offered. The program was planned and the work supervised 
by a committee of prominent educators.*^ An attempt was 
made to offer courses in the camps in all the subjects for which 
there was a demand. The services of the educational depart- 
ment of the Young Men's Christian Association were utilized 
for university extension courses, and wherever possible such 
educational facilities as the near-by civilian communities could 
afford were put at the soldiers' disposal. Local committees were 
formed in these communities, and one of the ways in which 
they cooperated most effectively was in securing teachers of 
French. Special attention was given to this work and a course 
was offered in which a vocabulary of six or seven hundred 

40 " House Hearings on the Army Appropriation Bill for 1919"; 
Vol. I, p. 042. 

41 Dr. William Orr, chairman: Dr. P. P. Claxton, United States 
commissioner of education : Dr. Henry P. Judson, president of the 
University of Chicago; Dr. J. H. Finley of the University of New 
York; Colonel P. H. Callahan of Louisville, Kentucky. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 227 

French words could be learned during the regular period of 
military training. In many camps a more elementary need was 
met with — the need of teaching the English language to sol- 
diers of foreign-extraction. Special efforts were made to meet 
this need. In one National Army cantonment alone, two 
thousand men were enrolled in classes to learn to read and write 
English. The war thus became by accident the means of doing 
something toward solving one of the pressing problems of 
Americanization.^^ 

The aid rendered in this educational work by the civilian 
communities near the camps was of primary importance. 
Atlanta, Burlington, Vermont; Charleston, South Carolina; 
Chicago, Indianapolis, Pensacola, San Francisco, Minneapolis, 
Spartanburg, South Carolina; Chattanooga, and many other 
cities and towns cooperated energetically to the full extent of 
their school facilities. The Universities of South Carolina, 
Texas, and Georgia placed their staff and equipment at the serv- 
ice of the soldiers in the adjoining camps.^^ At Camp Bliss 
alone two thousand men were enrolled in classes conducted 
by members of the University of Texas faculty. 



In the organization of its work, the Commission on Training- 
Camp Activities applied many of the same principles of admin- 
istration which had been used in administerng the Selective 
Service Act. This will have been observed in the foregoing 
account. Thus the commission started out with the idea of 
creating no more new machinery than was absolutely necessary, 
and worked largely through the organizations of existing 
voluntary bodies — the Young Men's Christian Association, 
Knights of Columbus, Young Men's Hebrew Association, 
Young Women's Christian Association, American Library 
Association, Playground and Recreation Association of Amer- 

*2 " House Hearings on the Army Appropriation Bill for 1919 " ; 
Vol. I, p. 942. 

^3 See leaflet of United States Bureau of Education on " Educational 
Work in Training-Camps." 



228 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ica, and the like. The membership of the commission 
itself was selected with this policy in view, and included men 
in close touch with one or another of these bodies. Secondly, 
wherever possible the commission worked through the local 
communities where the camps were situated. This has been 
seen in connection with both the positive and negative sides of 
its work. Thus law-enforcement work was largely carried on 
through the local police, and the women protective officers who 
aided in this work were paid by the local communities. So also 
with the educational activities, reviewed in the last paragraph. 

A word needs to be said about the cooperation of some of the 
more important voluntary organizations on which the commis- 
sion relied. Chief among them was the Young Men's Christian 
Association, which was represented on the commission by Dr. 
John R. Mott. The association erected a variety of recreational 
and social buildings, often as many as a dozen, in each of the 
camps and cantonments. These included writing-rooms, loung- 
ing-rooms, and a gymnasium. In the autumn of 1917 the 
association already had a staff available for the athletic, 
musical, recreational, and educational work which has been 
described. The Knights of Columbus by October 15, 1917, 
had built sixty-five halls in the camps and shortly afterwards 
had several hundred secretaries at work. The latter organiza- 
tion was intended to represent the Catholic Church, to which 
more than 30 per cent, of the new army belonged, just as the 
Young Men's Christian Association represented the Protestant 
denominations. The work of both bodies, however, was re- 
quired to be strictly non-sectarian, and their admission to the 
military reservations was on express condition that their build- 
ings and facilities should at all times be open to the entire 
camp.** 

In addition to the administrative advantages of the policy 
adopted for carrying out social work in the army through volun- 
tary organizations and the local communities, that policy em- 

■** See a pamphlet issued by the War Department on " The Com- 
mission on Training-Camp Activities." 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 229 

bodied a further advantage, its cheapness. It has already been 
seen that these extra-governmental agencies bore the expenses 
of most of the work directed by the Commission on Training- 
Camp Activities. During the first fiscal year of the war — that 
is, up to June 30, 1918 — the commission had at its disposal 
only $750,000. Its estimate of its requirements for the follow- 
ing year was fixed at the moderate sum of $1,500,000. This 
was a low price to pay for work of which Secretary Baker said, 
"1 regard the work of the Commission on Training-Camp Ac- 
tivities as a most significant factor in winning the war." 

6 

The administration's social program for the army might well 
have been expected to stop at the ports of embarkation ; but 
in fact it followed the soldiers to Europe. Everywhere behind 
the actual fighting front in France were training- and replace- 
ment-camps, hospitals, staff headquarters, and base-ports. 
Large areas more or less remote from the scene of operations 
were filled with American soldiers in training, on leave, or en- 
gaged in non-combatant service. The problem of these men 
was the same as that of the soldiers in training in the United 
States, and the same measures were resorted to. The policy 
adopted was to supply the men so far as possible with oppor- 
tunities to use their spare time in ways which would contribute 
to upbuild rather than to undermine their morale. 

In France the bulk of this work was in the hands of the 
Young Men's Christian Association. Virtually all the other 
voluntary associations, including the Salvation Army, which did 
social work with the soldiers in the United States, were rep- 
resented overseas ; but none of them had so ambitious a program 
or one which extended over so many fields as the Y. M. C. A. 
This program fell roughly under three heads : 

(i) To provide athletic facilities, amusements, and educa- 
tional classes. 

(2) To provide religious exercises. 

(3) To provide post-exchange facilities. 



230 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Work falling under the first head was planned on an elaborate 
scale. The ground was prepared by sending some prominent 
expert in the field of work proposed on a tour of inspection to 
survey the possibilities and recommend a program adapted to 
the situation. Such a tour was that of E. H. Sothern and 
Winthrop Ames, who returned from France to organize the 
American theatrical profession as a base of supplies for the 
Y, M. C. A. theaters in France. Such a tour, again, was that 
of Dr. Anson Phelps Stokes of Yale, who was invited to draw 
up a plan for educational work. What was actually undertaken 
in those fields will be described later on. 

The association had to adapt its work to two radically differ- 
ent sets of conditions — the conditions existing in the great 
base-camps and those existing at the actual fighting front. In 
the busy confusion of the base-camps, with their swarming 
thousands of troops of all kinds, the Y. M. C. A. erected its 
large wooden " huts," each marked at the end with the bright 
red triangle which was the association's badge. The life and 
activities centering about such a typical " hut " have been thus 
described by one of the association's workers : 

The hut usually contains a canteen-room, a large lecture-hall, and 
a number of smaller rooms for classes and group-meetings. In this 
building and on the athletic-field close by centers the camp life of the 
troops. The canteen, a large lounging-place, fitted up with board 
benches and tables, decorated with gay bunting or bright pictures of 
home life, is usually thronged at every hour of the day when soldiers 
can be found off duty; for it is generally the only place in the camp 
where soldiers can gather for recreational or social purposes. At one 
end, by the canteen-counter, lined up to get their hot coffee, their 
buns, crackers, sweet chocolate, sandwiches, or the like, are crowds 
of soldiers ; otliers are sitting at the tables, writing letters home on the 
stationery furnished them ; still others are at the other end of the 
room, gathered around the piano or victrola, playing the tunes they 
used to play at home; many are reading the home newspapers and 
magazines which are given out at the counter, or selecting books from 
the library, or matching their wits in friendly games of checkers. Out- 
side on the athletic-field during such afternoons as they are not on 
duty, crowds of soldiers are delighting in games of baseball, hand- 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 231 

hall, or volley-ball, or watching a boxing- or wrestling-match, or taking 
part in inter-company field-contests. ... In another part of the hut is 
a large lecture-room with a stage at one end; here are given in the 
evenings educational lectures, soldier minstrel-shows, musical enter- 
tainments, cinema-shows, patriotic addresses, and religious talks. . . . 
Surging in and out of the thirty huts in one of those base-camps there 
pass daily actually sixty thousand men of every race and creed ; every 
night between ten and fifteen thousand men are listening to educa- 
tional lectures and entertainments ; on two nights every week a like 
number are crowding to hear religious talks. . . . 

Closer to the firing-line all large buildings become impossible. It 
would be unsafe, from a military viewpoint, to mass so many troops 
where they could be seen and shelled together. The " huts " becoming 
impossible and large meetings being unsafe, the Y. M. C. A. must devise 
smaller units and, in company with the soldiers whom it seeks to 
serve, go underground. If the conditions under v/nich it must work 
in the great base-camps are unusual, they are infinitely more so in 
the desolated towns under enemy shell-fire. . . . 

The writer goes on to describe the conditions of the associa- 
tion's work in one of these desolated towns : 

On the wall of what was formerly a French home of the better 
class we see painted a large red triangle. Here the Y. M. C. A. 
secretaries have lived through all the furious shelling of the preceding 
months, serving hot coffee and caring for the needs of thousands of 
soldiers. . . . The upper stories, scarred with shrapnel and flying steel 
fragments, are not in use; the secretaries are sleeping underground in 
what was once a wine-cellar. . . . Under the city is a vast network 
of labyrinthine cellars and connecting passages, and in these under- 
ground mazes, with the rats and vermin, the soldiers are living. No 
wonder that the little friendly Y. M. C. A. building is thronged with 
troops night after night. We hear that in some way the secretaries 
managed to secure last week fifteen thousand fr^sh eggs which they 
supplied to the troops going up to the trenches; they are giving out 
ninety gallons of hot coffee every night. . . . 

Still nearer the firing-line, often only a few hundred yards back of 
the front-line trenches, are the little Y. M. C. A. dug-outs for serving 
the troops as they enter and leave the trenches. . . . On diving down 
into one of these dug-outs, at first we can see nothing; then by the dim 
light of a sputtering candle we can make out the forms of troops in 
their steel helmets gathered around us. Over in the rear a secretary 
is serving out hot coffee. The darkness, the foulness of the atmos- 



232 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

phere, the cramped dimensions of this rat-ridden den, make a squalid 
setting. But the Y. M. C. A. must follow the troops wherever they 
go, a secretary tells me. " The greater the shell-fire, the greater 
the need." 45 

Another eye-witness has given an interesting glimpse of 
Y. M. C. A. work in the front-line region. " A detachment of 
seasoned American troops recently moved to the heart of the 
great battle. It was several weeks en route, and a contingent 
of Y. M. C. A, secretaries with sixteen motor-trucks accom- 
panied it all the way. When the men got out of the trains on 
the first stage of their journey, they found hot chocolate and 
tobacco waiting ; when they camped after a day's march, on the 
ground, in barns, in tents, hot chocolate again, and open-air 
movies were on tap. . . . One resourceful secretary had got a 
bath going; a battered tin tub, rescued from a back yard and 
set in a tiled kitchen, a stove that had once heated water for 
laundry purposes, a detail of two soldiers to keep up the fire, 
cart the water (in rusty pails rescued from the roadside), give 
' back scrubs ' on request, empty and clean the tub — this was 
the organization. Baths were twenty minutes long and ten 
cents apiece, booked three days ahead by officers and men 
alike." *« 

The practical results of this work of the Y. M. C. A. in 
strengthening the morale of the troops in France were such that 
the military authorities came to place much dependence upon it. 
Mr. Sayre gives a telling instance : 

When the first detachment of American troops arrived [in the fighting 
zone] the military authorities had had no opportunity to send previous 
notification to the Y. M. C. A. ; and so the first troops found themselves 
quartered in little French peasant-towns with no Y. M. C. A. huts or 
tents in sight. The soldiers, most of them from comfortable American 
homes, were billeted in dirty barns, in dirtier outhouses, or wherever 
a roof could be found, sometimes with cattle below them and the 

^'^ Francis B. Sayre in "Harper's Magazine," February, 1918; pp. 
360 ff. 

*^ Elizabeth Shipley Sargent in "The New Republic," June 22, 1918; 
p. 228. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 233 

chickens above ; they were eating their mess in the middle of the street 
and washing their clothes in neighboring streams. There was no place 
in the whole village where they could gather to write letters, to play 
games, or to read ; no books or magazines were to be h^ at any price ; 
they could purchase no tobacco, chocolate, or soft drinks ; the little 
towns seemed absolutely barren of recreation or amusement of any 
legitimate kind. Furthermore, they had had no letters from America 
since they had left ; and they were in a strange country whose language 
and customs they did not understand ; with only evil ways in which to 
spend the money burning in their pockets, with nothing to relieve the 
dull monotony of idle evenings, many of them began to get homesick 
or to drift along dangerous paths. It was not many days before 
officers began to send hurry calls to the Y. M. C. A. headquarters in 
Paris : " For God's sake come down here before it 's too late and do 
something for my men." Ten days after the arrival in camp of one 
of the secretaries who were hastily despatched, he sent back the follow- 
ing typical program, which he had arranged as a starter to show the 
bo3-s that the Y. M. C. A. was on the job. 

Monday evening. — Scotch stories and lecture by Dr. Robert 
Freeman of Pasadena, California. 

Tuesday evening. — Regimental band-concert. 

Wednesday afternoon (half-holiday). — Inter-company athletics. 

Wednesday evening. — Minstrel show arranged by a sergeant. 

Thursday evening. — Musical evening under the leadership of 
Jerry Reynolds. Local talent, violin, har- 
monica, banjo, and quartet discovered in 
the regiment. 

Friday evening. — Men busy with military night manoeuvers. 

Saturday night. — Moving pictures. Wild West, and Charlie 
Chaplin. 

Sunday, 9 a. m. — Chaplain's Bible-class. 

Sunday, 6 p. m. — Evening service.*^ 

This program gives an excellent idea of the recreational 
work carried on by the association. Much of it was simple, 
primitive, and " home-made," the entertainers being drawn 
from among the boys themselves. There was much, however, 
which was not of this character. Prominent lecturers, musicians, 
and players gave their services to the association and toured 
the expeditionary force. Among the most successful of the 

47 "Harper's Magazine," February, 1918; p. 364. 



234 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

latter were Miss Elsie Janis and the troupe of players gotten to- 
gether by John Craig to present " Baby Mine." At the begin- 
ning of 1913,. on General Pershing's suggestion, Mr. E. C. Car- 
ter, the general secretary of the Y. M. C. A, in France, requested 
that some men conversant with theatrical matters should be sent 
abroad to investigate the possibilities for providing entertain- 
ment for the troops. The result was the tour of inspection 
of Mr. Sothern and Mr. Winthrop Ames already referred to.** 
On their return to America they addressed a great meeting of 
several thousand player-folk at the Palace Theater in New 
York, and " America's Over-There Theater League " was 
organized. This was an association of actors which undertook 
to supply dramatic performers for work with the soldiers in 
France. A considerable number of small companies were 
formed and sent over to act in groups of from three to five, a 
troupe of this size being found best suited to the conditions of 
camp-entertainment.^^ These companies, and the other singers 
and lecturers furnished by the " Y.," carried their activities up 
to the very fighting front and supplied relaxation and enter- 
tainment to the men who needed it most in the sound of the 
guns. Mr. Sothern's account of a recitation from "Hamlet" in 
a dark room filled with soldiers, while an air-raid was taking 
place overhead, gives a vital picture of what goes to build 
morale.^" 

Educational work was necessarily confined to the base- and 
leave-areas behind the lines. A program for this work was 
drawn up by Dr. Anson Phelps Stokes of Yale, who went to 
France at the request of the War Work Council of the " Y." ; 
and this program v/as approved on February 28. 1918, by 
General Pershing. In his report Dr. Stokes outlined the 

*^ See account by Mr. Sothern in " Scribner's Magazine," July. 
1918; p. 22. 

•*5 " New York Times," September 29, 1918; Part IV, column 6. 

so In " Scribner's Magazine," loc. cit. An elaborate and interesting 
account of the work has been written in " Entertaining the American 
Army," by James W. Evans and Captain Gardner Harding, New York, 
" Association Press," 1921 ; p. 259. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 235 

fundamental considerations governing the work and its possibili- 

j( ties and limitations. 

1 

F The primary and immediate purpose of the educational work is to 
help the army win the war; the secondary obje'ct is to help the army 
fit men better to discharge their duties as citizens on their retur»i to 

, America. The work must stand the acid test of whether or not it 
will improve the military efficiency and the fighting edge of the indi- 
vidual soldier. In this connection four fundamental questions require 
answers before any educational plan can be discussed. They are the 
questions of (i) time; (2) inclination; (3) spetific demands; and 
(4) military results. 

I. Have the soldiers who are not actually at the front time after 
meeting their military duties to attend educational classes? The an- 
swer is " Yes." As the intensity and complex character of modern 
warfare does not permit the majority of the numbers of an army to 
be in the front-line trenches at the same time, most of the soldiers 
are living under conditions where some study is possible. There is as 
a rule adequate time in the late afternoon and evening. Conditions 
vary in different camps, but generally there is at least two hours 
after supper without regular duties. In almost all camps the 
Y. M. C. A. huts are packed with men reading, writing, enjoying 
entertainments, or talking from before six until eight-thirty or later 
in the evening. 

2. Have the soldiers the inclination to make use of educational ad- 
vantages when offered ? The answer is " Yes " if the educational op- 
portunities are of a type suited to their needs. The number of men 
who have specially asked for French classes and other types of in- 
struction is significant. 

3. For what types of work is there most immediate demand? 
(a) Instruction in French, so that the men may make their wants 
known, and understand and get along with the people among whom 
they are living, (b) Lectures on the character and history of the 
French and English people. The average soldier will be much more 
sympathetic with his French and English allies and prove more effec- 
tive as a fighting man if he knows more about them, (c) Instruction 
in the causes of the war and of America's participation. Question- 
naires at several camps show that a large proportion of men have no 
adequate conception of the reasons for the war. This means a great 
loss of efficiency. 

4. Hence educational work will increase the flighting power of the 
American soldier. Nothing will do so much to give the soldier a keen 
edge for battle as the strengthening of his moral convictions as to the 



236 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

vital importance of defeating at all co"sts the armies now controlled by 
the military autocracy of Prussia. In fact, it is part of our thesis that 
education regarding the tremendous moral issues actually at stake in 
this war is a necessity if our soldiers are to meet triumphantly the 
severe test of trench warfare. Educational work not only has a good 
cfTect on the mental attitude of the soldier but by offering him an 
interesting evening occupation tends to prevent dissipation.^^ 

The program called for the appointment of a central educa- 
tional commission with offices in Paris.^^ This commission was 
to work through the Y. M. C. A. divisional directors and hut- 
secretaries, who were to have actual charge of the work. Lec- 
tures were to be given in the main room of the huts, and classes 
were to be held in the smaller rooms. Teachers and lecturers 
were to be drawn from the Y. M. C. A. secretaries, army 
interpreters, and from among the soldiers themselves. For the 
teaching of French, native teachers from the locality, usually 
lycee professors, soon became available. This branch of the 
work rapidly developed, and by Octobefr i, 191 8, it was esti- 
mated that there were two hundred thousand soldiers studying 
French from a text-book especially prepared for their use.^^ 
To increase interest in the French langtiage and art a theatrical 
company composed of members of the Comedie Frangaise and 
the Odeon was sent during July and August to perform at the 
large camps at Brest and St. Nazaire. Another branch of work 
for which the need soon became apparent and which rapidly 
developed in importance was the teaching of English to illiterate 
and foreign-born drafted men. By October 31 there were 
thirty thousand troops reached by this teaching ; and the chair- 
man of the educational commission reported that it was needed 
by many more, but the work was restricted by the lack of text- 
books and copy-books. Educational work in other fields, such 
as history and war-aims, was conducted through the medium 

°i " Educational Plans for the Army Abroad," by Anson Phelps 
Stokes, Association Press, New York, 1918; pp. 17-22. 

^~ During the summer of 1918 Professor John Erskine of Columbia 
University was at the head of the work. 

^s Stokes, op. cit.; p. 81. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 237 

of lectures given either by the secretaries themselves or by 
special lecturers who toured the camps. To stimulate the study 
of geography, each hut was equipped with a set of maps; and 
hundreds of thousands of brooks were placed in the huts and 
made available to the soldiers.^* 

The directors of the educational work reported having en- 
countered one peculiar obstacle. " The emphasis of the Y. M. 
C. A. work in France has been largely upon the canteen service, 
and many hut secretaries and divisional directors frankly believe 
that the canteen, supplemented with religious programs, should 
be the whole enterprise of the Y. M. C. A. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that 75 per cent, of the secretaries under- 
estimate the intellectual liunger of the men. Until we realize 
that the minds of the soldiers are enormously stimulated by 
the war, and that their intellectual curiosity must be satisfied 
if the war is to be fought with the greatest success, we shall 
be missing one chief usefulness in France." ^°' 

In addition to the program for educational work in France 
during the war, Dr. Stokes presented also an elaborate plan 
for expanding such work during the period of demobilization. 
This plan called not merely for elementary and vocational in- 
struction, but also for work of a university grade and for the 
sending of a limited number of men to attend courses at French 
and English universities. The great scale on which this work 
was actually organized after the armistice is a notable and novel 
feature of army policy; but it lies beyond the proper scope of 
this book, and the reader is referred for a brief account of it 
to General Pershing's final report. 

7 
No review of the Y. M. C. A.'s work in France would be 
adequate without some mention of the criticism and dissatis- 
faction which it provoked. As one journalist put it, the " Y." 
was the best loved institution in the army; but it was also the 

5* From October, 1917, to July i, 1918, 3,847,558 books were sent to 
the field. Of these, 266,657 were Testaments and religious books. 
55 Stokes, op. at.; p, 57. 



238 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

most violently criticized."'" The ground of dissatisfaction was 
twofold. Partly it grew out of minor irritations incidental 
to the association's performance of post-exchange functions. 
These functions consisted in selling to the soldiers tobacco, 
cigarettes, milk-chocolate, and other small personal conven- 
iences at cost. The same articles were also for sale by the 
quartermaster's corps post-exchanges. The quartermaster's 
corps, as a part of the army, did not have to pay transportation 
charges on its supplies, and hence could ofifer them at a lower 
price than the " Y." found necessary to cover their cost. This 
led to the feeling among many of the men that the " Y." was 
seeking to make a profit. So strong did this feeling become 
that in the case of one article, " Bull Durham " tobacco, the 
" Y." withdrew from the field altogether and left the sale of 
the article entirely to the post-exchanges. Another source of 
irritation was deeper. Many of the Y. M. C A. secretaries had 
had their previous training and experience entirely in religious 
work of an evangelical kind. Thrust into the midst of men of 
a different stamp from those with whom they had been accus- 
tomed to deal, men with a different outlook on life, diflferent 
prejudices, and dififerent needs, they did not readily adapt 
themselves to the requirements of a new situation and employed 
methods which the men relented. Many of the men objected 
to the projection of religion into meetings which were nom- 
inally supposed to be recreational. They did not want to have 
a prayer foisted upon them in the midst of a movie-show ; they 
did not want to go to a concert and find that they were expected 
to sing hymns. Of course, a great deal depended on the per- 
sonality of the particular secretaries. Some of them could 
succeed in carrying through the very things which led to the 
failure of others. If a secretary by his personality and in the 
course of his daily contacts with the men convinced them that 
he was a red-blooded human being, sympathetic and strong, 
they raised no objection to tactics on his part which they would 

56 Elizabeth Shipley Sargent, in "The New Republic," June 22, 1918; 
p. 228. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 239 

have resented in another man whom they regarded as a snivel- 
ing fanatic. The criticism was made that the association was 
not always wise in its choice of representatives. At the outset 
it laid much emphasis on the religious convictions of the men 
it was about to send over, and on such questions as whether 
they smoked and drank, and whether or not they were regular 
church-attendants. Unitarians, for instance, were not accepted. 
Insistence on such qualifications resulted in the sending of 
many men who were not well qualified for the work they had to 
do. Practical experience convinced the " Y." of its mistake, 
the policy was altered, and in the end the kind of men were 
being sent that the soldiers wanted. 

Taking all factors into account and weighing grounds of 
criticism against what was actually achieved, the immense 
service of the Y. M. C. A.'s work in France can hardly be 
questioned. It supplied the soldiers with comforts and interests 
which did something to make less sharp the transition from 
civilian to military life. It thereby contributed to maintaining 
their morale and to carrying over into scenes of warfare some 
of the inhibitions and restraints which operate in time of peace 
to protect the better sides of personality. It furnished much 
of what was wholesome and valuable under circumstances from 
which such things are only too often absent ; and if incidentally 
it adopted a policy which in some respects was open to mis- 
understanding or ran counter to the grain of prejudice, such 
failings in retrospect do not detract from the immense debt of 
gratitude which is due to the only body that was organized and 
equipped to do the work it set out to do, and which did that 
work unselfishly, heroically, and, in the main, efficiently. 

8 

How far did the elaborate organization of army welfare 
work, which has been so far outlined, go toward accomplishing 
what was expected of it? How far did it achieve the results 
which it was expected to achieve, and meet the problems which 
it was intended to meet? The results have been differently 



240 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

assessed in different quarters. On the one hand a pessimistic 
view has been taken by some observers ; and it may be well to 
look at the articles of their indictment, A good illustration of 
this view is an article on " Life in an Army Training-Camp," 
by Frank Tannenbaum, published in " The Dial " for April 5, 
1919, Mr. Tannenbaum says : 

I do not want to go into a discussion of the activities of the various 
welfare organizations, and of their value to the soldier, except to say 
that their activities as a whole have failed to reach the core of the 
problem — the provision of an opportunity for initiative and self- 
expression — and that at the very best they have reached but a small 
portion of the men. While they have had a very definite value in 
providing little things, they have failed to do so in the larger and 
deeper sense — failed both as educational and moral centers providing 
an imaginative and convincing interpretation of the world-forces which 
brought the men into the army. In fact, the truth is that not only did 
they fail to give the soldier something of the meaning of the things 
involved in a spiritual way in America's entrance into the war, but 
that they seem never to have realized that there was an opportunity to 
fill a very definite need. The welfare organizations as a whole seem 
to have been perfectly helpless in the light of this need. Their lack 
of imagination, and their helpless and antiquated attitude as to what 
constituted the essentials of moral activity under these conditions was 
pathetic. They therefore failed to render the one vital and essential 
service to both the soldier and the nation that was at this time so much 
needed and that would have given these organizations a real part in 
making the American war-effort mean something to the world in a 
spiritual way. 

In order to understand this criticism it is necessary to under- 
stand what was expected by the critic from the organizations he 
criticizes and whose efforts he indicts with failure, Mr, Tannen- 
baum states what he conceives to be the problem as follows : 

Camp-life reduces all things to one level. It dresses all bodies in one 
cloth, and contracts all souls into one mood — irresponsibility. For the 
soldier's life is so arranged that the only thing to do is to be irre- 
sponsible. His food, shelter, and clothing are provided for him. He 
has no voice in matters of the most intimate and personal activity. 
He can do nothing of his own volition. The shape of his shoes, the 
color of his hat-cord, the size of his necktie, and the place of his bed 
are regulated and determined for him. He lives a life where the will 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 241 

has no meaning and where thought and initiative are not only not 
demanded but suppressed. He is a nearer approach to an animate tool 
acting under response to external stimuli than any other human con- 
trivance. 

This reduction of the individual variant is not only in things material 
but in things spiritual as well. Not only do soldiers look alike, but 
to an extraordinary degree they think and feel alike, and about the 
same things. In civil life each individual is constantly called upon to 
exercise initiative in the solution of problems peculiar to himself — 
which involve personal responsibility. But in the army the problem 
and the situation are very much alike for each man. It is the problem 
of finding some medium of creative individual expression inside a 
system that strives to mold all character and all thought into a single 
formula and into a single type — a type capable of acting without 
hesitation to certain given and purely external stimuli having little or 
no correlation within the experiences of the men themselves. 

These paragraphs illustrate the point of view from which 
Mr. Tannenbaum's criticisms of social work in the army are 
directed. He has obviously a delicate appreciation of those 
values of human personality which depend upon personal in- 
dividuality and upon the capacity and freedom to embody that 
individuality in acts of self-expression of a creative kind. He 
finds that the social work as carried on in the army did little 
to promote these values — to further this kind of self-expres- 
sion and to expand and develop spiritual responsibility. At 
the same time in the camps he came into contact with a wide- 
spread attitude extremely offensive to a man sensitive to the 
higher moral values, an attitude indeed fundamentally hostile 
to them, as he rightly believes. His observations on the psy- 
chology of the average soldier are penetrating : 

It is no exaggeration to say that practically every soldier gambles. 
There is no other activity that is so popular or that seems so satis- 
factory. Gambling has many forms, but the shooting of dice (craps) 
is the most popular. "Crap-shooting" for money is prohibited in the 
army, and in my camp there has just been issued an order increasing the 
penalty. But that is the one rule that no one obeys. It is played every- 
where and on all occasions. I have seen men on the drill-field given 
a few minutes' rest take dice from their pockets and start a game. At 
night when the lights are out, they will crouch around a candle shielded 



242 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

from observation, and stretched on the floor, or straight on their 
stomachs, with bated breath and flushed faces, either as participants or 
observers, spend hours at the game. . . . 

The soldier is very much concerned about woman. Just as gam- 
bhng is one of the serious occupations of the soldier, so is the search 
after woman one of the great games he plays. It is the game of a 
huntsman, and like a good hunter he displays persistence, energy, 
avidit}', and resourcefulness in the chase. And generally speaking, this 
activity in the pursuit of woman is not in vain, for by and large 
practically every soldier who participates in this activity — and a 
very large majority do — finds his efforts rewarded. And in this 
process, he reduces all social institutions within his reach from the 
church to the gambling-house to an instrument for his end, and does so 
deliberately. . . . The interesting thing is the soldier's attitude toward 
woman as that attitude is affected by his life in camp and the narrow 
outlets which it forces upon him. This attitude is unexpected. It is 
the attitude of the scientist. It is an attitude shorn of modesty, morals, 
sentiment, and subjectivity. It is immodest, unmoral, objective, evaluat- 
ing, and experimental. Men will sit till late at night in a darkened 
tent, or lie on their cots, their faces covered with the pale glow of a 
tent-stove that burns red on cold nights, and talk about women, — but 
this talk is of the physical rather than the emotional, of the types, the 
reactions, the temperaments, the differences and the peculiarities of 
moral concepts, the degrees of perversity, the physical reactions, the 
methods of approach — in fact, as if it were a problem in physics rather 
than morals. 

The lack of personal interest, the freedom from care, the absence of 
the restraint of family and association, the close intimacy with men 
to the exclusion of women, accentuates the interest of and the craving 
for woman. This craving for the escape from an unnatural and dis- 
satisfying condition lacks, however, most of those sentimental and 
affectional aspects which we consider a normal consequence to the 
intimacy between man and woman. It is an expression of physical 
hunger desiring physical satiation. It is very much akin to the craving 
for food by a hungry man, and is talked about in terms applicable to 
food-hunger, food-acquisition, and food-satisfying qualities. 

These observations, acute as they are, represent the reactions 
of a sensitive and finely-grained man against average human 
nature as it exists in the rough, and roughened still more by 
the elemental conditions of camp life. They present a picture, 
however, of just the attitudes and conditions which the program 
of social work in the army was designed to combat. In so far 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 243 

as such things continued to exist, they showed thaf that work 
had not achieved its end; and that they did continue to be 
widely prevalent, no one with any knowledge of camp and of 
soldiers can doubt for a moment. But it is questionable whether 
we are justified in concluding from this that social work in the 
army was a failure. Mr. Tannenbaum's criticism is that such 
work failed to " provide an imaginative and convincing inter- 
pretation of world-forces," and failed to supply channels of 
individual self-expression to protect the creative side of person- 
ality against the leveling influences of army life. Admitting 
this and admitting also the prevalence through the army of 
many of the cruder forms of dissipation and vice, we are by no 
means driven to his sweeping conclusion. In the first place it 
may be doubted whether there is any strong craving or any 
capacity for that form of creative self-expression of which he 
speaks among the bulk of the civilian population. The average 
man's demands are less spiritualized. And in the second place 
it must be remembered that among large portions of the civilian 
population the vices by which he was offended are common 
and frequent. To expect social work to eradicate these vices 
in the army, or even to eradicate them below the point at which 
they exist in civil life, would be to demand the impossible. 
Even if they increased in the army greatly beyond their usual 
prevalence among civilians, it would by no means follow that 
army social work had not been successful. If that work served 
at all to hold such things in check, to prevent their expanding 
to tne proportions to which they might have expanded in the 
absence of social work, a great deal would have been accom- 
plished. Social work in the camps could hardly be expected to 
raise the moral tone of soldiers above that of civilians ; it could 
hardly even be expected to maintain it at the civilian level. 
What could be expected was the maintenance of a higher moral 
level among the soldiers than would otherwise have been possi- 
ble; and that that much was accomplished there can hardly be 
any doubt. 

In considering a question of this kind, it has to be remem- 



244 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

bered that an army is made up of all sorts of men. Many ol 
them are drawn from classes of the community where, owing to 
some of the tendencies of modem life, few of those social 
restraints of a domestic and religious character are operative 
even under peace conditions which the social worker depends 
on to check dissipation and profligacy. On the other hand the 
draft drew into the mass of the army many sensitive emotional 
spirits to whom the simple diversions, — the " little things," as 
Mr. Tannenbaum calls them — afforded by the social program 
supplied no substitute for the more delicate and creative forms 
of self-expression which they craved. The probabilities are 
that neither of these two classes v^as much affected by such 
social work as there was. But between these two, there was 
certainly a large middle class of young men from fair home 
surroundjngs who craved not opportunities for self-expression 
but some substitute, however inadequate, for the simple com- 
forts and diversions which they had left behind. Many of 
these men, turned loose from the watchful eye of neighbors 
and presented with exciting opportunities for license, no doubt 
gave way to the instincts of youth and slipped down to the level 
of their less carefully nurtured comrades in arms. There can 
hardly be any doubt of that. But on the other hand there must 
have been thousands whose inbred instincts and inhibitions were 
fortified by the supply of normal ways to employ their leisure, 
by the presence of the normal diversions to which they had 
been accustomed, athletics, movies, and magazines, and who 
accordingly were not influenced nearly so strongly by the temp- 
tations incident to their new and strange way of life. It was 
in reaching these men that the social program for the army did 
its work. ^ . 

In view of the criticisms of social work in the army from this 
point of view, it is interesting to turn to criticisms of another 
sort, based on other grounds and coming from an entirely differ- 
ent source. The following paragraphs are from an article en- 
titled " Mollycoddling the Army," written by a veteran of the 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 245 

Spanish-American War, and published in the " Infantry 
Journal." His point of view is as widely removed as possible 
from that of Mr. Tannenbaum : 

" Just at present enough well-meaning and earnest folk to 
fill about one thousand open-air lecture-grounds are obsessing 
themselves with the idea that unless the American army is 
thoroughly mollycoddled the world won't be safer for democracy 
than a bottle of rum is if found in transit through Idaho ; and 
they are working overtime to turn a perfectly good husky, built 
and geared for a scrap, into a little Lord Fauntleroy, preparing 
for an evening's entertainment in the nursery. If all of the 
misdirected energy that is being wasted on plans to rescue the 
morals of the young fighter and protect his throat, chest, indi- 
gestion, and home-cooking appetite from ruin were devoted to 
providing the essential things for a real army, the aggregation 
that followed old man Xerxes over the plains would look like 
the Salvation Army compared to the Army of Freedom, and 
the Boche would be sending out distress calls in advance." 
W'hen the boys marched away to the Spanish War " nobody 
sent the fellows in motor-cars, nobody came with garlands of 
flowers and extra blankets and shoes, and advice on the subject 
of avoiding either the wine or the lips when they are red. It 
was just a plain he aggregation of lads who were ready to 
shoulder rifles and do a hitch under the flag. . . . 

" There was n't a welfare league, a Gospel tent, or a ladies' 
investigating society for the protection of the young in a thou- 
sand miles, but across the road a Dutchman had a joint where 
a busted phonograph wailed ' Because I love you/ and the 
waiters made it mostly foam. 

" And did these lads pale and die for want of welfare atten- 
tion ? 

" Not so you could notice it. They followed the trail of the 
Star of Empire out to the coast, navigated the Barbary Coast 
without losing a man or a moral idea, swept through Chinatown 
in its most hilarious days without a nurse, and then made the 



246 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Honolulu shoals, the temptations of Manila, the allurements of 
Nagasaki, and the native jungles without so much as a dent in 
the fineness of the fiber of the men who wore the uniform. 

" The army is n't now and never was and never will be a 
breeding-place for physical, moral, or mental evils. Many a 
man who might take a chance in civil life on improper conduct 
is ashamed to do it in the light of association with other men 
who know his every act. The service is a character-builder, 
not a destroyer of character. It strengthens the weak and it 
makes the strong stronger. It makes for self-reliance and 
for honor. It has been the greatest ladder upon which man- 
kind ever climbed from obscurity to fame and honor." °^ 

By way of summarizing these two criticisms from opposite 
angles, it may be said that probably what Mr. Tannebaum 
desired to see accomplished was humanly impossible of accom- 
plishment; and that where j\Ir. Fry desired to see nothing at 
all done, circumstances demanded imperatively that some action 
be taken. The social program actually attempted fell some- 
where between two extremes; it was meant to meet the needs 
of average men so far as was possible; and it can hardly be 
doubted that it did meet and satisfy them to a valuable degree. 

^" Geor.2fe T. Fry, " Mollycoddling the Army," " Infantry Journal," 
April, 1918; p. 752. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 



IN 1 90 1 a volume was published by the War Department 
entitled " A Legislative History of the General Staff of the 
United States." ^ On examination it proves to be a compila- 
tion of laws relating to ten separate and independent bureaus 
of the War Department, namely the adjutant-general's depart- 
ment, the inspector-general's department, the judge-advocate 
general's department, the quartermaster's department, the 
subsistence department, the medical department, the pay depart- 
ment, the engineers' corps, the ordnance department, and the 
signal corps. These departments were collectively known as 
the " general staff," and were so designated in the annual 
appropriation acts for the support of the army.^ Each of the 
bureaus was directly subject to the authority and supervision 
of the secretary of war; other coordination there was none 
between them. 

In the second place it will be observed that of these bureaus 
all performed services of an administrative character. If to- 
gether they made up in a loose way a kind of general staff, it 
was a general staff which had nothing to do with problems of 
purely military policy, but which independently, each bureau in 
its own way, attended to one or another side of army adminis- 
tration — procurement of supplies, finance, health, alimenta- 

1 Compiled under the direction of Major-General Henry C. Corbin, 
adjutant-general of the army, by Raphael P. Thian, chief clerk, 
adjutant-general's office, Government Printing-Office, Washington, 1901. 

2 See, for instance, the acts of 1894 and 1895, 28 Statutes at Large, 

233, 655. 

247 



248 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

tion, and the like. Military policy, on the other hand, was in 
theory at least supposed to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
" commanding general of the army," an officer with vague 
powers and responsible not to the secretary of war, but directly 
to the President. The situation was thus summarized by Sec- 
retary Root : " Our old plan of army administration was that 
there should be a general commanding the army in peace as 
well as war, responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and con- 
duct of the troops, but having no control over finances or the 
departments of supply and transportation ; and that there 
should be a secretary of war controlling the finances and the 
money-spending bureaus, but not commanding the army or 
responsible for the conduct of purely military affairs," ^ 
■; In short, there was a divided control of the army between 
a civilian secretary and a military commanding general ; and the 
result was " almost constant discord and a consequent reduc- 
tion of efficiency." ^ " Because Congress has always looked to 
the civilian secretary at the head of the War Department to 
hold the purse-strings, the laws require all the great depart- 
ments which build the fortifications and furnish the arms, 
supplies, and munitions of war and actually expend the money 
for those purposes ... to act under the direction of the sec- 
retary, and withhold from the officer who is called ' command- 
ing general of the army ' all control over those departments. 
This way of treating the expenditure of money is an expres- 
sion of the ingrained tendency of the American people to 
insist upon civilian control of the military arm. . . . One 
result is that the officer who is called ' commanding general of 
the army ' cannot in time of peace really exercise any substan- 
tial power at all unless he acts in conformity to the policy and 
views of the secretary of war, acting under the direction of the 
President ; that is to say, he cannot exercise any independent 
command ; and this must always be, so long as the secretary 

^ Report of secretary of war, 1903. in " Five Years of the War 
Department," being the annual reports of Secretary Root, 1899-1903, 
p. 330. 

* Ibid. 



I THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY S49 

of war performs the duties which are imposed upon him by 
> law and which are essential to the maintenance of civilian 
' control over the military establishment. It was the inability to 
* exercise the power which the title of ' commanding general of 
the army ' appears to carry with it, but which does not really 
exist, that led General Scott to leave Washington and estab- 
lish his headquarters in New York, and General Sherman to 
remove to St. Louis, both of them abandoning the attempt to 
do anything in connection with the administration of the army 
in Washington, and this difficulty has been the cause of almost 
constant conflict and bitter feeling in the administration of the 
army for the past fifty years to the very great inj-ury of the 
service and very great loss of efficiency.."^ e 

The divorce of what staff existed from the military side of 
the army and its attachment to purely civilian administration 
resulted in the non-existence in our army of an institution 
which has come to be the central core of most of the great 
army organizations in the world — namely a general staff corps 
whose function is to plan and prepare for the execution of 
military policy. " In Prussia the term [general staff] has been 
exclusively applied, since about 1789, to a body of officers 
to whom, as assistants to the commanding general and his 
subordinate generals, is confided such work as is directly 
connected with the designing and execution of military opera- 
tions. That, in Germany as well as elsewhere, chiefs of 
special arms, heads of supply departments, judge-advocates, 
etc., form an important branch of the higher commands, goes 
without saying, but they are not included in the term ' general 
staff.' Clausewitz's dictum that the general staff is intended 
to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, 
not only by communicating them to troops, but rather by work- 
ing out all matters of detail, and thus relieving the general 
from a vast amount of unnecessary labor, is not a sufficient 
definition of general staff duties according to Von Schellendoff 
(upon this question certainly the better authority), as it fails 

5 Secretary Root, annual report for 1902, op. cit.; p. 298. 



250 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

to notice the important obligation of the general staff officer 
of constantly watching over the effectiveness of troops which 
would be impaired by a lack of attention to their material wel- 
fare. Out of this obligation grows, he says, the further duty 
of furnishing to the heads of the supply departments and other 
officers attached to headquarters such explanations touching the 
general military situation, or the effect of a sudden change 
therein, as will enable them to carry out intelligently what is 
expected of them. The general staff thus becomes a directing 
and explaining body. ... It follows that of the two terms 
* staff ' and ' general staff,' the Germans regard the former as 
the more comprehensive one and as embracing the latter. It 
is conceded on all hands that the almost phenomenal success 
which has attended the German [Prussian] arms during the 
last thirty years is due in a large degree to the corps of 
highly trained general staff officers which the German army 
possesses." '^ 

The American army at the time of the Spanish War 
possessed no element remotely corresponding to such a general 
staff or performing its functions. Those functions, so far as 
they were regarded at all, fell within the province of the 
" commanding- general." But obviously they were not func- 
tions which could be effectively performed by any one man. 
Commenting on the experience of the Spanish War, Secretary 
Root wrote : 

Our system makes no adequate provision for the directing brain 
which every army must have to work successfully. Common ex- 
perience has shown that this cannot be furnished by any single man 
without assistants, and that it requires a body of officers working to- 
gether under the direction of a chief and entirely separate and inde- 
pendent from the administrative staff of an army. This body of ofiicers 
in distinction from the administrative staff, has come to be called 
a general staff. . . . 

The duties of such a body of officers can be illustrated by taking for 

^ General Theodore Schwan, quoted by Secretary Root in his annual 
report for 1002, op. cit.; p. 293. For an account of the German general 
staff in the nineties see Spenser Wilkinson, "The Brain of an Army," 
new edition, Westminister, 1895. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 251 

example an invasion of Cuba such as we were all thinking about 
a few years ago. It is easy for a President, or a general acting under 
his direction, to order that 50,000 or 100,000 men proceed to Cuba and 
capture Havana. To make an order which has any reasonable chance 
of being executed he must do a great deal more than that. He must 
determine how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided 
among the different arms of the service, and how they shall be armed 
and equipped, and to do that he must get all information possible 
about the defenses of the place to be captured and the strength and 
character and armament of the forces to be met. He must determine 
at what points and by what routes the place shall be approached, and 
at what points his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he 
must be informed about the various harbors of the island and the 
depth of their channels ; what classes of vessels can enter them ; what 
the facilities for landing are ; how they are defended ; the character 
of the roads leading from them to the place to be attacked ; the char- 
acter of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealth- 
ful; what the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed 
movement ; the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants ; the quan- 
tity and kind of supplies that can be obtained from the country; the 
extent to which transportation can be obtained ; and a great variety of 
other things which will go to determine what will be necessary for 
the army to carry with it in order to succeed in moving and living 
and fighting. 

All this information it is the business of a general staff to procure 
and present. It is probable that there would be in such a case a 
number of alternative plans, each having certain advantages and dis- 
advantages, and these should be worked out, each by itself, with the 
reasons for and against it, and presented to the President or general 
for his determination. This the general staff should do. This can 
not be done in an hour. It requires that the staff should have been at 
work for a long time collecting the information and arranging it, and 
getting it in form to present. Then at home, where the preparation 
for the expedition is to be made, the order must be based upon a 
knowledge of the men and material available for its execution; how 
many men there are who can be devoted to that purpose, from what 
points they are to be drawn, what bodies of troops ought to be left 
or sent elsewhere, and what bodies may be included in the proposed 
expedition; whether there are ships enough to transport them; where 
they are to be obtained; whether they are properly fitted up; what 
more should be done to them ; what are the available stocks of cloth- 
ing, arms and ammunition and engineers' material, and horses and 
wagons, and all the innumerable supplies and munitions necessary for 
a large expedition; how the things are to be supplied which are not 



252 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ready but which are necessary, and how long a time will be required 
to supply them. 

All this and much more necessary information it is the business of 
a general staff to supply. When that has been done, the order is made 
with all available knowledge of all the circumstances upon which the 
movement depends for success. It is then the business of a general 
staff to see that every separate officer upon whose action the success 
of the movement depends understands his share in it and does not 
lag behind in the performance of that share; to see that troops and 
ships and animals and supplies of arms and ammunition and clothing 
and food, etc., from hundreds of sources, come together at the right 
times and places. It is a laborious, complicated, and difficult work, 
which requires a considerable number of men whose special business 
it is, and who arc charged with no other duties. 

It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of work 
which led to the confusion attending the Santiago expedition in the 
summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa and elsewhere was the 
necessary result of having a large number of men, each of them doing 
his own special work as best he could, but without any adequate force 
of officers engaged in seeing that they pulled together according to 
detailed plans made beforehand. Such a body of men, doing general 
staff duty, is just as necessary to prepare an army properly for war 
in time of peace as it is in time of war. It is not an executive body; 
it is not an administrative body; it acts only through the authority 
of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procuring and 
rearranging information and working out plans in detail, and it makes 
intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by keeping 
all the separate agents advised of the part they are to play in the 
general scheme.'^ 

/ In short the Spanish War demonstrated effectively the need 
for a general staff, and it showed that need in two directions; 
in the first place, the need for a central planning body, and 
in the second place, the need for some central body to supervise 
and coordinate the operations of otherwise independent army 
departments. The latter need was especially pres.sing because 
of the status of the various bureaus and departments which, 
as we saw, were called collectively the staff corps. Those 
organizations were wholly separate and distinct from one 
another except in so far as all were subject to the common 

"^ Secretary Root in annual report for 1902, op. cit.; pp. 293 ff. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 6353 

authority of the secretary of war. Furthermore, as a group, 
they were separate and distinct from the rest of the army — 
" the bureaus forming the whole of the administrative branch 
of the miHtary estabHshment being each and all subject to the 
direction and control of the secretary of war, and not at all, 
except in certain contingencies, expressly provided for by law, 
to the army." ^ This distinctness and independence of the 
stafif bureaus was greatly enhanced by the fact that the appoint- 
ment of officers to service in them was permanent; and chiefs 
of bureaus could not be removed from their posts by even the 
secretary of war.^ 

The permanent tenure of the officers serving with the staflf 
departments was the subject of criticism on two grounds. In 
the first place it tended to solidify each of those departments 
into a compact bureaucracy preserving its own unbroken tradi- 
tions of routine and exaggerating the independence of the 
bureaus from each other and from the rest of the army. 
Secondly, it made it impossible for more than a very limited 
nunAer of officers to acquire any knowledge or experience of 
the important administrative and supply functions; and those 
who did acquire such experience acquired it only in the narrow 
field of the bureau to which they were attached. The bad 
results of this arrangement became evident during the Spanish 
War. " Our experience in that war brought the War Depart- 
ment face to face with the fact that few officers of the regular 
service had knowledge of the problems of subsistence, clothing, 
equipment, transportation, sanitation, the vast and complicated 
business of supplying and transporting an army, caring for the 
health and strength of the men — matters which require pre- 
vious training and experience. The policy had been followed 
that the country relied for its main strength upon volunteers 
who, when called into the service, brought but little of the 
knowledge and experience necessary to these important func- 

^ Ingersoll, "History of the War Department"; p. 315. 
''Report of chief of stafif for 1916, War Department, "Annual Rq- 
port," 1916; Vol. I, p. 176. 



254 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

tions. So, having in view the special duties to be performed 
by regular officers, not only in connection with their own 
affairs, but with militia and volunteers, the then secretary of 
war (Mr. Root) felt very urgently the necessity of substituting 
a system of details from the line in place of the, at that time, 
permanent staff and supply departments so as to provide for 
the training of as many officers as possible in the variety of 
experience which would fit them for the duties of the staff and 
the combined service of regulars, militia, and volunteers." ^° 
A further objection to the system of independent bureaus 
was the wastefulness implicit in a decentralized system of 
purchase and supply. Each of the bureaus made its own pur- 
chases in the open market, and in the hurry and scarcity which 
accompany a state of war, this led to competitive bidding 
among the bureaus against each other, resulting in increased 
cost to the Government, and to the building up of separate 
reserve supplies by each which would have been unnecessary 
had every bureau been able to draw upon a common reserve. 
This again was clearly shown during the Spanish War. " Once 
the expenditures of the various departments began, one of the 
most glaring evils of our supply system was carried to its 
utmost limit, and the duplication of purchases resulted in an 
enormous surplus of supplies for which there existed no de- 
mand and which were disposed of for a trifle by condemnation 
shortly after the close of the war. We have no general supply 
department for the army, and the supplies of the engineer, 
ordnance, medical, and signal corps are bought by each one in- 
dependently of the others and of the quartermaster department 
in spite of the fact that many of the supplies are of the same 
kind in all the departments." ^^ This led Secretary Root to 
say in his annual report for 1901 : " I am satisfied that the 
division of the supply departments into separate bodies acting 

1° Report of chief of staflf, War Department, " Annual Report," 1916 ; 
Vol. I, p. 169. See Secretary Root's report for 1900, op. cit.; p. 139. 

^^ Huidekoper, "Military Unprcparedness of the United States"; p. 
204. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 255 

independently of dach other, and each responsible only to a 
civilian secretary of war, is a bad arrangement, resulting often 
h confusion, in unnecessary expenditure of money, in increase 
of paper-work, and making it difficult to fix responsibility. 
The quartermaster's, commissary, and pay departments should 
be consolidated under such provisions regarding the present 
permanent officers in those departments as shall secure them 
against injustice." ^^ 

2 

In short, the defects in the central mechanism of army organ- 
ization, as they stood revealed in the opening years of the 
twentieth century, may be summarized as folfows. 

(i) The absence of connection between the stafif bureaus 
and the army proper. 

(2) The absence of any central agency for the formulation 
of a general military policy, for working out the details 
of a military program, and for the accumulation of 
military information. 

(3) As one of the causes of the foregoing, the permanent 
assignment of officers to staff duty. 

(4) The lack of coordination between the various staff 
bureaus. 

(5) As an incident of the foregoing, the wastefulness of a 
decentralized system of purchase and supply. 

The correction of these defects was the object of some of 
the most important legislation carried through by Mr. Root 
during his service as secretary o-f war. Defect No. 2 was 
sought to be remedied by the act of February 14, 1903, creat- 
ing a general staff. Defects No. i and No. 3 were struck at 
by the legislation of February 2, 1901, providing for the aboli- 
tion of permanent appointments to staff duty. Defect No. 5 
found a partial and belated remedy in the act of August 24, 
1912, consolidating the quartermaster's, commissary, and pay 
departments. The two statutes first mentioned will be briefly 
reviewed in the order of their* enactment. 

12 Annual report for igoi, op. cit.; p. 166. 



256 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The act of February 2, 1901, did not disturb the permanent 
tenure of officers already permanently assigned to duty with 
staff corps under the old system, — this was felt to be required 
by justice to the officers so assigned ; but the act provided that 
" when any vacancy in such stafT department or corps shall 
occur which can not be filled by promotion, it shall be filled 
by detail from the line of the army, and no more permanent 
appointments shall be made in those departments or corps after 
the original vacancies created by this act shall have been 
filled. . . . All officers so detailed shall serve for a period of 
four years, at the expiration of which time they shall return to 
duty with the line, and ofificers below the rank of lieutenant- 
colonel shall not again be eligible for service in any staflf 
department until they have served two years with the line." ^^ 

" The workings of the law have proved satisfactory in every 
respect," the chief of staff reported in 1916. One provision, 
however, contained latent possibilities of inconvenience. This 
was the requirement that so long as any officers holding per- 
manent appointments remained in service in the stafif corps, 
the chief of the corps must be selected from among them. 
" As the number of permanent stafif officers is steadily decreas- 
ing, a condition will soon arise when selections for the position 
of chief must be made from a small number, and thus limit 
the range of selection." This was the more important as 
" chiefs of bureau can not be removed by the secretary of war, 
whereas in the interest of efficient military administration they 
should be as easily removed as is a chief of staff. The associa- 
tion of the permanent officers of the staff corps with the line 
is, in most cases, limited to inspections, reading of reports, etc., 
whereas every officer of the permanent stafif should be in close 
touch with the sentiments and needs of the line. There would 
result better cooperation and increased efficiency." " 

General Leonard Wood expressed his approval of the work- 

13 30 Statutes at Large ; p. 748 ; Section 26. 

1* Report of chief of staff, 1916, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1916; Vol. I, P-. 170. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 257 

ings of the Detached Service Act in his report as chief of staff 
for 1913. He said: 

The staff corps are vastly more efficient as a result of the detail 
for duty therein of officers fresh from duty with troops. In my opin- 
ion no legislation of recent years with the possible exception of that 
establishing the general staff has been of more benefit to the army 
man than that establishing the detail system. ... It is true that an 
officer recently detailed from troops may be somewhat less familiar 
with the purely clerical features of the paper-work of his department, 
but his practical knowledge of the needs of troops is so much greater 
and his appreciation of the conditions under which they are living is 
so much keener that he is a more efficient officer when measured by 
the standards which require thorough personal knowledge of what the 
army is really doing and what it needs. . . . Officers permanently de- 
tached from troops eventually lose touch with their needs, and the 
paper side of the army little by little replaces the soldier to promote 
whose efficiency the staff corps are maintained. ^^ 

In short, the aim of this legislation was to establish a living 
connection between the staff and the line through a continuous 
interchange of personnel between them rather than through 
the more mechanical device of common supervision. How- 
ever desirable the latter, it could only be ma.de really effective 
on the basis of the former. 

A beginning toward the coordination of the entire army into 
a single unit under centralized supervision was maxie by the 
passage of the act of February 14, 1903, creating a general 
staff corps, " to be composed of officers detailed from the army 
at large under such rules as may be prescribed by the Pres- 
ident/' 

Section 2 provided : 

The duties of the general staff corps shall be to prepare plans for 
the national defense? and for the mobilization of the military forces 
in time of. war; to investigate and rep'ort upon all questions affecting 
the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military 
operations ; to render professional aid and assistance to the secretary 

^5 Report of chief of staff, 1913, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1913; Vol. I, p. 15^ 



258 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of war and to general officers anrt other superior commanders and 
to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of 
all the different officers who are subject under the terms of this act 
to the supervision of the chief of staff; and to perform such other 
military dlities not otherwise assigned by law as may from time to 
time be prescribed by the President. 

Section 3 provided that the general staff corps was to consist 
of a chief of staff and forty-four officers.^*' 

All officers detailed in the general staff corps shall be detailed 
therein for periods of four years unless sooner relieved. While serv- 
ing in the general staff corps, officers may be temporarily assigned 
to duty with any branch of the army-. Upon being reliev'ed from duty 
in the general staff corps, officers shall return to the branch of the 
army in which they hold permanent commission, and no officer shall 
be eligible to a further detail in the general staff corps until he shall 
have served two years with the "branch of the army in which he is 
commissioned, except in case of emergency, or in time of war. 

Section 4 provided : 

The chief of staff under the direction of the President, or of the 
secretary of war under the direction of the President, shall have 
supervision of all troops of the line, and of the adjutant-general's, 
inspector-general's, judge-advocate's, quartermaster's, subsistence, 
medical, pay, and ordnance department, the corps of engineers, and 
the signal corps, and shall perform such other military duties not 
otherwise assigned by law as shall be assigned to him by the 
President.!^ 

The second section of the act thus aimed to create in the 
general staff that central agency for planning and for the ac- 
cumulation of military information the lack of which had been 
referred to in Secretary Root's report quoted above. The 
fourth section of the act was designed to establish the general 
staff as a coordinating and correlating body between the var- 

1*5 Increased to forty-five by addition of chief of artillery, ex officio, 
act of February 2, 1907. 
IT" 32 Statutes at Large, pp. 83 ff. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 259 

ious staff bureaus and between the staff bureaus on one hand 
and the hne of the army on the other. The latter result was 
to be achieved, however, through " supervision " ; in Secretary 
Root's words, the staff was not to be " an executive body ; it 
is not an administrative body ; it acts only through the authority 
of others. It makes intelligent command possible by procur- 
ing and rearranging information, and working out plans in 
detail ; and it makes intelligent and effective execution of com- 
mands possible by keeping all the separate agents advised of 
the part they are to play in the general scheme." ^^ 

The act abolished the position of commanding general of 
the army, the place of this officer being filled under the new 
arrangement by the chief of staff. This put an end to the 
constant friction and ill-feeling which had for years been en- 
gendered by the bestowal of the title without the legal or actual 
power to command. Under the new law, the chief of staff was 
simply chief military adviser to the President, aided in his 
deliberations and conclusions by the general staff. 

The general staff fell roughly into two parts, the War De- 
partment general staff, consisting of staff officers on duty in 
Washington, and the general staff serving with troops, i.e., 
staff officers assigned to duty with the commanders of various 
geographical divisions and departments. The War Depart- 
ment general staff was organized into three sections, the first 
dealing with problems of general army administration, the 
second with the collection and distribution of military informa- 
tion, and the third with questions affecting the technical 
services, military education, and plans of campaign.^^ The 
second and third sections were consolidated by an order of the 
chief of staff of June 2'j, 1908.-*^ The functions of these sec- 
tions can be seen from Secretary Taft's review of the work of 

18 Above, p. 252. 

1^ Captain Rhodes in his Gold Medal Prize Essay, quoted in Huide- 
koper, op. cit.; p. 294. 

20 "Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Memoranda relating to the Gem 
era! Staff Corps," Government Printing-Office, 1912; p. 17. 



26o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the War Department general staff during the first year of its 
existence : 

Besides aiding the secretary of war as contemplated by law in 
the administration of current business, it has made important revisions 
during the year of existing regulations, orders, and manuals governing 
the instruction and administration of the army. In consultation with 
the chiefs of staff bureaus in the War Department, it has completed 
a revision of the Articles of War to be submitted to Congress for 
adoption, and of the general regulations of the army. It has revised 
the drill regulations for infantry, and the orders governing military 
education in the army and at military colleges, and has now in course 
of preparation field service regulations for the government of troops 
in the field, and at peace manoeuvers. It has further systematized and 
developed the military information division, to which has been trans- 
ferred the W^ar Department library and the distribution of War De- 
partment publications. In addition it has made some progress in ad- 
vance of the establishment of the War College in the important duty 
imposed by statute on the general staff of preparing plans for the 
national defense and for the mobilization of the military forces of the 
country in time of war. The volume of work done has been very 
great, and substantially all the subjects placed by statute or the regula- 
tions of the President have been considered during the year.21 

The general staff prepared and published during following 
years numerous compilations of regulations and instructions, 
manuals, and treatises. By general order of August 15, 1903, 
the Army War College, for the establishment of which pro- 
vision had been made two years before, was transferred to 
the general stafif.-^ The latter body was also made the channel 
of communication with militarv attaches abroad. Two new 
sections were subsequently added to the general stafF — the 
coast artillery division and the division of militia affairs.^' 
The latter organization, to which reference has been made in 
an earlier chapter, was created as a consequence of the Militia 
Act of 1908, and was charged with coordinating the National 
Guard organizations which received Federal aid with the rest 

21 Report of the secretary of war for 1914, War Department, "An- 
nual Report," 1904; Vol. i, p. 19. 

22 " Laws, Regulations, etc. " ; p. 4. 
23 //nW.; p. 19. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 261 

of the military establishment. The organization of the general 
staff as described in a memorandum '^^ of September 26, 1910. 
was as follows : 

( 1 ) Mobile army division : 

All matters pertaining to personnel and material of 
the mobile forces and such other subjects as are not 
otherwise assigned. 

(2) War College division: 

(a) Collection and distribution of military informa- 

tion ; War Department library ; preparation of 
non-technical manuals ; direction and coordina- 
tion of military education ; plans for field man- 
ceuvers ; collation and discussion of all obtain- 
able data relating to strategical, tactical, and 
logistic features of future military operations, 
and formation of complete working plans for 
passing from state of peace to state of war. 

(b) The Army War College. 

(3) Coast artillery division: 

•\11 matters pertaining to the personnel and materiel 
of the coast artillery forces. 

(4) Division of militia affairs: 

All matters pertaining to the organized militia. 

3 

From this summary it will be observed that in accordance 
with the second section of the act of 1903 the general staff had 
developed into an elaborate agency for the gathering of mili- 
tary information and for the planning of military policy. To 
what extent was it coordinating the activities of the various 
branches of the army and thereby remedying the defects of 
the system of independent bureaus of which Secretary Root 
had so often spoken and which he had so keenly felt? This 
question raises at once the further question of the supervisory 
power of the general staff and of the legal channels open to it 

^*Ibid.; p. 18. 



262 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

for exercising that power. The following view df its position 
is set forth in the army regulations : 

" The command of the army of the United States rests with 
the constitutional commander-in-chief, the President. . . . 
Under ordinary conditions the administration and control of 
the army are effected without any second in command. The 
President's command is exercised through the secretary of war 
and the chief of staff, . . . The chief of staff reports to the 
secretary of war, acts as his military adviser, receives from 
him the directions and orders given in behalf of the President, 
and gives effect thereto in the manner hereinafter provided. 
For purposes of administration, the office of the chief of 
staff will constitute a supervising military bureau of the War | 
Department. . . , The chief of staff is charged with the duty 
of supervising, under the direction of the secretary of war, all 
troops of the line, the adjutant-general's, inspector-general's, 
judge-advocate general's, quartermaster's, subsistence, medical, 
pay, ordnance departments, the corps of engineers, and the 
signal corps. . . . The supervisory power -v^ested by statute in 
the chief of staff covers primarily duties pertaining to the 
command, discipline, training, and recruitment of the army, 
military operations, distribution of troops, inspections, arma- 
ment, fortifications, and kindred matters, but includes also, in 
an advisory capacity, such duties connected with fiscal adminis- 
tration and supply as are committed to him by the secretary of 
war. In respect to all duties within the scope of his super- 
visory power, he makes and causes to be made inspections to 
determine defects which may exist in any matter affecting the 
efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for war. Ht 
keeps the secretary of war constantly informed of defects dis- 
covered, and under his direction issues instructions, and exer- 
cises all other functions necessary to secure proper harmony 
and efficiency of action upon the part of those placed under his 
supervision. All orders and instructions emanating from the 
War Department and all regulations affecting the army and the 
status of officers and enlisted men therein are issued by the 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 263 

secretary of war through the chief of staff, and are communi- 
cated to troops and individuals in the mihtary service through 
the adjutant-general of the army." 

What was the nature of the supervisory power of the chief 
of staff and of his authority to advise the secretary of v»^ar? 
What was the extent of his power to issue regulations, orders, 
and instructions? This early became a point of difference 
between the bureaus on one side and the general staff on the 
other, and it is doubtful whether the question has yet been 
permanently settled. 

Admittedly, the chief of staff had no authority of his own to 
interfere in any way with the bureaus or issue instructions to 
them. The general staff was not a "source of command" ; it 
could act only, as Mr. Root put it, through the authority of 
others. On the other hand the bureaus were admittedly sub- 
ject to the secretary of war ; and the chief of staff was legally 
required to make reports to the secretary of war and to 
render professional advice and assistance to him. Was the 
secretary thereby justified in making the chief of staff the inter- 
mediary for his dealings with the bureaus? There is lan- 
guage of Mr. Root's which seems to indicate the opinion that he 
was ; although in such a case the authority exercised by the 
chief of staff would still be the authority of the secretary. 
If it might appear, however, that such a procedure amounted 
to an illegal delegation of power by the secretary, it still seems 
clear that under the supervisory authority conferred by the 
act, the chief of staff could investigate any matter pertain- 
ing to a bureau and advise the secretary with reference to 
it ; and the secretary was in such a case free to follow the 
advice of the chief of staff. This in fact seems to have 
been the intention of Mr. Root, and presumably of Congress, 
as to the way in which the general staff should function. No 
illegal delegation of power would be involved, because the 
secretary would preserve his discretion ; there would be no 
exercise of command by the general staff ; the latter body 
would be acting simply by procuring information and pre- 



264 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

senting it to the secretary of war. On the other hand, if 
the secretary was thus free to consult with the chief of 
staff and receive recommendations from the latter regarding 
the internal organization and policy of the bureaus, the old- 
time autonomy and independence of these bodies would virtually 
be gone. They had always been subject to the control of the 
secretary; but the latter official, coming from civil life and 
being more or less unfamiliar with the details of army ad- 
ministi-ation, was entirely dependent upon the chief of a 
bureau for information and guidance in matters that pertained 
to it. The injection of a chief of staff into the system altered 
matters largely ; the secretary was provided with an expert 
adviser whose counsel he might conceivably prefer to that of 
the bureau chief. Accordingly it was contended by the bureau 
organizations that the general staff had no legal right to con- 
cern itself at all with matters falling within the functions 
of the bureaus ; and that as to such matters the chief of 
staff had no right even to advise the secretary of war, but that 
the views of the particular bureau chiefs should govern the 
secretary so far as he required advice. 

As the general staff became a settled institution of army 
administration and its effectiveness increased, a certain resent- 
ment developed on the part of the bureaus toward what was 
regarded as an invasion of their prerogatives. The bureaus 
had always jealously guarded their independence, which they 
looked on as the secret of their effectiveness. -^ Their ar- 
gument was that only by virtue of such independence from 
the periodical fluctuations in army command could the per- 
manence of policy and the continuity of method be secured 
which were essential to sound administration. Much of the 

2S Before 1903 the bureaus had been suspicious of attempts by the 
commanding general to bring them under his control. They had then 
protested strenuously that they were subject only to the secretary of 
war. (Ingersoll, "History of the War Department"; p. 317.) When 
for the commanding general there was substituted a chief of staff 
subordinate to the secretary of war, they insisted on their right to be 
subject to the secretary directly. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 265 

weight of this argument was destroyed by the considerations 
which led to the abolition of permanent tenure in the bureaus. 
In fact their isolation and independence tended to develop a 
routine and a tradition which were anything but conducive 
to real efficiency. Nevertheless the point of view of the 
bureaus found strong support in Congress ; and the Army 
Appropriation Act of 1912 contained a provision reducing the 
number of officers serving with the general staff from forty- 
six to thirty-six. More deserving of attention is the important 
provision relating to the general staff which was inserted in 
the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. Section 5 of this 
act provided: 

All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed 111 
the study of military problems, the preparation of plans for the 
national defense, and the utilization of the military forces in time of 
war, in investigating and reporting upon the efficiency and state of 
preparedness of such forces for service in peace or war. or on ap- 
propriate general staff duties in connection with troops, including the 
National Guard, or as military attaches in foreign countries, or on 
other duties, not of an administrative nature, on which they can be 
lawfully and properly employed. 

The act went on to abolish the mobile army division and 
coast artillery division of the general staff, the business of 
the former being transferred to the office of the adjutant- 
general, " subject to the exercise of the supervising, coordinat- 
ing, and informing powers conferred upon members of the 
general staff corps by the act of Congress of February 14, 
1903." 26 

Then ensues the following restrictive language: 

Provided further, that hereafter members of the general staff corps 
shall be confined strictly to the discharge of the duties of the 
general nature of those specified for them in this section and in the 
organic act of Congress last hereinbefore cited, and they shall not 

26 By Section 81 of the act, the militia division was made an inde- 
pendent bureau of the War Department under the immediate super- 
vision of the secretary of war, but the chief of the militia bureau 
was to be ex officio a member of the general staff. 



266 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

be permitted to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature 
that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department, 
or that, being assumed or engaged in by members of the general 
staff corps, would involve impairment of the responsibility or initia- 
tive of such bureaus or offices, or would cause injurious or unneces- 
sary duplication of or delay in the work thereof. 

What w^as the effect of this langua^^e? Did it deprive the 
general staff of that power of supervision over the administra- 
tive bureaus which had been conferred by the organic act of 
1903? Did it deprive the chief of staff of his power to 
advise the secretary of war in matters relating to these bureaus ? 
Or did it merely prohibit the general staff from actually en- 
gaging in administrative work and thereby duplicating work 
which was already being performed by the bureaus? The 
question was doubtful, and gave rise to a difference of opinion. 

Secretary Baker called for an interpretation of the enactment 
from General Crowder as judge-advocate general, and the 
latter rendered an opinion interpreting the statute from the 
point of view of the bureaus. This opinion is worth study, 
as it is a very clear exposition of that attitude.^'' " This 
statute," wrote General Crowder, " gives clearest evidence of 
the conviction of Congress that the general staff has hereto- 
fore been employed not altogether on its own proper duties, 
but has been diverted from them, leaving them to some extent 
unperformed, and has invaded and interfered with the long- 
established jurisdiction of the several bureaus of the depart- 
ment, to the consequent impairment of such bureau adminis- 
tration and to the detriment of general military efficiency. The 
primary purpose of the legislation was clearly to correct what 
was deemed to be a departure from established organic func- 
tions, to reestablish such functions, and to prevent future en- 
croachments." Under the terms of the enactment under con- 
sideration, " the general staff must not perform administra- 
tive duties. . . . Those duties which by law, regulation, and 
established custom, are, or heretofore were, habitually per- 

-^ Printed as appendix to report of secretary of war. War Depart- 
ment, "Annual Report," 1916; Vol. i, pp. 80-89, 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 267 

formed in the several bureaus or offices of the department 
commonly known as administrative bureaus or offices . . . may 
not be performed or interfered with by the general staff. . . . 
Duties performed by the general staff of whatever nature must 
be general in character. So the statute expressly provides. 
If the matter be of special rather than of general interest 
and concern; if it be limited rather than general in its effect; 
if it be a matter falling within and confined to the special 
jurisdiction of a bureau and not reaching directly other bureaus 
or the army as a whole; if it be routine rather than of far- 
reaching consequence and importance ; if it deal with details 
and specifics rather than with generalities, with particular 
performance rather than general policy, then it is entirely 
clear that it is not a subject for general staff consideration and 
functions." 

Issue may be taken with General Crowder on a number of 
points in his interpretation. In the first place, he takes " per- 
formance " as including " interference," and " function " as in- 
cluding " consideration." What the act forbade was " per- 
formance " by the general staff of work pertaining to the ad- 
ministrative bureaus — " they shall not be permitted to assume 
or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to 
established bureaus." This is not a prohibition against " con- 
sideration " of such work or " interference " with it in the 
exercise of the general staff's power of supervision. This 
power of supervision, conferred by the act of 1903, was ex- 
pressly incorporated by reference in that clause of the National 
Defense Act which transferred the mobile army division of 
the general staff to the adjutant-general's office. Secondly, 
General Crowder's distinction between " general " duties and 
" special " duties is either not helpful, or else misleading. If 
he meant to establish a hard and fast line between them, so 
that some duties would fall always into one class, and the 
rest into the other, it is misleading. If the army be viewed 
as an organic unit there is no duty performed anywhere by any 
of its parts which may not at certain times or under certain 



268 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

conditions become of importance to the whole. The routine i 
system of paper-work followed by a particular bureau may 
appear to have no possible relation outside that bureau ; yet ' 
if it be antiquated and clumsy it may under certain circum- I 
stances impair the efficiency of the whole army. If a recog- i 
nition of this is implied in General Crowder's statement, then 
the distinction which he draws is not helpful. If the general 
staff has power to make recommendations regarding any ad- 
ministrative work whatever when that work becomes of im- 
portance to the w'hole army, it must judge as to whether the 
work has that required character of importance or not. 

In fact, however, General Crowder seems to mean that 
there is a hard and fast line between " general " and " special " 
duties. " General policy," he elsewhere says, " cannot be con- 
cerned with mere administrative methods." -* This statement 
is subject to emphatic dissent by virtue of just such an instance 
as that suggested in the last paragraph. The entire success 
of a campaign may depend upon the method of purchase or 
of transportation followed by a supply bureau ; yet these are 
matters of " mere administrative method. " " General policy " 
is built up out of " specific details," and nothing else. 

The sum and substance of General Crowder's opinion was 
that the new enactment limited the advisory and supervisory 
powers of the chief of staff to such matters as did not fall 
within the jurisdiction of any of the administrative bureaus. 
" The general staff relation of rendering professional aid to the 
secretary of war and superior military commanders, and of 
acting as their agents in supervising, coordinating, and inform- 
ing the action of the different officers subject to the super- 
vision of the general staff, becomes limited, if not by the 
original act, certainly by the express requirement of the recent 
statute, to matters of a non-administrative character, not per- 
taining to a particular bureau, and involving only general 
policy." -^ In questions touching any function of a bureau the 

28/&trf.; p. 86. 
29/61W.; p. 85. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 269 

chief of staff had not even a right to advise the secretary of war. 
" In all matters falling within the special jurisdiction of the 
several bureaus, Congress has said in effect that the views of 
the particular bureau chiefs shall govern the secretary so far 
as his own judgment is to be advised; and if the secretary of 
war respects not the advice of his lav/ful advisers, but sub- 
mits it to extra-legal review, he to that extent dispenses with 
the statute, and the lawful medium of control, and moreover 
destroys the distribution of departmental organic powers or- 
dained by law." ^^ 

The effect of this opinion would have been to make im- 
possible any coordination of administrative functions by the 
general staff ; for coordination requires some interference with 
the details to be coordinated. 

General Crowder's opinion seems to have been based rather 
on what he thought was in the mind of Congress in enacting the 
statute than on the express provisions of the statute itself. 
This was pointed out in Secretary Baker's own authoritative in- 
terpretation, which served as a basis for the War Department's 
policy .^^ Mr. Baker began by pointing out that " the section 
under review does not negative the survival of the supervisory, 
coordinating, and informing powers conferred by law upon the 
members of the general staff corps, but on the contrary reiter- 
ates those powers." He then reviewed the recommendations 
of Secretary Root which had led to the establishment of the 
general staff, and sought to discover by their light the position 
and functions which the chief of staff was meant to occupy 
under the legislation of 1903. He summarized his conclusions 
as follows : 

I think nothing can be clearer from the written opinion of the 
secretary of war whose suggestions are responsible for the creation 
of the general staff, and from the hearings before the committees of 
Congress and the debates in Congress upon the passage of the General 
Staff Bill, than that it was intended to supply to the secretary of war a 
lawfully authorized military adviser to whom all other heads of depart- 
so /frjrf.; p. 84. 
31 Ibid.; pp. 70-80. 



270 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ments and bureaus should report, and through whom the secretary 
of war should be constantly kept advised and informed; that it should 
be the duty of this officer, aided by the general staff corps, so to 
advise himself of all operations of the military departments and bureaus 
of the War Department as to inform the judgment of the secretary 
upon any question submitted for his decision, and by correlating, co- 
ordinating, and supervising the judgments of the various heads of 
bureaus and sub-departirtents to be able to prevent a civilian secretary 
of war from inadvertent error, due either to a lack of familiarity with 
military matters or to the vast pressure of business of many and diverse 
characters which too far absorb the time of the secretary of war to 
permit him personally to undertake the detailed study necessary in 
each case. 

The question was w^hether Congress meant to overturn this 
whole policy when it provided that general staff officers should 
not be permitted to engage in administrative work pertaining to 
the established bureaus. 

At the outset it would seem obvious that no such glancing blow as 
this could have been intended as an implied repeal of the whole funda- 
mental theory of the reorganization act whereby the general staff was 
created. ... It must not be forgotten that the army is a whole — 
divided for purposes of administration into many parts, but each action 
by any of the parts must be consistent with the healthy action of the 
whole. A realization of this was the moving cause to the creation of 
the general staff ; and if the Congress had come to believe that its 
effort to correct the evils sought to be redressed by the creation of the 
general staff was a failure, and that no such supervision and coor- 
dination as was then aimed at had resulted from the general staff when 
created, and so believing had desired to abandon the experiment, it 
would not have been done by this tentative, obscure, and admonitory 
sentence. 

The whole question reduced itself to one of what was meant 

by the words " administrative duties." 

Now the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of this term in this 
context obviously is that the chief of the general staff corps shall not 
administer the offices of the bureau chiefs. That is to say, that the 
chief of staff shall give no order to a subordinate of the chief of 
ordnance or the adjutant-general, for that would be the administration 
of that department and such administration must proceed from the 
head of the department. Indeed it seems to me entirely likely that the 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 271 

statute under examination provides its own definition of the meaning 
of the word "administrative," for it says that these administrative 
duties are those which pertain "to established bureaus or offices of 
the War Department." Those words enumerate the kind of acts which 
the original law creating the general staff did not intend to assign to the 
general staff. Secretary Root said the duties proposed for that body 
are not administrative, are not executive, but are correlating, informing, 
supervising. So that we have in this latest legislative expression a 
reiteration of the intentions of the Congress in the earlier act as defined 
and explained by the authority of the act and the policy which it em- 
bodied. . . . The policy of the War Department, therefore, will remain 
as heretofore; the chief of staff, speaking in the name of the secretary 
of war, will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus, offices, and 
departments of the War Department; he will inform himself in as 
great detail as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify him adequately 
to advise the secretary of war. 

It is possible that Congress in enacting Section 5 of the 
National Defense Act may have intended to achieve the result 
which would have followed from General Crowder's interpreta- 
tion of that enactment; but it seems equally clear that the ex- 
press words of the enactment do not require and will not even 
bear that interpretation. The section was a piece of slipshod 
legislation whereby the legislative body passed on to the execu- 
tive the responsibility of interpreting a carelessly drawn statute. 
Whether or not the purpose of the enactment was to seem to 
satisfy certain interests in such a way as to permit the executive 
authorities to defeat the ends which those interests had in view, 
it seems certain that no violence was done to the statute by 
Secretary Baker's interpretation of it. Any other interpretation 
would have been most unfortunate, for it would have made 
definitely impossible the great part which the general staff was 
to play in improving army administration during the war.^^ 

4 

The National Defense Act increased the general staff corps to 
a maximum of fifty-five officers, this maximum to be reached, 

32 For an interesting discussion by General Hugh Scott of the his- 
tory of the general staff, and the function which it should perform 
in our army administration, see report of chief of staff for 1917, 
War Department, "Annual Report,'' 1917; Vol. i, pp. 129^135. 



272 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

however, only in five annual increments, ending in 1920. It 
was at the same time provided that not more than one-half of 
the corps should be assigned to duty in the District of Columbia. 
Accordingly v^'hen war was declared on April 6, 191 7, the 
general staff had an authorized strength of forty-one officers, 
and consisted of nineteen officers stationed in W'ashington and 
twenty-two stationed elsewhere. The Army Appropriations 
Act, passed May 12, 1917,^"' increased the general staff 
to ninety-one and removed for the period of the emergency 
the restriction on the number of officers who might be stationed 
in Washington. Finally, the Selective Service Act of May 18 
of the same year by its provision authorizing the President to 
provide all necessary officers for the line and staff removed 
legislative restriction as to the strength of the general staff. At 
the date of the signing of the armistice 1072 officers were on 
duty with the War Department general staff. 

It is interesting to note that when the war began in Europe 
the respective strengths of the general staffs of Germany, 
France, and England were 650, 644, and 232.^^ 

The expansion of the general staff during the war took place 
by a series of reorganizations. The National Defense Act, by 
removing from the general staff the coast artillery division and 
the division of militia affairs, and by abolishing the mobile 
army division, had left nothing of the former organization but 
the War College division. Before the passage of the act, this 
division had functioned through a number of committees — a 
committee on military preparation and policy, another on war 
plans, a third on organization, equipment, and training, and so 
on. The provision of the National Defense Act which restricted 
the number of general staff officers who might be stationed in 
Washington to one-half the authorized strength of the corps 
so reduced the personnel of the War College division that no 
definite organization was thereafter possible. When the Act 
of May 12, 1917, raised the strength of the general staff to 

32040 Statutes at Large; p. 46. 

■■'3 Report of chief of staff, 1919, War Department, "Annual Report," 
1919; Vol. I, p. 249. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 273 

ninety-one officers, fifty of these were assigned to duty with the 
War College division, and the following standing committees 
were set up : (i) recruitment and organization;, (2) military 
operations; (3) equipment; (4) training; (5) legislation and 
regulation ; (6) military intelligence. These committees formed 
the nuclei of subsequent larger organizations.^* 

The first general reorganization of the general staff was 
announced on February 9, 1918, in accordance with General 
Order No, 14.^^ By this order the corps was organized into 
five divisions : 

I. Executive. 

II. War plans. 

III. Purchase and supply. 

IV. Storage and traffic. 

V. Military intelligence. 

Subsequent reorganizations took place from time to time, 
culminating finally in General Order No. 80 of August 26, 
1918, which remained in effect to the end of the war. This 
order provided for four main subdivisions of the general staff : 

I. Operations. 

II. War plans. 

III. Purchase, storage, and traffic. 

IV. Military intelligence. 

The functions belonging to the first, second, and fourth of 
those divisions fell mainly within the field of collecting infor- 
mation and formulating policy which have by all parties been 
admitted to belong properly to the general staff. On the other 
hand, the duties of the purchase, storage, and traffic division 
lay in the debatable field of coordination and supervision; and 
it is in connection with it that the significance of Secretary 
Baker's interpretation of the fifth section of the National De- 
fense Act will be observed. The activities of the other divis- 
ions will first be briefly sketched. 

The most important work of the war plans division was that 

'■* War Department, "Annual Report," 1919; Vol. i, p. 39^ 
^^Ibid.; p. 249. 



274 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of its organization section and its training section. The for- 
mer was charged with the formulation of organization poHcy 
and prepared the organization tables for all the branches of the 
army. The training branch grew out of a committee formed 
at the beginning of the war to coordinate the theoretical and 
practical sides of army instruction and to deal with plans and 
policies of technical military training. The work of this branch 
or section illustrates so well the need for a body charged with 
the study and development of plans and at the same time shows 
so clearly the relations between such a body and the men who 
actually administer the policy adopted, that its work may prof- 
itably be examined in some detail. The duties of the training 
committee, which grew into the training branch, were authorita- 
tively defined as follows : 

(a) To study the methods of the war and the latest methods 
of military instruction as learned from them through 
information sent from the front by the staff of General 
Pershing and the Allies. 

(b) To see that the execution of those methods in the camps 
and cantonments conformed to the policy laid down in 
the orders of the chief of staff. 

(c) To improve the methods of instruction in the camps by 
direct and frequent contact with the camp instructors. 

To accomplish these results the committee was authorized to 
perform the following functions : 

1. Maintenance of close relations with the expeditionary 
force abroad and with troops undergoing training in the 
United States. 

2. Supervision of the central schools, such as the school of 
fire, the infantry school of arms, and divisional schools 
for officers, candidates, and enlisted men. 

3. The assignment and supervision of, and cooperation with, 
foreign officers on training duty. 

4. Preparation of programs of instruction. 

For the performance of these functions liaison officers were 
appointed to visit the points where instruction was being given, 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 275 

including the camps, cantonments, and central schools. These 
visits were not for the purpose of criticism, but for consultation 
with the commanding officers and instructors and for observa- 
tion of the practical workings of prescribed programs. To 
keep the training branch in touch with developments in Europe, 
the commanding general of the American Expeditionary Force 
was instructed to forward all programs, schedules, and plans 
bearing on the training of troops ; and senior officers returning 
from duty with troops were directed to report to the chief of 
the War College division for personal conference with the train- 
ing committee concerning existing conditions. The need for 
such a medium as this committee supplied between the fighting 
front and the centers of training in the United States was made 
imperative by the revolutionary changes which the war had 
brought about in fighting methods. 

Trench warfare had demonstrated the necessity of standardizing and 
making uniform the methods of instruction and of perfecting them by 
constant exchange of information between the front and the rear. It 
was necessary that every lesson learned and every method found 
successful in the war should be utilized in our schools and camps of 
instruction. With the view of standardizing and maintaining their 
training at the highest efficiency, it was decided that our divisions 
would be required to follow programs established by the training 
committee when these were approved by the chief of staff. . . . Among 
some of the more important programs issued were: 

(a) Programs covering sixteen weeks' courses of training for in- 
fantry, field artillery and machine-guns, which were issued on 
August 2"^, 1917, for initial training of the divisions. 

(b) Regulations and programs for the officer's training-camps, depot 
brigades, and replacement centers. 

(c) A course of training for divisions which had completed the 
preliminary and basic course of training, issued May 6, 1918. 

(d) Various revisions from time to time of the foregoing programs. ^^ 

This summary illustrates how impossible it is to keep separate 
the functions of study, observation, and the formulation of a 
program on the one side and on the other the functions of 

3" Report of chief of staff, War Department, "Annual Report," I919; 
Vol. I, pp. 294-298. 



276 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

supervision, application, and execution. Policies and programs 
are not things apart but are woven into the texture of action. 
Within the training branch of the war plans division there 
was organized ^" a " committee on education and special train- 
ing " to study the needs of the army for skilled specialists and 
technicians, and to secure the cooperation of the colleges and 
other educational institutions of the country toward meeting 
such needs. This committee developed the policy embodied in 
the students' army training corps, to which reference has al- 
ready been made. The membership of the committee largely 
consisted of men connected in civil life with prominent 
educational institutions ; and it was kept in touch with the needs 
of the various staff and technical corps through the medium of 
liaison officers. It thus affords another instance of the function 
of a general staff in supplying a link between two agencies 
which require to be connected. And the quality of its member- 
ship exemplifies again the War Department's policy, so well 
illustrated in the description of the draft administration, given 
in an earlier chapter, of calling in from civil life persons whose 
experience and connections peculiarly fitted them for the work 
in hand. 

In addition to the organization section and the training section, 
the war plans division included a " national defense projects " 
section charged with the preparation of general war plans, and 
an inventions section which " investigated thousands of inven- 
tions, suggestions, and devices submitted to the War Depart- 
ment, thus relieving other agencies of this work, expediting 
consideration of valuable inventions, and rejecting those with- 
out value." 

The next great division of the general staff, the military 
intelligence division, was organized into a positive branch, a 
negative branch, and a geographic branch. At the time of the 
armistice the military intelligence division included 292 officers, 
twenty-nine non-commissioned officers, and 948 civilian em- 
ployees. 

»'^ On February 10, 1918. See ibid., pp. 320 ff. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 277 

The work of the geographic branch was to build up a collec- 
tion of maps and charts and to compile route-books and guide- 
books to various foreign countries. The section furnished 
numerous maps to our forces in France, Russia, and Siberia. 
Its later productions consist entirely of handbooks on Mexico.^^ 
The positive branch was charged with collecting, classifying, 
and making available to the proper officer any current military 
information which had not yet found its way into books and 
libraries. This branch was also charged with the compilation 
and study of codes and ciphers, with all the translating work 
of the War Department, and with the administration of our 
system of military attaches. 

The most interesting work of the military intelligence division 
was that performed by the negative branch. This branch col- 
lected, sifted, and conveyed to the proper authorities informa- 
tion likely to be useful in preventing activities which would 
impair military efficiency. It studied the conduct of aliens, 
pacifists, and suspects, investigated the character of persons 
applying for positions in the army, performed certain censor- 
ship work, and passed upon applications for passports. 

The operations division of the general staff supervised the 
recruitment and mobilization of the army. This was the 
agency which determined when and how many draft registrants 
should be called, the camps to which the men should be sent, the 
organizations to which they should be assigned, the priority in 
which organizations should be sent overseas, and the times 
when they should be moved from their camps. In addition 
supervision over all questions of camp sites and construction 
was assigned to the equipment branch of this division. The 
same branch also had authority to approve types of design for 
equipment, the research connected with it, and the basic allow- 
ance of all articles for the different army units. " This in- 
cluded investigation of new types of equipment, such as trench- 
mortars, trench-knives, harness, the new field-shoes, the new 
method of fitting shoes, fire-control equipment, the standard- 
's /6«i; p. 331. 



278 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ization of motor-vehicles, and the changes which were made in 
uniforms in order to assist procurement," Further, it pre- 
pared the tables of equipment allowances for use in training 
in this country, and amounts to be transported overseas, as 
well as the artillery procurement programs for the ordnance 
department. 

After April, 1918, the equipment branch was charged particularly 
with the solution of the question of priority of equipment in connection 
with the rapid movement of divisions to France. ... It had long 
been a standard rule for military operations that troops should be 
embarked on shipboard as organizations, carrying with them their full 
equipment together with supplies for a certain period of time, depend- 
ing upon the conditions existing; furthermore, that the equipment and 
supplies should be loaded in such a manner that those needed first 
on disembarkation would be the first to be unloaded. In this way an 
expedition can be transported to a hostile shore, and on effecting a 
landing, the organization is complete, both in personnel and equipment, 
and able to undertake at once operations against the enemy. In our 
first movements of troops to France, endeavor was made to follow 
the same principle, but it was soon found impossible to adhere to it 
nor was there the same necessity that exists when landing in a hostile 
territory. The principal difficulty confronting our expedition was not 
that of landing on the other side, which would have been the case 
had the landing been opposed, but was the lack of shipping to trans- 
port troops and supplies which were necessary for the operations 
in France. This made it necessary to take advantage of every ton of 
shipping. Transporting organizations as complete units, and with their 
full equipment and supplies, is very wasteful of tonnage space. Further, 
ships of all types had to be pressed into service, some passenger ships 
which had no place available for the carrying of supplies and equipment, 
some cargo ships which were unable to take personnel. . . . This neces- 
sitated the adoption of a policy of entirely separating the baggage 
from the troops. The personnel was sent with the equipment they 
carried on their persons or could store in the ship's hold, the latter 
being limited to organizational records, bedding rolls, etc. The re- 
mainder of the equipment was sent on a separate cargo vessel, and on 
arrival in France no effort was made to supply that particular equip- 
ment to the organization which had used it in the United States. In- 
stead, it was all pooled, and issues were made from the pool to organ- 
izations as they needed supplies. So far as the shipments were con- 
cerned, this worked well, but it was later decided that additional tonnage 
could be saved, and also railroad transportation in this country, by 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 279 

sending across only new equipment direct from the factories. When 
a division was ordered from its training-camp for oversea duty, it 
then left tlie equipment which had been used (except that carried on 
the person) in the camp to be assigned to the new organization to be 
formed there. Upon its arrival in France it received a complete outfit 
of new equipment which had been sent over in bulk for that purpose. 
In this way, the equipment lasted longer after reaching France, and 
therefore did not require replenishing so frequently, and the amount 
of railroad shipments in the United States was reduced. In this way 
the capacity of every ship was utiHzed to full advantage.^^ 

This matter of shipments of equipment has been gone into 
at this length because it shows how what may seem on the sur- 
face to be a thing of shght importance may well become by its 
ramifications a matter of foremost consequence. It thus serves 
to show how little value there is in an attempt like that of 
General Crowder discussed above, to distinguish between 
" general policy " and " specific details." It brings out, fur- 
thermore, the usefulness of a body like the general staff charged 
with studying details in their relation to the whole, and the wis- 
dom of empowering such a body to modify the management of 
details in the interest of wider efficiency. 

5 

The most interesting development in the general staff organ- 
ization during the war, and the one which gave rise to the most 
controversy and discussion, was that connected with the forma- 
tion and development of the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division. Here the general staff was boldly entering, and on 
an immense scale, upon that debated ground of coordination and 
supervision of the supply bureaus where its authority had been 
questioned in time of peace before any considerable step had 
been taken toward exercising that authority. 

When the United States entered the war, the system of 
separate and independent supply bureaus was still flourishing. 
Something had been done toward securing unity by the con- 
solidation in 1912 of the quartermaster, pay, and subsistence 
departments. Secretary Baker's interpretation of Section 5 of 

^^Ibid.; p. 272. 



28o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the National Defense Act had been intended to pave the way 
toward doing more when the necessity for it became imperative. 
But to all intents and purposes the supply bureaus in 191 7 were 
enjoying their traditional autonomy as fully as during the 
Spanish War. 

The result, when the system was subjected to the sudden 
strain of the emergency, was what might have been anticipated. 
In the words of General March: 

Under the system of separate and independent bureaus, as organized 
when we entered the war, a condition of affairs eventually and in- 
evitably developed which threatened the very success of any military 
program. Each bureau, absorbed in the tremendous expansion of its 
personnel, and in its problems of supply, naturally concentrated every 
effort upon the development of a program which would meet every 
possible requirement that might be imposed upon that particular bureau, 
without reference, in general, to the requirements either of other 
bureaus or services or of the army program as a whole. With this 
independent and uncorrelated action of the different bureaus, the 
defects of the existing bureau system soon became manifest. There 
developed a competition for manufactured articles and for raw materials 
and for labor which resulted in high prices and in an inefficient dis- 
tribution of labor, involving a scarcity in some localities and actual 
unemployment in others ; similarly there resulted a congestion in the 
placing of contracts and the location of new manufacturing plants 
in many localities, irrespective of the labor, fuel, power, and trans- 
portation available. Plants and real estate were commandeered and 
purchased by individual bureaus without consideration of the effect 
upon the requirements of other bureaus, and no standardized contract 
procedure obtained to protect either the manufacturers and owners 
or the United States. The total lack of standardized specifications re- 
sulted in a delay in manufacture, a lack of interchangeability, and in- 
creased cost. Nine independent and different systems for estimating 
requirements were in operation, with a consequent lack of balance in 
the military program and inefficient utilization of the available manu- 
facturing plants. There were five different sources of supplies for 
organizations to be equipped and five different and complicated systems 
of property accountability for the officers charged with equipping these 
organizations. There were ten different agencies for handling money 
accounts in the War Department and at least five different systems 
of fiscal accounts with no adequate supervision of expenditures.'*" 

*°Ibid.; p. 245. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 281 

The same story is told with added emphasis in another part 
of the same report: 

The war began with the supply system of the artny organized on the 
bureau plan, the bureaus being five separate purchasing agencies, *i 
with separate systems of finance, storage, and distribution, each feeling 
itself largely independent within its own sphere of action, and ac- 
customed by long habit and tradition to perform its various functions 
without reference to the activities of the others or of other depart- 
ments of the Government. Accordingly, when the army went into the 
nation's markets to buy the vast body of supplies needed for the war, 
it went not as a single agency, seeing the problems of supply as a 
whole, but as five separate bureaus competing with each other as well 
as with the other great agencies of the Government and of the Allies 
for manufactured articles, raw materials, industrial facilities, labor, 
fuel, power, and transportation. Some of the disastrous effects of such 
a system of competitive purchasing by numerous government agencies 
are apparent on the surface. In the case of purchases within a given 
industry it has been generally recognized that large-scale purchases by 
the Government might completely disorganize the industry through 
absurdly high prices both to the Government and to civilians, and 
might at the same time fail to call forth in full measure the capacity 
of the country for the production of the particular article. It has 
been a matter of knowledge, also, that the process of placing orders 
for finished articles by bureaus and departments of the Government 
acting without a common plan tended to stimulate a scramble for raw 
materials which is equally disorganizing. . . . The responsibility which 
rested upon each bureau and upon numerous divisions and subdivisions 
of the bureaus was to procure and deliver in France the particular 
supplies, materials, or munitions with which it was individually charged. 
In discharging this obligation each of these numerous agencies played 
a lone hand. Each naturally wished to show a record of large achieve- 
ment in getting to France the particular things for which it was 
eventually responsible. It was not an accepted principle early in the 
war as it came to be later that to preempt tonnage space for ship- 
ments in excess of actual current needs was, if anything, a greater 
offense than a failure to provide supplies according to schedule. The 
carrying capacity of the available ocean tonnage was at all times the 
neck of the bottle of supply. The system of individual procurement 
by bureaus ignored this fundamental fact, and the natural result was 

41 Quartermaster corps, ordnance department, medical department, 
signal corps, corps of engineers. 



282 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

congestion at the ports. This port congestion rapidly developed into 
a general congestion of railroad facilities, including very serious dif- 
ficulties in the movement of fuel needed by war industries. An im- 
portant contributing cause of the fuel shortage was the concentration of 
contracts in congested districts already referred to as a product of the 
bureau system of procurement. Moreover in the carrying out of war 
contracts placed in the same particularistic way, new manufacturing 
facilities were frequently created or planned in congested areas which 
called for raw materials, transportation, and labor where at the same 
time elsewhere in the country adequate and unused facilities already 
existed. The outcome of all these difiSculties was inevitably such a 
slowing down in the output of war supplies as resulted, in the worst 
days of the winter of 1917-18, in conditions approaching partial paralysis 
of the war machine.*^ 

To add to the confusion, the various army bureaus were not 
the only purchasing agencies in the market for war suppHes. 
There were in addition the navy, the Emergency Fleet Cor- 
poration, and the various purchasing commissions of the allied 
governments which had filled up many mills and factories with 
contracts prior to our entrance into the war. In the competitive 
race between all these agencies plant capacity had often been 
appropriated to some purpose which in the scale of military 
importance was less urgent than some other purpose which was 
thereby deferred to second place. There occurs to the writer's 
personal recollection a case where a plant manufacturing canvas 
urgently needed by the quartermaster's department for tents 
had been commandeered by the medical department to supply 
canvas for stretchers. The output of the steel mills was being 
absorbed by the agencies which had got first into the field rather 
than by those whose needs were greatest.*^ There was also an 

42/fciU; pp. 341 ff- 

*^ Another illustration is afforded by the following testimony of 
Major-General Burr: "At the outbreak of the war I was in com- 
mand of the Rock Island arsenal. A day or two before war was 
declared I received an order to buy all the necessary equipment for 
200 regiments. In doing so, I had a great deal of leather equipment 
to purchase, and it occurred to me that there was a shortage of 
leather in the country. As a matter of fact I knew it from the 
people I was in touch with, and I secured authority to go ahead 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 283 

abuse of the priority privilege given to government shipments 
over the railways. It was authoritatively stated that on some 
lines 90 per cent, of the freight shipments carried the blue tag 
entitling the shipment to government priority, and an instance 
was given of a quartermaster at an army-post in Wyoming who 
secured priority for a shipment of coal from Pennsylvania 
although there were coal fields in his own State which might 
have supplied him." 

Some effort had been made at the outset to guard against 
these developments through the establishment of a number of 
committees connected with the Council of National Defense. 
The committee on supplies of the latter body, which came into 
existence on February 12, 1917, was organized to cooperate 
in an advisory capacity with the purchasing departments of the 
War and Navy Departments in securing requirements of cloth- 
ing, equipment, and subsistence. In its composition the regular 
principle was followed of selecting men in close touch with the 
particular industries concerned, who were informed as to the 
conditions which would be encountered in the course of gov- 
ernment purchasing. The committee advised the bureaus as to 
the business concerns which had the best facilities for filling 

and buy a lot of leather that would take care of my requirements. 
I spent two, three, four million dollars for leather and I got prac- 
tically all the equipment leather in the country. Within a couple of 
weeks other departments were asking me if I would not release leather 
to them. I had it all. Well, that was wrong, you know, but I went 
on the proposition that it was up to me to look after my particular 
job, and I proceeded to do so. My department did not have any 
trouble in getting leather for many months to come, because I had it 
all. The medical department and one or two of the other departments 
which required leather for certain of their equipment — very nec- 
essary equipment — had gone into the market a few days later and 
could not get any suitable leather." Testimony before the subcom- 
mittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, August 19, 1919; 
" Hearings on Senate Bills 2691, 2693, and 2715," Sixty-Sixth Con- 
gress, first session ; Part 4, p. 221. Washington, Government Print- 
ing-Office, 1919. 

*•* Senator Wads worth's speech of February 5, 19 18, " Congressional 
Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, second session; p. 1693. 



284 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

their orders, and endeavored also to coordinate the procuring 
activities of the various bureaus and departments. The pur- 
chases vi^ith which the committee was concerned totaled nearly 
a billion dollars. Similar services in connection with some of 
the more important raw materials were performed by a com- 
mittee on raw materials. The urgent need for coordinating 
purchases led to the formation of the General Munitions Board, 
which was meant to be a great clearance committee consisting 
of representatives of all the procuring agencies where they 
could meet daily and arrange their requirements in the order 
of importance. These three organizations ultimately merged 
in the War Industries Board. 

The great difficulty, however, with those organizations as a 
means of securing coordination was that they were without 
legal position or power. The most that the War Industries 
Board could do was to advise the procurement agencies as to 
where and at what price to buy ; there was no compulsion upon 
those officers to take the advice, and they often went ahead and 
followed their own course without so much as informing the 
War Industries Board of their action. A further difficulty was 
that it was virtually hopeless to attempt to coordinate army 
purchases with the purchases of other governmental agencies 
when army purchases were not coordinated among themselves. 
This came out strikingly in connection with the matter of re- 
quirements. In order to plan ahead and arrange the procure- 
ment activities of different arms so that they woul.d not conflict 
with each other, it was necessary to have some idea of what 
supplies would be needed and in what amounts. E,ach of the 
army bureaus had, however, its own system of calculating re- 
quirements or no system at all. Where a system existed, the 
units of measurement were different from those in use in the 
other bureaus, and a combined conspectus was impossible. 

The paralysis which resulted from this confusion in the 
machinery of procurement became notorious toward the end of 
191 7 and culminated in an investigation of the conduct of the 
war by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, which held 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY '285 

a series of hearings that lasted from December 12, 1917, to the 
end of March, 1918. As a result of this action, a policy of 
radical reorganization was undertaken in the War Department, 
which was still going on at the date of the armistice. On 
February 5, 1918, Senator Wadsworth of New York, who was 
a member of the committee, made a speech in the Senate which 
is an admirable s^mmar}^ of the results of the hearings. He 
began by giving credit to the War Department for three very 
great achievements, the operation of the selective draft, the mo- 
bilization and transportation of troops, and the feeding of the 
army. It was on the procurement side that the department 
had failed. " The committee commenced its labors by an in- 
quiry into the management and operations of the supply bureaus 
of the War -Department. ... As we proceeded, we found 
that these bureaus were handicapped very seriously by a condi- 
tion which springs from years of routine operation, regulated 
and checked, down to the last crossing of a ' t ' and dotting of 
an ' i,' which condition is popularly described as due to * red 
tape.' The military channels through which a matter must 
proceed are so long and so tortuous that exceedingly grave 
delays have occurred. Some of the incidents might be regarded 
as uproariously funny were the situation less serious. . . . 
The organization of the War Department when we went into 
the war, and as it continued to operate through the summer and 
autumn, resulted in the supply bureaus, headed respectively by 
the quartermaster general, the chief of ordnance, the chief 
signal officer, the chief of engineers, and the medical department 
reporting direct to the secretary of war and not through the 
general staff. It was possible, therefore, for the five different 
supply bureaus in the War Department to report over the head 
of the chief of staff and go direct to the secretary of war and 
if possible persuade him to do what any one of those individuals 
thought ought to be done." The great need was for centraliza- 
tion to secure unity and harmony of action. " We had before 
that committee the chairman of the war committee of the Cham- 
ber of Commerce of the United States, Mr. Catchings. Mr. 



286 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Catchings has been the first assistant to Mr. Stettinius during 
the time that Mr. Stettinius was managing the purchases for 
Great Britain, They purchased something Hke $3,ooo,ooo,(X)0 
worth of goods in this country for Great Britain. They did it 
under a centrahzed authority. They made a tremendous suc- 
cess of it. It is astounding to hear him say how simple it all 
was when properly organized. For six or seven months Mr. 
Catchings and his committee have been endeavoring to persuade 
the officials here in Washington that something must be done 
to centralize control and authority." Mr. Baruch and Mr. 
Howard Coffin recommended the same thing. 

Senator Wadsworth felt that one of the chief difficulties was 
that procurement was not properly a military function at all and 
could not be competently performed by military men. It was 
a task for business men. " As we proceeded, those of us who 
attended the hearings every day, and listened to all the testi- 
mony, became deeply impressed with the conviction that pur- 
chase and initial distribution of this vast amount of supplies 
must be essentially an industrial operation, and that military 
men, no matter how distinguished and capable in their profes- 
sion, are, with very rare exceptions, inexperienced in such mat- 
ters, and therefore incapable of bringing about the best results 
in the shortest possible time." Further, the mere coordination 
of army purchases would not go the whole way necessary; what 
was needed was a consolidation of all the procurement activi- 
ties of the Government, including the navy, the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, and the Allied purchasing commissions.*^ 

Accordingly what Senator Wadsworth advocated was a 
ministry of munitions along the lines which had been followed 
in England. A bill embodying this proposal was introduced 
in the Senate on January 4, 1918, by Senator Calder of New 
York.*^^ The new ministry was to take over the re- 
sponsibility of supplying the requirements of the army, navy. 
Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the Allies, and was to be 

^5 For Senator Wadsworth's speech, see " Congressional Record," 
Sixty-Fifth Congress, second session; pp. 1687-1694. 

«a/6,flf; p. 558. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 287 

headed by some civilian business man of higli standinsf. An- 
other proposal was for the formation of a small war cabinet to 
exercise centralized authority over the various procurement 
agencies. Both proposals were combatted vigorously, and in 
retrospect it would seem wisely, by the War Department on the 
ground that reforms so radical and on such a large scale would 
throw into confusion everything that had been done and cause a 
fatal loss of time ; that it was better to disturb as little as pos- 
sible -the existing agencies which were in the midst of their 
work, but that measures should at once be taken to coordinate 
and correlate them. To avoid being reformed from without, 
the War Department therefore set hastily about reforming itself 
from within. The first steps in the reform were the summon- 
ing from New York of Mr. Stettinius to advise the secretary of 
war as surveyor-general of supplies, and the establishment by 
General Order No. 5 (January 11, 1918) of the office of direc- 
tor of purchases as a part of the general staff. 

During the hearings before the Senate committee Secretary 
Baker stated that the complete consolidation of the procurement 
activities of the supply bureaus into a single central procure- 
ment agency for the army was under consideration. The 
adoption of such a measure would have meant the substitution 
of one purchasing department for the army in place of the 
decentralized bureau system then prevailing ; the army at least 
would have gone as a unit into counsel with the other procure- 
ment bodies before the War Industries Board. But difificulties 
stood in the way of even such a half-way approach as this 
toward consolidated government purchase by a ministry of 
munitions. The opposition of the chiefs of the army supply 
bureaus to the plan was a determined one. They alleged that 
a sweeping reorganization of existing procurement machinery 
would operate to disorganize the bureaus, which, they claimed, 
were functioning effectively and furnishing the American troops 
in France with supplies. Accordingly, the first steps taken 
were simply in the direction of providing supervision and cor- 
relation of the procurement work of the bureaus ; and it was to 



288 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

perform this function that the new office of director of pur- 
chases was estabHshed.'*" 

The oflfice of director of purchases came into existence as a 
part of the general staff on January ii, 1918; on February 9, 
it was reorganized as the division of purchase and supplies/'^ 
On April 16 there was another reorganization, from which 
emerged the purchase, storage, and traffic division.^^ A third 
reorganization took place by virtue of General Order No. 80 
on August 28. There were further reorganizations in Septem- 
ber and October. 

The detailed history of these organizations and reorganiza- 
tions is confused and confusing. It would seem as if, almost 
before the new organization had time to get the swing of its 
work, it was thrown out of gear by a subsequent reorganization. 
And that is in effect what happened. The history of the var- 
ious transformations of the purchase and supply division of the 
general staff is hardly a history of concrete achievement; it is 
rather a history of painful progress by slow degrees toward a 
form of efficient organization. That organization was not 
reached until the very end. At the date of the armistice the 
organization was at last in shape to function effectively. 

The story, in short, is one not so much of accomplishment as 
of development in organization ; and under its surface two 
lines of development can be traced very clearly. The first, 
strong at the beginning and growing weaker, is development 
in the direction of a kind of federalism of supervision and co- 
ordination between the activities of the supply bureaus. The 
second, growing stronger all along, is development in the direc- 
tion of consolidating army purchasing into the hands of one 
central agency. It was clear to very many from the beginning 
that the latter must be the inevitable outcome ; but so strong 
were the opposing influences that the result could only be 
reached by halting approaches. 

*'5 Report of chief of staff for 1919; War Department, "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, p. 353. 
4" General Order No. 4. 
*8 General Order Not. 36. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 289 

Throughout the spring and summer of 19 18 the purchase and 
storage division functioned as a coordinating agency between 
the supply bureaus. To this end it was provided in the general 
orders that the director of purchase and storage should " exer- 
cise control in matters of purchase " and should communicate 
directly with the heads of the supply bureaus.'*^ 

The work of coordination with which the new division was 
charged required that it should first of all act as an interme- 
diary between the bureaus and the War Industries Board. 
This function was of importance mainly in connection with re- 
quirements, clearances, and priorities. 

One of the principal functions of the War Industries Board 
was to discover and make available adequate facilities for fur- 
nishing the supplies needed by the army. Hence when actual 
or threatened shortages existed in particular finished articles or 
in raw materials or production facilities, it was necessary for 
the board to know the prospective requirements of the army as 
a whole. Only the ordnance department and the quarter- 
master's corps among the bureaus had developed any machinery 
for calculating their requirments in terms of finished articles; 
none of the bureaus had made any attempt to convert these 
requirements into terms of raw materials. Yet it was obviously 
necessary for the War Industries Board to know not merely the 
requirements of finished articles, such as shoes and uniforms, 
but also the amounts of leather, wool, etc., needed for the 
making of the finished products. The new organization set 
itself to the task of compiling this information, and a separate 
section on requirements calculations was established to do the 
work.^** 

A second function of the purchase and storage division was 
in connection with " clearances." " Clearance " in the lan- 
guage of Washington during the war meant the settlement of 
priority as between immediate purchases. We have already 

*^ General Order No. 14. 

50 Report of chief of staff for 1919, War Department, "Annual 
Report," 1919; Vol. i, p. 355. 



290 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

seen how during the early months of the war conflicts devel- 
oped between the departments and bureaus of the Government 
in regard to purchases of articles in which there was a scarcity. 
In order to settle those conflicts the contemplated purchases 
were referred to the General Munitions Board for " clearance," 
and " clearance " was supposed to be granted only after the 
conflicts had been adjusted. In these negotiations the five sup- 
ply bureaus of the army appeared independently before the 
Munitions Board and frequently asked that body to settle con- 
flicts between two supply bureaus of the army. As the 
army program developed in size, purchases calling for 
clearance increased, and it became a matter of dissatisfaction 
to the General Munitions Board, and to its successor, 
the War Industries Board, that the army was not able 
to act as a unit in requests for clearances. Accordingly 
the purchase, storage, and traffic division undertook in 
May to bring about this unity. The eflFort, however, was a 
little belated, as an efficient organization had already grown up 
in the shape of army commodity committees. Each of these 
committees was concerned with arranging for the supply of 
the particular article or group of related articles which were 
handled by some one of the commodities sections of the War 
Industries Board. That is, there was an army commodity 
committee corresponding to each commodity section of the 
board, a committee on chemicals, a committee on cotton, a com- 
mittee on jute and cordage, etc. Each of these army com- 
mittees consisted of representatives of those supply bureaus 
into whose requirements the article entered. A direct contact 
was thus established on the one hand between the supply bur- 
eaus, and on the other between the army as a whole and the 
producing agencies as represented in the War Industries Board. 
Efficiently as the committees were operating, it was no doubt 
the part of wisdom to subject them, as was done, to the unify- 
ing control of the purchase, storage, and traffic division. In 
this way possible conflicts of interest between committees were 
guarded against; and a guarantee of unity was introduced into. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 291 

army policy which placed the army in a position of greater 
advantage before the War Industries Board. Through the 
machinery of the committees requests for clearance became 
reduced to a mere matter of routine. Speaking of the work 
of the army commodities committees, the chief of staff said 
in his report for 1919: "If the United States should ever 
again be involved in a war comparable in magnitude with the 
recent war, one of the first steps which would need to be taken 
would be the reconstruction of a set of commodity committees 
similar to those which served the army during the late emer- 
gency. This should be done in any event, whether or not an 
organization similar to the War Industries Board is to be 
created. The chaotic relationships which existed during 1917 
between the various parts of the army organization and the 
War Industries Board, as contrasted with the efficient mechan- 
ism finally devised under the director of purchase, storage, and 
traffic, serves powerfully to establish the conviction that there 
should be no return to the former bureau system of army 
supply." ^^ 

As " clearance " was the word used for priority between 
immediate purchases, so the application of the word " priority " 
was limited in our war-time speech to the determination of 
preferences in broader matters of policy and requirements. It 
was also used of the preference to be given a government 
contractor in matters of fuel, raw material, labor, and trans- 
portation service as against other government contractors 
whose contracts were deemed to be less essential to the army 
program. Here, as in the matter of clearances, but in a less 
detailed way, the army had to work with the War Industries 
Board. " One of the tasks of the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division was the development of a priority system for the army. 
This included both the settling of priority questions as between 
the various supply bureaus of the War Department and the 
single representation of the War Department in priority mat- 
ters in the forum of the War Industries Board." The scheme 

^^Ibid.; p. 364. 



292 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

which was worked out "provided for the creation of a prior- 
ities committee within each supply bureau : conflicts within a 
bureau were to be settled by the bureau committee ; the requests 
were then to be transmitted to the army priorities officer; and 
after conflicts between bureaus had been resolved, the requests 
were to be put through the regular procedure of the priorities 
committee of the War Industries Board." '^- 

In addition to taking charge of the army's relations with 
the War Industries Board, the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division undertook in a number of other ways to unify the 
policy of the supply bureaus. Thus a surveyor-general of 
contracts was appointed in the division to establish uniformity 
among the contract forms used by the bureaus, develop im- 
proved forms, and act in an advisory capacity in matters of 
contract policy. Similarly a standardization unit was estab- 
lished to develop uniformity and interchangeability between 
different articles of the same kind used by the army. An 
instance is reported to illustrate what was accomplished in this 
direction. The subcommittee on standardization of hand-tools 
and hand-chests made a reduction in the number of kinds of 
tool-chests used by the various branches of the army from 
approximately seventy-seven to seven types, which were smaller 
and less expensive than the replaced types. The subcommittee 
estimated that the saving in cost and freight charges on this one 
item alone amounted to approximately $5,000,000.^^ 

The statement has been made above that the supervisory and 
coordinating policy of the purchase, storage, and traffic divi- 
sion merged gradually into a frank policy of consolidating 
the procurement of army supplies in the hands of a single 
centralized bureau. This policy was made possible by the 
passage of the Overman Act on May 20, 1918.'^^" The Overman 
Act represented a victory for the War Department in its op- 

^^Ibid.; p. 371- 
^^Ihid.; p. 362. 

53a This very important statute fills only one page of the statute- 
book. 40 Statutes at Large, p. 556. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 293 

position to the various proposals for a war cabinet or a ministry 
of munitions. The act, instead of creating a single agency for 
the conduct of supply operations, merely gave the President a 
free hand and full power to transfer the functions of any 
bureau of the Government to any other as he saw fit. Under 
the authority of this act, steps were taken toward the consolida- 
tion of army procurement. The first step was the compara- 
tively conservative one of instituting a system of so-called 
" interbureau procurement," The essence of this system was 
that when two or more bureaus were using and purchasing the 
same article, all purchases should thereafter be made solely by 
the bureau which consumed the article in the largest quantities. 
On this principle, the purchase of one group of articles was 
consolidated in one bureau, and of another group of articles 
in another, in accordance with supply-circulars prepared by 
the purchase, storage, and traffic division. An issuing bureau 
which wished to obtain supplies assigned for procurement by 
the supply-circulars to another bureau, requisitioned the pro- 
curing bureau for such supplies. Upon receipt of an inter- 
bureau requisition, the procuring bureau was responsible for 
making the purchase, following up production, conducting in- 
spection, and making acceptance of and payment for the ar- 
ticles requisitioned. Funds for the payment of the order were 
transferred by the finance office of the issuing bureau to that 
of the procuring bureau. After the articles had been pro- 
cured and paid for, they were turned over to the issuing 
bureau.^* 

The interbureau procurement system gave rise to many 
difficulties and resulting complaints. Purchasing officers in 
the bureaus were irritated at having to give up direct connec- 
tions which they had established at considerable trouble with 
the sources of supply, and at being compelled to resort to 
tedious and roundabout dealing through another bureau. The 
charge was made, no doubt in many instances with justice, that 

^* Report of quartern.aster-general, War Department, "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, p. 723. 



294 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the procuring bureau was mainly interested in getting its own 
supplies and did not give proper attention to the procurement 
requests of other bureaus. ^^ The latter were no longer able to 
follow up the progress of work on their contracts, and delays, 
deadlocks, and disputes between the bureaus resulted, Mucli 
of this dissatisfaction was due to inherent defects in the system 
of interbureau procurement itself, which was at best a clumsy 
half-way compromise ; much on the other hand was no doubt 
due to the fact that the system " became a point of complaint 
around which centered the widespread opposition of the bu- 
reaus to the general process of supervision and centralization 
which was going on." ^^ 

The interbureau procurement system inevitably represented 

^^ The criticism of the "interbureau procurement" system by the 
chiefs of the procuring bureaus is well represented by the following 
testimony of Major-General Sibert, chief of the chemical warfare 
service: "Under the system of interbureau requisition, the theory 
is that one man should buy all the monkey-wrenches for the army; 
that another man should buy all the acetic acid for the army; 
that a third man should buy all the sulphuric acid for the army — 
responsibility scattered all over the face of the earth. For instance, 
suppose I am called on to supply a certain line of gases for the army; 
I find that I need acetic acid, let us say. I have to put in an inter- 
bureau requisition to the aircraft to get it. If I need sulphuric 
acid, I have to put in a requisition to the ordnance to get that; if I 
need organic chemicals, I have to put in a requisition on the 
quartermaster to get them; if I need alcohol, I have to put in a 
requisition on the ordance department to get that ; and so on, 
interminably. I put in my requisitions to all these bureaus. If any- 
body can tell me when they will get through then I will tell you 
when I can do business. My hands are tied until every one of those 
independent agencies, over which I have no control, turns out his par- 
ticular element of those things that I must have before I can go 
ahead. He does it when he gets ready, and he will furnish him- 
self first, generally." Testimony before subcommittee of Senate Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, August 25. 1919; "Hearings on Senate 
Bills 2691, 2693, and 2715," Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session; 
Part VI, p. 334; Washington, Government Printing-Office, 1919. 

■■■"Report of chief of staff, War Department, "Annual Report," igiO; 
Vol. I, p. 373. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 295 

a transitional stage ; it was too complicated and clumsy, and in- 
volved too much crossing of wires, to be economical or efficient ; 
but it led logically to a f tirther and simpler stage in the evolution 
toward centralized procurement. This development took place 
through the consolidation of the procurement of an increasing 
number of articles in the hands of one bureau, the quarter- 
master corps. The latter corps was gradually stripped of 
operating functions and converted into a pure purchasing and 
issue agency.^^ At the same time its connection with the pur- 
chase, storage, and traffic division of the general stafif was 
drawn increasingly closer. When the functions of the latter 
organization were extended, defined, and elaborated in the 
great reorganization of August 28, 1918,^** the quartermaster- 
general was ordered to report to the director of purchase, 
storage, and traffic; and two weeks later the two offices were 
partially consohdat^d by Supply Circular No. 91, which pro- 
vided that " the quartermaster-general of the army, as director 
of purchase and storage, shall have responsibility for and 
authority over storage, distribution, and issue within the United 
States of all supplies for the army." This consolidation 
between the two departments was the closer as the offices of 
quartermaster-general and director of purchase, storage, and 
traffic were for the time being filled by the same man, Major- 
General Goethals. 

On September 18 practically the entire quartermaster corps 
as it was then functioning was removed bodily and made a 
part of the purchase, storage, and traffic division of the gen- 
eral stafll^.^'* This radical measure made way for the great 
final step toward centralized procurement; and between Octo- 
ber 22 and October 24 the procurement activities of the en- 
gineer corps, the medical corps, and the Signal Corps were 
also transferred to the purchase, storage, and traffic division, 

^'^ Report of quartermaster-general, War Department, "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, p. 724 

^^ 1918, General Order No. 80. 

^^ Report of quartermaster-general, War Department, "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, p. 30. 



296 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the latter office thereby becoming a central procuring agency 
for the entire army except for articles of a technical and highly 
specialized nature such as were used by the ordnance depart- 
ment, the Bureau of Aircraft Production and the Chemical 
Warfare Service. These bureaus continued to make their 
purchases independently. " The consolidation of i)rocurement 
into a central ]-»urchasing agency," writes the chief of staflF, 
" was a great achievement from the point of view of the re- 
organization of the supply system of the army, and of the 
elimination of the wasteful and unbusinesslike methods of buy- 
ing which were the inevitable results of the uncoordinated 
activities of the bureaus. The problem of organization was 
solved, and the precedent of centralization was established." ^° 
Eighteen days later came the armistice. 

Testifying nine months later before the Senate Committee 
on Military Affairs, Major-General Burr, then head of the 
purchase, storage, and traffic division of the general staff, sum- 
marized the advantages of consolidated procurement as fol- 
lows : " T can not put too much emphasis on this question of 
consolidation of procurement and finance and transportation. 
It is sound business policy. All of our business corporations 
that amount to anything, and have any system at all, have a 
single purchasing-agent. Take the United Fruit Co., which 
has a fleet of steamers and which practically runs colonies in 
Central America ; it has stores, hospitals, schools, transporta- 
tion lines, and so forth, and it has a single purchasing-agent 
who purchases medicines, hospital supplies, subsistence, cloth- 
ing, engineering materials, steamboats, and everything that it 
uses. The War Department will not get down to a practical 
business basis until we are permitted to carry through this 
consolidation that was begun by General Goethals. The bureau 
system did not work in an emergency and it never will work." '^ 

^° Report of chief of staff, War Department, "Annual Report," 1919: 
Vol. I, p. 426. 

"1^ Testimony in "TTcarings before subcommittee of Senate Committee 
on Military Affairs, on Senate Bills 2691, 2693, and 2715," Sixty-Sixtli 
Congress, first session; Part IV, p. 227. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 297 

In a general way what has been said of the consolidation of 
purchases applies also to the consolidation of storage and 
transportation operations in the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division. The conditions which existed at the outbreak of the 
war were virtually the same as in the case of purchases, and 
the same reasons operated to bring about consolidation. Each 
bureau maintained its own storage depots, and with the sudden 
increase in the size of the army a shortage in storage space 
developed with consequent confusion. In addition, the quarter- 
master's corps, which required about 80 per cent, of the storage 
space needed for the whole army, had a very incomplete system 
of control over its depots and was even without detailed in- 
formation regarding their needs. The first step taken was to 
organize a separate warehousing division inside the quarter- 
master's corps with authority to supervise and control all the 
storage operations of the corps. On February 10, 1918, the 
director of storage of the quartermaster's corps became the 
chief of the storage division of the storage and traffic branch 
then established in the general staff. In this capacity, he took 
over the task of supervising army storage in general. Until 
September his functions remained of a supervisory character, 
this supervision being exercised first over the provision and 
secondly over the utilization of storage facilities. Instructions 
were issued to all bureau chiefs that requirements for storage 
and shipping facilities were to be submitted to the director of 
storage for investigation and approval before action was taken. 
Several of the bureaus at this time had on hand funds for the 
construction of storage facilities. The director of storage was 
required to determine the actual storage requirements of all 
the bureaus and the proper location for new facilities from the 
point of view of economical distribution. Whenever one of 
the bureaus desired additional storage facilities, a statement 
of the requirements, with the necessity and the comparative 
desirability of locations, was submitted to the director of stor- 
age, whose office investigated the need for the project, 
approved ihe location, and authorized the allotment of funds. 



298 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Even more important than the provision of storage facilities 
was the problem of their proper utilization. Through lack of 
adequate storage facilities at the ports, piers were quite gen- 
erally used for storage purposes with the result that supplies 
were loaded on ships without regard to the actual need for 
them in France, but purely as a result of their random accessi- 
bility to the ships. It developed that much of this congestion 
was due to lack of coordination between the activities of the 
bureau representatives at each port. The limited storage facil- 
ities available were not utilized to capacity because of the 
established practice of allotting certain definite warehouses to 
each of the bureaus, so that space controlled by one bureau was 
often unoccupied, while other bureaus had a surplus of supplies 
which had either to be left in the cars in railroad yards or else 
stored on the piers. To remedy this situation at the port of 
New York, a chief storage officer for the port was appointed 
in April, 1918, and was vested with the power of general 
supervision over all storage space, with authority to supervise 
and coordinate the activities of the different bureau representa- 
tives there. This officer was a subordinate of the director of 
storage. The bureau representatives, however, still retained 
the responsibility for supplies in storage and for their assembly 
for overseas shipment. By General Order No. 54, issued June 
2, 1918, this responsibility was tranferred at the primary em- 
barkation ports to the port storage officer, who was thus placed 
in charge of the actual operation of port storage facilities. 

In a memorandum of July 18, 1918, the chief of the pur- 
chase, storage, and traffic division recommended to the chief 
of staflf that " storage ought to be consolidated in one central 
system responsible for the storage of all army supplies. Such 
is the case in all great business systems, and in the English 
and possibly other armies." The first step toward realizing 
this result was the consolidation of the office of quartermaster- 
general with that of the director of purchase and storage, al- 
ready referred to. Between this time and the signing of the 
armistice the storage functions of three other bureaus — the 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 299 

engineers, the medical department, and the signal corps — were 
taken over by the purchase, storage, and traffic division. The 
effect was to transfer the actual operation of most of the 
storage functions of the army to the general staff.**" 

The history of storage consolidation thus shows the same 
stages of evolution as were observed in the case of the con- 
solidation of procurement — first, absolute decentralization ; 
secondly, an unsuccessful attempt at coordination through 
supervision ; and finally, direct consolidation of operating func- 
tions in the general staff. 

A similar development can be traced in the control of the 
transportation of troops and supplies. At the outbreak of the 
war, movements of all troops and supplies by water, and move- 
ments of troops and quartermaster's supplies by land, were 
conducted by the transportation division of the quartermaster's 
corps. Land movements of freight belonging to the other sup- 
ply bureaus were carried out directly by the bureau concerned ; 
and each bureau had its own machinery for handling its own 
transportation problems. With our entrance into the war the 
transportation problem for the army as a whole divided into two 
parts : first, the problem of embarkation and shipment overseas 
of troops and supplies ; and, secondly, the problem of inland 
transportation from the point of origin to the port of embarka- 
tion. At the outset. New York and Newport News were 
designated as ports of embarkation; 88 per cent, of the troops 
shipped overseas passed through New York, For each of 
these ports a commander of the port was appointed, whose 
functions were to plan and supervise the prompt transshipment 
of troops and supplies. He was to make proper arrangements 
for the detraining of troops and material, for the subsistence 
of troops while at the port, and for their subsequent embarka- 
tion; and to prepare schedules for and supervise the embarka- 
tion process. Arrangements for financing, chartering, and 

^~ For a history of the consolidation of storage functions in the 
general staff, see report of chief of staff. War Department, "Annual 
Report," 191 7; Vol. i, pp. 397-410. 



300 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

altering the necessary ships were left with the quartermaster's 
corps. On August 4, 1917, by General Order No. 102 there 
was established in the general staff" an embarkation service " to 
coordinate all shipments of supplies of every kind and all troop 
movements whose ultimate destination is Europe. ... It will 
have direct supervision, under the chief of staff, of all move- 
ments of supplies from points of origin to ports of embarka- 
tion, will supervise the latter, and will control the employment 
of all army transports engaged in the transatlantic service and 
such commercial shipping as may be used to supplement that 
service." At first the service occupied itself with supervising 
and coordinating the ports with each other to meet cabled re- 
quirements, permitting the officers of the transportation divi- 
sion of the quartermaster's corps to continue performing actual 
operations. Gradually, however, control was centered in the 
embarkation service, to which the water transportation branch 
of the transportation division in effect reported."^ The func- 
tions which the embarkation service performed either directly or 
through the transportation division were (a) to allocate troops 
and freight to the various transport vessels ; (b) to supervise the 
loading of troops and freight; (c) to prevent the shipment of 
freight to a port before the port was ready to handle it; (d) to 
trace the movement of freight urgently needed for shipment. 
In December, 1917, the embarkation service became part of 
the newly organized storage and traffic service of the general 
staff', and in April, 1918, of the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division. Through these various reorganizations, however, its 
functions and internal organization remained unaltered. 

The thorniest transportation problem with which the army was 
confronted was that of securing the prompt shipment of freight 
between the source of supply and the embarkation port, and 
at the same time of preventing the shipment until the port was 

•53 Colonel Chauncey Baker, assistant to the chief of the embarkation 
service, was in charge of the transportation division of the quarter- 
master's corps ; testimony of General Hines before Senate subcommittee, 
August 19, 1919, " Hearings " ; p. 232. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 301 

ready to handle it. At the outset, as has been said, these ship- 
ments were under the separate control of the different supply 
bureaus. Just as the bureaus competed for raw materials and 
for manufacturing facilities, so they competed for transporta- 
tion. " A quartermaster officer buying shoes for the American 
Expeditionary Force felt no concern for any possible short- 
ages in railway, warehouse, or steamship facilities from which 
some other division or bureau might be suffering. Nor did 
the engineer corps worry over getting forage or clothing or 
small arms from the farm or factory to the front'. . . . Nat- 
urally the inevitable result followed. In the placing of con- 
tracts, the emphasis was all upon speed, and as the productive 
facilities of the country responded to the urgent demand of the 
hundreds of procurement officers, a vast stream of supplies 
began to flow over the railroads toward the ports of embarka- 
tion. The shipments were soon in excess of the carrying 
capacity of the available ship tonnage, and congestion began at 
the ports. The universal pressure for speed resulted in ship- 
ments of army articles greatly in excess of current needs. And 
with the submarine steadily making the available tonnage still 
more inadequate, such excess shipments meant either that the 
articles would be sent to France in cargo-space more needed 
for other things or that they would be held at the ports, taking 
up much needed space and hindering the f^ow of the great 
current of supply." ^^ 

The method first adopted to remedy this situation was to 
require the supply bureau which desired to make a shipment 
to secttre a transportation release before it made arrangements 
for the shipment with the carrier. These transportation re- 
leases were at the outset granted by the commander of the port 
but after October, 1917, were centralized in the embarkation 
service of the general staff. The issuance of the release was 
contingent upon the capacity of the port to take care of the 
shipment. This measure, however, proved ineffective. The 

"4 Report of chief of staff. War Department, "Annual Report," 1919; 
Vol. I, p. 391. 



302 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

embarkation service had no effective mechanism for holding 
up shipments at the point of origin; and in the absence of such 
a mechanism the regulation was to a considerable extent dis- 
regarded by the shipping officers of the supply bureaus. Con- 
ditions, instead of improving, became worse, and culminated in 
the virtual paralysis of transportation in January, 1918. " Ap- 
proximately 30,000 car-loads of government freight, including 
that of the War Department and that of the Allies, were on 
hand at the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Balti- 
more, Newport News, and Norfolk. There were approximately 
2000 cars under load with War Department property, more 
than 3000 car-loads on piers, and approximately iioo on the 
ground." ^^ 

To meet this situation there was created in the storage and 
traffic branch a division of inland transportation on January 
10.^^ A director of inland transportation was appointed who 
was to " have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to routing 
and inland transportation of all troops and property by what- 
ever means of transport. He shall prepare and promulgate 
for the information and guidance of those interested a system 
and uniform plan for the conduct of the business of the divi- 
sion. Bureau chiefs, commanding officers, depot quarter- 
masters, and all other officers shall provide such assistance as 
may be required from time to time." To prevent future con- 
gestion it was provided that henceforward no shipments to 
embarkation ports or other congested points should be accepted 
by the carriers at points of origin except with the approval of 
the director of inland transportation. This approval was to 
be evidenced by a transportation order which not only allowed 
the shipments to be made but operated as an order to the 
carrier to furnish the necessary transportation. The supply 
bureaus, when they wished to arrange for an overseas ship- 
ment, had to obtain a release from the embarkation service and 

^^' Testimony of Brigadier-General Frank Hincs, before Senate sub- 
committee, Aup^ust 19, 1919, "Hearings"; p. 240. 

^" The personnel of this service was largely recruited from ex- 
perienced railroad men. 



AN ARMY OF HUMAN BEINGS 303 

to present this release to the inland transportation division in 
applying for the transportation order without which the ship- 
ment could not move from the point of origin. The director 
of inland transportation was made a member of the Railroad 
Administration, and through the control which the GovernmenL 
has assumed of the roads it became possible to make mandatory 
upon the carriers the observance of the transportation order 
requirement. 

By order of June 8, 1918, the separate transportation units 
in the various supply bureaus were abolished, and their func- 
tions transferred to the division of inland transportation, which 
was renamed the inland traffic service. In this way all in- 
land transportation of army freight was centralized in a single 
offi.ce. 

The inland traffic service also cooperated in inland move- 
ment of troops, serving as an intermediary between the em- 
barkation service and the troop movem.ent section of the Rail- 
road xALdministration.*"" 

The last field in which the termination of hostilities found 
the general staff acting as an operating department was that 
of finance. At the outbreak of the war each of the five supply 
bureaus had its own disbursing officers and its own system of 
fiscal accounts. These systems were quite independent and 
received no outside supervision except an occasional inspection 
by representatives of the inspector-general's department."^ In 
addition to the financial operations of the supply bureaus, funds 
were disbursed by the general staff corps, the militia bureau, 
the inspector-general's department, and the office of the secre- 

^^ This summary of the traffic work of the general staff has been 
based on the report of chief of staff, War Department. "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, pp. 377-397- See also testimony of Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Frank Hines before Senate subcommittee on Military Affairs, 
August 19, 1919, Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, " Hearings on 
Senate Bills 2691, 2693, and 2715"; pp. 231-252: before House Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, October 14, 1919, Sixty-Sixth Congress, 
first session, "Hearings on H. R. 8287, etc."; pp. 991-1027. 

•'^ Officers of this department were not trained accountants but em- 
ployed to some extent the assistance of trained clerks. 



304 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

tary of war. In short there were ten agencies in* the War 
Department which were handhng funds. A fundamental diffi- 
culty existed in the system by which money appropriations for 
the army were made by Congress. Jealousy of military power 
and a desire by Congress to retain control of the details of 
army administration has led to the practice of allotting in 
every annual army appropriation bill a definite sum to each of 
the expending bureaus for a definite purpose, and money al- 
lotted for one purpose can not be utilized for another 
purpose. The army appropriations were divided into water- 
tight compartments the contents of which were not trans fer- 
able.'"'^ No alteration in this system was possible through ad- 
ministrative action even under the Overman Bill, and all that 
could be done was to improve the machinery of accounting and 
disbursement. Theoretically control was centered in the sec- 
retary of war; but the secretary had no machinery for exercis- 
ing it and there was " no opportunity and no agency 
to review the financial operations of the War Department 
as a whole. No one could tell the entire balances 
of the army." "'^ Each bureau was supposed to know its own 
deficiencies or surpluses, but often did not. " The great 
bulk of the War Department funds was naturally handled by 

^"An example of the working of the system is given in the fol- 
lowing: "We had a liberal appropriation for the purchase of animals. 
Owing to a change in military policy and the urgent need of shipping 
troops, the shipping of animals was discontinued, and consequently 
the purchase of horses was stopped, so that when the year 1918 expired, 
there was a balance of $32,000,000 left under the appropriations for 
'horses for cavalry, artillery, and engineers.' Notwithstanding that, 
the secretary of war was obliged to go before the Congress and call 
for a deficiency to meet certain demands that had arisen. If he had 
had budgetary authority to use that balance, he could have avoided or 
reduced the amount he was obliged to request from Congress." Gen- 
eral Lord, " Hearings before House Committee on Military Aflfairs, on 
H. R. 8287, etc.," Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, October 20, 1919; 
p. 1679. 

70 General Lord. Ibid.; p. 1685. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 305 

the five supply bureaus, each of which had its own finance sys- 
tem. The organization and functions of these sections varied 
greatly. Terminology employed, forms used, methods of pro- 
cedure followed, and the character of the records maintained 
differed widely. There was no uniformity of classification as 
to the exact purposes for which funds were spent. As a result 
it was impossible without going through a mass of individual 
vouchers to determine the total expenditures of the War 
Department for single items, or, in some cases, the itemized 
expenditures of a single bureau. Property accountability, the 
preparation of appropriation expenditures, the recording, filing, 
and execution of contracts, the settlement of claims, etc., were 
handled by the finance sections of some of the bureaus, but not 
by others." ^^ 

With the creation of the office of director of purchase on 
January ii, 1918, there was established under him a unit known 
as the fiscal section " for supervising the preparation of finan- 
cial estimates and expenditure of appropriations." This section 
became the finance section of the purchase, storage, and traffic 
division on May 8, 1919, and was charged (i) with standardiz- 
ing and coordinating all fiscal accounting methods in the several 
bureaus; (2) preparation in budget form of estimates for the 
entire War Department; (3) furnishing reports at stated inter- 
vals of accounts for the entire War Department. The powers 
of the finance section were supervisory, not operating ; and here, 
as elsewhere, supervision over several operating agencies tended 
to duplication, conflicts of authority, and divided responsibility. 
It was inevitably a half-way stage toward consolidation of oper- 
ation. This was effected on October 1 1 when the finance section 
was superseded by the finance department, headed by a director 
of finance, who was given direct responsibility for and authority 
over disbursements, money accounts, property accounts, fiscal 
reports, and the preparation of estimates for the entire army. 

^1 Report of chief of stafif, War Department, "Annual Report," 1919', 
Vol. I, p. 375. 



3o6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

In this office were consolidated the finance functions of all the 
bureaus, and the new organization took over their offices and 
personnel.'- The director of finance at once called to his assist- 
ance an advisory council consisting of a number of prominent 
financiers, among whom were Otto H. Kahn, of Kuhn, Loeb, 
& Co. ; C. D. Norton, president of the First National Bank of 
New York; and Charles G. Dawes, president of the Central 
Trust Co. of Chicago. This step, like the utilization of railroad 
men in the inland traffic service, goes to illustrate once more 
the policy which was observed in connection with the draft 
administration of resort by the Government to the assistance 
of civilian experts. 

The removal of finance operations from the bureaus and their 
consolidation in a central agency met with particularly strong 
opposition from the bureau chiefs. Pages of Congressional 
hearings are filled with their complaints. The measure, how- 
ever, had the endorsement of prominent financiers who had 
studied the problem, including Secretary Glass of the Treasury; 
and it effected two improvements in army policy. In the first 
place, it made it possible for the first time to get a complete 
and accurate survey of army finances at any given moment; 
and, secondly, it made possible mobilized action with con- 
sequent saving in such matters as purchase and sale of foreign 
money, transmission of credits overseas, and a proper schedule 
of allotting appropriations through the year. The bureau 
chiefs retained power to control the expenditure of money 
allotted to their bureaus ; but the funds of the department as a 
whole were kept massed for greater economy and effectiveness. 

In 1919 the finance department was severed from the general 
staff and became a separate operating bureau along with the 
other bureaus. At the same time steps were taken toward the 

"2 The consolidation of disbursements in the United States followed 
an earlier application of the same method to disbursements in France. 
See General Lord, " Hearings Before Senate subcommittee," October 
6, 1919; p. 1071. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 307 

preparation of a "budget scheme for the army and a modifica- 
tion of the system of non- transferable appropriations.''^ 

6 

/ 

At the close of the war it became necessary to determine 

what features of the emergency organization of the army 
should be embodied in permanent legislation. So far as con- 
cerns the general staff, this seems the proper place to summarize 
the result. 

The first project for army reorganization put forward after 
the armistice was a bill prepared by the War Department and 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Chairman Dent 
of the Military Affairs Committee on January 16, 19 19 (Sixty- 
Fifth Congress, third session, H. R. 14560). The provisions 
of this bill dealing with the general staff w'ere substantially re- 
I)roduced in the bill introduced in the Senate on August 4, 1919, 
at the instance of the War Department. General March stated 
that the bill was " licked into shape " by a committee consisting 
of himself. General Goethals, and the heads of the war plans, 
operations, and .military intelligence 'divisions of the general 
staff.'* The bill therefore represented the post-war views of 
the general staff. 

In this bill it was provided that the general staff should consist 
of 231 officers, and 378 non-commissioned officers and enlisted 
men. The chief of staff was to have the rank of general and 

"3 For a summary of the work of the Finance Department, see the 
following: Report of chief of staff, War Department, "Annual Re- 
port," 1919; Vol. I, pp. Z72)-Z77, 410-414: testimony of General Lord 
before Senate subcommittee on Military Affairs, October 6, 1919, 
" Hearings before Senate Committee on Military Affairs, on S. 2691, 
etc."; Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session; pp. 1065-1131; October 17, 
1919, " Hearings on H. R. 8287, etc." ; Sixty-Sixth Congress, first ses- 
sion ; pp. 1569-1684. 

7* Hearings before Senate subcommittee on Military Affairs, Au- 
gust 8. 1919, Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, " Hearings on S. 2691, 
etc, " ; p. 84. 



3o8 'I'lII': r.lMI.DING Ol'^ AN ARMY 

l.ilso precedoncc omt all other officers of the army.'''' The 
(Iitail of officers in llie j^etieral staff was to he for four years 
and no lon^^-r ; and no officer 'was to he ch^'lhle for a further 
detail until allerat least two years' service in the line, except in 
the event of war. The chief of stafT, mxler the direction of 
the President, was to " have su])ervision of all aj^'encies and 
finutiiins of the military estalilishnient." lie was to he "the 
immediate adviser of the secretary of war in .all matters relating 
to the military estahlishmint," and " hy authority of and in the 
nrune of the secri-tary of war" was to "issue such orders as 
will insure that tlie policies of the War Department are harmon- 
iously executed hy the several corps, hmeaus, and oilier aj^en- 
cies of the military estahlishment." The general stafT corps, 
under the diicction of the chief of stalT, was to " prepare ])lans 
for the national di-fense and for the niohili/.ation of the military 
forces in time of war; to investigate and icport on all (|uestions 
affecting- the effuiency of the army and its state of preparation, 
for military operations; to render prcjfessional aid and assist- 
.mce to the secretary of w.ar :md to t^eni'ral ofiicers and other 
superior commanders, and to act as their agents in informing 
.'uid co(")rdinating the .action of all the corps, hureaus, and agen- 
cies which are sid»jecl mider this act to the sn])ervision of the 
chief of stall"; and tt) perf(«ni such other military duties not 
otherwise assigned l)y law as may from time to time he pre- 
scrihcd hy the President." Section 5 of the National Defense 
Act, containing the restrictive language which h;ul caused trouhle 
in 1916/" was to he expressly repealed. The i)olicy of the ( )ver- 
man Act, conferring on the President power to assign, withdraw, 
and redistrihule in his discretion the functions of the various 
bureaus was to he continued as to the army : " The President 
sh.'dl have authority to make such distrihution or redistrihution 
of the duties, juiwers, functions, records, property, and person- 

"f* It had hoiii provided l)y tlie Army Appropri.itioii Act approved 
May T2. Itn7, tliat the chief of slalT was to take r;mk and preeedcinc 
over all other olVieers of tlic ;iriny (.|0 Statutes at l..nr>.H'; j). .)6) , his 
rank was raised to that of Rcneral hy act of Octohcr 6, 1917. 

'" See idiovc, p. 26^' 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 309 

nel of such previously existing departments, bureaus, and offices 
as he may deem necessary for the efficiency of the miHtary 
service." ^^ This very broad power would have allowed the 
War Department to transfer bureau functions to the general 
staff without restriction; and the object of the clause seems 
to have been to make possible the continuance of the general 
staff organization and functions as they stood at the end of 
the war. 

Considering the duties which the bill thus laid upon the 
general staff, together with the size of the permanent army 
which it at the same time provided for — 500,000 men — the 
proposed increase in the number of general staff officers to 231 
was hardly excessive. Even apart from the continuance of 
administrative duties by the staff, the number is not excessive 
when compared with the size of the staffs maintained by other 
great powers before the outbreak of the war.''^ An important 
factor in this connection was the plan of the War Department 
to increase the number of general staff offi/:ers serving with 
troops. Only ninety-seven officers and no non-commissioned 
officers or enlisted men were to be kept on duty in Washington. 
The new permanent army was to be organized into corps and 
divisions, and each of these was to be provided with a staff in 
which officers would be trained for the performance of such 
staff duties in the field as had been found necessary in the 
American Expeditionary Force in France.''^ 

Nevertheless, the eize of the proposed general staff met with 
violent opposition in Congress/ In his analysis of the War 
Department's bill, Senator Chamberlain thus comments on it: 

'^'■'Section i. For the bill as introduced on January 16, 1919, see 
" Hearings before House Committee on Military Affairs," Sixty-Fifth 
Congress, third session, H. R. 14560, Washington, Government Print- 
ing-Office, 1919; pp. 3 ff. 

7=* French general staff, 1914, 644 officers ; German general staff, 650 
officers ; British general staff, 232 officers ; Japanese general staff, 234 
officers. 

'''•> Testimony of General March before House Committee on Military 
Affairs, September 12, 1919, Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, "Hear- 
ings on H. R. 8287, etc."; pp. 123-125. 



310 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

" It will be difficult to convince any one, not a present or a pro- 
spective member of the general staff corps, and who is reason- 
ably well informed as to the affairs of the War Department and 
the army, that there is the slightest necessity either in peace or 
in war for a general staff corps of 231 officers, top-heavy with 
military rank of the highest grades. Undoubtedly the pro- 
ponents of such an organization will undertake to defend it by 
asserting that it is urgently needed because of the vast amount 
of business that was transferred to the general staff, under the 
Overman Act, from the various bureaus of the War Depart- 
ment during the recent war, and that it is one of the purposes 
of the present bill to make that transfer permanent. The re- 
joinder will be that there never was any reason for taking that 
business away from the bureaus, or for refusing to return it 
to them, other than a desire of the general staff for self- 
aggrandizement; that whatever inefficiency there was among 
them at the outbreak of the war was mainly due to the utter 
unpreparedness of both the War Department and the army for 
war, and that after the transfer to the general staff it increased 
rather than diminished, nothwithstanding a reckless expen- 
diture of a vast amount of money; and, finally, that if the 
general staff would confine itself to its legitimate duty of super- 
vising the work of the bureaus, instead of doing that work, the 
fifty-five officers authorized for the general staff corps b}^ the 
National Defense Act would be an ample allowance in time of 
peace." ^° This view finally prevailed, and in the bill which 
became law on June 4, 1920, the number of officers to be de- 
tailed to the general staff was fixed at ninety-two. 

It seems to have been the intention of the War Department 
to continue the functions and organization of the purchase, 
storage, and traffic division of the general staff as they existed 
at the close of the war. This was urged by Secretary Baker 
as the reason of the War Department's desire for the new 

80 "Army Reorganization Bill (S. 2715); Analytical and Explanatory 
Statement by Senator Georjie Chamberlain ; printed for use of Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs " ; September 5, 1919. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 311 

general staff legislation : " As the result of the war we think 
we have discovered a better relationship of the staff to the 
army, and of the staff to the bureaus, a better organization 
of the War Department. I doubt whether that could be legally 
carried on without this legislation." ^^ General March urged 
the same thing : " Any general staff which would be organized 
would necessarily embrace four principal divisions. Those 
divisions are : operation ; military intelligence ; purchase, stor- 
age, and traffic, which is the coordination of all the supply 
systems ; and what we call the war plans division, which studies 
strategy and plans of campaign. The matter of supplies and 
purchases is a marked change over what occurred before the 
war." 82 

The retention of these supply functions by the general staff 
met, however, with determined opposition from a long list 
of bureau chiefs who testified before the committees of Con- 
gress. Their objections crystallize into two : that the new 
system was less efficient than the bureau system of procure- 
ment; and that it involved duplication of effort and was more 
expensive. General Williams of the ordnance department com- 
plained that under the system of consolidated procurement the 
arsenals found difficulty in getting from the central purchasing 
agency the exact articles fitted to their technical requirements : 
they would call for " King Cutting-Oil," which they had found 
better than any other, and be supplied with a different brand. 
Great delay was experienced in receiving articles requisitioned. 
Clerical work was enormously increased by the number of new 
reports and forms which had to be filled out. He thought little 
was to be gained by removing the function of purchase of 
manufacturing material from manufacturing establishments like 
the arsenals. " In this matter of consolidated purchases there 

81 " Hearings, House Committee, Sixty-Fifth Congress, third session, 
H. R. 14560, etc."; p. 21. 

^^ " Hearings, Senate subcommittee, Sixty-Sixth Congress, first ses- 
sion, S. 2691, etc."; p. 77. These hearings will hereafter be referred 
to as " Senate Hearings." 



312 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

has been a great deal of specious argument. ... In passing 
from a peace to a war condition there comes a time when the 
different government bureaus unless coordinated will be compet- 
ing against each other. Just as soon as it becomes evident that 
there is not enough of any particular kind of material to go 
around, then competition becomes a serious thing and has got to 
be regulatel. But as soon as 3'^ou get on the war basis, the ques- 
tion of competition passes, and you get to a condition of ab- 
solute regulation and allocation of material and fixing of 
prices." ^^ This regulation and allocation General Sibert of 
the chemical warfare service and General Coe of the coast 
artillery thought should be administered through some such 
outside agency as the War Industries Board.^* 

Most of the bureau chiefs were opposed to consolidation 
of procurement altogether, irrespective of whether or not the 
central procuring agency was to be the general staff. General 
Sibert suggested a different solution, which corresponded with 
their point of view: 

Senator Chamberlain : "How far do you think that we should go 
back, then, to the system that obtained on April 6, 1917?" 

General Sibert : " I do not see any fault with that system." 

The Chairman (Senator Wadsworth) : "It broke down, General. We 
had chaos here for a year after we went into the war. Something 
was wrong." 

General Sibert: "Any old machine that suddenly has put on it about 
a thousand times its ordinary load will break down under ordinary 
circumstances. The principal element of this machine was the general 
staff. , . . The general staff did not meet the situation by previous 
planning. They should have worked out a plan for the ordnance depart- 
ment and a plan for the quartermaster's department, and for all the 
departments to meet such a situation; worked out conjointly by such 
departments and the general staff. This is the general staff function. 
Now if a complete plan had been worked out and had been made ready 
on file for each of the bureaus of the War Department to meet the 

83 " Hearings, House Committee on Military Affairs, Sixty-Sixth Con- 
gress, first session, H. R. 8287, etc."; p. 502. These hearings hereafter 
referred to as "House Hearings." 

84 "House Hearings"; p. 55^, 1036. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 313 

general situation in case of a war of this magnitude, why could not 
that plan have been followed? " ^^ 

The inadequacy of such a suggestion is, however, clear, 
The exact nature and size of any emergency is not predictable 
until it occurs. Everything depends on the current state of 
a thousand things which can not be foreseen — the state of 
the leather supply, wool supply, copper market, ocean ton- 
nage, and so on. Plans can not be made beforehand to cover 
every possible permutation and combination of future circum- 
stances. What is needed is an organization which will expand 
flexibly and make possible rapid adjustment to circumstances 
when they arise. 

Among the most thorough-going advocates of consolidation 
of procurement, on the other hand, a number were not in 
favor of making the general staff the central procuring agency. 
General Goethals, himself the chief of the purchase, storage, 
and traffic division, was among these. General Goethals ad- 
vocated the creation of a separate supply corps for the army. 

The Qiairman : " General, reverting to that suggestion I made a 
moment ago as to the supply department and its connection, if any, 
with the general staff as such : Do you believe that a supply depart- 
ment such as you in effect established is a proper part of the general 
staff?" 

General Goethals : " No ; . . . but conditions were such during the 
war, especially on the supply question, when somebody had to do some- 
thing — it did not make a particle of difference whether it was a 
general staff officer or a line officer — somebody had to do it." 

Senator Fletcher : '" Do you think in peace times it is necessary to 
have such an organization as you have ? " 

General Goethals : " Not such a big organization, but I believe that 
such an organization ought to exist. It is simply absurd for two or 
more branches of the army for instance to be buying woolen clothing, 
or cotton goods; several buying leather goods, several buying hard- 
ware. When I looked into the situation with regard to hardware, 
the hardware men showed me the purchases to be made by the various 
bureaus, and the total amount required by the various bureaus of the 
War Department exceeded the production of the United States in 
hardware. Now that was an absurd condition. The central supply 

^^ " Senate Hearings " ; p. t,27' 



314 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

service should cover all standard commodities ; the various bureaus 
would draw the specifications and the supply department would purchase 
them. I would leave to the bureaus the technical articles that require 
technical service, technical knowledge." s" 

General Goethals went on to outline the details of the supply 
corps which he proposed. He thought it should be composed 
of a military rather than of a civilian personnel. In time of 
peace a competent civilian personnel could not be secured at 
the salaries which the Government would be willing to pay. Also 
he thought that the personnel should be permanent. " I am 
opposed to the detail system. One of the reasons that the 
quartermaster's department broke down was that as soon as 
the war came- on, all the detailed officers who were any account 
wanted to get out with the troops ; that is where they properly 
belonged, and they did get out, and their places were filled 
by commissioning a number of clerks in various divisions of 
the quartermaster's department with the expectation that they 
would continue to perform the functions they previously per- 
formed. General Bliss, who was then chief of staff, objected 
to that and had the men ordered away; and it disrupted the 
department pretty badly." ^^ 

The most elaborate plan for doing away with the defects 
of the bureau system of procurement was presented by Assis- 
tant Secretary of War Crowell, whose duties had been in the 
main in connection with mu-nitions. His proposal looked rather 
in the direction of coordinated interbureau procurement. He 
described his plan as follows : 

" All the functions of the War Department can be divided into two 
main groups, the military function and the munition and supply func- 
tion. At the head of the War Department stands the secretary of war, 
and he should naturally have two advisers. The head of the military 
establishment should advise the secretary of war on all military matters. 
I am proposing the abolition of the present office of assistant secretary 
of war and the creation of an under-secretary of war, or chief of 
munitions, to advise the secretary of war on all matters relating to 
munitions and the supply of the army. . . . The head of the military 

^*5 " Senate Hearings"; pp. 1031-1032. 
^Ubid.; p. 1036. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 315 

establishment would therefore have charge of all military' matters such 
as the training of troops, the operation of troops, etc. He should have 
no authority whatever over industrial matters. The chief of munitions 
on the other hand should with his staff have charge of all matters 
relating to the munitioning of the army, but should have no voice 
in military matters. . . . The actual reorganization of the War Depart- 
ment to meet these general principles is very simple; in fact, it requires 
little change from the organization which we had wihen we entered the 
war. The director of munitions should of course be a civilian, since 
it is very rare that an officer of the army is temperamentally fitted to 
head a huge supply organization. The military mind and the industrial 
mind are entirely different. Since he must be a close adviser of the 
secretary of war and have authority he should fill the position of 
assistant secretary of war. The duties of the assistant secretary previous 
to 191 8 could profitably be handed over to other officiaJs. Under the 
director of munitions would be grouped all problems of purchase and 
procurement, of storage and transportation. To the corps and bureaus 
as they now exi^t would fall the duty and function of the problems for 
which they were severally created. However, in order that inter- 
bureau competition should be eliminated in the matter of purchases, 
storage, etc., the director of munitions should be vested by law with 
authority to standardize procurement and distribute and redistribute the 
function of purchase as applied to specific articles, especially where they 
are common to the operation of two or more bureaus, as best experience 
would dictate. With this strong supervisory power in the director 
of munitions will be found, I believe, the solution of the much-criticized 
condition of purchases in the War Department prior to the operation of 
the Overman Act. Directly under the director of munitions would 
be a small group of men designed to coordinate the supply functions 
of the bureaus. In time of peace this would be limited to a very 
few men. Under this small coordinating body should be placed the 
supply bureaus. None of these bureaus are wholly devoted to sup- 
plies ; they all have military functions connected with them, and the 
legislation should direct that in all supply matters these bureaus and 
departments should report to and function under the director of 
munitions, and in all military matters they should function under and 
report to the head of the military establishment." *^ 

The Chairman (Senator Wadsworth) : "The subcommittee has had in 
mind the establishment, either under the name of the quartermaster 
corps or other appropriate name, of a department of supply which 

88 "Senate Hearings"; pp. 1761-1762: "House Hearings"; pp. 1803- 
1804. 



3i6 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

should be charged with the procurement or purchase of all articles whose 
issue or use is common to two or more branches or corps of the army, 
and leaving thereby, by implication, the procurement of technical 
material to the staff corps." 

Mr. Crowell : "Would this supply corps function under a depart- 
ment of purchase, storage, and traffic of the general staff?" 

The Chairman : " Lacking any other suggestion or new legislation of 
that kind, it would operate under the general staff just as all these 
bureaus are operating to-day; it would be coordinated by the general 
staff." 

Mr. Crowell: "I do not favor general staff coordination of industrial 
matters. . . . Under the organization existing to-day there might arise 
a conflict between the chief of operations of the general staff and the 
chief of the purchase, storage, and traffic division, the former insisting 
that certain supplies could be obtained as planned and the latter 
insisting that they could not be obtained in that quantity or of that 
particular type. Under the organization existing to-day their difficulty 
would be settled by the chief of staff. Under the organization I propose 
if there were a conflict between the general staff and the director of 
munitions, the secretary of war would settle the matter. I am anxious 
to take from the jurisdiction of the general staff all matters which are 
industrial in their nature." 

The Chairman : " To speak frankly of this matter, this subcommittee 
is a little weary of the friction that exists between the bureaus and 
the staff on the one side and between the different bureaus themselves; 
and if we could get it straightened out in the law, prescribing certain 
general principles by which the bureaus would govern themselves, and 
the general staff govern itself, we would be happy." 

Mr. Crowell : " Under the plan I have suggested there would be no 
friction between the bureaus and the general staff because they would 
nowhere come in contact. The friction between the bureaus them- 
selves I think could be better handled by the method I have outlined; 
I do not think the general staff ought to meddle in matters of pro- 
duction under any circumstances." ^'^ 

6 

The plan finally adopted by Congress and embodied in the 
Army Act of 1920 was a compromise between Mr. Crowell's 
proposals and the plan for a consolidated supply bureau. The 

83 "Senate Hearings"; pp. 1769-1771. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 317 

offices of second assistant secretary of war and third assistant 
secretary of war were abolished and provision was made for an 
assistant secretary of war in charge of munitions at an annual 
salary of $10,000. It is provided that this official shall super- 
vise the procurement of all army supplies. " Under the direc-^. 
tion of the secretary of war chiefs of branches of the army/ 
charged with the procurement of supplies for the army shall / 
report directly to the assistant secretary of war regarding all 
matters of procurement. He shall cause to be manufactured 
and produced at the government arsenals or government- 
owned factories of the United States all such supplies or 
articles needed by the War Department as said arsenals or 
government owned factories are capable of manufacturing or 
producing on an economical basis. . , . There shall be detailed 
to the office of the assistant secretary of war such number of 
officers and civilian employees as may be authorized by regula- 
tions approved by the secretary of war." 

At the same time provision was made to consolidate procure- 
ment functions in large measure in the quartermaster corps. 
" The quartermaster-general, under the authority of the sec- 
etary of war, .shall be charged with the purchase and pro- 
curement for the army of all supplies of standard manufacture 
and of all supplies common to two or more branches, but not 
with the purchase or procurement of special or technical 
articles to be used or issued exclusively by other supply depart- 
ments; . . . with the storage and issue of supplies; . . . with 
the transportation of the army by land and water including the 
transportation of troops and supplies, with the furnishing of 
means of transportation of all classes and kinds acquired by the 
army . . . provided, that special and technical articles used or 
issued exclusively by other branches of the service may be 
purchased or procured with the approval of the assistant sec- 
retary of war by the branches using or issuing such articles, 
and the chief of each branch may be charged with the storage 
and issue of property pertaining thereto." 



3i8 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The provisions of the new act conferring on the assistant sec- 
retary of war statutory control over munitions were adversely 
criticized by Secretary Baker before the Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs. " I think it unfortunate that the sections as 
drawn with regard to the under-secretary give him a certain 
amount of independence of the secretary of war. The under- 
secretary ought to be, just as the chief of staff is, a subordinate 
of the secretary of war, to do what he is directed to do. and 
that direction ought to be elastic, so that the secretary of war 
can add to his functions or take away from his functions as 
the convenience of business and the talents of the two men 
justify." The secretary might be a lawyer; he would then 
want his under-secretary to be a business man who would take 
charge of the business work of the department; or the sec- 
retary himself might be a business man who would want to 
control personally that end of the work and who would want 
an under-secretary to handle legal matters. " It ought to be 
left open to the secretary of war to assign to the under-sec- 
retary such functions as he wants him to perform, and either 
diminish or increase the assignments as the successfu-l operation 
of the department from time to time necessitates." He also 
thought there was a chance for divided responsibility which 
might result in trouble. 

The Chairman (Senator Wadsworth) : "But I think, on reading the 
language, you will find that the secretary of war in every instance is 
absolute master." 

Secretary Baker : " Only to this extent : The under-secretary is to 
perform the statutory functions that are given him under regulations to 
be prescribed by the secretary of war. So it becomes a question of the 
secretary of war making such detailed regulations as practically amount 
to administration, or else the secretary has no function at all. ... I 
do not think there would be any difficulty between the secretary of war 
and the under-secretary because as soon as the under-secretary failed 
to be in harmony with his chief he would of course be replaced ; but 
I think that any senator or member of Congress or citizen ought to be 
able to go to the secretary of war to find the last resort in the War 
Department, and not be shown some statute which said that a part 
of the secretary of war's power had been conferred on somebody else, 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 319 

with the responsibility that goes along with it. That is what this 
amounts to." ^0 

In fact there are a number of provisions in the Army Act 
of 1920 which seem to aim at limiting the control of the sec- 
retary of war over the army and centralizing that control not 
indeed in the general staff, but in Congress. The first is the 
vesting of the under-secretary with statutory control over / 
munitions. The second is the establishment of a war council.-. 
The third is the provision which authorizes Congress to call 
for a report from the general staff without the consent and 
over the head of the secretary of war. 

The war council which the act creates is to consist of the 
secretary of war, the assistant secretary of war, the chief of 
staff, and the general of the army,®^ and is required to hold 
periodical meetings for the consideration of military and supply 
problems. It is expressly provided that the secretary of war 
after considering the recommendations of the various members 
of the council shall determine finally the policy of the depart- 
ment; but the necessity of consulting the cou.ncil which the 
act imposes on the secretary will inevitably operate to limit 
somewhat his freedom of discretion. As Secretary Baker put 
it : "I have a very strong sympathy with the statement- of a 

°o " Testimony of the Hon. Newton D. Baker before Senate Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, Sixty-Sixth Congress, second session, \ 
January 21, 1920"; pp. 21-23. ^—^ 

^1 This post was created for General Pershing by act of Congress 
approved September 3, 1919. (41 Statutes at Large, p. 283). The act 
revived the office of " General of the Armies of the United States," 
and authorized the President to appoint to it " a general officer who on 
foreign soil and during the recent war had been especially distinguished 
in the higher military command." Any provision of existing law 
which would enable any other officer to take rank over the holder of 
the office of "general" was repealed. (This provision was introduced 
to do away with the provision of the act of May 12, 1917 which gave 
the chief of staff precedence over all other officers of the army). No 
more than one appointment was to be made to the office of " General," 
— i. e. on the termina^tion of the incumbency of the first appointee, the 
office was to lapse. 



320 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

famous general that war councils never fight. I object to you 
making the secretary of war listen to anybody that he does not 
want to hear. There might be things upon which a secretary 
of war had his mind made up, and if you put down a statutory 
provision that he has to sit .down and listen while two men 
debate things that he does not want to hear, that seems to be 
an unnecessary provision." ®^ In consequence of this criticism, 
the form of the provision as enacted was somewhat weakened 
from the shape in which it was originally drawn. 
/jThe other provision of the Army Act which I have men- 
''tioned as tending to curtail the authority of the secretary of 
war is that which requires- the secretary to submit to Congress 
in connection with any proposed legislation the recommenda- 
tions of the appropriate subdivision of the general staff/' Ob- 
viously the effect of this provision is that in case of a disagree- 
ment between the secretary of war and some subordinate 
division of the general staff regarding legislation falling within 
its province, the general staff officers will be able to get their 
view before Congress and, as it were, try their controversy 
with their chief before a Congressional committee. Congress 
becomes the court of appeal in disputes between the general 
staff and the secretary of war. The W^r Department is 
divided and final control is vested in the legislative body."' 
Much is to be said for Secretary Baker's view that the War 
Department should speak to Congress as a unit through the 
secretary of war. 

The effect of the Army Act is to strip the general staff of all 
purchase and supply functions. The act goes further and re- 
enacts expressly the provision of the National Defense Act 
denying to the general staff all administrative functions. What- 
ever may be said of the advisability of having the staff 
perform operating functions — and the opinion of both 

^^Ihid.; p. 23. 

^3 The origin of this provision is probably to be found in Secretary 
Baker's refusal to sulimit to Congress proposals for universal military 
training prepared by the general staff. See " Hearings before House 
Committee on Military Affairs, January 16, 1919 " ; pp. 26-35. 



THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY 321 

General Pershing ^* and General Goethals ^^ is that it should 
not perform those functions — still the wisdom is questionable 
of attempting to draw a hard and fast line in a statute where 
no such hard and fast line can be drawn in fact. General 
Leonard Wood has well shown the difficulty : " Too many 
limitations on the function of the general staff may cause 
trouble. Take, for instance, the case of an ammunition-cais- 
son. The question arises as to how many rounds of ammuni- 
tion are to be carried in each caisson. The chief of ordnance 
may think that only a certain number should be carried. The 
artillery may feel that a larger number is necessary for the 
tactical purposes of the army. A case of this kind did actually 
arise, and the differences had to be coordinated. Yet on the 
surface it would appear that the issue was a mere administra- 
tive detail whereas it was nothing of the kind."'"' 

iThe attitude of Congress toward the general staff, since the 
war as before it, remains in general one of hostility. A re- 
sponsible member of the House summarized the effect of the 
new legislation as follows : " Another thing this bill does is . 
to reenact the provision of the National Defense Act that pro- 
vides that the general staff will no longer serve as an operating 
force in the War Department. We eliminate them from the 
duties which they assumed during the war, not only to give 
advice on military matters and to prepare military plans, but 
they actually operated all of the bureaus of the War Depart- 
ment during the war, and in my opinion were responsible for 
the era of chaos, confusion, and extravagance that resulted 
from such domination. Under this bill we divorce absolutely 
the general staff from such operations and return them to their 
own field to offer advice and prepare plans." ^^ 

3* " House Hearings " ; p. 1482. 

ss See above, p. 313. 

^'^ See " Senate Hearings " ; p. 660. See also testimony of Colonel 
Palmer, ibid.; p. 1226. 

"■^ This is taken from the speech of the Hon. D. R. Anthony of 
Kansas, March 8, 1920, on introducing in the House of Representatives 
the bill which subsequently became the Army Act of 1920. 



322 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Such criticism is ungenerous as well as unfair. As General 
Goethals put it, the war produced a situation where something 
had to be done and somebody had to do it, and the general 
staff was the only body available. It is Hkely that the staff is 
not the best possible body to perform the functions which they 
performed daring the war. Before the war there was no 
machinery at all for performing those functions. The Army 
Act of 1920 establishes new machinery which in the light of ex- 
perience is probably in many points of view better adapted for ' 
the task than the general staff would be.^^ 

^® The finance department is retained as a separate bureau of the 
army by the new Army Act. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE ARMY ACT OF I92O 
I 

"Y T /"ITH the conclusion of the armistice the attention of 
VV ^'^^ country at once turned impatiently to the matter 
of demobilization, the popular desire being to get the men out 
of uniform as quickly as possible. In this unfavorable atmos- 
phere, the War Department was confronted with the task 
not merely of shaping a permanent army policy for the coming 
years of peace, but more immediately of getting some make- 
shift policy adopted which in the meanwhile would not leave 
the country denuded of military defens^ By the Stone 
Amendment of June 15, 1917,^ it had been provided that all 
men serving under the Selective Service Act should be dis- 
charged within four months after the conclusion of peace; and 
by the Selective Service Act itself enlistments in the Regular 
Army and the Federalized National Guard were to expire on 
the termination of the emergency. It could not then be fore- 
seen that many months would elapse before an official peace 
was signed, and the prospect was imminent that if legislation 
was not speedily passed the United States might find itself 
without any army at all. 

Accordingly on January 16, 1919, a bill was introduced in 
the House of Representatives at the request of the adminis- 
tration - which Secretary Baker told the House Committee on 
Military Affairs was not to be taken as embodying a permanent 

140 StatuteTs at Large, 217. 
2 " New York Times," June 17 ; p. 7, column 3. 

323 



324 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

policy.^ It must be admitted, however, that the bill bore the 
appearance of something more than a temporary makeshift.* 
It was a short bill which authorized the continuance of the in- 
ternal organization of the army as it had been developed dur- 
ing the war by making permanent so far as the army was con- 
cerned the powers which the President had exercised under 
the Overman Act ; and it provided for a Regular Army with 
an enlisted strength of 509,909 enlisted men. Now 500,000 
was the figure which the general staff had been recommending 
for the permanent size of the Regular Army ever since 1912; 
and the impression prevailed that the existing situation was 
being used as an opportunity to get this policy enacted into 
law. Mr. Baker, when asked by a member of the committee 
to explain why he recommended an army larger than the coun- 
try had ever before had in time of peace, repHed: "It is 
because of the future situation. We have no means of knowing 
what the military obligations of the United States will be 
after the declaration of peace. We do not know the extent to 
which we will be called upon to have an army, and therefore I 
regard the question of the size of the army as an entirely 
tentative determination. It may very well be that next year 
Congress will feel disposed to cut down the number from 
500,000. It may very well be that Congress will be disposed 
to increase that number. But it is a situation in which we have 
to provide for a Regular Army, and being participants in the 
making of peace, which involves a disturbed state of the whole 
world, it seemed to us in our best judgment that 500,000 men 
for the present would enable us to meet any military obliga- 
tions we might have in concert with others in reference to the 
effect of the peace treaty." ° 

There was much public interest as to whether the country as 
a result of the war would adopt a system of compulsory uni- 
versal military training; but Mr. Baker refused at this time to 

•''"Hearings on H. R. 14560, January 16, 1919"; p. 14. 
*See the text in ibid.; pp. i ff. 
'^Ibid.; p. 17. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 325 

commit the administration to any definite attitude on the sub- 
ject." 

Apparently the Military Affairs Committee decided against 
adopting Mr. Baker's bill ; ^ and it was thereupon dropped, and 
a decision was taken to make temporary provision for an army 
in the annual army appropriation bill. The figures recom- 
mended by Mr. Baker were written into the latter bill and as 
introduced in the House on February 10, 1919, it contained 
appropriations for the support of an army of 509,909 enlisted 
men for one year. For two weeks the bill was the subject 
of heated debate. The provision was badly drawn and was 
subject to misunderstanding on three points, (i) It was not 
clear whether the proposed army of 500,000 was to include or 
to be in addition to an army of 175,000 to be raised under the 
National Defense Act of 1916. (2) It was not clear whether 
the administration was authorized to maintain a force of 
500,000 men throughout the entire year, or whether that figure 
was to represent the maximum permitted average, including the 
draft army during demobilization. (3) It was not clear how 
far the bill would reenact and continue in force the draft 
provisions of the Selective Service Act.* The bill met with a 
generally unfavorable reception in the House. The idea that 
by the peace treaty the United States might be committed to 
foreign military engagements was not liked; and the profes- 
sedly temporary character of the legislation was received with 
suspicion. " Did we not get along well enough with a stand- 
ing army of 100,000 prior to the war?" asked one member.^ 
" The war has not added to our possessions. Is there any 
difficulty that prevents our saying to England, France and Italy, 
' We are going to bring every one of our boys home at once 
and you must furnish the troops to police your own territory 

'^ Ibid.; p. 26. 

^ See speech of Mr. Wise of Georgia, " Congressional Record," Sixty- 
Fifth Congress, third session; p. 3716. 

8 " Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, third session; pp. 
3197-32.14, particularly at pp. 3200-3207. 

^ Mr. Wingo of Arkansas in ibid.; p. 3207!^ 



326 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

of Europe ? '" " With what new menace are we confronted 
that threatens the safety of our seacoast and our insular pos- 
sessions ? " asked another member.^^ " What war-cloud is brew- 
ing over the Panama Canal Zone or Porto Rico or the Philip- 
pines? Gentlemen, this is but the entering wedge for a per- 
manent policy of a large standing army that the people of the 
United States have opposed [Applause] and to which I am 
unalterably opposed in time of peace." Arguments of a finan- 
cial character were urged against the bill. " There never has 
been a time when such a plan was so unwise. The bill author- 
izes an expenditure of more than $1,000,000,000 for the support 
of the army for the fiscal year beginning June 30, 1919, almost 
a year after the termination of the war. A year's expenditure 
for the support of the army for any fiscal year before the 
war was never much over $100,000,000. How can we justify 
such a change at this time when the only enemy constituting a 
serious menace to this nation has been humiliated and crushed 
and when we are trying to establish universal peace ? " ^^ The 
general feeling toward the bill was perhaps best expressed by 
Mr. Quin of Mississippi : ^^ " Gentlemen, I have looked over 
the signs of the zodiac, and I have observed that the season 
is propitious for altering this bill. I think the number of the 
army should be cut down from 500,000 to 175,000 men. [Ap- 
plause] What is the object of this big army? Do you believe 
that 500,000 soldiers and 30,000 officers could save us? With 
the experience that we have had, do you not know that an 
army could be raised in a very short while if we should be 
suddenly attacked from any quarter? Do you not know that 
it has been demonstrated that all this talk is nonsense that 
you have to have a great standing army in order to be prepared 
to fight a war successfully ? All of that idea has passed away 
like mists before the sun. Yet we have it urgently insisted 
upon us that this Government should fasten upon itself this 

10 Mr. Bankhead of Alabama, ibid.; p. 3290. 

11 Mr. Steagall in ibid.; p. 3292. 
^2 Ibid.; p. 3287. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 327 

great ball and chain to drag along and hold us down. In the 
name of Heaven, let us get those soldiers that are now in the 
army back home in civil pursuits — let us have those men 
back on the farms and in the workshops. Across the seas 
there are still two millions of men. . , . The bob-whites in the 
corn-field are calling for the boys back on the farm, and here 
we are proposing to keep two millions of men standing almost 
in idleness, drawing salaries and wasting money, and to have 
500,000 more in this country." 

When it became apparent that the appropriation bill could 
not possibly pass in the few remaining days of the session, 
steps were hurriedly taken to carry through a bill which had 
been earlier introduced in the Senate by Mr. Chamberlain,^^ 
for permitting the resumption of enlistments under the Na- 
tional Defense Act. This bill would at least make possible 
the recruiting of a stop-gap army of 175,000 men. The bill 
was taken up by the House on February 18 and amended ^* 
to provide that the period of enlistment should be for one 
year instead of the three years with the colors and four with 
the reserves which had been the period provided by the Na- 
tional Defense Act. This provision was further altered by 
an amendment in the Senate which fixed one-third of the en- 
listments at one year and two-thirds at three years, with power 
in the secretary of war to discharge in his discretion men 
enlisted for three years at the end of the first year of their 
service.^^ In this form the bill passed and was signed by 
the President on February 28.^*^ 

This was the situation when the Sixty-Fifth Congress ter- 
minated on March 3, 1919. When its successor met in extra 
session in June, the administration had as yet formulated no 
proposals for a permanent army policy. The first task was 
to carry through an appropriation bill for the fiscal year about 
to begin ; and with the introduction of the bill the debate 

13 On January 3. Ibid.; p. 979. 

^*Ibid.; p. 3725. 

'^^Ibid.; p. 4041. 

16 40 Statutes at Large; p. 121 1. 



328 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

on the size of the army reopened. The bill was reported by 
Mr. Kahn from the Military Affairs Committee of the House 
on Jiune 9 containinj^ appropriations for an army of 40x3,000. 
In his speech he argued that had America possessed such an 
army in 191 7, we might have been able to keep out of the 
war. " In 19 16," he said, " when Congress was considering 
the National Defense Act, I offered an amendment which 
auth'orized the President to increase our Regular Army to 
250,000 men. That amendment was voted down. We have 
incurred indebtedness to the extent of $34,000,000,0010. I 
maintain that if we had been prepared on the thirty-first of 
January, 1917, if Congress had voted for my amendment to 
increase the army to 250,000 men, this cost of life and blood 
and treasure would have been saved the American people. 
The question that confronts us is this : Will we in the future 
run along as we have been running in the past, drifting, wait- 
ing until something happens before we prepare our country 
for possible emergencies? No nation is the sole arbiter of 
its own destinies." ^" The assertion was sharply challenged 
that the existence of a larger Regular Army woiild have kept 
us out of the war ; ^^ and again the argument was advanced that 
under the cloak of an appropriation bill the general staff was 
simply seeking to get an entering wedge for a permanent 
army of 500,000.^^ The upshot was that on motion of Mr. 
La Guardia of New York the House amended the bill so 
as to provide maintenance for the year for an army o'f only 
300.000 ; -'' and in this shape the bill passed the House. -^ 
When it went to the Senate, the original appropriation for 
an army of 400,000 was restored.-- " I think it a lack of 
intelligence on our part, a lack of vision, to put it mildly, 

^^ "Congressional Record," Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session ; p. 832. 

18 Mr. Fields of Kentucky, ibict; p. 869. 

18 Mr. La Guardia of New York, ibid.; p. 998; 

20 On June 11. Ibid.; p. 1003. 

^^ June 13. "New York Times," June 14; p. 7, column 4. 

22 "New York Times," June 24; p. 17, column 4. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 329 

to reduce our arm}' under present circumstances," said Senator 
Hoke Smith of Georgia. " At least we ought to keep an 
army of 400,000 for the next twelve months. We know the 
situation in the Orient, with Japan taking over 40,000,000 
Chinamen and an intense feeling existing there. When condi- 
tions change we may come to a permanent army of 240,000 
men or less, but to-day the world is in a state of disturbance. 
Germany has signed the terms of peace, but Austria has not." ^' 
The bill was sent to conference, where a compromise was 
reached, and when the bill finally became law it carried appro- 
priations for 325,000 men for the fiscal year 1919-20.'* 

In the course of these debates the whole subject of the 
size of the army was opened up and it became apparent that 
any permanent determination of that question depended first 
of all on what policy was to be finally adopted with regard 
to two other matters — universal military training a-nd the 
position of the State militia. A large Regular Army was 
opposed not merely by those who were against all heavy ex- 
penditures for military purposes but also by those among the 
advocates of preparedness themselves who felt that a system 
of universal military training for civilians would be a more 
effective and democratic measure of defense than a profes- 
sional army. " In my opinion," said Mr. Kahn while arguing 
for a year's appropriation for an army of 400,000, " a country 
like this could v/ell get along with an army of 100,000 if they 
Avere used as a training cadre for the universal training of 
American youths between the ages of eighteen and nineteen. 
I do not approve now and never will approve in this country 
a standing army of 400,000."^^ "If you have an army of 
400,000, with 22,000 officers," said Mr. Ouin, " they are going 
to keep down the further organization of the National Guard 

23 July T. "Congressional Record," Sixty-Sixth Congress, first ses- 
sion ; p. 2186. 

2* " New York Times," July 2; p. 13. column i. 

25 " Congressional Record," Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session ; p. 
867. 



330 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

in this country." ^^ These are the two hnes of thought which 
run through all the subsequent debates. 



On August 3 Secretary Baker sent to Congress a bill ^'' em- 
bodying the permanent army policy which had finally been 
determined on by the general staff and the administration.^^ 
This bill, which will hereafter be referred to the Baker-March 
bill, consisted of two parts : The first part was simply the bill 
providing for an army of 509,000 which Mr. Baker had pre- 
sented in January; the second part provided for three months 
of universal compulsory military training for youths between 
the ages of eighteen and nineteen. About the same time a 
number of other bills dealing with various aspects of army 
reorganization were introduced in both houses ; and the Senate 
and House Committees on Military Affairs thereupon insti- 
tuted a series of hearings which continued for more than three 
months and went exhaustively into the whole subject. Vir- 
tually every person of importance who had any special 
knowledge or interest in military affairs appeared and was 
questioned ; and the result is a valuable record af the best 
opinion of the country on military policy as formulated in the 
light of war experienced^' 

The Baker-March bill was framed on the assumption that 

'^^ Ibid.; p. 999. 

27 SJxty-Sixth Congress, first session, S. 2715 ; H. R. 8287. 

28 In its final form the bill was " licked into shape by a committee 
consisting of myself [General March], General Gocthals, the head of 
the war plan divisron, the head of the operations di^■ision, the head of 
the military intelligence, the heads of the different divisions of the 
general stafif, which sat nights after the preliminary work had been 
done by subordinates down below : and after we got through that, we 
had several hearings wifh Mr. Baker and Secretary Crowell and met 
in his office for two or three nights." General March in " Senate 
Hearings," August 8, 1919; p. 84. 

29 The hearings before the Senate committee will hereafter be re- 
ferred to as "Senate Hearings," those before the House committee 
as " House Hearings." 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 331 

the United States should be in a position to place one field 
army, or 1,250,000 men, in the field at once upon the outbreak 
of an emergency. This required that all the units necessary 
to such an army should be kept in existence with a requisite 
supply of officers in time of peace. But they would exist in 
" skeletonized " form, their personnel reduced to the lowest 
figure capable of expanding speedily on need to full war 
strength. ** We are recommending to Congress," said General 
March, " to keep one field army with complete units, and to 
cut down the personnel of all the units in such proportion that 
we will have the minimum number of men which will permit 
us to function and still keep up all the organizations." ^° On 
the other hand experience had shown that there was danger 
in carrying the skeletonizing process too far; it resulted in 
swamping each unit with green recruits when the need arose 
to expand it rapidly to war strength. Under the National 
Defense Act infantry companies had been kept at a peace 
strength of 100 men; it was now felt that 138 was the lowest 
number at which such a company could be maintained in peace 
to render it efficient on the outbreak of war. The figure of 
509,000 men was arrived at by computation as the smallest 
regular force capable of promptly expanding into an efficient 
field army of 1,250,000. This standing field army was to be 
divided into twenty-one divisions, of which eighteen were to 
be maintained within the United States and three in the out- 
lying possessions.^^ It was thought that this distribution 
would make possible in a way not theretofore possible the 
training of troops in bodies of a size somewhat approximating 
those which participate in actual warfare. " Prior to this 
war," said General March,^^ " the American army was sta- 
tioned in small units at posts all over the United States. As 
a result, officers who had to command brigades and divisions 
were conspicuous for their lack of experience in handling 

30 " House Hearings," September 4, 1919; p. 3i- 

3 General March, "Senate Hearings," August 7, 1919; p. 58. 

2- "House Hearings," September 4, 1919; p. 38. 



332 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

large numbers of men like that. The organization of a corps 
and an army was unknown. The greatest handicap we had 
at the start of this war was our lack of officers who had had 
experience in commanding these large units. They had to 
be trained. If we had sixteen divisional camps, such as we 
propose, where these large units would be located and trained 
with a major-general in command, the commanding officer of 
such a unit would have the same sort of a command there 
that he would have in time of war, with his staff functioning 
with reference to the thousands of men in these units exactly 
as his staff would function in time of war. The training 
of the United States army will be in divisional units instead 
of its training being in small units all scattered around over 
the country. That is one of the most important lessons that 
we have learned as a result of our experience in this war, 
and we are trying to keep that lesson, trying to keep the 
results of that experience for all time." 

The justification of the Baker-March bill depended ulti- 
m.ately on the validity of its fundamental assumption, the need 
of the country to keep an army of 1,250,000 men in readiness. 
The point of view of the War Department was explained by 
both Secretary Baker and General March. " The War De- 
partment," said the latter, " in considering what recommenda- 
tion it should make, finds itself confronting a situation 
throughout the world of absolute unrest, unrest at home and 
unrest abroad. There is actual fighting going on everywhere 
and the War Department under those conditions did not feel 
that it could afford to recommend an army of less than 
500,000. As far as other nations are concerned, my recol- 
lection is that the estimates for the British army submitted by 
Winston Churchill the other day on the floor of the House 
of Commons called for an army of something like 050.000 
men, although their strength before the war was something 
like 250,000. It is a plain fact that all nations during this 
period of unrest are deliberately preparing themselves for 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 333 

any emergency that may arise. France, Italy, and all our 
allies have substantial forces. Fighting is now going on in 
Europe in twenty-seven places and every nation is taking the 
matter seriously. We propose if possible to be able to meet 
any emergency that may ari'se. The psychology of the 
situation is just this : During the last year and a half, in 
order to get through with this war, Congress has spent 
$14,000,000,000 for the army. Five per cent, on that prin- 
cipal would have carried the expense of the entire military 
establishment for the last ten years. If it is supposed that the 
War Department wants to make preparations for immediate 
war, that is not the impelling thing. But this expenditure 
is a fair insurance on what the country will demand of us 
in time of war. When the war broke out, if we had been in 
the position we should have been in, Germany would not have 
dared to have brought us into the war at all." ^^ 

Secretary Baker placed the question of the size of the army 
in the light of the relation between the League of Nations and 
the prospect of disarmament. " I do not wish," he said, " to 
inject into this discussion any controversial or disputed 
matter. It is perfectly well known, however, that one of 
the provisions of the proposed League of Nations looks to a 
gradual disarmament by agreement among nations, and it is 
entirely possible that any armament which Congress might 
now think necessary to provide might, when the League of 
Nations has brought about a harmonious arrangement among 
the several constituent nations, rapidly reduce the total per- 
mament force the United States would be obliged to have. 
My belief is that if tlie league of nations is not formed, 
500,000 is a child's-play army compared with what the United 
States will have to have unless some arrangement is made 
by which international disputes will be amicably adjusted, and 
unless that happens I think the United States and every other 
country will have to arm to the teeth, and 500,000 will be a 

33 " House Hearings," September 4, 1919; pp. 32-35. 



334 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

baby army compared with what we will need to keep our 
position in the world without a leagtie or some substitute 
for it." ^'^ 

The Baker-Mardi bill contained no reference to the 
National Guard, merely leaving in efifect the provisions 
of the National Defense Act. The omission led to consider- 
able discussion and to the suspicion on the part of certain 
members of Congress that it was the intention of the War 
Department to abandon the Guard as an element in national 
military organization.^^ This intention General March 
denied ; but certainly the emphasis of the bill, so far as civilian 
reserves of military strength were concerned, was on the 
recruits who would be brought into the Regular Army in time 
of war from the body of citizens who had been trained under 
the universal military training features of the bill. " If we 
call out a field army of 1,250,000 men," he said, " for defense 
against another nation, or for oflfense, the National Guard 
units could be utilized as guardians for use in their States, 
while these other men, these Regular Army men, plus the men 
who have had universal military training, could be sent 
abroad." ^^ 



The question of. universal military training had been before 
the country ever since the preparedness agitation of 1915-16 
and an elaborate plan for such training had been worked out 
by the general staflf and presented to Congress by Secretary 
Baker without comment in March, 1917.^^ The fundamental 
idea behind the policy now proposed was that it would pro- 
vide the greatest possible military preparedness for the 
country while avoiding the objections to which a large stand- 
ing army was open on the ground of the militaristic tendencies 

34 "House Hearings," September 23, 1919; p. 1770. 

35 " House Hearings"; pp. 163 ff. 

36 " Senate Hearings " ; p. 46. 

87 "Senate Hearings"; p. 1173. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 335 

regarded as inherent in the latter. As General Scott had put 
it in 19 16, "Universal military training has been the corner- 
stone upon which has been built every republic in the history 
of the world." ^^ The issue was presented as one between a 
large standing army and a citizen army; and to enable full 
reliance to be safely placed on a citizen army, it was urged as 
essential that the body of citizens should have military train- 
ing. Colonel Palmer of the general staff restated the argu- 
ment to the Senate committee during the hearings we are now 
considering.^^ " The form of the military institutions of a 
country is very largely a political question and depends on 
a consideration of national institutions," he said. " There 
are two types of army through which man-power may be 
developed. One is the professional or standing army type. 
. . . This is the system of Continental Europe. ... It pro- 
duces a highly efficient military system but it is open to 
serious political objections. In such a country, intelligent 
opinion as to military policy is largely concentrated in a pro- 
fessional class. Under such a system the people themselves 
are competent to exert only a limited intelligent influence on 
the issues of war and peace. As military leadership and 
control are concentrated in the personnel of the professional 
military establishment, that establishment must be relatively 
expensive and of relatively large dimensions in time of peace. 
Under such a system only the brawn of the people is prepared 
for war, there being no adequate provision for developing the 
latent military leadership and genius of the people as a whole. 
The evils under this system may be summarized under the 
term militarism. . . . The second type of military institu- 
tion is a citizen army, formed and organized in peace with 
full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to rise by 
successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely 
qualify and with special facilities for such qualification and 
advancement as an essential characteristic of the peace estab- 

38 War Department, "Annual Report," 1916; Vol. i, p. i6a 
30 "Senate Hearings"; p. 1175. 



336 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Hshment. An army of this type has among others the follow- 
ing advantages : Military leadership is not exclusively con- 
centrated in tlie professional soldier class. Ati, intelligent 
public opinion is provided as the basis for the determination 
of public questions relating to military affairs. As the war 
army is identical with the organized citizen army, there is a 
specific force always organized, always at war strength and 
always prepared to function under tested mobilization plans. 
The minimum number of soldiers is maintained in active 
service in time of peace and so the cost of an effective war 
establishment under such a system is reduced to a minimum. 
And finally, as all our great wars have been fought in the 
main by citizen armies, the proposal for an organized citizen 
army in time of peace is merely a proposal for perfecting a 
traditional national institution to meet modern requirements 
which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of 
war." 

It was urged also that a system of universal training would 
result in certain by-products highly beneficial to the civil life 
of the nation. It would improve the physical health of the 
men, stiffen their sense of the responsibilities of citizenship, 
and give them opportunities to better their education. It was 
stated that there had been an average gain of twelve pounds 
in the weight of the men in the service during the war. " Men 
came into the camps through the draft." said General March, 
" undersized, with their chests undeveloped, men who were 
just able to get through the physical examinations, men who 
knew nothing at all of personal hygiene and sanitation or 
cleanliness. Those men were cured and taken care of. They 
were turned out better men physically and morally; they had 
a better vision. I was told in a number of places they had a 
different sense of duty, that the men who had jobs came 
back to their jobs and worked on them instead of shirking." *" 
The advantages of training from this point of view were fully 
■*"" Senate Hearings'"; p. 41. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 337 

urged by General Leonard Wood.'*^ " I do not believe," he 
said, " that people understand to what an extent a man's 
economic efficiency, and citizenship value is enhanced by 
military training. /HThe man comes out of the training-camp, 
with rare exceptions, better physically. He comes out with a 
better coordinated mind and muscle; he has learned habits of 
promptness, personal neatness, respect for authority, respect 
for law, respect for the rights of other people ; he has learned 
to do things when told and as told, and to do them with prompt- 
ness and exactness/ His real efficiency as an industrial force 
has been vastly increased. . . . You have made him a straight- 
thinking, prompt-acting man — in short a better working 
force/ Above all and beyond this, you have made him through 
association one who knows the various elements which go to 
make up our population, one who has learned to value men at 
their true worth, one in whom the narrow prejudices of 
locality, religion, environment have been largely ironed out. 
You have made him a better American. In Kansas I had the 
opportunity to try out for a short time a plan for education 
in addition to pure military training. Camp Funston hap- 
pened to be near the Kansas State Agricultural College, a 
large establishment with ample shops and the usual university 
curriculum. The university opened its shops to our men and 
we put some hundreds in the machine-shops. It also opened 
its classes and filled many of them with men from camp. 
Lectures were given on various phases of agriculture such 
as soil-fertilization, crop-raising, etc. They also sent pro- 
fessors to camp who gave lectures on critical periods of 
American history, economics, industrial questions ; in other 
words, it was a short but very interesting and successful 
attempt to show what could be done during a period of train- 
ing outside of and in addition to the purely military work.*^^ 

*i " Senate Hearings " ; p. 634. 

41^ General Leonard Wood's opinions on the subject of education are 
interesting in view of the fact that he has subsequently been elected 
provost of the University of Pennsylvania. 



338 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

. . . There is another important benefit which comes from 
assembling the men in camp; that is the cleaning up of the 
men who suffer from vice diseases and returning them to 
civil life no longer menaces to their fellow-men Then again 
there were many men who had minor physical defects which 
were cured by the treatment and exercises given them in 
camp. They were sent back to civil life much more efficient 
industrial and economic factors than they were before. Those 
who did not speak English were taught English, and a 
systematic attempt was made to Americanize them, to impress 
upon them the spirit of our institutions, and to prepare them 
to take up with added vigor and intelligence the duties of an 
American citizen in time of peace." General Pershing saw 
another advantage in universal military training. " We are 
now confronted," he said, " with serious social problems, 
resulting from the presence of large masses of ignorant for- 
eigners in our midst who are highly susceptible to the anar- 
chistic or bolshevik proposals of numerous agitators now at 
work. The influence of the public schools is insufficient to 
weld this portion of our population to the body of real 
American citizens due to the fact that these foreigners usually 
collect in such large groups that few truly American children 
find a place in the public schools in such neighborhoods. 
Universal military training is the only means I see available 
for educating this foreign element in the real meaning of the 
democracy of our Government and its institutions, and for 
developing them into good citizens before they fall under the 
sway of dangerous agitators and become a real menace to the 
country." *^ 

It was urged that to withdraw a large number of young 
men from industrial work for a brief period of training would 
not seriously cripple the industry of the nation or unduly 
deplete the labor market because of the large number of 
youths of that age who in any event would still be at school or 
would at least not yet have got a settled occupation."*^ 

*- " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1675. 
'*3 " Senate Hearings"; p. 1589. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 339 

Finally, it was argued that the time was peculiarly promis- 
ing for the successful establishment of a policy of training. 
" At this moment," said Senator New, " the country is in 
condition to develop such a policy at less expense and to 
better advantage than ever before. The cantonments neces- 
sary are already in existence and at comparatively small 
expense may be made to answer our needs for several years. 
We have great surplus stores of clothing, arms, and ammu- 
nition, much of which will deterioriate and become worthless 
within a short time and be a total loss if not used, and it 
might better be employed to a useful purpose than permitted 
to go to waste." ** Public opinion, also, under the influence 
of the war, was more keenly interested in the military needs 
of the country than would be the case after an interval of 
peace. " The establishment of such a system now," said 
Colonel Palmer, " would be simple. Five or six years from 
now it would not be so easy. If it is started now, what it 
would amount to would be perpetuating the army we have 
created in this war. It would be converting an immense 
unproductive outlay into a permanent investment so that the 
outlay for this war would to a very large extent be available 
for a war a hundred years from now. For example if at 
the end of the Civil War — we then had a trained citizen 
army on both sides — if that army at the close of the Civil 
War, instead of being disbanded, had assumed a reserve obli- 
gation for two or three years, and then had gradually been 
replaced by each year's crop of young men, we would have 
had a very economical military system that would have found 
us prepared for the last war." *^ 

Among those, however, who advocated a system of universal 
military training there was considerable difference of opinion 
as to the details of the proper plan to be adopted. Perhaps 
the most typical views were those embodied in the Kahn- 

**" Congressional Record," Sixty-Fifth Congress, third session; p. 
2419 (January 31, 1919)- 
*5 " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1187. 



340 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

Chamberlain bill,^" which was under consideration in com- 
mittee at the same time as the Baker-March bill. The latter 
bill departed in a number of particulars from the orthodox 
views of training advocates. 

The period of training prescribed by the Baker-March bill 
was only three months, to be taken by all the young men of the 
country during the calendar year in which they should reach 
the age of nineteen. Certain persons, such as physical defec- 
tives and youths actually engaged as mariners or who had al- 
ready served in the army and been honorably discharged, were 
totally exempted from having to take the training; for other 
causes such as support of dependents and temporary physical 
disability the training period might be deferred until the removal 
of the disability. In case, however, the deferment should con- 
tinue to the age of twenty-four, the training liability was then 
to terminate. These exemptions and deferments together with 
the registration of men subject to training were to be admin- 
istered through a system of local and district boards virtually 
identical in character with the draft boards which had adminis- 
tered the Selective Service Act during the war. After the 
completion of his three months of training the youth was to be 
discharged from all further liability whatever for military serv- 
ice in time of peace. He was not to be enrolled in a reserve 
or required to report for further training at intervals, but for 
two years was subject to be called on to file written reports. 
On the declaration of a war by Congress the Selective Service 
Act of May i8, 19 17, was to come automatically into effect. 
The operation of the act would be facilitated by the fact that 
the system of administrative boards would be already in exist- 
ence and that the youths on their discharge from training would 
have been classified into groups in the order of their liability 
for service.'*'^ 

The program of training which the War Department had 

^'■•Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, S. 2691: "Senate Hearings"; 
pp. 8-16 for text. 

*7 See Senate Bill 2715, Sections 39-52 inclusive; text in "Senate 
Hearings " ; pp. 24-26. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 341 

planned to carry out under the provisions of the bill was linked 
up with its program for a standing army which has already been 
discussed. We have seen that it was proposed to maintain 
eighteen combat divisions of regulars at cantonments in the 
United States. Each of these divisions was to be skeletonized 
down to about 15,000 or 16,000 regular troops. The full war 
strength of such a division would be approximately 27,000. This 
deficiency of 11,000 men in the standing strength of the divi- 
sions was to be at all times made up by young men undergoing 
training. These men would thus have an opportunity of get- 
ting their training as members of organizations more than two- 
thirds of which were professional troops."*^ About 200,000 
youths could thus be in training at the same time. As the 
training period was to last only three months, it would be 
possible to train three batches of men, or 600,000 in all, during 
the nine months of the year available for training purposes. 
It was estimated that the number of men who yearly reach the 
age of nineteen in this country is about 750,000. Calculating 
that 100,000 of these would be unavailable for training on 
various grounds, 650,000 would be left to require accommoda- 
tions. Many of these would desire to be trained in the coast 
artillery or other specialized services and would be provided 
for elsewhere than at the cantonments. The proposed arrange- 
ment would therefore provide accommodations for training the 
entire annual quota of young men of nineteen. 

The Baker-March proposals for training were criticized on 
three grounds : ( i ) because the period of training w'as, it was 
alleged, too short; (2) because no provision was made for 
organizing into a reserve force the men who had graduated 
from training; (3) because of the large army of regulars which 
was contemplated as an adjunct to the training proposals. 

The experience of the war worked a great alteration in the 
ideas of military men as to the length of the training period 
necessary to make a good soldier. In his annual report for 
1916 General Scott had spoken of two years as the proper 

*** " Senate Hearings " ; p. 40. 



342 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

period. The board which was appointed to consider the matter 
when the Baker-March bill was beings drafted had at first 
recommended a training period of eleven months. Afterwards 
they altered this recommendation to seven months."*^ But 
General March was willing to recommend a three months' period 
as sufificient. He explained his views as follows : 

" My own belief, and one which has been accepted is this : That any 
form of universal training to be accepted by Congress should be one 
which should create as little disturbance in the body politic as possible. 
If it is possible to get a length of time which would give as much 
intensive training to the men as they had in this war, at the same time 
not taking them away from their occupations more than necessary, then 
I think we would have an ideal solution. Now the three months' 
period adjusts itself to almost all occupations. The college boy of 
nineteen has a summer vacation for practically three months, and we 
fix the time for him to go into training during those months, and not 
affect his education. With a man down South who has a cotton crop 
to get in, his period of training could be fixed when he was not working 
on his crop. The man who was gathering the wheat crop would have 
his time fixed when he would not be working on his wheat crop. In 
other words, it fixes the time of year best suited to all occupations so 
that men will be taken away from their business with just as little 
disturbance as possible in their daily work. As a general proposition, 
it would mean that the recruits from Minnesota would serve during 
one three-months' period and those from Alabama during another. It 
would lead to working out some system of that kind. . . ." 

Senator New: "I would like to ask you if it is the experience of the 
heads of the army that a three months' training period is sufficient?" 

General March : " That brings up a very difficult question, and one 
which we had before us and considered very thoroughly. It can be 
stated frankly from the very beginning that if more time could be 
given better results would be obtained. But the point of the matter is 
that we in fact threw into the field to fight for our country, to actually 
fight the Germans, men who had only three months' training and they 
got away with it. It is useless for us to say, when we have done that, 
that we cannot do it again. If we have got to keep the men eleven 
months to get the same results, that means that the instructors are 
poor, that the men are not getting the same training that they did 
get." 

*^ " Senate Hearings " ; p. 38. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 343 

Senator Chamberlain : " But the cost of life is bound to be greater 
when they have had so short training?" 

General March: "That is bound to be. The question is of getting 
the proper combination, and we believe that we can do it with a three 
months' combination, instead of six, seven, or nine months. You can 
get a large percentage of your 650,000 men who will not be disturbed 
at all in their regular daily work. We have turned out our soldiers 
in three months of intensified training during the war. We have 
actually done it. It is not theory. We can do it, and the men can 
keep on with their education and their work. In the old days in the 
Regular Army, we used to talk about it taking two years to make 
a soldier, but that is all gone now." ^° 

On the other hand, a large majority of the army officers who 
were examined by the committees regarded three months as too 
short a period, and most of them agreed in recommending a 
training period of six months. Of this number was General 
Wood. " The provision in the bill for three months' train- 
ing is too short," he said. " I would recommend six 
months, and combined with it a certain amount of industrial 
training. We can do a great deal in three months with the 
stimulus of war upon us, but you cannot in time of peace turn 
out effective soldiers in three months ; to send soldiers to war 
with three months' training is to double your dead. Working 
under the most intensive methods, and under the stimulus of 
war, troops should have this period of training. We can turn 
out men in a little shorter time, but the gain in time would be 
paid for in lives. . . . Under the stimulus of war we can do 
more in four months than we can do in peace in six months 
because every man feels that he is about to use the weapons 
with which he is training; that he is working to make himself 
more efficient, working so that he may have a better chance to 
come back, a better chance to live through. Under these condi- 
tions the men will stand harder driving than they will in time 
of peace, and they absorb and assimilate their instruction much 

5° " Senate Hearings " ; pp. 39-41. General Pershing stated that the 
average training of American troops who served in the war was about 
eleven months. Ibid.; p. 1596. 



344 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

more rapidly." ^^ He thought, however, that a six months' 
training period was ample. " Two or three years ago six months 
was looked upon as a ridiculously short time. To-day I think 
the experience of the war indicates it is a rational and reason- 
able period." General Pershing agreed. " I should prefer," 
he said, " to see the training period made six months. You 
can do so much more relatively in six months than you can do 
in three. If men were trained only three months you would 
have to do a lot of training after war was declared before these 
men would be ready to go into battle." ^- 

Tlie Kahn-Chamberlain bill, in contrast with the Baker- 
March bill, provided tliat the training period should be six 
months and that the young men who had undergone training 
for that period should be organized into a reserve army. The 
members of this reserve were to be organized into proper mili- 
tary organizations and for five years were to be subject to 
military service for additional training with their respective 
organizations for not exceeding three weeks in any one year and 
not exceeding nine weeks during the entire five years. Some 
such scheme as this was felt by many to be essential to the 
adequate establishment of a citizen army which could be de- 
pended upon; and it was considered a defect in the Baker- 
March bill that it failed to make provision for such an organized 
reserve. This was General Wood's view.'^^ The matter was 
most fully gone into by Colonel John McA. Palmer of the 
general stafif. " The War Department bill," he said, " does not 
provide for an organized citizen army.'^* ... In my opinion, 
the main feature of the military establishment of the United 
States should be a trained citizen army, organized territorially 
in divisions, army cor]«. and field armies in such a manner as 
to permit immediate mobilization in the event of an emergency. 
In the initial organization of this force the charter members 

^1 " Senate Hearings " ; pp. 626 ff. 

S2 " House Hearings " ; p. 1446. See also statements of former Sec- 
retary Stimson, " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1242. 
''^ " Senate Hearings," p. 629. 
^*Jbid.; p. 1177. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 345 

should be those veterans of the great war who volunteer to 
enter a unit of the citizen army whose territorial allocation 
includes their place of residence. This force should be perpet- 
uated by universal military training. Every young man should 
undergo military training for not less than six months and after 
such training he should be enrolled in an organization of the 
citizen army and should be a member thereof for five years, 
after which he should pass to the unorganized reserve. . . . 
The organized citizen army should be mobilized for inspection 
and team training for a short period of about two weeks each 
year. . . . All private soldiers who are graduates of the train- 
ing system should be required to attend at least two annual 
mobilizations during their period of prescribed membership in 
the organized citizen army. ... In order to provide for the 
necessary continuous administration of the organized citizen 
army in the intervals between annual mobilizations, each unit 
of the organized citizen army should be provided with a small 
skeleton staff of ofificers and enlisted men detailed from the 
Regular Army." ^^ This skeletonized force General Wood, 
who advocated the same fundamental plan as Colonel Palmer, 
thought should be about 3500 men for each training-canton- 
ment.'^*' Colonel Palmer went on to explain his plan as follows : 
" With sixteen training-centers located with proper reference 
to the distribution of military population, each such training- 
center should generate and maintain the personnel for an army 
corps of two or three divisions. The commander of this army 
corps, provided with a proper staff, should command the army 
corps, and should be responsible for all military activities within 
his corps area. In the initial organization of each army corps, 
its component units should be given the designation of previously 
existing local military units having historic records in former 
wars, in so far as this can be done without defeating the primary 
objects of correct military organization and the localization of 
homogeneous tactical units. Upon mobilization of the army 

55 " Senate Hearings," pp. 1180 ff. 
5fi Ibid.; p. 629. 



346 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

corps in war, the training center will continue its training func- 
tion with the view of maintaining the supply of trained replace- 
ment. If the period of membership in the organized citizen army 
be fixed at five years, each corps area will be able immediately 
to mobilize a complete army corps at full strength and to fill its 
replacement depots with trained replacements, and will have 
sufficient surplus strength in trained officers and men to form 
such new and unforeseen organizations as any particular mili- 
tary situation may require even after necessary exemptions for 
war industries have been determined. The corps area with its 
territorial units and its training center thus becomes a contin- 
uously functioning machine through which, if necessary, the 
entire man-power of the nation can be mobilized promptly, 
effectively, and economically." ^^ 

In short there was a fundamental difference between the plan 
underlying the Baker-March bill and the one embodied in the 
Kahn-Chamberlain bill and supported by such advocates of 
civilian training as Colonel Palmer. The Baker-March bill 
provided for the training of civilians, but it released them at 
once on the conclusion of their training. It made no provision 
for an organized citizen army. It imposed no military obliga- 
tion in time of peace upon citizens. All that it did was to pro- 
vide a brief period of training for the men from whom an army 
would be built up on the outbreak of an emergency by means of 
the selective draft. As General March put it, the bill provided 
for universal compulsory training but not for universal com- 
pulsory service except in war-time. The Kahn-Chamberlain 
bill and the plan suggested by Colonel Palmer on the other hand 
provided for an organized citizen army in time of peace. Not 
merely were the youths of the country to be given a course of 
military training but they were to become members of military 
organizations and remain such for five years. During that 
period they were to form part of the military establishment of 
the country and were to be called together at intervals for 
training and inspection. 

67 "Senate Hearings"; p. 1182. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 347 

This difference between the two plans resulted in assigning 
different places under them to the Regular Army. Under the 
Baker-March plan, with no organized civilian army in existence 
and capable of rapid mobilization, it was necessary to maintain 
a larger Regular Army in readiness for an emergency. Hence 
the proposal to keep up a standing army of 509,000 men. On 
the other hand Colonel Palmer and General Wood and other 
advocates of an organized civilian force felt that if their plan 
was adopted a very much smaller army of regulars would be 
adequate. As General Wood put it : "I can see no use for an 
army of more than 500,000 unless it is proposed to keep 
large forces in Europe.^^ ... I can find no reason for recom- 
mending an army whose strength will be in excess of 225,000 
men or at most 250,000.^^. . . Our trained civilians should 
be put into reserve organizations fully officered and with ade- 
quate supplies, arms, and equipment of all kinds held ready 
for them. Once this general system is in force, our Regular 
Army can be still further reduced. Any Regular Army 
which we may decide upon will be only a small fraction of 
what will be needed in case of a great war.**". . . I would 
build up reserve units as fast as our reserves of trained men are 
built up. One way would be to have in this country a cer- 
tain number of divisions of regulars, maintained at near war 
strength, divisions we will say of twenty to twenty-two 
thousand men. I should like to see at least three such divi- 
sions maintained in the United States, one on the Pacific 
coast, one in the Middle West, and one on the Atlantic, but 
I should prefer to see five. If we had five, two should be on 
the Pacific, one in the Middle West, and two on the Atlantic, 
and with training areas large enough to make it possible to 
bring to these areas the draft quota for that divisional area 
each year. The other divisional training areas would be 
occupied only by training cadres. I think at each of these 

5^ " Senate Hearings " ; p. 626. 
^^Ibid.; p. 620. 
^° Ibid.; p. 622. 



348 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

other training areas, which I presume would be the present 
cantonments, we should only maintain a training cadre of 
about 4500 or 3500 men. To these areas will come the men 
from that section of the country each year to be trained. Gen- 
erally speaking, there will be more than enough men for a 
division. The policy should be to train a division at each 
area ; and when it is demobilized at the end of the training 
period the men should be kept track of. They should rea- 
lize that they are definitely assigned to their division ; that they 
will report to it in their old positions and organizations in case 
they are called to the colors. ... If this policy is carried out, 
we should have, based upon each training area, a number of 
divisions. In case of a general call to the colors, we should be 
able to call the recently trained divisions from each divisional 
area, or a number of divisions, as might be required. In other 
words, these training areas would become military rendezvous 
for a certain number of divisions. . . . If we attain this condi- 
tion of efificiency, we shall be as secure as any nation can be in 
peace, and shall need no large permanent army of regulars." '^^ 

Colonel Palmer's views were similar. " The total number 
of trained officers and men required for the purposes I have 
indicated," he said, "will be approximately 21,000 oflficers 
and 280,000 enlisted men. All of these need not be regu- 
lars. . . . But while the number of citizen soldiers so em- 
ployed will tend to reduce the number of professional soldiers 
required, the actual number cannot be predicted in advance 
and can only be determined by experience. It may be said, 
however, that the enlisted strength of the Regular Army 
after the citizen army is fully organized will not be greater 
than 280,000 and will probably prove to be considerably 
less." «2 

In short the Baker-March plan was a sort of compromise — 
a half-way measure between a policy of main reliance on a 
standing army and a policy of developing a civilian army by 

"^Ibid.; p. 629. 
^^Ibid.: p. 1 1 88. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 349 

universal training. It provided for universal training but 
for no civilian army, and the short period of training it con- 
templated was dictated rather by political and industrial con- 
siderations than by the demands of military efficiency. To 
make up for those defects, it made provision for the main- 
tenance of what was admitted to be an unusually large stand- 
ing army. In fact Colonel Palmer was willing to say that 
the military policy of the Baker-March bill was not of the 
democratic civilian army type at all, but rather of the Euro- 
pean standing army type. Having elaborated the difference be- 
tween these two types of policy in a passage already 
quoted,*'^ he went on to say : " I consider that the War De- 
partment bill proposes a military institution of the standing 
army type. It relies essentially on a large Regular Army and 
proposes universal military training primarily as a means of 
providing men to fill the lower ranks of that army on the out- 
break of war. It does not provide for an organized citizen 
army and does not provide sufficient training to prepare the 
young men of the country for membership in such a 
force. ... In my opinion the War Department bill proposes 
incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms 
that are not in harmony with the genius of American insti- 
tutions." ^* 

There was a wide-spread feeling that a military policy 
which placed main dependence on a standing army was not 
merely at variance with democratic institutions, but that even 
from the point of view of military efficiency it was an anach- 
ronism. This view was set forth by General O'Ryan, a distin- 
guished National Guard officer who commanded the Twenty- 
Seventh Division in France. General '0'Rya,n said : " A 
regular professional army is an obsolete institution, a survival 
of a former period when wars were largely waged by mercen- 
ary troops. As a system of defense, it has been abandoned 
by all the great powers except Great Britain and the United 

«3 Above ; p. 335. 

«*" Senate Hearings"; p. 1177. 



350 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

States. It is unavoidably wasteful of funds and organically 
incapable of the waging of modern wars of consequence. 
This is largely because of the character of its enlisted per- 
sonnel. Always and everywhere in time of peace the soldiers 
of such an army are for the most part those who have failed 
in civil life, and the army is for them an asylum. But mil- 
itary effort in modern wars is only one- fourth military tech- 
nic. It is three-fourths the character of effort that con- 
stitutes the industrial and professional success of the country, 
and in that effort these men have failed. . . . Further, a 
professional army, having no direct interest in the educational, 
professional, and industrial life of the people, develops un- 
molested its own customs, habits, and methods. These may 
be adapted to the life of a professional army in peace, but they 
are not always useful in the great citizen army with which a 
war must be fought. Such customs may even become handi- 
caps in a war army and certainly some of them created 
great impatience among the energetic men from civil life 
who accepted reserve commissions to do work vital to 
the success of the army. The greater the size of a professional 
army in peace, the longer will it require after the outbreak 
of war to force the abandonment of obsolete methods." ^^ 

General Pershing, like General Wood and Colonel Palmer, 
thought that if universal military training were adopted the Reg- 
ular Army should not number more than between 275,000 and 
300,000.^" 

A second objection to the scheme embodied in the Baker- 
March bill was its expensiveness. This also seemed mainly 
due to the large size of the Regular Army which the bill 
contemplated. General March estimated that three months 
of training could be given annually to 650,000 youths at a 
total cost of about $94,000,000, On the other hand the main- 
tenance of the proposed permanent army of more than 

''s " Senate Hearings"; p. 514. 
^C'lbid.; p. 1578. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 351 

500,000 regulars called for an annual outlay of $798,660,000.''^ 
In short, on the War Department's own showing, a policy of 
civilian training was vastly cheaper than the maintenance of 
a large standing force. This was used as an added argument 
by those like Colonel Palmer who favored a greater reliance on 
a civilian army with a correspondingly smaller army of reg- 
ulars tha-n was contemplated by the adminstration bill. As 
General Wood expressed it : " The cost of maintenance of a 
regular force, as compared with the cost of training a reserve, 
is out of all proportion. The policy to be adopted depends 
on whether our people are willing to carry this unusually 
heavy burden in peace or whether they will adopt the sounder 
policy of a small Regular Army with an adequate reserve of 
trained men." ^® 



Various places in the proposed schemes of army reorganization 
were assigned to the National Guard, ranging all the way fiom 
the suggestions of General March to the plan supported by 
the National Guard Association. The Baker-March bill, as 
has been said, made no provision whatever ToT the Guard and 
.left it under the National Defense Act but with the idea, ap- 
parently, that it would possibly be used mainly as a State force 
for State purposes. The bill prepared by the National Guard 
Association and introduced' in Congress at their request by 
Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey stood at the other ex- 
treme, and while making no changes of a fundamental nature 
in the status or character of the Guard, proposed to rely on it 
wholly to furnish the citizen army which was to be the keystone 
of national defense. Between these two extremes stood the 
proposals of General Pershing, General O'Ryan, and Colonel 
Palmer who suggested using the Guard organizations as nuclei 
of the national citizen army which should be perpetuated and 

G7 " Senate Hearings " ; pp. 47-50. A detailed analysis of the elements 
of cost is given. 
68/fcirf.; p. 626. 



352 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

kept filled by instalments of men graduated from universal 
compulsory training. 

Nothing but good was said of the manner in which the Na- 
tional Guard had acquitted itself in the fighting in France. 
" These troops," said General Pershing, " have shown them- 
selves in battle to be worthy of our best efl^orts." ®° "In those 
trained units we have a very great asset." ^° "The gentle- 
men of the National Guard," said Colonel Palmer, "in my 
opinion have done an immense public service in this country 
by keeping alive the tradition of a citizen army." "^ It was 
felt, furthermore, that the spirit of local association in which 
the Guard was founded, springing from very deep principles of 
human nature, was of the utmost value and required to be 
embodied in any sound scheme of military policy. " The 
general principle of localization which is characteristic of 
the National Guard must be characteristic of any eflfective cit- 
izen army," said Colonel Palmer.'^ On the other hand Regular 
Army officers and National Guardsmen alike were agreed 
that " the Guard could not go on as it had before." ^^ There 
was agreement that this was so because of the opposition 
which the dual scheme of organization tended to create be- 
tween the National Guard on the one hand and the Regular 
Army on the other. General Pershing stated the matter frankly, 
" The National Guard never received," he said, "the whole- 
hearted support of the Regular Army. During the war there 
was always more or less prejudice against them, and many of 
our regular officers failed to perform their full duty as com- 
petent instructors and often criticized where they should have 
instructed. The National Guard people resented this, and 
very properly so." "^ General O'Ryan, himself a National Guard 
oflficer, expressed the same opinion. " I think the National 

69 " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1645. 
''^Ibid.; p. 1590. 
7^ " Senate Hearings"; p. 1184. 
'2 " House Hearings"; p. 1196. 
73 "House Hearings"; p. 1898. 
7* " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1645. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 353 

Guard under the existing law is a hopeless proposition-," he 
said, " due to the fact that the provisions of that law and the 
regulations which are written under those provisions are car- 
ried out by the Regular Army, and they are carried out in 
such a way as to subject its development to a great handicap. 
I mean that at times those who are charged with carrying it 
out are unfriendly to the National Guard, and at other times, 
while they are not unfriendly, they do not understand the 
conditions which afifect the Guard." ''^ 

For doing away with this inherent opposition, two divergent 
lines of policy were suggested. On the one hand it was pro- 
posed to give up the Guard as a State force altogether and 
take over its existent units as nuclei of a national citizen 
army ; and on the other to leave to the Guard its present status 
but to remove it effectively from Regular Army interference by 
making the connection between the Guard and the Federal 
Government through other than Regular Army channels. The 
former was the policy proposed by General Pershing and Col- 
onel Palmer; the latter was the policy of the Frelinghuysen 
bill. 

Colonel Palmer, after explaining his plan for an organized 
reserve citizen army which has already been outlined, went on 
to discuss the National Guard : 

" In my opinion the National Guard should go into* that organized 
citizen army. . . . The citizen army provides the best place for the 
National Guard officers and men. They would become the charter mem- 
bers. They would then have only the single function of nationail 
defense, and it would be necessary for the States to provide, each 
State in its own way, for a State militia or constabulary or whatever 
it chose to have. ... I commanded a National Guard brigade in the 
fighting north of Verdun, and it had severe fighting. I talked to a 
great many of my officers on this question, and the opinion of most of 
them was that if we had an organized citizen army under Federal 
control that is what they would want to enter. . . . They say, ' If we 
are to go back to a vague reserve status like our present reserve corps 
or to National Guard duty, we are through.' A number of them said 
that to me. I think the point is just this: You cannot organize an 

75/felW.; p. 527. 



354 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

efficient army — it is impossible to organize an efficient army — for war 
purposes under the militia clauses of our Constitution. If you should 
speak to Marshal Joffre or to Marshal Foch or to any great military 
expert and say, '1 will allow you to organize an army; you can do 
whatever you please with it except you cannot train it, you cannot 
discipline it, and you can have no voice in the training or selection 
of its officers ' ; he would say to you, ' But those very things you except 
are the absolutely essential things in providing an efficient military force.' 
I believe the solution is to form a citizen army under the constitutional 
clause that authorizes Congress to create and support armies. The 
service in many respe'cts would be like the present National Guard 
service. The present National Guard personnel should be received 
into the new force and should be an important element in starting 
it. . . ."'0 

Mr. McKenzic: "Your plan would obliterate the National Guard 
provided for in the National Defense Act." 

Colonel Palmer : " It would." 

Mr. Crago : " Would it nat be almost the same as the Continental 
Army plan, proposed in 1916 by Mr. Garrison?" 

Colonel Palmjer : " It would be very different from that." '''' 

Essentially the same plan was advocated by General Per- 
shing. " We have a very great asset," he said, " in our trained 
units that have had experience in the war. I am referring 
to the units of the National Guard as well a.s the units of 
the so-called National Army. They have returned with tradi- 
tions, with a history, with pride of service, all of which makes 
a very valuable asset in any organization that is to be used 
as a basis for training. I think those divisions should be 
continued in existence with the officers that served with them, 
retaining them in the rank they had as far as their efficiency 
proved that they were capable of performing the duties of 
their respective ranks ; and I would hold those divisions and 
designate them as reserve divisions into which could be put 
the young men as they left the training camps. I would try 
to get together the officers and men who fonnerly composed 
these divisions ; by so doing the traditions and the esprit of 
those organizatio-ns would be kept alive for the rest of time, 

"•^ " Senate Hearings " ; p. 1 184. 
77 " House Hearings"; p. 1195. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 3.55 

and we would build up a reserve which would be available 
any time the country needed it." '^^ The State National 
Guard as such would not be a part of the Federal reserve, 
because we would have taken all of the National Guard which 
was called into service and Federalized ft." "^ 

General O'Ryan's proposals were essentially the same, " My 
proposal," he said, " is to constitute a citizen army of the 
officers a!nd men who served in the recent war, recommission- 
ing all the officers who were honorably discharged in the 
grades they heM at the time they were discharged. . . . We 
would perpetuate these organizations with their traditions and 
history and efifectiveness by training 'the 500,000 young men 
a year for a short period of time in training-camps under a 
professional training corps, and upon graduation from these 
training-camps assign them to the National Guard unit or the 
National Army unit of their home town-, there to be merged 
with those veteran soldiers and receive additional instruction 
for a remaining period of three years. . . . The National 
Guard as it fought in the war was the product of a system 
filled with handicaps. In spite of these handicaps the National 
Guard men proved to be very efficient soldiers and their divi- 
sions were efficient divisions ; but under the system I propose 
they would have all the advantages of National Gu'ard esprit 
and citizen soldier esprit, with all the traditions of the organi- 
zations descending through the years with them." ^° 

It is obvious that these proposals looked to a very radical 
and revolutionary alteration in the character and status of 
the National Guard. Although they provided for the per- 
petuation of the National Guard units as organizations, they 
in fact contemplated the wiping out of the National Guard 
as it had hitherto existed. The principle of the National 
Guard was that it was a force made up of local units, locally 
organized and locally controlled. The proposals of Colonel 
Palmer and General Pershing and Major-General O'Ryan rec- 

'^s " Senate Hearings"; p. 1590. 

"^^Ibid.: p. 165.4. 

^° " Senate Hearings"; p. 519, 



356 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ognized the value of local organization and contemplated retain- 
ing it; but they proposed the abandonment of the principle 
of local control. For this most of the National Guardsmen 
were not yet ready. Local control was admitted to lie at the 
basis of the defects of the National Guard system, but an 
attempt had been made to counteract its weaknesses by the 
policy of Federal aid embodied in the National Defense Act 
of 1916; and there was optimism on the part of the Guard 
that an extension and elaboration of that policy would yield 
all the beneficial results that were desired. There was strong 
hostility to a total abandonment of local control and the frank 
substitution for it of direct Federal authority under the army 
clause of the Constitution, As one prominent Guardsman put 
it: "An army program which attempts to bring a centralized 
military power into being is to my conservative New England 
brain one of the greatest potential dangers that the institutions 
of this country have to face, because it is upsetting the checks 
and balances against usurpation of power. Any system that 
you install ought to have the double check of being under a 
state." ^^ In the language of another prominent Guardsman : 
" The problem is to retain in the localities where the men are 
to serve enough local control to make it interesting, and to 
allay that fear of military control that is so evident when you 
talk to a man about enlisting in the army ; to meet that situa- 
tion and at the same time to meet the need of centralized 
control which is absolutely essential to military success. The 
difficulty is to find some centralized control which will be 
agreeable to the various States because each State has its own 
problems to solve to meet its own conditions with regard to 
the maintenance and training of its militia. The methods that 
apply in New York State would not work for a moment in 
Texas. I speak for the National Guard Association when I 
say that they feel that any plan looking to the raising of a 
National Army or a citizen army under the so-called army 

81 Brigadier-General Sherburne of Massachusetts, " Senate Hear- 
ings"; p. 1780. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 357 

clause of the Federal Constitution will fail in its purposes and 
will not represent the best thought of the citizens of the coun- 
try who are interested in military affairs." ^^ 

The Guardsmen's principal objection to the status of the 
Guard under the National Defense Act of iqi6 arose from 
the control which the Regular Army was, under that act, 
enabled to exercise over the Guard through the militia bureau 
of the War Department. They regarded this control as an 
obstacle to the growth and efficiency of the Guard because 
they felt that it was not exercised sympathetically or with an 
understanding of the needs and peculiar problems of the Guard. 
They accordingly proposed to take Federal control of the 
Guard out of the hands of the Regular Army altogether by 
abolishing the militia bureau, and to substitute for it a Na- 
tional Guard bureau functioning directly under the secretary 
of war and not subject to the chief of staff or any Regular 
Army officer or board. This National Guard bureau was to 
consist, not of Regular Army officers, but of National Guard 
officers designated by the President on the recommendation of 
a National Guard council. The latter body was to be a sort 
of federal congress consisting of one representative from the 
National Guard of each of the States and was to meet at 
least twice yearly. It was to be vested with power to make 
rules and regulations for the organization, discipline, and gov- 
ernment of the Guard. The National Guard bureau, on the 
other hand, was to be the administrative agency for carrying 
these into effect. The chief of the latter bureau, who was to be 
a National Guardsman, was to have supervision, under the 
direction of the secretary of war, of all National Guard troops 
throughout the United States : and it was provided that " for 
the purpose of coordinating the instruction of the National 
Guard and the Regular Army the secretary of war shall on the 
request of the chief of the National Guard bureau detail 
Regular Army officers not above the grade of colonel for duty 

82 Colonel Ransom H. Gillette of New York, "House Hearings"; 
pp. IQ24, 1923. 



358 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

in such bureau." The principles underlying these proposals 
were adopted by a convention of the National Guard Associa- 
tion which met in St, Louis in May, IQ19, and were shaped into 
a bill by a committee of National Guard officers.^^ This bill 
was by request introduced in the Senate by Senator Frelinghuy- 
sen of New Jersey, and will hereafter be referred to as the Fre- 
linghuysen bill.^* 

The effect of the proposals contained in the Frelinghuysen 
bill was to make the National Guard a virtually autonomous 
force shaping its own policy through a federal organization 
of its own independent of the Regular Army. One of the 
spokesmen of the National Guard Association explained their 
proposals as follows : " The National Guard feels, and I 
think there is a reason, that they are much more capable of 
dealing with the problems and conditions that confront them 
than any officer trained in the Regular Army could possibly 
be. That applies to the question of recruiting, the question of 
supply, and the question of training. I will cite an instance. 
The National Defense Act required that the National Guard 
units shall hold forty-eight drills per year, which is perfectly 
proper. But it has been construed that those drills must be 
held in each separate week. That means, when I go out to 
recruit one of my companies, a man says, ' What have I to 
do ? ' I tell him, ' You have to report every week for forty- 
eight weeks a year.' He says, * I cannot do it ; I go away in 
the summer for my vacation,' or, ' My business is such that I 
want to take a certain length of time for myself,' and so on. 
That is only an instance. And that condition, and conditions 
similar to it, can best be dealt with by National Guard officers 
who are familiar with conditions and not with theoretical 
propositions only. Nobody knows better than I do that the 
training and regulations promulgated for the government of 

S3 See " House Hearings " ; p. 1922. 

8* Sixty-Sixth Congress, first session, Senate Bill 3424; see "Congres- 
sional Record," p. 8412; for text see "Senate Hearings," pp. 1803 ff. 
For resolutions of the St. Louis convention of the Guard Association, 
see ibid.; p. 1836. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 359 

the Regular Army of the United States could not be improved 
upon when you are talkinis: about professional soldiers : but 
we are not professional soldiers; we do not pretend to be; all 
we can hope to do is to keep ourselves in a comparative 
state of readiness so that we can turn in and learn the tech- 
nic of soldering in a short time, and I submit that our 
record overseas proves that we can do just that. There is 
a feeling in the Guard that our success there was brought 
about in spite of the Regular Army and not with its help. 
For that reason this association in their meeting at St. Louis 
resolved that in their opinion the best interests of the citizen 
soldiery would be subserved by taking it out from the control 
of the Regular Army and establishing it as a separate force." ^^ 
Another instance which was alleged to show the failure of 
the militia bureau to appreciate the conditions facing the Na- 
tional Guard was its requirement that militia companies should 
number at least one hundred men.*'' It was maintained that 
this was a physical impossibihty for many American towns 
which were yet capable of maintaining valuable and effective 
militar}'- organizations. One Guardsman cited the example of 
his own town. " I live in a small town of less than 1200 
population. We have had a company there since 1884, and 
that company served in the Spanish War and in this war. We 
had twenty-seven officers in the army from that town at the 
time the armistice was signed, and men from that town had 
served on every front in Europe from Dalmatia to Archangel. 
When they came home we started to reorganize the company ; 
we got a company of about eighty men and they were mustered 
in. But under the requirements as laid down by the militia 
bureau that company will have to go out of existence. We 
cannot maintain 100 men in that company in that town. The 
State is going to give us a fine brick armory costing $35,000. 

85 Colonel Ransom H. Gillette, " Senate Hearings " ; pp. 1841 ff. 
" House Hearings " ; pp. 1923 fF. 

s° See General Carter, chief of militia bureau, in "House Hearings"; 
p. 1868. 



36o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

But it will be no use to expend that money if the present 
requirements of the militia bureau are enforced." ^" 

It was to meet such situations that the GuaTdsmen desired 
to have the Guard itself in control of the Federal militia 
bureau. As one of them said : " We think if we have an 
experienced National Guard officer in charge of the bureau 
when we tell him our troubles he will know what they are. 
He will know without being told that you cannot maintain in 
95 per cent, of the towns of the United States a company 
with a minimum membership of lOO men." ^^ 

The purpose of the proposed National Guard council, con- 
sisting of a representative from the Guard of each State, was 
to insure that the general policies and regulations established 
for the Guard as a whole would be framed by a body fully 
acquainted with and taking into account local needs, differences, 
and conditions. " The difficulty is to find some centralized 
control that will be agreeable to the various States, because 
each State has its own problems," said Colonel Gillette. " We 
have tried to bring al)out that result by providing this council 
so that the man from Maine, the man from Florida, and the 
man from California can get together and talk over local 
conditions to which each is subject and arrive at some line 
of action that will bring about the best results to all and 
serve to attain uniform methods of training and discipline in 
those different communities." ®^ 

The Frelinghuysen bill provided for an extremely diluted 
form of universal military training. It was to be administered 
as part of the curriculum of graded and high-schools at the 
expense of the Federal Government, under the direction of 
National Guard officers and according to a program prescibed 
by the National Guard council. During the winter this train- 
ing was to be mainly athletic and gymnastic, " to develop 

87 Major A. B. Critchfield, " House Hearings " ; p. 1868. 
88 Major Critchfield, "House Hearings"; p. 1875. 
89 " House Hearings " ; p. 1924. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 361 

physical posture and bearing, mental and physical alertness, 
self-control, discipline, initiative, and spirit of cooperation 
under leadership." Male pupils of high-schools were to be 
organized in a cadet corps, which was to receive field training 
in a camp of instruction for fifteen days during the summer 
months.^" 

It was admitted by the advocates of the bill that the military 
benefits of such training would be negligible. The argument 
advanced, however, was that for direct military training the 
public sentiment of the country was not yet ready; that it 
needed to be prepared by a growing interest in military affairs 
and that such an interest would be stimulated by the kind of 
training proposed. It was an entering wedge which had some 
chance of being adopted. Further it was likely that many 
of the school graduates whose interest had been aroused by 
the training would afterwards go into the National Guard 
and in that way add to the nation's reserve of citizen soldiers. 
" We think that those sections of the bill would be worth 
while to try, and see what would happen," said Colonel Gil- 
lette. " It might not amount to anything, but it might do 
some good. I think I am right in saying that it is hopeless 
to try to get legislation on the books giving compulsory mil- 
itary training. I believe that if we can write into the law 
something of this kind we will gradually get in the path where 
we can get universal military training and everybody will be 
perfectly satisfied with it." °^ 

The Frelinghuysen bill was submitted for criticism to Major- 
General Carter, chief of the militia bureau, who expressed 
fundamental disagreement with its provisions. " To place the 
development of the National Guard," he wrote, " under any 
other than trained officers of the Regular Army would be a 
decided step backward. Your attention is invited to the fact 
that the National Guard was under the entire control of the 

9" Sections 44 and 45 of the bill; "House Hearings"; p. 1814. 
91 " Senate Hearings " ; pp. 1847, 1844. 



362 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

States and of National Guard officers from the time of the 
Revolution until approximately 1903, a period of 127 years, 
and that during that period there w-as little in its history to 
commend it as a military asset of the National Government. 
. . . The provisions of the bill under consideration with re- 
spect to the National Guard council place forty-eight National 
Guard officers, one from each State, in such* a position as to 
menace the authority and usurp the functions of the secretary 
of war. The records of the militia bureau conclusively 
demonstrate the pernicious influence of the meddling of 
individual States in this perfecting of a Federal military 
organization. The provisions of the bill with respect to the 
National Guard council and National Guard bureau were evi- 
dently drawn up with a desire to give to the National Guard 
officers a greater voice in the control of the nation's military 
aflfairs. It is believed that the provisions of the bill would 
result in further divorcing the interests of the Regular Army 
and the National Guard and would tend to lack of cooperation, 
jealousy, and intrigue and would remove from the National 
Guard the helpful influence of those Regular Army officers 
who are now earnestly working for its proper development. 
It is believed that provision for the detail of a small number 
of National Guard officers to the general staff of the army 
would give to the National Guard the opportunity that they 
desire in formulating military policies and would tend to co- 
operation, mutual understanding, and increased efficiency in 
both services. With respect to compulsory physical training in 
schools, your attention is invited to the fact that public schools 
are entirely under State control and the Federal Government 
is without power to prescribe the curriculum, or to enforce 
a requirement for physical or other special training in these 
schools. The cost of the arrangement as outlined in the bill 
would be stupendous as compared with the military benefit 
to be derived from the training received." "- 

92 "House Hearings"; p. 1887. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 363 

5 
At the conclusion of the hearings the Senate and House 
committees adopted none of the bills before them but proceeded 
to draft their own bills. The Senate committee's bill, which 
was associated with the name of Senator Wadsworth, the 
chairman of the committee, was a very elaborate and careful 
piece of legislation, " The biggest thing that has been pro- 
posed in the line of military legislation since the beginning of 
our country," General O'Ryan called it.^^ It was drawn with 
the assistance of Colonel Palmer and in the main followed 
the policy proposed by that officer, General Wood, and General 
Pershing, rather than the lines of the Baker-March bill; but 
it was less radical and made a number of concessions to exist- 
ing institutions. In the first place it provided for the smaller- 
sized standing army of 280,000 men which Colonel Palmer and 
General Pershing had recommended. It then made provision 
for building up a citizen army to consist on the one hand of 
the National Guard reorganized as a Federal force under the 
army clause of the Constitution, and on the other hand of a 
reserve army whose charter members should be such veterans 
of the World War as cared to enlist in such a force. Universal 
military training for a period of four months was to be re- 
quired of all youths, who were to have an election as to whether 
they would take the training in their nineteenth, twentieth, or 
twenty-first year; but as a substitute for such training youths 
might at their election enlist in the National Guard for a period 
which would supply an equivalent amount of training. Also 
provision was made to allow as many youths to take their train- 
ing in the navy as the needs of the later force would accom- 
modate. Youths who had taken and completed the four 
months' training were to be enrolled in the reserve army above 
mentioned for a period of five years during which time they 
were to be required to attend at least two annual manoeuvers of 
two weeks each; but they were not to be liable for the per- 
formance of any military service except after a declaration of 
93 "New York Times," February i, 1920; Part II, p. i, column 4. 



364 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

war by Congress, -Provision was made for vocational training 
and for training for citizenship during the four months of 
mihtary instruction ; and for the reduction of the Regular Army 
to 210,000 by the end' of six years. 

There was some criticism of the Wadsworth bill from the 
more pronounced advocates of universal military training. 
" The Senate's treatment of the subject in its bill leaves much 
to be desired, training with the National Guard being per- 
mitted as an alternative to the four months' training which 
young men can elect to take," said the " New York Times " 
editorially.^ On the other hand the bill succeeded in winning 
the support of a number of diverse elements. At a meeting 
held at the National Republican Club in New York City, Gen- 
eral O'Ryan, representing an important section of National 
Guard opinion, gave it his unqualified approval, as did Major 
Tompkins Mcllwaine, chairman of the National Training 
Camps Association, one of the most active of the organizations 
which had been agitating for universal training. " This bill," 
said the latter, " contains everything for which we have con- 
tended." «= 

It was becoming apparent, however, that the sentiment of the 
country was running strongly against a policy of compulsory 
training. The press throughout the South and West was al- 
most universally hostile. " As the war recedes, there seems 
to be less and less interest in the subject," said the " Times " ; ^^ 
and at the same time there was more and more opposition. 
This expressed itself particularly on the floor of Congress. 
An outspoken member of the Plouse went so far as to say, 
" All this talk about compulsory training in time of peace is 
rot, and the majority of the people will drive any party out of 
Congress which enacts such a thing in this country," ^^ There 

9* January 12, 1920; p. 8, column 3. 

95 " New York Times," February i, 1920; Part II, p. i, column 4. 
98 " New York Times," January 12, 1920; p. 8, column 3. 
97 Mr. Quin of Mississippi, February 13, 1919, " Congressional 
Record," Sixty-F.ifth Congress, third session; p. 3287, 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 365 

was special irritation at what was felt to be the attempt to 
coat the unpalatable pill of militarism with a sugared capsule 
of talk about vocational training and education for citizenship. 
" It would be refreshing," said a member of Congress, " to 
find a man who favored this system willing to stand pat on 
the proposition as a matter of military defense, and not under- 
take to say we are doing this for the boys' health." ^^ A 
National Guard officer who appeared before the Senate com- 
mittee in the interest of the Frelinghuysen bill was asked to 
state his view of public sentiment on the subject of compulsory 
training. " The employer," he said, " and the man who ap- 
pears prominently before the public, is in favor of it, but the 
employed man is not, and the farmer is not, and they are in 
the majority." ^^ The reasoned opinion against compulsory 
training which went on other grounds than mere sentiment 
was based in the main on considerations which were 
expressed in the following letter to a member of Congress: 

1. To take a young man awa»y from the work in which he is 
engaged and put him in a camp for a j^ear or even for six months 
means that he will grow away from the business in which he was 
engaged ; that when he returns to civil life his place will be filled 
by another man and he will have to shift to find a new place, arid 
he is very much more unfitted for it than he was before he left for 
the military camp. I personally know numbers of young men who 
entered the service during the World War with the promise that their 
places would be open when they returned, but now that they are 
back they are told tliat their places are satisfactorily filled and thai 
they will have to wait for an opening. 

2. The idleness which necessarily comes to men in a military camp 
unfits them" for a business or professional life and makes them dis- 
satisfied wi^h the steady grind which they are called upon to under- 
go outside of the military camp. 

3. The immoral influences growing out of and in connection with 
the herding together of great numbers of men without the moral 
restraints of the family and the home are very strong, and lead to 
excesses and dissipation as soon as the men get outside of the camp 

88 Mr. McKenzie of Illinois, "House Hearings"; p. 1396. 
99 "Senate Hearings"; p. 1948. 



366 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

limits which are always surrounded by a gang of vultures and 
harpies, ready to prey upon and to plunder the thoughtless young 
man. 

4. I am opposed to the vast expenditure of money that will be 
required to keep up such a military program. . . . Just as surely as 
to-morrow's sun rises, a military program in this country will have 
no other results than it had in Germany. I think it wicked to have 
made the sacrifice of life and money necessary to overthrow militar- 
ism in Germany only to establish it in this country. These are the 
views of a large majority of the people whom I meet in church and 
lodge and in social circles in my daily intercourse. ^ 

The bill which was prepared by the House committee ^ 
differed from the Wadsworth bill in that it omitted altogether 
any provision for compulsory training. It fixed the size of the 
Regular Army at approximately 300,000, left the National 
Guard essentially as it was under the National Defense Act, 
and made a number of important alterations in the details of 
army organization and administration. The omission of pro- 
vision for training was the storm-center of interest. Chair- 
man Kahn, who was in favor of the training provisions of 
the Wadsworth bill, threatened to carry the fight to the floor 
of the House. Majority Leader Mondell thereupon announced 
that he was opposed to training because of the expense, that 
it would cost at least $1,000,000,000 the first year and 
$700,000,000 yearly thereafter, that the country ought not to 
assume such a burden when it was facing a deficit of nearly 
$3,000,000,000, and that if tlie Military Affairs Committee 
should determine to present a bill containing provisions for 
training, it would surely be rejected by the House. The finan- 
cial argument Senator Wadsworth sought to answer when he 
introduced his own bill in the Senate on January 28, 1920. 
He argued that its provisions would call for an exjienditure 
of only $ 609,805,000 in^ 1921 and would never involve a greater 
yearly outlay than $ 635,000,000. At this expense the country 
would be provided by 1926 with a reserve of 3,345,000 trained 

1 Printed in " Senate Hearings " ; p. 2041. 

- It was prepared by a subcommittee of which Representative An- 
thony of Kansas was chairman. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 367 

men at a total average cost of $170 a man as against the cost of 
$1800 a year required to maintain each regular soldier of a 
standing army.^ Chairman Kahn expressed his opinion that 
the economy argument was being employed by many mem- 
bers to hide their real objections to military training and that 
the " mask ought to be torn from the face of these pac- 
ifists." * 

On February 9 the Democrats of the House held a caucus 
to determine the attitude of the party on the training question. 
To this meeting the President sent an appeal in the form of 
a letter to Secretary Baker urging that the matter be not made 
a party issue but that each member should be left free to 
follow his own best judgment with regard to it. " The present 
disturbed state of the world," he wrote, " does not permit 
such sureness with regard to America's obligations as to allow 
us lightly to decide this great question upon purely military 
grounds, while the demonstrated advantages to the country 
which came from military service in the war plainly suggest 
that in the national interest, quite apart from military considera- 
tions, a moderate and carefully conducted course of military 
training may have the highest possible advantages. In our dis- 
cussion of the subject you will recall that I gave my approval 
in principle to the various very moderate training projects 
suggested by the general staff, and I would be very glad to 
have you convey to appropriate members of the House who 
will attend the caucus my strong feeling against any action by 
the caucus which will tend to impose an arbitrary party deter- 
mination upon the consideration which this subject should 
receive from the best thought of the members of the House, 
considering alike the national emergencies which may confront 
us and the great disciplinary and other advantages which 
such a system plainly promises for the young men of the 
country." ^ 

3 " New York Times," January 29, 1920; p. 15, column 3: February 
I, 1920; Part II, p. I, column 4. 
^ Ibid., February 21. 1920; p. 3, column 6. 
5 " New York Times," February 10, 1920; p. i, column 6. 



368 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

The caucus lasted for two hours and is said to lia\e been 
very " lively." Nearly all of the 189 Democratic members 
of the House were in attendance. The leaders of the opposi- 
tion to the President's advice were Representatives Kitchin, 
Dent, Field, and Flood, their principal argument being that the 
sentiment of the country was against compulsory training. 
Ex-Speaker Clark, absent in Missouri, had informed his col- 
leagues that he was opposed to the training proposals. Sup- 
porting the President were Representatives Doremus of Mich- 
igan, Olney of Massachusetts, and Caldwell of New York, 
Representative Caldwell referred to the resolution just adopted 
by the national convention of the American Legion in favor 
of training and argued that political expediency dictated a 
stand in favor of training rather than against it. At the close 
of the discussion the caucus adopted by a vote of 106 to 
17 the following resolution: 

" Resolved, that it is the sense of this caucus that no measure 
should be passed by this Congress providing for universal 
compulsory military service or training." '^ 

On February 21 it was reported in the newspapers that the 
Military' AfTairs Committee of the House by a vote of eleven 
to nine had decided to bring in a bill containing provisions 
for compulsory training." Conferences between Republican 
leaders followed and three days later it was announced that 
the training provisions would be omitted from the bill and 
made the subject of separate legislation at the next session 
of Congress.^ This decision was generally attributed to the 
unwillingness of the majority party to commit themselves on 
the question in the face of an approaching Presidential elec- 
tion. " Universal training has not been and will not be side- 
tracked," said Mr. Kahn ; " but in view of the attitude of 
House members, separate legislation is the only thing that is 

<• " New York Times," February 10; p. i, column 2. 
"^ Ibid., February 21, 1920; p. 3, column 6. 
8 Ibid., February 25 ; p. 15, column 5. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 369 

practical." The " New York Times," however, printed an 
editorial entitled " Military Training Shelved." ^ 

On February 2^ Mr. Kahn reported the bill from committee. 
It provided for a maximum Regular Army of 17,700 officers 
and 299,000 enlisted men, of whom 250,000 were to be combat 
troops. Enlistments were to be for one or three years at the 
option of the recruit. The most important features of the 
bill were those which dealt with the National Guard. Essen- 
tially the Guard was left under the provisions of the National 
Defense Act; but many of the recommendations were adopted 
which had been made by Guard officers during the hearings. 
Thus it was provided that the chief of the militia bureau should 
be a National Guard officer, that Federal aid should be ex- 
tended to Guard companies having a minimum of fifty mem- 
bers, and that the Federal pay for attendance on Guard drills 
should be increased. To prevent such a threatened destruc- 
tion of the Guard as was imminent when the Guard organi- 
zations which had been in Federal service during the war 
were mustered out, provision was made that when Guard 
troops should be called into national service their discharge 
from such service should not release them from State service. 
" Our purpose is to rehabilitate the National Guard," said 
Representative Anthony, chairman of the subcommittee which 
had drafted the bill. " Following the war, the National Guard 
units were discharged wholesale upon their release from the 
national army. It was never intended by Congress when it 
passed the National Defense Act that any power should be 
lodged in the War Department which would enable it prac- 
tically to destroy the National Guard at one blow, but the 
War Department has assumed that power, and by its arbitrary 
discharge from every obligation of State and national service 
of every unit of the National Guard which went into the army 
duing the war, it has all but destroyed the National Guard. 
In this bill we are providing liberal legislation under which we 

^ February 27 ; p. 12, column 4. 



370 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

hope to build up again the Guard to its authorized strength 
under the National Defense Act which we believe in a few 
years will give us a National Guard approximating 400,000 
men to serve not only as a second line of defense in this 
country, but as an efficient first line when called out in con- 
junction with the Regular Army as was amply demonstrated 
in the present war on the battle-fields of Europe. . . . One of 
the most essential things this bill provides is to start right in 
at the top. We provide that the chief of the militia bureau 
down at the War Department shall be a National Guard officer 
instead of a Regular Army officer, [Applause] It has been 
found that with an officer of the Regular Army at the head 
of the militia bureau, instead of the bureau being allowed to 
be free to exercise what is thought best for the National Guard, 
the bureau has been dominated by the purpose of the general 
stafif to destroy the Guard, and it has been working at cross- 
purposes all these years. We propose to correct that evil 
by appointing a National Guard officer as the head of the 
militia bureau, and I believe it will go far to accomplish that 
purpose." ^° 

The bill also provided for limiting the functions of the 
general staff in the manner described in the preceding chapter, 
and for concentrating the supply operations of the army in 
the hands of a new under-secretary of war. The chief point 
of attack on the bill during the debates in the House was the 
size of the Regular Army proposed. Three attempts were 
made to reduce the figure of 299,000 men. Mr. Dent's 
motion to substitute 185,000 was lost by a vote of seventy-five 
to twenty-five; a motion by Representative Jones of Texas 
for a reduction to 175,000 was defeated by the same vote; 
and another motion to set the figure at 150,000 was lost 
viva voce. " We are apt to get into trouble," said Mr. Kahn, 
" before we know it. We are trying to expand our foreign 
trade, and nothing stirs up trouble so much or so quickly as 

10 March 8, 1920 ; " Congressional Record," Sixty-Sixth Congress, 
first session; pp. 4025 ff. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 371 

getting the trade from another country. That frequently 
brings war, and the only salvation is to be prepared to defend 
the rights of the country at any time." On March 18 the 
House passed the bill and sent it to the Senate. 

On April 5 Senator Wadsworth called up his own bill in 
the Senate, and the contest for compulsory training passed 
into its final phase. At the end of three days advocates of 
training perceived that they were beaten and sought to save 
something from the wreck by offering a substitute proposal 
for voluntary training. This plan, which was brought forward 
by Senator Frelinghuysen, permitted the Government to offer 
four months of military training to all young men between 
eighteen and twenty-eight years of age who applied for it. 
At the end of the training the youth would be permitted, if 
he so desired, to enlist for four years in the organized 
reserves, but he would be under no obligation to do so. 
Senator Frelinghuysen estimated that if 100,000 men applied 
annually, the cost of the training would amount to only 
$28,000,000 a year. The Frelinghuysen substitute was 
adopted in place of the compulsory training provisions of 
the Wadsworth bill by a vote of forty-six to nine. Senator 
McKellar of Tennessee then moved to strike out the Freling- 
huysen amendment, thus leaving the bill without any provisions 
for training at all. This motion was lost by a vote of thirty- 
seven to nine. 

This final rejection of compulsory military training was 
regarded with much bitterness by some of its advocates. 
" Little of value," said the " New York Times " in an editor- 
ial, " is to be expected from voluntary military training. An 
army of millions could not have been raised by enlistment 
during the war. It would therefore be fatuous to maintain 
that any considerable number of young men between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-eight would present themselves for 
four months of instruction in drill and tactics during the 
summer months. . . . The pacifists, the pro-Germans, the 
radical labor men, and the Bolsheviki, and, it must be ad- 



372 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

mitted, a mercenary and calculating class that does not want to 
lose the services of the young men during even a brief period 
of military training were opposed to the system proposed in 
the Senate army bill. These pseudo-and little-Americans 
poll a vote that is worth truckling to." ^^ 

With the universal training feature of the Senate bill 
eliminated, it was felt to be unwise to provide for the gradual 
reduction of the "Regular Army to 210,000 men, as had been 
originally contemplated; and the clauses containing that pro- 
vision were accordingly struck from the bill. Senator Fre- 
linghuysen said there ought to be no reduction in the size of 
the Regular Army " when we know the forces that are work- 
ing at this time in this country." He thought that one 
division of approximately 27,500 regulars should always be 
stationed in the vicinity of Washington. On being asked the 
reason, he replied that 2000 men had captured Petrograd and 
he wanted the American capital to be protected at all times 
against any possible emergency. 

On April 20 the Senate j^assed the amended Wadsworth bill 
and the two Houses went into conference. The main matter 
of difference was as to the provisions of the two bills relating 
to the National Guard. The Senate bill organized the 
National Guard under the army clause of the Constitution, 
making it primarily a national force. Provision was made 
for the use of the Guard for State police purposes, but the 
War Department was always to have ultimate control, and 
the Guard was to have representation on the general staff of 
the army and be under its supervision. These provisions were 
violently opposed by the majority of Guardsmen on the 
ground that they would carry still further that very subordi- 
nation of the Guard to the Regular Army which in their 
opinion ought to be entirely done away with. The House 
bill on the other hand followed, as we have seen, the lines 
advocated by the Guard. It continued the policy of the 
National Defense Act and largely relieved the Guard from 
ii April 12, 1920; p. 14, column 3. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 373 

Regular Army control by providing that the militia bureau 
should be presided over by a National Guard officer. By 
way of compromise the Senate conferees offered a provision 
giving each State the option of having its Guard organized 
as a part of the Federal force or of retaining it as a purely 
State organization. This proposal when reported to the 
House was rejected by a vote of 209 to 106. The House 
also insisted on the elimination of the Senate proposal for 
voluntary military training. On both points the Senate 
conferees finally gave way, and the bill was reported out, 
passed by both Houses, and approved by the President on 
June 4, 1920.^- 



The Army Act of June ,4, 1920, is essentially the House 
UilJ;.^wjth almost nothings of ...the.,. Wadswprth ,.bill , in, it. In 
contrast with the large plans of constructive reform and the 
proposals of far-reaching changes urged upon Congress by 
military experts during the hearings, it is surprising how 
little there is in the bill as finally adopted that is novel or 
constructive. In its very form the act is a series of loose 
amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916; and it 
adds nothing in essentials to the policy of the National Defense 
Act. An outline comparison of the two statutes will show 
the contributions made by the more recent legislation. 

The Army Act of 1920, like the National Defense Act, 
provides that the army shall consist of a Regular Army, a 
reserve corps, and the National Guard while in Federal 
service. Unlike the National Defense Act, the Army Act 
contains no reference to a volunteer army as part of the army 
of the United States. 

The Army Act made provision for a Regular Army of ap- 
proximately 298,000 men, the figure to which the National De- 
fense Act had provided that the army was to be raised in incre- 

12 Sixty-Sixth Congress, Public Act No. 242 (41 Statutes at Larga 
pp. 759 fif). 



374 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

ments extended over five years ; but the Defense Act had con- 
tained a proviso that in time of peace the size of the army 
should not exceed 175,000, and this hmit was increased in the 
Army Act to 280,000. 

The term of enhstment prescribed in the act of 191 6 had 
been three years with the colors and four in an unorganized 
Regular Army reserve." The Army Act of 1920 fixed the 
enlistment period at one or three years in the option of the 
recruits ^^ and abolished the Regular Army reserve.'* These 
changes were suggested by the difficulties which had been met 
with in enlisting recruits. They mark the final passing of 
the method of building up a reserve which Secretaries Stimson 
and Garrison had viewed with so much hopefulness. It had 
not worked. The newer view was expressed by General 
March : " In raising the army necessary to fight a modern 
war, this little handful of soldiers in the reserve does not 
cut any figure one way or the other. They are no good from 
the standpoint of being a military asset. On the other hand, 
it is a distinct disadvantage in the eflfort to get men to enlist 
in the Regular Army. They will not go in for seven years' 
service, three years in the Regular Army and four years in 
the reserve. It is a distinct bar to getting enlistments." ^® 
The provision in the act of 1920 for optional enlistments of 
one year was meant to open the army to young men who had 
not yet decided whether they would like a military life and 
who were unwilling to assume a longer commitment. Reen- 
listments were required to be for three years. The provisions 
of the National Defense Act for vocational training of sol- 
diers in the Regular Army were retained as an added induce- 
ment to enlistment. 

The act of 1920 provided for the recognition as distinct 
departments of the army of a number of new services created 

12 See above, p. 47. 
1* Section 30. 
1^ Section 27. 

^« " Hearings Before House Committee on Military Affairs, January 
16, 1919"; p. 51. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 375 

by the war ; namely, the air service, the chemical warfare 
service, and the finance department. 

Finally the provisions of the new act dealing with the 
Regular Army represented a noteworthy departure in the 
manner in which the details of army organization were dealt 
with. Preceding army legislation, including the National 
Defense Act, had minutely defined the composition of each 
of the units of organization. Thus the National Defense Act 
had prescribed that each regiment of infantry should consist 
of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, three majors, and so 
on through the list of officers, and of so many battalions and 
companies. The composition of a battalion and a company 
were then defined with similar minuteness, the number of 
officers and men of each grade being rigidly prescribed, down 
to the number of cooks, mechanics, and buglers.^^ The various 
units of each arm of the service being thus strictly defined, 
the statute, by prescribing the number of such units of which 
that arm was to consist, completed a perfectly rigid structure 
of organization which left no opening to flexibility in ad- 
ministration. The result was felt as a hindrance and check 
by all who had to do with the administration of mihtary 
policy. In Colonel Palmer's language : " So long as Congress 
fixes the detailed organization of the personnel assigned to 
each military function, it will be impossible to provide a 
flexible and economical military organization properly adjust- 
able to changes in the military art. Under this system each 
branch of the service is and always will be tempted to over- 
state its proper personnel requirements. Under this system 
it is impossible to make a scientific readjustment of the 
authorized commissioned personnel to meet the requirements 
of a new policy. " ^^ During the war the difficulty had been 
overcome by the Overman Act, which gave the President 
authority to override the statutory structure of organization 
by transferring individuals and groups from one organization 

1'' See, e. g., National Defense Act. Section 17. 
18 "Senate Hearings"; p. 1 189. 



376 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

to another; and the Baker-March bill proposed to continue 
in him the same power permanently with respect to the army. 
As far as this, Congress was not willing to go; but the Army 
Act of 1920 made a great stride forward in laying down no 
statutory definition of the composition and number of the 
units into which the various branches of the army were to 
be organized. It simply provided that so many officers and 
so many men were to compose the infantry, to be organized 
into such units as the President might direct; and similarly 
with regard to the cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, and 
so on. The only statutory provision as to organization was 
thus the prescription of the total number of officers and men 
assigned to each major arm of the service.^^ 

The National Guard provisions of the act of 1920 have for 
the most part been sufficiently discussed. The term of enlist- 
ment in the Guard was altered to a period of one or three 
years at the option of the recruit to bring it into conformity 
with the new enlistment period prescribed for the Regular 
Army. Reenlistnients in the Guard were to be for one year 
each.^° The rate of Federal pay to militia officers and men 
for attendance upon drills and manoeuvers was considerably 
increased.^^ 

The act of 1920 altered materially the character of the en- 
listed reserve corps established by the National Defense Act. 
Under the act of 1916 the reserve corps had been limited in 
its scope to securing skilled men as reserves for the technical 
services, e. g., the engineers, ordnance, signal, and medical 
corps. The provisions of the act of 1920 aim to create a 
volunteer reserve force of troops. Enlistments are to be for 
a period of three years, all persons are to be eligible who 
are eligible to enlist in the Regular Army, and the reservists 
may be formed into practical units and organizations similar 
to those of the Regular Army. Members of the reserve corps 

1^ For some puzzling language on this section of the act by Sec- 
retary Baker, see " Congressional Record," December 14, 1920, at p. 345. 

20 Section 27. 

21 Sections 47 and 48. 



THE ARMY ACT OF 1920 ^-j-j 

may be placed on active duty as individuals or organizations, 
but except in time of a national emergency expressly declared 
by Congress no reservist is to be kept on active duty for more 
than fifteen days in any calendar year without his own consent. 
In conception the enlisted reserve corps is thus the beginning 
on paper of a sort of national militia, but it may be doubted 
whether enough men will enlist in the corps to render it an 
efifective military asset. 

The Army Act perpetuates the officers' reserve corps and 
the reserve officers' training corps established by the National 
Defense Act. The provisions of the later statute are more 
general in scope than those of the Defense Act and matters 
of detail are left more largely to Presidential regulation. 
Officers in the National Guard are permitted to hold reserve 
commissions while retaining their commissions in the Guard. 
Provision is made for the holding of annual instruction- 
camps for the training of reserve officers. 



CHAPTER X 

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 

THE Army Act of 1920 represents a return in essentials 
to the National Defense Act of 1916, a statute passed 
almost a year before the outbreak of the war. The question 
naturally suggests itself whether the act rests on the unten- 
able assumption that the war taught no lessons of army policy 
worth following. It must be remembered also that even at 
the time of its passage the National Defense Act was far from 
satisfying those elements of public opinion which most clearly 
foresaw th,e danger of approaching war. When the war 
came the act had to be supplemented by new legislation built 
from the bottom up, and in the face of the emergency legal 
and administrative machinery had to be freshly created to 
make it possible for the country to put forth an adequate 
military effort. The wisdom, after such an experience, of 
deliberately returning to the old statute challenges serious 
inquiry. The automatic desire of a country after the con- 
clusion of a war to relapse comfortably into a pre-war " nor- 
malcy " serves as a sufficient explanation for the Army Act ; 
but such a result is never really desirable because it is never 
actually possible. A return to pre-war policy requires always 
an express justification in post-war conditions; and the weight 
of presumption is against it. If the Army Act of 1920 
represents sound military policy it must justify itself against 
a prima facie case to the contrary. 

/The case against the Army Act is strengthened by the fact 
that the policy it embodies has been condemned by the pre- 
ponderance of the expert military opinion of the country. 
This is clear from the summary given in the last chapter of 

378 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 379 

the testimony of the experts who were examined by the Con- 
gressional committees. The act follows the lines of tradi- 
tional policy from which it was their almost unanimous 
opinion that the country ought to depart/ It perpetuates 
arrangements which have been criticized for a long time as 
defective, and the defectiveness of which was alleged to have 
been proved by the universally recognized necessity of aban- 
doning them at once on the outbreak of the war. If the fact 
that a system of military arrangements has to be altered in 
the face of war is proof of the defectiveness of the system, 
then it must be admitted that the military policy of the new 
Army Act has already been discredited by experience. But in 
the opinion of the writer there is no need to reach so pes- 
simistic a conclusion. 

In approaching a question of military policy, we start from 
the axiom that the goal is preparedness. Now no one would 
contend that preparedness means that a nation in time of peace 
should maintain the complete military force which it is neces- 
sary to launch into action on the outbreak of a war; the 
expense and effort of such a policy are prohibitive for any 
modern industrial nation. It means rather that a nation 
should always keep itself in the best possible position to launch 
the requisite force when the necessity arises with the minimum 
of expense and effort, and the maximum of speed and effi- 
ciency. But if preparedness thus does not require that the 
peace-time military establishment of a country should coincide 
at all points with its war-time military establishment, it might 
be argued by analogy that neither does preparedness neces- 
sarily demand that the peace-time military institutions of a 
country should exactly coincide with the type of military 
institutions called for in war. Just as new troops will in- 
evitably have to be raised on the outbreak of a war, so it is 
to be expected that new legislation will have to be passed to 
meet the needs of each particular emergency as it arises; 
for it is of the essence of an emergency to present novel 
conditions and call for novel measures to meet them. The 



38o THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

fact, therefore, that on our entrance into the World War the 
National Defense Act had to be supplemented and in large 
measure superseded by the Selective Service Act and later 
statutes is not of itself conclusive evidence that the Defense 
Act was not the best available instrument of preparedness 
before the war; and the fact that the Selective Service Act 
itself was required as an instrument of our organization for 
the war with Germany is no indication one way or the other 
as to whether that particular act would be similarly required 
in a future war. It was a sound instinct which caused Con- 
gress to reject the proposal of the Baker-March bill that the 
mere declaration of war by Congress should automatically 
bring back into effect the provisions of the Selective Service 
Act. In the event of war with Mexico, for instance, it would 
probably not be necessary or desirable. It seems better to 
leave to Congress, acting in the face of a particular emergency, 
the question of whether or not that particular emergency de- 
mands the revival of the act. 

Whether or not the National Defense Act or its successor, 
the Army Act, supplies an adequate measure of preparedness 
depends really on the question of whether it paves the way 
for the most efifective mobilization of military force required 
to meet isuch emergencies in general as are likely to face us; 
whether, that is, it lays down the most favorable foundation 
on the basis of which those special measures can be adopted 
which, from time to time, will be called for by the peculiar 
character of each particular war emergency of the future. 
The question raised is a concrete problem of foresight. For 
what most of all needs to be recognized is that a policy of 
preparedness is not one which can be formulated abstractly 
or in vacuo; it must be fitted to a realization of the limitations 
imposed by the concrete situation and needs of this country 
as they exist to-day. The question is not one which can be 
properly solved by general references to the practices of other 
countries, or by theoretical speculations as to the possibilities 
of war in general ; it needs to be approached with a direct eye 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 381 

to the present conditions of American national life and to 
an estimate in detail of the special military emergencies in 
which there is reasonable likelihood that the United States 
may become involved. The problem of preparedness has been 
too much dealt with in the air; what is needed is a more 
definite forecasting of the nature and variety of the possible 
military emergencies of the future and a closer attention to 
the materials, social, political, and economic, which limit the 
lines of a workable American policy of preparedness. 

Regard for this distinction between ways of approaching 
the problem brings out the need for taking a sufficiently modest 
view of what is capable of accomplishment. The task is not 
that of securing the abstractly most perfect system of military 
efficiency, leaving other considerations out of account; it is 
rather to estimate what degree of military efficiency social and 
economic factors in this country leave room for and to devise 
how that efficiency can be best organized to meet the special 
situations which are likely to call for it. Those who would 
frame a military policy for the United States are not pre- 
sented with a clean slate on which to write a plan Olympian- 
wise; they must deal with given conditions and attempt to 
utilize them to more or less given ends. Of course the 
greatest difficulty is with this matter of ends — with the 
estimate, that is, of what military emergencies are likely to 
arise. Here individual views will differ as widely as indi- 
vidual opinions of what is the proper line for our foreign 
policy to take. Some may contemplate, for instance, the not 
distant possibility of a war which would lead to an extensive 
invasion by American troops of territory in this hemisphere. 
If that view is accepted, our army policy ought to be vastly 
more ambitious than what would be required if all that is 
contemplated is the prospective defense of our own territory 
against an invading army shipped from abroad. If only the 
latter contingency is regarded as probable, it would be wasteful 
to make preparations which would be no more than prudent 
for the former. A third possibility which should be weighed 



382 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

is that of having to send an American expeditionary force 
abroad, for instance on service in China. But in any event, 
concrete possibihties of this kind should be faced, and their 
comparative likehhood balanced before any intelHgent con- 
sideration of the preparedness problem becomes possible. 
Otherwise discussion is a mere bandying of words in the dark. 
To talk generally of an increase or decrease of the armies of 
other nations, or of the likelihood of war being enhanced by 
our ownership of the Philippines or the Canal Zone is not 
directly helpful unless carried forward to a consideration of 
the more concrete possibilities above suggested. 

But while individual views as to the nature of possible 
emergencies will thus vary as widely as views of what con- 
stitutes a proper foreign policy, the views which need to be 
given serious consideration are happily confined within the 
narrower limits set by the more or less discoverable temper 
of American public opinion; and this lends something tangible 
to what would otherwise be an insoluble problem made up 
wholly of variables. For it may be laid down as fairly cer- 
tain that American foreign policy will not consistently follow 
the views of aggressive imperialists on the one hand any more 
than it will realize the dreams of advanced pacifists on the 
other. It will be a human policy determined by the temper of 
the American people and thus ultimately by current conditions 
of American national life. This means that for one thing it 
will not for a long while at least be a consistent or continuous 
policy in any one direction. The conditions of American life 
are changing too rapidly and the scope and direction of 
American interests are fluctuating too widely for that. While 
these forces of change are at work, America cannot be counted 
on as ready or willing to adhere to any settled line of foreign 
policy, least of all to a policy of deliberate and well-planned 
political expansion. Our situation is very different from 
that of the Continental nations of Europe prior to the war. 
Those countries had a foreign policy imposed on them by a 
long tradition and by a conventionally accepted conception of 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 383 

national needs. The possibility of extensive land-warfare 
formed a recognized incident of that policy and was accepted 
as a natural consequence of expanding population coupled 
with natiojnalist ambitions. There was general acceptance of 
premises which made large armies evidently necessary. Under 
such circumstances public opinion in France, Austria, Russia, 
and Germany submitted sympathetically to a policy of ex- 
pensive preparedness. That is not our situation. The United 
States may in the future become involved in a great war on 
land in America or some other continent, but, if so, it will be 
due to a hasty decision taken at the moment and to no settled 
plan or steady expectation of such a war as inevitable. 
American public opinion does not, as did European opinion 
in the early twentieth century, contemplate such a war as a 
foregone conclusion./ And therefore American opinion is not 
ready to make the grinding sacrifices of money and effort re- 
quired for adequate preparation for such a war. Hence the 
elements of American opinion which do look forward to such 
a war as unavoidable are prone to condemn the majority 
opinion of the country as recklessly blind to our military 
needs. The accusation is justified if a great land war is within 
the range of not distant probabilities. But there is no reason 
to suppose that it is ; and, if not, the cost of preparing for it, 
together with the influence that preparation would certainly 
have in bringing on a war of that kind, goes far to justify the 
normal American belief that preparation on a great scale would 
not be worth what it would cost. But, justified or unjustified, 
it seems that the weight of American opinion does not con- 
template or desire a foreign policy which would make elaborate 
preparedness a necessity; and therefore public opinion is un- 
willing to submit to the burdens which such preparedness 
would entail^^ 

It is in any case to this public opinion that any preparedness 
policy which has a chance of being adopted must conform. 
Even if it is regarded as wrong-headed and blind opinion, 
it defines inexorably the limits of a workable army policy for 



384 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

the present. Advocates of preparedness have for a number of 
years followed the course of attempting to effect a change in 
public opinion, but with what little success is shown by the Con- 
gressional debates on army reorganization which were reviewed 
in the last chapter. It would therefore seem clear that the 
army policy of the next few years must be shaped in harmony 
with opinion as it now exists rather than in antagonism to it; 
looking to the slow processes of time to effect such an altera- 
tion in opinion as will alone ever make possible a more frankly 
vigorous military program. The present problem is to devise 
the most vigorous and effective program compatible with the 
current state of American opinion and the current conditions 
of American life. 

It is in the light of these essential limitations rather than 
from the point of view of abstract military efficiency that the 
National Defense Act of 19 16 and the Army Act of 1920 
should be criticized. /In both instances the legislation repre- 
sents a deliberate choice by Congress of one type of army policy 
in ^clean-cut preference to a definitely different type. The 
whole subject has been gone over and considered in recent 
years with greater thoroughness than almost any other sub- 
ject of legislation; and, broadly, three general types of policy 
have been proposed and considered exhaustively. The first 
placed main dependence on a great standing army; the other 
two were essentially plans for the military training of citizens 
to constitute a dependable reserve. ^X. was between these last 
two plans that the real choice lay; for there was hardly any 
chance of acceptance of a large standing army by American 
opinion. The broad difference between the two opposing 
plans for citizen training was that the plan adopted in 1916 
and reaffirmed in 1920 followed very much more closely the 
lines of traditional policy than did the plans rejected. In 19 16 
the issue was between the National Defense Act and Secretary 
Garrison's Continental Army plan; in 1920 between the Army 
Act as adopted and the Wadsworth bill. Secretary Garri- 
son's plan stood closer to the traditional policy than did Sen- 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 385 

ator Wadsworth's in that it contained no compulsory elements 
and contemplated training through membership in a militia 
body rather than a specialized period of exclusive military 
training in a camp; but the two plans resembled each other, 
and stood opposed to the plan adopted, in that the training 
they proposed was to be under the authority of the central 
government rather than under the local control of the States. 
Two issues were thus presented: (i) whether the training 
should take the form of a definite period of exclusive military 
service or of membership in a militia organization with occa- 
sional periods of practice; (2) if the training was to take the 
latter form, whether the organization should be under national 
or State control. These are the critical issues of current army 
policy, which require to be considered in any attempt to 
assess the value and wisdom of the recent legislation, 

I,. The great objection made by many military experts to 
training through membership in a militia organization with oc- 
casional drills and practice-camps is that it is not sufficiently in- 
tensive, that the total length of time likely to be devoted to train- 
ing of this sort in the occasional intervals of civilian occupation 
does not add up to a period adequate to produce a seasoned 
soldier. To be sure, the war has effected a remarkable change 
in military opinions as to the length of time necessary to train a 
good soldier ; during the hearings of 1919 there was no insist- 
ence on Washington's dictum that the training of a soldier must 
be a matter not of months but of years. Nevertheless it seems 
clear that military opinion is fully justified in holding that a 
period of exclusive training undergone in youth is much more 
likely to produce a soldierly attitude and habit of mind and 
body than militia practice participated in during the spare in- 
tervals of civilian life, even where such practice is greater in 
total amount than has in the past been customary in our State 
militia organizations. If the youth of America could be sub- 
jected to a period of army life and discipline before entering on 
their civilian life-work there can be little doubt that the military 
spirit and efficiency of the nation would for good or ill be 



386 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

greatly increased. Of course such efificiency would be pur- 
chased at an enormous expense, not merely in the actual out- 
lay of money necessary for maintaining the apparatus of train- 
ing, but also in the loss of effective man-power drawn off during 
the trcfining period from productive industrial effort. The 
question is simply one of balance and comparison between the 
value of the military result and the heaviness of the economic 
and social sacrifice. From the sheer militarv point of view, 
the superior quality of the military result would clearly prevail ; 
and the issue thus turns on the intrinsic validity of the demand 
for sheer military efficiency. This is a question of the temper 
of the American people. The heaviness of the burden involved 
is patent at first sight, and it will not be accepted unless the 
compensating advantages are even more strikingly patent to 
public opinion. No one has ever supposed that general mil- 
itary training would at present be submitted to in America 
unless under governmental compulsion. The question is 
whether public opinion will support a policy of compulsion to 
secure what would admittedly not be effected voluntarily. 
It is here that the history of the United States and the difference 
between the present position of the American people and the 
situation of European peoples before the war becomes of ac- 
count. A people will not willingly submit to the obvious 
economic waste of elaborate military training unless the dom- 
inant public opinion among them is habituated to regard large- 
scale warfare as an ever-present possibility and normal inci- 
dent of national life. That was the case in Europe during the 
fifty years preceding the war. Rival nations crowding each 
other geographically and laboring under the fear of impending 
overpopulation accepted whole-heartedly a tradition of na- 
tional antagonisms. Military efficiency was a consideration 
understood and appreciated not merely by professional military 
men but by the controlling elements of the population at large. 
Our own past and present result in a radically different popular 
conviction. Military matters are not normally present to the 
minds of the average American citizen because there has not 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 387 

been and is not now any close connection between them and 
the economic and political activities which a!bsorb the effort and 
attention of our people individually. Economic and political 
expansion has gone forward unthreatened by the rivalries of 
neighboring states. Our people have inherited a traditional 
Enghsh dislike for an idle soldiery because they have been able 
to achieve their ends without military assistance or interference. 
Wars have with us been always more or less accidents, and 
while accident-insurance is profitable it does not pay to 
expend for it any large share of total annual income. Bodies of 
troops are not a familiar feature in American communities and 
the uniform has been invested with no such glamour as to make 
American youths in general willing to postpone for a period of 
military training the chance to begin to earn a living. The 
normal diversities of human nature always produce a number of 
men to whom things military make a strong appeal, and these 
are willing to devote much of their energy and most of their 
spare time to the drills and manoeuvers of militia organizations 
and training-camps. But at present military interest is not 
strong enough among our people as a whole to convince them of 
the need for universal participation in such activities ; nor can 
the conviction be expected to come until our frontiers crowd so 
dangerously against expanding neighbors that the tremor of 
imminent war becomes a steady feeling through the protected 
heart of the nation. Until then a general policy of military 
training can hardly be looked for on the part of a government 
actuated by popular opinion. In short it seems clear that 
whatever may be our national needs from a far-sighted and 
military point of view, legislation subjecting American youths 
to a period of exclusive military training would not be wise 
because it would be out of joint with the present outlook and 
beliefs of the American people. It would not fit into our 
policy because it would not be in harmony with the current of 
our present activities and interests. 

2. The judgment of Congress seems therefore sound in 
having resorted to voluntary m^ilitia organizations rather 



388 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

than to compulsory military training to develop whatever 
reserve is needed of civilian soldiers. The question remains as 
to the wisdom of following American tradition in leaving the 
militia organizations under State control rather than following 
Secretary Garrison's plan of establishing a new national militia. 
The plan of a national militia embodies very obvious advantages 
at just the points where experience has shown the old system of 
State militia to be most defective. It would make possible a 
centralized control for tactical purposes and a valuable un- 
iformity of training, and would obviate the great handicap so 
often experienced of having certain State Governments grossly 
neglect their militia duties. On the other hand the motor im- 
pulse under a centralized militia system would have to come 
from the center — from the Government at Washington. In 
that respect it differs from the local system which has always 
prevailed. The American militia system rests upon the interest, 
energy, and effort of those individuals scattered through many 
local communities who are spontaneously attracted to military 
affairs. It rests upon the enthusiasm of individuals who devote 
their time to it for love of the thing and not because they are 
paid to do so. Much of this spontaneous interest would be lost 
if control were taken away from the local organizations and 
vested in the central government. The present system has most 
of the faults, and they are serious faults, which inhere in any 
system of amateur management; but in determining whether it 
should be given up it is desirable to estimate what faults would 
be present in the system to be put in its place. It is here that 
the rub of the question comes. The issue is between amateur 
management on one hand and bureaucratic management on the 
other. For the army administration of our central government 
is necessarily of a character which must be called bureaucratic. 
The explanation lies in that same absence of interest in military 
matters on the part of the people at large which has already 
been referred to. Hence in times of peace there is little life 
or energy in our central government's army policy. It 
functions automatically and outside the limelight of publij 



ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN ARMY POLICY 389 

scrutiny, because it is outside the field of sympathetic public 
interest. The result is naturally an accumulation of the dead 
wood of routine which so challenged the surprise of American 
business men when they came suddenly into contact with it 
on the outbreak of the war. Their reactions are illustrated by 
some of the criticisms considered above in the chapter on the 
general staff. Now the establishment of a national militia 
would certainly result in substituting bureaucratic adminis- 
tration of tiiis character for the less technical but more 
spontaneously interested control which prevails under our 
present system of State administration. At present our militia 
organizations live by the natural life of the communities which 
support them. They attract those elements in the population 
who are spontaneously drawn to military affairs by the prospect 
of having a more or less free hand in the management of local 
organizations. Many of these elements would be alienated if 
they were required to fit themselves into a large mechanical 
system controlled from a distant center. This loss would be 
more than compensated if there were certainty that central con- 
trol contained elements of life and vigor which would flow out 
and vivify the local constituents. But there is no such certainty. 
Rather there is danger that central control would spread a 
petrifying poison of routine fatal to real energy and 
antagonistic to the very elements on which the strength and 
effectiveness of our militia system must depend. It is here that 
the philosophy behind the Selective Service Act affords perti- 
nent suggestions. That act was founded on the belief that in 
a country as large and heterogeneous as the United States 
centralization ought to be reduced to a minimum in order to 
take advantage of the elements of interest and force which are 
pocketed in myriad differing localities each having its own 
diversified conditions and problems. In such a country vigor 
must be drawn mainly from below, not supplied from above. 
In a few matters where a dominant and more or less uniform 
popular interest runs throughout the whole nation effective 
ce;atralized action is possible and desirable; but it seems clear 



I 



390 THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY 

that army policy has not yet emerged into the circle of such 
matters. Meanwhile life and interest are more important than 
system or routine ; for they must be present before system and 
routine can produce results that are valuable. 

By way of summary it may be admitted that in the 
external respects of technical military efficiency a national 
militia would be no doubt far superior to our present system of 
State-controlled militia; but that on the other hand the system 
of State control is essential to foster that popular interest in 
military matters upon which army policy must rest in a country 
governed by public opinion and without which a mechanical 
efficiency in the details of organization and administration would 
be only an empty shell. In its fundamental philosophy the 
Army Act of 1920 like the National Defense Act of 1916 "p- 
resents a sound conformity with the conditions, good or ba s 
we view them, of American life. The hope of our milita y 
preparedness for the future lies in strengthening voluntary 
military organizations like the State militia bodies, summer 
training-camps, and military schools which embody the interest 
and enthusiasm of those individuals and groups iri the popula- 
tion who are naturally interested in military affairs. The pos- 
sibility of improvement lies in devising better ways for the 
technical military skill embodied in the Regular Army to touch 
and influence these voluntary organizations; and it is along 
that line that there is the greatest need for legislation to develop 
in the future. 



INDEX 



Administration of army, see 
Army 

Administration of Selective Serv- 
ice Act, 171 ct scq. 

Advisory boards, 187 ct scq. 

Age limit of the draft in 1917, 

Alcoholic liquors, prohibition of, 
208 ct scq.; discussion of pro- 
hibition of, in Congress, 209-14 

Aldrich, Judge, on Emerson and 
Lowell cases, 55 

Alienage and selection for serv- 
ice, 130-6; case of Angelus vs. 
Sullivan, 180-2 

Aliens, number registered under 
Selective Service Act, 131-2 

American army policy, essentials 
of, 378 et scq. 

American Bar Association, 189, 
190 

American Expeditionary Force, 
first units to reach France, 116 

American Library Association, 
220, 221, 226 

American Medical Association, 

^^'^ 
American Social Hygiene Asso- 
ciation, 219 
Ames. Winthrop, 230, 234 
Anderson, Congressman, on the 

draft, 70-1 
Angelus vs. Sullivan, 132. 180-2 
Arkansas National Guard, equip- 
ment lost, 2\ 
Army, report on reorganization 
of, 5-6; strength of, 10 et .<;cq.; 
Continental Army Plan, 39 et 
scq.; provision for under Na- 
tional Defense Act, 44. ct scq.; 
provision for, under Selective 

391 



Service Act, 75 ct seq.; the Na- 
tional, 85; order of August 7, 
1918, distinction between Regu- 
lar Army, National Guard, and 
National Army. 85, 127; com- 
parative parts played in France 
by these organizations, 125-7; 
social organization of, 202 et 
scq.; Bureaus of, 247; divided 
control of, 248; non-existence 
of general staff, 249-52; Span- 
ish War demonstrated need of 
a general staff, 252 ; tenure of 
officers of staff departments, 253- 
4; wastefulness of independent 
bureaus, 254-5 ; defects of cen- 
tral mechanism in early years 
of twentieth century. 255 ; legis- 
lation to correct defects, 255 ct 
scq.; general staff created, 255; 
Detached Service Act, 257; du- 
ties and composition of general 
staff, 257-9; position of com- 
manding general abolished, place 
being filled by chief of staff, 259; 
development of general staff, 
259 et seq.; authority of chief 
of staff, 263 ; friction between 
general staff and bureaus. 264- 
S; interpretation of National 
Defense Act as relating to gen- 
eral staff, 265-71 ; increase of 
general staff, 271-3; reorganiza- 
tion of general staff, 273; func- 
tions of divisions of the staff, 
273-9; formation and develop- 
ment of the purchase, storage, 
and traffic division. 279-307; re- 
organization after the war, 307 
et scq.; Army Act of 1920. 316 
et seq.; administration bill for 



392 



INDEX 



temporary provision for, after 
the war, 323 et scq.; bill per- 
mitting resumption of enlist- 
ments under National Defense 
Act, passed, 327; Kahn-Cham- 
berlain Bill, 328, 344-6; Baker- 
March Bill, 330 ct seq.; ques- 
tion of universal military train- 
ing 334 ^' ^''9-; place of Na- 
tional Guard in schemes of 
army reorganization, 351-62; 
the Wadsworth Bill, 363 ct 
seq.; the House Bill, 366 et 
seq.; Army Act of 1920 finally 
passed, 272) ', its provisions, 373-7 
Army Act of 1920, discussions of 
different proposals for, 307 et 
scq.; as finally adopted, 316 et 
seq., Z73-7 
Army Appropriation Act of 1912. 

12 
Army Medical museum, 219 
Army War College, transferred 

to General Staff, 260 
Army welfare work, achievements 

of, 239 et seq. 
"Arnold-Foster, Life of," cited, 

12 
Arver vs. United States, 82-3 
Athletics in the army, 221-3 
Atlantic fleet sent to Vera Cruz, 8 
Australia, system of national 
military training, 35 

Bacon, Robert, cited, 59 

Baker, Secretary, on National De- 
fense Act, 48 ; on universal li- 
ability to service, 58 ; letter to 
Congressman Dent, 62-3 ; before 
Military Affairs Committee of 
the House on Selective Service 
Act, 65-70, 81 ; on militarism 
72; on social organization of 
army, 202, 203 ; on protection 
of army from vice, 207 ; criti- 
cizes provisions of Army Act 
of 1920, 318-20; on larger army, 
324; on Baker-March Bill, 333-4 



Baker-March Bill, 330 ct seq. 

Bell, Gen. J. Franklin, and con- 
scientious objectors, 141-2 

Benson, Captain Percy, on uni- 
versal service in England, 63-5 

Borchard, F. M., "Diplomatic Pro- 
tection of Citizens Abroad." 130 

"Brain of an Army, The," Spen- 
ser Wilkinson, 250 

Bureau of Aircraft Production, 
296 

Bureaus, army, sec Army 

Burr, Major-General, on purchase 
of army supplies, 282-3, 296 

Camps, established, 101-5 ; cost 
of, 106; organization of divi- 
sions at, 106-8; embarkation, 
108; officers' training, 119-25; 
work of Commission on Train- 
ing Camp Activities in, 214 ct 
seq. 

Carter, E. C, general secretary of 
the Y. M. C. A. in France, 234 

Carter, Major-General, on Na- 
tional Guard, 361-2 

"Case for Compulsory Military 
Service, The," C. G. Coulton, 
36. 

Catchings, Mr., Chairman of War 
Committee of Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States, 
285-6 

Chamberlain, Senator George D., 
cited on military Affairs, 7; in- 
troduces army bills, 31-2; on 
Selective Service Act. 59-61 ; an- 
alytical and explanatory state- 
ment on army reorganization 
bill, 310 

Chemical Warfare Service, 296 

Chief of Staff, replaces comman- 
der in chief of army, 259; 
power of. 263-4 

Classification under the question- 
naire 149-50 

Commission on Training Camp 
Activities, 214 et scq.; policy of. 



INDEX 



393 



215; difficulties of, 215 et seq.; 
and vice-prevention, 217 et seq.; 
athletics, 221-2; mass-singing, 
223-4; entertainmenits, 224-6; 
educational opportunities, 226- 
7 ; cooperating organizations, 
227 et seq. 

"Conscientious Objector, The," 
W. G. Kellogg, 138, 139, 141, 14s 

Conscientious objectors, action on, 
in selection for service, 136-45 

"Congressional Record," cited, 32, 
79, 209 et passim, 283, 286, 325, 
328. 329, 339 

Continental Army Plan, 39 et seq. 

Coulton, C. G., "The Case for 
Compulsory Military Service," 
36 

Courts, supervision over draft 
boards, 180-5 

Cox vs. Wood, 82-4 

Crowder, General, Judge-Ad- 
vocate, opinion on status of 
militia and volunteers, 53-4; on 
the draft, 80; opinion on power 
of General Staff, 266 et seq. 

Crowell, Secretary of War, on 
army reorganization after the 
war, 314-16 

Dawes, Charles G., 306 
Deferments, occupational, 154 et 

seq. 
Department of Justice, Bulletin of, 

133 
Dependency and selection for serv- 
ice, 150-4 
Detached Service Act 257 
Dicey, Professor, cited, 194 
Dick Act, 16, 17, 21; defects in, 

48-9 
Dickinson, Secretary, report, 19 
"Digest of International Law," 

John Bassett Moore, 130 
"Diplomatic Protection of Citizens 

Abroad," F. M. Borchard, 130 
Discharges under Selective Serv- 
ice Act, 123-4 



District boards, see Draft boards. 

Division of Militia Affairs, 18 

Draft, see Selective Service Act 

Draft Act, 5 

Draft boards, action on aliens, 133 
et seq.; constitution of, 172 et 
seq.; duties of district, 174; 
duties of local, 174 et seq.; juris- 
diction of district, 177-8; ad- 
ministrative bodies, not courts, 
178-9; supervision over, by the 
courts, 180-5 ; duties well ad- 
ministered, 185-7; assisted by 
advisory boards, 188 et seq.; 
coordinated into one system, 
194 et seq.; functions of pro- 
vost-marshal general's office, 
197-9; charactedstic features 
of the draft administration, 
199-201 

Drunkenness in the army, 204 

Easby-Smith, Col. J. D., on the 
conscientious objector, 140, 144 

Educational opportunities in 
camps, 226-7 

"Educational Plans for the Army 
Abroad," Anson Phelps Stokes, 
236 

^lite, Swiss citizen army proper, 
36 

Ellis, Challen B., "Study of Con- 
scription in the United King- 
dom," 167 

Embarkation camps, 108 

Embarkations, figures on, 117 

Emergencv Fleet Corporation and 
special deferments, 158-9 

Emerson and Lowell cases, 54-5 

Entertainments in camps, 224-6 

Erskine, Prof. John, 236 

Ex parte Beck, 132 

Ex parte Lamachia, 132 

Federal Reporter, cited, 55 
"Forging the Sword ; the Story of 

Camp Devens," William J. 

Robinson, 168, 225 



394 



INDEX 



Fosdick, Raymond B., on army 
conditions, 204, 205, 206; at 
head of Commission on Train- 
ing Camp Activities, 214; his 
work and reports, 215 et seq. 

Fourteenth Amendment as bearing 
on constitutionality on Selective 
Service Act, 82 

Friends' Reconstruction Unit, 143 

"Frontiers of Freedom," 202, 204, 
207 

Fry, George T., article on "Molly 
coddling the Army," 244-6 

Funston, General Frederick, goes 
to Vera Cruz, 8 

Furlough Act, 160 

Gardner, Congressman, of Mas- 
sachusetts, 29-30 

Garrison, Secretary, 7, 22; report 
of, 13-14; army bills introduced 
at instance of, 31; on military 
policy, 37; report of Nov. 15, 
1915, 39-43 ; resigns from office, 
44 

General Munitions Board, 284, 290 

General Staff, non-existence of, 
249-252 ; Spanish War demon- 
strates need of, 252; created, 
255 ; duties and composition of, 
257-9; development of, 259 et 
seq.; friction between, and bu- 
reaus, 264-5 '' interpretation of 
National Defense Act as relat- 
ing to, 265-71 ; increase of, 271- 
3 ; reorganization of, 273 ; func- 
tions of divisions of, 273-9; for- 
mation and development of the 
purchase, storage, and traffic di- 
vision, 279-307; provisions for, 
under Army Act of 1920, 307 
et seq. 

Gettysburg, Pa., camp at, for mil- 
itary instruction in 1913. 6 

Goethals, General, part in putting 
Baker-March Bill in shape, 307 
et seq., 330 



Great Britain, expenditure on 
families of men in service, 64 

Hale, William Bayard, special mis- 
sion of, to Mexico, 7 

Harding, Senator, advocates 
amendments to Selective Serv- 
ice Act, 72 

Hatch. Col. E. E., on military 
policy, 38-9 

Hibben. President, of Princeton, 
on military training, 34 

Hines, Gen. Frank, testimony of, 
before Senate subcommittee. 
300, 302, 303 

"History of the War Department," 
L. D. Ingersoll, 253, 264 

Huerta, 6 

Huidekoper, F. L., "Military 
Unpreparedness of the United 
States," II, 14, 21, 24, 28, 254, 
260 

Industrial advisory boards, 191-4 
Infantry Association, 7 
"Infantry Journal," cited, II 
Ingersoll, L. D. "History of the 
War Department," 253, 264 

Jewish Board for Welfare Work, 

220 
"Journal of the American Medical 

Association, 205 
"Journal of the Military Service 

Institute," cited, 24 

Kahn, Otto H., 306 

Kahn-Chamberlain Bill, 328, 344-6 

Kellogg, W. G., "The Conscien- 
tious Objector," 138, 139, 141, 
145 

Knights of Columbus, 220, 228 

Landsturm, Swiss, 36 
Landwehr, Swiss, 36 
"Laws, Regulations, Orders, and 
Memoranda Relating to the 



INDEX 



395 



General Staff Corps," 259, 260, 

261 
Lee, Mr. Joseph, 225 
Legal advisory boards, 188-91 
"Legislative History of the Gen- 
eral Staff of the United States, 

A," 247 
"Life of H. O. Arnold-Foster," 

cited, 12 
Lind, John, special mission of, to 

Mexico, 7 
"Literary Digest," 205 
Local boards, 5ft' Draft boards 
Lodge, Senator, on proposed 

Roosevelt volunteer division for 

France, 74 
Lord, General, testimony of, 304, 

306 

McKellar amendment to Selective 
Service Act, rejected, 74 

Man-power, survey of mobilization 
of, under Selective Service Act, 
III et seq. 

March, General testimony of, no; 
on bureau system in the army, 
280-2 ; part in putting Baker- 
March Bill in shape, 307 et scq., 
330; on Baker-March bill, 331- 
3; on universal military train- 
ing, 336-8, 342-3 

Marine Corps, enlistments in, 90 

Mass-singing in the army, 223-4 

Medical advisory boards, 188 

Menken, S. Stanwood, president of 
National Sectirity League, 31 

Mexico, troubled relations with, 
6 et seq. 

Military Affairs Committee of the 
House, hearings before on Se- 
lective Service Act, 65-70, 81 

Military Intelligence division of 
the General Staff, 276-9 

"Military Unpreparedness of the 
United States," Htiidekoper, it, 
14, 21, 24, 28, 254. 260 

Militia, State, 15 et seq. 

Militia Pay Bill, 21-2 



Miner, Miss Maud, 215 

Mobilization, under Selective Serv- 
ice Act, 98-100; survey of, iii 
et scq. 

Monterey, Cal., camp at for mili- 
tary instruction in 1913, 6 

Moore, John Bassett, "Digest of 
Liternational Law," 130 

Mott, John R., 228 

Napore z's. Rowe, 132 

"Nassau Literary Magazine/' cited, 

34 

National Army, 85 ; comparative 
part played in France by, 125-7 

National Civil Liberties Bureau, 
pamphlet on conscientious ob- 
jectors, 141 

National Defense Act, 44 et seq. 

National Guard, 15 et seq.; con- 
vention of, 21 ; provision for 
under National Defense Act, 
48-53 ; called into Federa'l serv- 
ice on Mexican border in 19 16, 
54; strength of April i, 1917, 
57 ; provision for under Selec- 
tive Service Act, 75 ; drafted 
into Federal service, 87; growth 
of, 87-8; comparative part 
played in France by, 125-7; 
place of, in schemes for army 
reorganization after the war, 
351-62; provision for, under 
Army Act of 1920, 376 

National Militia Board, 18 

National Security League, 8, 30- 
I ; endorses Continental Army 
Plan, 43 

Navy, enlistments in, 90 

"New York Times," cited, 7, 11, 
14, 21, 31, 33, 36, 39, 55. 56, 57, 
61. 62, 63, 71 72, 74, 75, 234, 323, 
328, 329, 363, 364, 369 

Norton C. D., 306 

Occupational deferments, 154 et 

seq. 
Officers' Reserve Corps, 45-7 ; pro- 



396 



INDEX 



vision for, under Army Act of 

1920, 377 
Officers' training camps, Ii9;i25 
Oglethorpe, Fort, summer training 

camp at, 46 
O'Ryan, General, on universal 

military training, 349-50; on 

National Guard, 352-3, 355 
Overman Act, 292-3 

Palmer, Colonel, on universal 
military training, 335-6, 339. 
344-6, 348, 349; on National 
Guard, 352, 353. 354 

Pershing, General, and Y. M. C. 
A. work, 234; rank of general 
of the army revived for, 319; 
thinks general staff should not 
exercise administrative func- 
tions, 321 ; on universal military 
training, 344; on National Guard 

352, 354-5 

Physical examination in selection 
for service, 167-70 

Plattsburg, N. Y., summer train- 
ing camp at, 46 

Playground and Recreation Asso- 
ciation of America, 225, 227 

Polish Legion, 135 

Pollitzer, Dr. Sigmund, 205 

Provost-Marshal General, report 
of, 78, 80, 82, 88, 89, 91. 92, 93. 
94, 96, 97, 98, 99. 100, 109, 115. 
125, 131, 135, 136, 143, 146, 148. 
149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 
158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 
165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 174. 
175-7, 186, 187, 188, 190-2, 193, 
195. 197, 198 

Purchase, Storage, and Traffic 
division of General Staff, for- 
mation and development of, 279- 
307 

Questionnaire, the, 147 ct seq.: 
classification under, 149-50 

Quotas, apportionment of, under 
Selective Service Act, 94-6 



Rainbow Division, 103 

Registration, under Selective Serv- 
ice Act, 92-4; numbers enrolled 
under, 92 ct seq.; method of de- 
termining order of liability, 96- 
7; selection for service, 98; ad- 
ditional, ordered, 109; extension 
of ages of, III 

Regular Army, enlistments in, 7; 
strength of, 10 et seq.; increase 
of, advocated, 31 et seq.; pro- 
vision for under National De- 
fense Act, 44-48; strength of 
April I, 1917, 57; provision for 
under Selective Service Act, 75; 
growth of, 86-7; comparative 
part played in France by, 125-7; 
provisions for, under Army Act 
of 1920, 273-^ 

Reserve Corps, enlisted, provision 
for under National Defense 
Act, 53-4; supplies new army 
with technically trained men, 
85-6; provisions for, under 
Army Act of 1920, 376-7 

Rhodes, Captain, Gold Medal 
Prize Essay, 259 

Robinson, William J., "Forging 
the Sword; the Story of Camp 
Devens," 168, 225 

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 
signs Dick Act, 16; opposes 
Continental Army Plan, 43; 
plan to lead a division to 
France, 73-4 

Root, Elihu, Secretary of War, 
16; opposes Continental Army 
Plan, 43-4; Annual Reports of, 
248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255: 
view of position of General 
Staff, 262-3 

Sargent, Elizabeth Shipley, on Y. 

M. C. A. work in France, 232, 

238 
Sayre, Francis B., on Y. M. C. 

A. work in France, 230-3 



INDEX 



397 



Scott, General Hugh, on the 
General Staff, 271 

Secretary of War, powers under 
Army Act of 1920, 318 et seq. 

Selection for service, 128 ct seq.; 
alienage and, 130-6; draft 
boards, 133; conscientious ob- 
jectors, 136-45 ; questionnaires, 
147-50; dependency, 150-4; oc- 
cupational deferments, 154 et 
seq.; "work or fight" order, 161 
et seq.; physical examinations, 
167-70 

Selective Draft Cases, cited, 83 

Selective Service Act, the, 57 et 
seq.; Senator Chamberlain on, 
57-61 ; hearings before Military 
Affairs Committee of the 
House, 65-70, 81 ; age limit, 
71-2; fear that it might commit 
the country to a permanent pol- 
icy, 72 ; accepted by Senate 
Committee on Military Affairs, 
72; amended by House com- 
mittee, 72-2, ; debate in House, 
73-4; finally passed, 74; provi- 
sions of, 75 ct seq.; amended 
on August 31, 1918, 82; con- 
stitutionality of, 82-4; numbers 
drafted under, 92; registration 
under, 92-4; apportionment of 
quotas, 94-6 ; order of liability, 
96-8; selection for sen'ice, 98; 
mobilization, 98-100; camps 
established, 101-5 ; organization 
of divisions, 106-8; additional 
registration, 109; extension of 
ages of registration, 11 1 ; sur- 
vey of mobilization of man 
power under, 11 1 et seq.; dis- 
charges under, 123-4; reasons 
for study of working of, 128- 
30; administration of, 171 ct 
seq. 

"Selective Service Regulations," 
162, 188, 189, 194, 196 

Senate Committee on Military Af- 
fairs, investigation of conduct 



of the war, 284 ct seq. 

"Seventh New York Regiment 
Gazette," cited, 56 

Sibert, Major-General, on inter- 
bureau requisition 294 

"Social Hygiene," 205, 206 

Social organization of army, 202 
et seq. 

Sothern, E. H., 230, 234 

Spanish War, volunteer troops in, 
22 et seq.; American army at 
tiem of, 50; demonstrated need 
of General Staff, 252-3 

"Spirit of Selective Service, The," 
199 

"Statement Concerning tlie Treat- 
ment of Conscientious Object- 
ors in the Army," 140, 142, 144 

Statutes at Large, cited, 9, 12, 16, 
17, 23, 25, 44, 45, 74, 136, 137, 
143, 149, 247, 256, 258, 323, 327 

Stimson, Secretary, report of, 12- 

13 

Stokes Dr. Anson Phelps, 230, 
234; cited, 234-6, 237 

Supplies, army, confusion regard- 
ing at beginning of European 
war and development of sys- 
tem of purchase and transport, 
279 et seq. 

Supreme Court, on constitution- 
ality of the Selective Service 
Act, 82-4 

Swiss system of national mili- 
tary training, 35-6 

Taft, William H., Secretary of 

War, 17 
"Tampico incident," the, 8 
Taney, Chief Justice, on powers 

of the Federal Government to 

impose duties on State officers, 

80 
Tannenbaum, Frank, article on 

"Life in an, Army Training 

Camp, 2, 240 et seq. 
Terry, Fort, summer training 

camp at, 46 



398 



INDEX 



Thomas, Senator, speech on army 
increase, 32 

United States ex rcl. Roman vs. 
Ranch, 178 

United States Reports, 217 

Univers:il military training, pro- 
vision for, in Baker-March bill, 
330; discussion of, 334-Si. 364- 
6; final rejection of, 371 

Unpreparedness for war, cam- 
paign to arouse public senti- 
ment on, 29 et seq. 

Venereal disease in the army, 205 
et seq., 215-7 

Vera Cruz, battle-ship squadron 
sent to, in 1913, 7; Atlantic fleet 
sent to, 8 

Vice-prevention in training camps, 
activities of Commission on 
Training Camps, 217 et seq. 

Voluntary enlistment under Selec- 
tive Service Act, 86-8; sus- 
pended, 89; disadvantages of. 
91-2 

Volunteer Act of 1898, 23-4 

Volunteer Army Bill of 19 14, 8, 

25 

Volunteer troops, 22 et seq.; pro- 
vision for, under National De- 
fense Act, 54 

Wadsworth Bill, 363 et seq. 

Wadsworth, Fort, summer train- 
ing camp at, 46 

Wadsworth, Senator, speech on 
conduct of the war, 285-6 

War Camp Community Service, 
225-6 

War College, report on reorgan- 
ization of army, 5-6, 11, 20; 
"Statement of Military Policy, 

191S," 38 
War Department, "Annual Re- 
ports," cited, 5, 6, 9, 11. 12, 13, 
IS, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 37, 38, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 



53, 56, 57, 75. 86, 87, 88, 89, 93. 
94, loi, 103, 104, 105, 108, 116, 
118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127, 219, 
22s, 253, 254, 256, 257, 260, 261, 
266, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 275, 
276, 277, 279, 280. 289, 291, 292, 
293, 294, 295, 296, 299, 301, 303, 
305, 307. 335 

War Industries Board. 284, .389, 
290, 291, 292 

War Plans division of General 
Staff. 273-6 

"Washington, Works of," cited, 
27 

Wickersham, Attorney-General, 
opinion on Dick Act, 18 

Wilkinson, Spenser, "The Brain 
of an Army,'" 250 

Wilson, President Woodrow, asks 
authority from Congress to act 
against Mexico, 8; message to 
Congress in December, 1914, 
33 ; recommends declaration of 
war against Germany, 57; ad- 
vocates universal liability to 
service, 57 ; letter to Congress- 
man Helvering, 61-2; on per- 
manent military policy, 72 

Witherspoon, General, recom- 
mends increase of Regular 
Army, 32 

Wood, Major-General Leonard, 
cited, 5, 6, 14, 36, 256-7; and 
summer training camps, 46; on 
general staff and administrativ^e 
functions, 321 ; elected provost 
of University of Pennsylvania, 
337; on universal military train- 
ing, 343-4, 347-8 

"Work or fight" order, 161 et seq. 

Young ATen's Christian Associa- 
tion, 220, 228 ; account of its 
work, 229-39; criticism of, 237- 
9 ; immense service of, 239 

Young Women's Christian Asso- 
ciation, 219, 221 



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